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in return for it whatever he happens to want for. his living, or money even; in exchange for which he will be able to procure them,1 and to have on the instant all things in plenty. [6.] Provided, said I, persons existing happen to be in want of his residence,2 more than of the wisdom of that person; since, if they were such as to value more the wisdom of the man,3 and what results from it, he would have 4 much more to dispose of, if he happened to be in want of any thing, and wished to dispose both of it and the works resulting from it. Surely 5 of the residence6 the use happens to be much and necessary; and great is the difference to a person in the case of things relating to life, as regards his living7 in a dwelling of this kind, or in a small and mean tenement; but of wisdom the use costs little,8 and slight9 is the difference for a person to be wise 10 or untaught in questions of the greatest moment. "And oh! that men should despise the one,11 and not be buyers of it! but that of cypress for their residence, and Pentelican12 marble, many should be in want, and willing to purchase! Now would not a person, if he were a clever pilot, or a skilful physician, and able to practise well and creditably his art,13 or any other of such kind of arts,13 be of greater value
1 In lieu of ravra I should prefer roiavra, " such things—"
2 Here again we must read oiaiav for oiniav,
'Since the name of Nestor, who is here alluded to, has not been mentioned recently, I suspect that in avBpiZvov lies hid yeptivwv iinrorov— with reference to the ycprjvwg iirnora. Niorwp in Homer.
4 I have adopted av l\oi from Fischer, who correctly saw that Guy had dropt out after fiaWov—
5 In lieu of fi, which I cannot understand, I have translated, as if the interrogative if were written originally.
'Here again one would prefer ovaiav to outlay—
'Instead of oUclv, which is without regimen, the syntax and sense require Oikovvti, as I have translated.
* Such seems to be here the meaning of iXiyov a£ta, which elsewhere signify " of little value."
s Instead of autxpa, one would have expected ou auiicpa—
10 To support the syntax, we must suppose that Hart has dropt out before i;—
"—" The Greek is ij Tovtov fiiv Karafpoviiv— I have translated, as if it were 'H To roi piv Karajipovtiv— where Tou uiv, referring to To «o0oj. tlvoi, is opposed to rije *« mmeapiTTov ■ while on the syntax in To "araippoviiv, it will be sufficient to quote To Ala vouiZeiv, in Aristoph. Nf*. 817.
11 Pentele was a mountain in Attica famous for its marble.
"_i3 The words between the numerals seem strangely introduced here.
than 1 any one whatever1 of those 2 of the greatest possessions according to substance ?1 and would not he, who is able to deliberate well both for himself and another, how he might do the best, be able to dispose (of his skill),3 if he wished to do so?
[7.] (On this) Eryxias, taking up the discourse, and 'looking with his eyes under,4 as if he had been injuriously treated,5 observed—And would you, Socrates, if one must speak the truth of you, assert that you are wealthier than Callias,6 the son of Hipponicus? And yet you would acknowledge that you are not less taught (than he is) on matters of the greatest moment, but wiser rather; and still you are not on this account the wealthier. For perhaps you imagine, Eryxias, said I, that these arguments, which we are now discussing, are a sport, since the facts are not really so; but that they are like pebbles in the pebble-game, which if a person cleverly7 brings forward,8 he will be able to cause the opposite players to be beaten,9 so as not to have what they can bring forward against those movements. Perhaps then you imagine, that matters are thus without any reference to the rich; and that there are certain arguments in no respects either true or
and so thought Clericus and Horreus. Fischer defends them by quoting the translation of Pirckheimer, "aut alius quispiam simili arte prasditus," who evidently wished to read rj Tiq a\Xoc rwv ToiovTorp6iru)v Tc^vitt/c S>v— in lieu of y Tiv Ctwjjv ruiv ToiovTOTponwv rexvuiv—
1—1 This is the proper English translation of ovdtvoc Otov Ouk in Greek, literally " no one not—"
3— 2 Although this may perhaps be understood, yet I should prefer KexXrifievmv to KTij/idriDv, in English, "of those called the greatest as regards their means—"
3 I have added " of his skill," to complete the sense.
4— 4 In lieu of vwofiXtyac I should prefer the Homeric vvoSpa /SXei/zac, where the Schol. explains imodpa by deivov, opyiKov.
5 How Eryxias could fancy he had been injuriously treated, I cannot understand. Hence I suspect the author wrote Scucvojitvog, not ddncoL1fiivog. See my note on Soph. Philoct. 377.
* On the wealth of Callias see Schol. on Aristoph. Sarp., 431, and Hemsterhuis on Lucian Timon, f 24.
'Instead of tpkpoiro, which could not be thus used in the middle voice, as shown by the subsequent avriipepaai, the author wrote, I suspect, 0Epoi eS, as I have translated.
8 The description here given of the pebble-game, applies equally well to chess, draughts, and backgammon.
'In lieu of r/Traadai, which seems somewhat too much here, I should prefer lordtrBai, "to be at a stand-still—"
false, by detailing which, a person may get the better of his opponents, how that the wisest are likewise the wealthiest, 1 and by saying these of such a kind of falsehood of persons saying true.1 And perhaps there is nothing wonderful in this; just as if two persons should be speaking about letters, one asserting that sigma (o-) begins the word Socrates, but the other alpha (a), the argument of the party, who says that alpha (a) begins, should be superior to his, who says that sigma (e) does.
[8.] And, looking round to the parties present, Eryxias observed, smiling at the same time, and blushing, 2 as if he had not been present3 during what had been said before, I did not imagine, Socrates, that there was any need of arguments of that kind, by which a person would be able to persuade not one of those, who are present,3 nor be benefited by them. For who is there with any intellect, who would be persuaded that the richest are the wisest? 4 but would rather be informed with greater delight, if it is necessary4 to talk about being wealthy, from whence it is honourable to be wealthy, and from whence disgraceful, and what it is to be wealthy, whether a good or an evil. Be it so, said I. Henceforth then we will be on our guard; and you do right in admonishing me. But why do not you yourself, since you have introduced the subject, endeavour to state whether it seems to you to be a good or an evil to be wealthy? especially since the previous arguments do not appear to have been spoken with reference to this point.
[9.] To myself then for the present5 it seems that to be
'—1 Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. The author wrote, what might be got at, I think, by a bold conjecture.
1—* Why Eryxias should blush, in consequence of his being supposed to have been not present at the former part of the discourse, I cannot understand. I could have understood, had the author written, what I suspect he did write, iooirtp arropHv Iv role inwpoaStv \t\eyfUvoiQ, "as if having been in a difficulty during the preceding conversation—" for that would have been a fair ground for blushing. And similarly one would prefer diropoOvrwv for irapovriiiv—just afterwards (3). The error has arisen from § 12.
4—4 I have translated, as if the Greek were originally, iwaiot, tl Su— Hfiiov— not as at present, lirtiSt) Suv— which I cannot understand. On the loss or confusion of litaUiv, see my note on Legg. ix. p. 127, n. s, while on ijitwc, or i/Jiov, or ijSioTa, united to verbs of hearing or understanding, see Ast's "Lexicon Platonicum," in 'Hleio;.
5 In lieu of roivvv, the sense requires ri. vvv, as I have translated.
wealthy is a good. But while he was still desirous to state something, Critias suddenly interrupted him1 (by saying)— Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good to be wealthy? Yes, I do, by Zeus. For I should be mad (if I did not); and I think there is not a single person, who would not say so too. And yet, said the other,2 I think too that there is not a single person, whom I could not cause3 to say with myself that to some men it is an evil to be wealthy. If then it were a good, it would not have appeared to some to be an evil. Hereupon I said to them that—If ye happened to be at variance about this point, which of you two is speaking with the greater truth about horsemanship, how a person would ride the best, and had I myself happened to be skilled in horsemanship, I would have endeavoured to cause you to cease from your differences in opinion; for I should have been ashamed had I not, if present, prevented, as far as I could, your being at variance; or if you had been at variance upon any other matter whatever, and were about to separate not at all, unless you agreed upon 4 this, rather as enemies instead of being friends. But now,4 since you happen to be at variance upon an affair of this kind, of which there must needs be the use through the whole of life, and a great difference, whether we are to attend to it, as being beneficial or not; and this too as being a part not of trifling questions, but of those that are thought to be the greatest by the Greeks, since fathers recommend this as the first point to their children, as soon as they arrive at the age for reflecting upon 5what they ought;5 and6 they seem
1 On this sense of viro xpoiitiv see Aristoph. Ach. 38.
3 Boeckh would read 6 iraipoQ, " his friend," for he says that 6 irtpoq is scarcely found thus used elsewhere in Plato or his imitators.
s The sense and syntax evidently require Troi^aim, the Attic aor. I, optat., or TTOiTjaaQy in lieu of iroiijaai, which is without regimen.
*—* The Greek is Tovti paWov—vvv Si— But first, there is nothing to which Tovti can be referred; and secondly, pakkov could not be thus repeated after the preceding paXkov; and lastly, the propositions, laid down after vvv Si, want their proper conclusion. I have therefore little doubt but that the author wrote, ti jiri ofio^oyolre, txfpw avrl 0i'Xwv aTraWayrjvat' vvv Si Tovt tn paWov oirtvSuv Sti, lirttSij— for airtiiStiv SiZ might easily have been lost through iiruSrj—
5—5 In Tov Qpovtiv, where r)St] is perfectly unintelligible, evidently lie hid Tov, & Sti, Qooveiv—
• I have translated as if xai, not Ml, were written here originally. The two words are constantly confounded. See Markland on Eurip. Iph. A. 173.
to consider from whence they shall become wealthy; 1 so that should you possess anything you are worth something, but if not, nothing.1 [10.] If then this object is made so violently a serious pursuit, and you, who agree on other matters, differ upon this one of such great moment, and still in addition you are at variance on the question of wealth, not whether it is of a 2 black colour or white,2 nor whether of a light weight or heavy, but whether it is an evil or a good, so as even to be arrayed to the extreme of enmity, should you be at variance about things evil and good, and this too, although you are friends as much as possible, and relations, I will not, as far as rests with myself, neglect you, while at variance with each other; but, if I were able myself, I would tell you how the case stands, and cause you to cease from your difference (in opinion). But now, since I happen to be not able, and each of. you thinks himself able to cause the other to agree with him, I am prepared to take a part (in the discussion), as far as I can, in order that it may be agreed upon by you how the matter stands. Do you then, Critias, said I, endeavour to cause us to agree with you, as you have undertaken to do.
[11.] I would, said he, as I have begun, gladly ask Eryxias here, whether there seem to him to be men unjust and just. By Zeus, said he, and very much so. Well then, to act unjustly seems it to you to be an evil or a good? To me at least an evil. Would a man, who commits adultery with his neighbours'wives by means of money, seem to you to act unjustly? and this too when the state and the laws forbid it. To me at least he would seem to act unjustly. Consequently, said he, if the unjust man happens to be wealthy, and 3both able and willing to expend money,3 he would go astray; but if it were not his fortune to be rich, he would not have the means of expending, nor would he be able to accomplish what he wished, so that he would not even go astray. Hence it would be a greater benefit to the party to be not wealthy,
1—1 Fischer quotes opportunely Horace Sat. i. 1, 62, "Nil satis est, iiKjuit; quia tanti, quantum habeas, sis."
—* Here is an allusion to the dark colour of iron, the coin of Sparta, and the white colour of silver, the coin of Athens.
*—3 I have translated, as if the author had originally written, what is required by the sense, Svvqrbg Kai (3ov\6ijsvoq dvaKwaai i, adiKo$ dvfywTof, not as at present, Svvarbg dvak&aai 6 Clsikoq rt dv9pwrro£ Kai 6 favkopevot, which I cannot understand.