sit, licet is eius iuri subiectus non sit, qualis est colonus et inquilinus: per eos quoque, apud quos deposuerit quis aut quibus commodaverit, ipse possidere videtur: et hoc est, quod dicitur retinere possessionem posse aliquem per quemlibet, qui eius nomine sit in possessione. quin etiam animo quoque retineri possessionem placet, id est ut, quamvis neque ipse sit in possessione neque eius nomine alius, tamen si non relinquendae possessionis animo, sed postea reversurus inde discesserit, retinere possessionem videtur. adipisci vero possessionem per quos aliquis potest, secundo libro exposuimus. nec ulla dubitatio est, quin animo solo possessionem adipisci nemo potest. Reciperandae possessionis causa solet interdici, 6 si quis ex possessione fundi vel aedium vi deiectus fuerit: nam ei proponitur interdictum unde vi, per quod is qui deiecit cogitur ei restituere possessionem, licet is ab eo qui vi deiecit vi vel clam vel precario possidebat. sed ex sacris constitutionibus, ut supra diximus, si quis rem per vim occupaverit, si quidem in bonis eius est, dominio eius privatur, si aliena, post eius restitutionem etiam aestimationem rei dare vim. passo compellitur. qui autem aliquem de possessione per vim deiecerit, tenetur lege Iulia de vi privata aut de vi publica : sed de vi privata, si sine armis vim fecerit, sin autem cum armis cum de possessione expulerit, de vi publica. armorum autem appellatione non solum scuta et gladios et galeas

III supr. The following texts will help to elucidate the present pas

sage:

Dig. 41. 2. 9 'generaliter quisquis omnino nostro nomine sit in possessione, veluti procurator, hospes, amicus, nos possidere videmur,' ib. 10. I ‘aliud est .... possidere, longe aliud in possessione esse,' ib. 25. I 'nec inter colonum et servum nostrum, per quem possessionem retinemus, quicquam interest,' Gaius iv. 153 'quinetiam plerique putant, animo quoque retineri possessionem, quod nostrorum verbi gratia aestivorum et hibernorum saltuum animo solo, quia voluerimus, ex quo discessimus, reverti, retinere possessionem videamur,' Paul. sent. rec. 5. 2. 1 '(possessionem) retinere nudo animo possumus, sicut in saltibus hibernis aestivisque contingit,' Dig. 41. 2. 3. 1 'apiscimur possessionem corpore et animo, neque per se animo, aut per se corpore' ib. 8.

For the difference between colonus and inquilinus see p. 424 supr. The reference for acquisition of possession through others is to Bk. ii. 9. 4 supr.

§ 6. Under the older law there were two interdicts for recovering

7 significari intellegimus, sed et fustes et lapides. Tertia divisio interdictorum haec est, quod aut simplicia sunt aut duplicia. simplicia sunt, veluti in quibus alter actor, alter reus est : qualia sunt omnia restitutoria aut exhibitoria: namque actor est, qui desiderat aut exhiberi aut restitui, reus is, a quo desideratur, ut restituat aut exhibeat. prohibitoriorum autem interdictorum alia simplicia sunt, alia duplicia. simplicia sunt, veluti cum prohibet praetor in loco sacro vel in flumine publico ripave eius aliquid fieri (nam actor est, qui desiderat, ne quid fiat, reus, qui aliquid facere conatur): duplicia sunt veluti uti possidetis interdictum et utrubi. ideo autem duplicia vocantur, quia par utriusque litigatoris in his condicio est nec quisquam praecipue reus vel actor intellegitur, sed unusquisque tam rei quam actoris partem sustinet.

possession of land or buildings from which a person had been violently ejected (ad duas dissimiles res duo disiuncta interdicta sunt, Cic. pro Caec. 32); one, the ordinary interdict unde vi, applying where there had been no use of weapons (vis quotidiana); the other, interdictum de vi armata, where there had.

In the first case the ejector could plead the exceptio vitiosae possessionis, i. e. the grantee of the interdict was successful only if he could show that he had not himself obtained possession vi, clam, or precario from the other (lex Thoria 7, Cic. pro Tullio 44-5, Gaius iv. 154). In the second the mode in which his possession had originated was immaterial, Gaius iv. 155. This difference, however, as appears from the text, had disappeared in Justinian's time, possibly in consequence of Valentinian's enactment (Cod. 8. 4. 7) here referred to, for which see on Tit. 2. I supr. Originally too only the first of these interdicts had been subject to prescription in a year, Cic. ad Fam. 15, 16, but under Justinian this distinction too had ceased to exist, and there was only one interdict de or unde vi, which could be brought after a year had elapsed from the ejectment only so far as the ejector had been thereby enriched, Dig. 43. 16. 1. pr. and 39. Justinian allowed unde vi to be brought even where land had been entered upon in the possessor's absence, Cod. 8. 4. II.

The limitation of this interdict to res immobiles (Paul. sent. rec. 5. 6. 5, Dig. 43. 16. 1. 6) seems to hold also under Justinian. The action under the constitution of Valentinian (which applied also to moveables) would be one of the actions which lay upon theft in addition to the actio furti, Tit. 1. 19 and notes supr. For the lex Iulia de vi see Tit. 18. 8 and notes inf.

§ 7. For the sense in which uti possidetis and utrubi were 'double' in the formulary period see note p. 590 supr. Under Justinian they are

De ordine et veteri exitu interdictorum supervacuum est 3 hodie dicere: nam quotiens extra ordinem ius dicitur, qualia sunt hodie omnia iudicia, non est necesse reddi interdictum, sed perinde iudicatur sine interdictis, atque si utilis actio ex causa interdicti reddita fuisset.

XVI.

DE POENA TEMERE LITIGANTIUM.

Nunc admonendi sumus magnam curam egisse eos, qui iura sustinebant, ne facile homines ad litigandum procederent: quod et nobis studio est. idque eo maxime fieri potest, quod temeritas tam agentium quam eorum cum quibus ageretur modo pecuniaria poena, modo iurisiurandi religione, modo metu infamiae coercetur. Ecce enim iusiurandum omnibus 1 qui conveniuntur ex nostra constitutione defertur: nam reus non aliter suis allegationibus utitur, nisi prius iuraverit, quod putans se bona instantia uti ad contradicendum pervenit. at adversus infitiantes ex quibusdam causis dupli vel tripli actio constituitur, veluti si damni iniuriae aut legatorum locis venerabilibus relictorum nomine agitur. statim autem ab initio pluris quam simpli est actio veluti furti manifesti quadrupli, nec manifesti dupli: nam ex his causis et aliis quibusdam, sive quis neget sive fateatur, pluris quam simpli est actio. item actoris quoque calumnia coercetur: nam etiam actor pro calumnia iurare cogitur ex nostra constitutione. utriusque etiam partis advocati iusiurandum subeunt, quod alia nostra constitutione comprehensum est. haec autem omnia pro

double, as is clear from the text, because there is no difference, as in ordinary actions and simple interdicts, between the respective rôle of plaintiff and defendant; the burden of proof lies upon the two parties equally, and whichever proves that he has not obtained possession vi, clam, or precario from the other will win, and the other be condemned; 'par causa omnium videtur' Dig. 5. 1. 13, ‘hi, quibus competit (interdictum) et actores et rei sunt' ib. 43. 17. 3. 1, 'quaeritur, quis actor intellegitur' Dig. 5. I. 13, uterque actor est' ib. 44. 7. 37. I.

§ 8. For interdict procedure in the earlier period and under Justinian see the first note upon this Title.

Tit. XVI. 1. In the time of Gaius the defendant could be compelled to

veteris calumniae actione introducta sunt, quae in desuetudinem abiit, quia in partem decimam litis actorem multabat, quod nusquam factum esse invenimus: sed pro his introductum est et praefatum iusiurandum et ut improbus litigator etiam

swear 'non calumniae causa se ad inficias ire' only where he was not restrained from vexatiously defending the action by some other recognised motive, such as the penal sponsio in condictio certi and the actio de constituta pecunia, the duplication of damages in some actions on denial of liability, or the penal nature of the action itself, Gaius iv. 172. By Cod. 2. 59. 2 Justinian required the oath from all defendants and their advocates.

By a defendant's 'allegationes' are to be understood the evidence and arguments in support of his contradictio, Cod. 3. I. 14. I. The oath was taken on the Bible, 'sacrosanctae scripturae' Cod. loc. cit. The primary juristic signification of 'instantia' seems to be 'keenness,' 'energy' ('diligenti studio instantiaque complere opera' Cod. 8. 12. 22, 'stricta instantia falsum arguere paratus' Cod. 9. 22. 24), whence it comes to mean, as here, a contention ('believing that his contention in defence is honest'). For the actions in which it was said 'adversus inficiantes lis crescit in duplum' see on Bk. iii. 27. 7 supr.: cf. Tit. 6. 19 and 26 supr. The actions to which Justinian alludes, in which 'adversus inficiantem lis crescit in triplum,' are unknown; those on furtum conceptum and oblatum (p. 501 supr.) were in triplum 'sive quis neget sive fateatur,' and the triple penalty in Tit. 6. 24 supr. did not apparently result from a denial of liability.

In the earlier procedure vexatious litigation in plaintiffs had been restrained in four ways: 'actoris quoque calumnia coercetur modo calumniae iudicio, modo contrario, modo iureiurando, modo restipulatione' Gaius iv. 174. In actions where there was a sponsio poenalis, the defendant could require that the plaintiff should promise him by restipulatio an equivalent sum in the event of his being unable to prove his case. In other suits, if absolved, he could often bring against him an action in the nature of 'malicious prosecution.' By the actio calumniae he might recover (in interdicts ) of the value in dispute in the previous action, but had to prove that the other had sued him knowing that he had no ground of action, 'calumnia enim in adfectu est' Gaius iv. 178. By the contrarium iudicium, which was an alternative to this, but which lay only against an unsuccessful plaintiff in certain specific actions (e. g. iniuriae, Gaius iv. 177), and in which it was unnecessary to prove malice, he could similarly recover damages equivalent to some fraction of the amount claimed in the previous action. Neither of these iudicia, however, lay, nor could the defendant claim a penal restipulatio, if he had compelled the plaintiff to take the iusiurandum calumniae, i. e. to swear that to the best of his belief he had a good ground of action, Gaius iv. 181.

Under Justinian the penal sponsio and restipulatio in the two actions

damnum et impensas litis inferre adversario suo cogatur. Ex 2 quibusdam iudiciis damnati ignominiosi fiunt, veluti furti, vi bonorum raptorum, iniuriarum, de dolo, item tutelae, mandati, depositi, directis non contrariis actionibus, item pro socio, quae ab utraque parte directa est et ob id quilibet ex sociis eo iudicio damnatus ignominia notatur. sed furti quidem aut vi bonorum raptorum aut iniuriarum aut de dolo non solum damnati notantur ignominia, sed etiam pacti, et recte; plurimum enim interest, utrum ex delicto aliquis an ex contractu debitor sit.

specified had disappeared, and, as is remarked in the text, the iudicia calumniae and contrarium were also obsolete, though they had still been in use in the age of Diocletian, Cod. Hermog. 5. 3. In lieu of these precautions the plaintiff had in all cases 'pro calumnia iurare' Cod. 2. 59. 2, and the unsuccessful litigant had to pay his adversary's costs: 'sive autem alterutra parte absente sive utraque praesente lis fuerit decisa, omnes iudices, qui sub imperio nostro constituti sunt, sciant in expensarum causa victum victori esse condemnandum, quantum pro solitis expensis litium iuraverit, non ignorantes quod si hoc praetermiserint, ipsi de proprio huiusmodi poenae subiacebunt et reddere eam parti laesae coartabuntur' Cod. 3. 1. 13. 6.

§ 2. For the meaning of existimatio see on Bk. i. 16. 5 supr. As a matter of fact, minutio existimationis, which was generically denoted by the term ignominia, most usually resulted from a citizen's getting into a position in which the Edict branded him with infamia, Dig. 3. 2. 1. Infamia attached, in consequence of a judicial sentence or something equivalent (infamia iuris) to all persons condemned in a iudicium publicum (Dig. 48. 1. 7), or in any of the civil actions specified in the text (to which must be added the delictual action for sepulcri violatio, and, for the older law, the actio fiduciae, Gaius iv. 182), or found guilty of usury, Cod. 2. 12. 20, or ignominiously discharged from military service (Dig. 3. 2. 1), guardians removed as suspecti ob dolum, Bk. 1. 26. 6 supr., and bankrupts (p. 377 supr.). Other persons became infames apart from anything in the nature of a judicial sentence (infamia immediata), e. g. wives taken in adultery, Dig. 23. 2. 43. 12 and 13; guardians who married their female wards while under age, ib. 66. pr.; and persons who violated a transactio (p. 387 supr.) made under oath, Cod. 2. 4. 41.

Under the Republic the consequence of infamia had been serious; the infamis lost the political rights of civitas, suffragium, and honores; was disabled from applying for the magistrate's judicial assistance except on behalf of himself and specified other persons ('postulare: postulare autem est, desiderium suum vel amici sui in iure apud eum, qui iurisdictioni praeest, exponere vel alterius desiderio contradicere' Dig. 3. 1. 1.