sius, "As oft as it is lawful to equivocate, it is lawful to use an oath, if it be needful, and some notable cause require it." (q) We heard Tho. Sanchez before, with the concurrence of many other authors, determining, That he who swears he did not do something which indeed he has done; yet by the help of some mental reservation, he neither lyes, nor is forsworn.(r) Add but Jo. Sanctius, who will make it needless to add any more; "That cause which does excuse a lye by a reserved equivocation, is sufficient also to excuse an oath."(s) And for this he alledgeth many authorities. (t)

F. Garnet being one day by his judges convicted of many lies, when he was brought back to the Tower, there again he was examined whether he did not repent of this infamous art, and did seriously believe it lawful? Or only used it for that time, necessity pressing him? He instead of an answer, as his manner was, writ what follows with his own hand, and delivered it to the examiners: "This I acknowledge to be according to my opinion, and the opinion of all the schoolmen; and our reason is, for that in cases of lawful equivocation, the speech by equivocation being saved from a lye, the same speech may be without perjury confirmed by an oath, or by any other way, though it were by receiving the Sacrament." And subscribed it, "Harry Garnet." And Casaubon transcribed it out of the Jesuits own manuscript. Casaub. Epist. ad Front. Duc. p. 202. This is their doctrine; whereby it appears, that if a person be accused or condemned for a design to murder his prince, though he designed it as much as any assassinate ever did, yet he may not only deny it, and yet not lye by virtue of a mental equivocation; but though he be as guilty, and his own conscience tells him he is as guilty, as any person that ever was condemned in the world; yet he may assert his innocency with oaths; and notwithstanding by this art, he may free himself from all guilt of perjury, and all other sin. As they will have him not to lye, though he assert that which is false; so they will not have him forsworn, though he swear that which is false, in the sense of all that hear him: And this quite destroys their credit, as to all their asseveraions and oaths, how many and horrid soever they be, when they think themselves concerned to equivocate.

(q)" Quoties licet equivocare, licet uti juramento, si necessitas vel causa notabilis postulat," lib. 2.

De Just. et Jure, cap. 42. dub. 9.

num. 48. (r) Vide supra.

(s)" Nam eadem causa quæ adest ad excusandum mendacium, equivocatione retenta, sufficit etiam ad excusandum juramentum." Select Disput. 46. num. 17. p. 330.

(t) Angelus Sylvester, Navarr, Azorius, Valentia, Salonius, Sanchez, Toletus, Manuel, Chiliarchus, Suarez, Lessius, Del Rio, Sa. add Bonacia, Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 1. Ubi clmus Reg. Sanchez. Azovius, Lessius, Rodriquez, Valentia, Filliutius, Laiman,

They would have it observed how confident they are in swearing themselves guiltless.

"I am not now upon terms to speak other than truth, and therefore in his most holy presence, and as I hope for mercy from his divine majesty, I do declare to you here present, and to the whole world, that I go out of the world as innocent, and as free from any guilt of these things laid to my charge in this matter, as I came into the world from my mother's womb :" So Thomas Whitebread.

"I do here declare in the presence of Almighty God, and the whole court of heaven and this numerous assembly, that as I ever hope (by the merits and passion of my sweet Saviour) for eternal bliss. I am as innocent as the child unborn of any thing laid to my charge, and for which I am here to die :" So William Harcourt.

"I do solemnly swear, protest, and vow by all that is sacred in heaven, and on earth, as I hope to see the face of God in glory, that I am as innocent as the child unborn of those treasonable crimes which Mr.O. and Mr. B. charge me withal :" So Jo. Gavan.

"I call God to witness, that I was never in my whole life at any consult where any proposal was made, or resolve taken, or signed for taking away the life of our dread sovereign. [I am as free from the treason I am accused of, as the child unborn] I vow to God as I hope for salvation, &c." So Anthony Turner.

"I do declare before God and the whole world, and call God to witness, that what I say is true, that I am as innocent of what is laid to my charge of plotting the king's death, as the child unborn. [As I hope for mercy at the hands of God, before whom I must shortly appear, and give an account of all my actions] I do again declare, that what I have said is most true:" So John Fenwick.

These are modest oaths; they might have advanced many strains higher, and outdone F. Garnet, who swore in such a tone, as well nigh made his judges tremble; and they might have repeated the most horrid oaths a hundred times for confirmation of what they know to be most false; yet by this artifice they might have done this without either lie or perjury, and with no less innocence "than the child in the mother's womb." Seriously such words in circumstances, would have been very significant from men whose principles allow of nothing but truth and sincerity; but from those whose doctrine bids defiance to both, they signify little, besides a warning to take heed lest we be deluded.

They that believe they may speak what is false in the sense of all that hear them, without either lie, or sin great or small; and also, that when they may speak what is false lawfully, they may as lawfully swear it, what credit can be given to their oaths, more than to their words? And what regard can be due to the words of those who declare it lawful to speak one thing and think another? and no less lawful when they are dying, than at any other time? Those that would be believed against such evi

dence as convicted these men, had need be persons of more than ordinary credit: But men of their principles are quite broke as to this, their credit is utterly blasted by their doc trine. They that count it lawful to deceive us, will do it when they are concerned. And they declare it as lawful to deceive us by equivocating at the point of death, as any time else; and as lawful to delude us with solemn oaths, as any other words; and have thereby taught us, that if we will not be deceived, we must not, as the case stands, believe a Jesuit, whether he says or swears, no not when he is dying.

I know not what use knights of the post may make of their doctrine; it is so very favourable to their practice, and assures it of so much secrecy and innocency, as no other doctrine in the world besides; and so may be a shrewd temptation to them to turn Roman catholics. If they can but secure their ears, their consciences by this popish device may be safe enough for they may swear that which is false when occasion serves, and yet persuade themselves they swear nothing but what is true; and so after perjuries continued for many years, they may be "as innocent as when they were born."

Hereby it appears that the witnesses from St. Omers had no very hard task imposed upon them by their superiors: For if they had given their testimony upon oath, as they were very ready to do; and if what they testified were false, and they knew it to be so, yet by this artifice they had testified nothing but what was true; and so though they were false witnesses, yet no less innocent for all that, than any infants. Though it was as certain and evident that Mr. O. was at a consult at London, as that these gentlemen were in court at the trial; yet by this device, they might truly and innocently say and swear, that he was at the same time at St. Omers. Such is the virtue of this admirable art, that it makes that which is lying and perjury, both in itself, and in the sense of all the world besides, to be a most innocent and sinless thing, and no worse than a very true testimony. But suppose these innocent children (as J. F. calls them) were not capable of this subtilty, yet they might have come off like innocence another way, and yet have done the business which their superiors enjoined them; for they came only to secure these Jesuits, and other persons of quality, by their testimony; and if they should have given a false testimony on their behalf, there had been no great harm, since a false testimony for anoter is no crime but only that which is false and against him too, which is plain by the words of the commandment, Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour; it is no prohibition to bear false witness for him, as is gravely observed by one of the most eminent divines in the council of Trent, and confessor to Charles the fifth, who on this account will have " false testimony excused when it is to hinder one from doing of injury." And another of

a

their greater divines (u) "will not have him condemned, who to defend himself, makes use of witnesses, offering themselves freely to testify for him by false oaths." (w)

And for their further encouragement, their doctors determine, that in way of defence, and to weaken the credit of such as accuse them, they may without mortal guilt charge them with false crimes: (r) So Bannez, "It is only a venial fault to charge a false crime upon a witness unduly accusing us, when such a charge may serve to refute his testimony (y)." To the same purpose Ledesma, Orella, besides many more in Diana, who says, opinion is probable enough (z)," (and that which is probable, is by their principles, lawful in practice, though it has no probability, but what the opinion of some grave doctors can give it). And Caramuell tells us, there are more than twenty doctors who assert, that "he who claps a false testimony upon any in his own defence, sins not mortally (a)."

"This

We need not wonder therefore, that such endeavours have been used to procure false testimonies, and forge odious crimes to discredit the king's witnesses; nor to hear T. W. and J. G. charge them with false oaths and false accusations, when they knew that they were true; for if it be but a venia! fault to do this, to secure the reputation of a particular person; it will be scarcely accounted any fault at all, when the honour of whole societies and religious orders, and of the Popish religion itself, is so much concerned, and stands in so great need of such a vindication.

But the argument whereby they would justify this doctrine is more remarkable; "Why will this be a sin," says my author, "if it be lawful in defence of one's reputation to kill another (b);" which is maintained by Sotus,

(u)" Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi non est mortale, neque adeo quando dicitur ut idem impediatur injuriam facere, quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum." Præceptum Exod. 20. " sub illa forma constituitur, non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium," Soto de Justitia et Jure, lib. 5. quest. 7. art. 4.

(w)"Victoriæ visum est non esse damnandum de mortali falsitate, qui ut suam tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus se ultro offerentibus ad testificandum falsum jurando," vid. Lopez. instruc. pars 2. chap. 44. p. 264.

(x) Guimen, opusc. p. 176.

(y)" Solum esse peccatum veniale mendacii objicere crimen falsum testi iniquo, quando talis objectio protest ad refutandum ejus testimonium." Bannez, 2, 2, quest. 70, artic. 3, dub. 2.

(z) Part. 9, tractat. 9, resolut. 43.

(a) Theologia fundament. num. 1151, "Viginti et plures doctores asserunt, eum qui imponit falsum testimonium alicui, ut suam justi, tiam et honorem defendat, non peccare mortą, liter."

(b) Guimen, ibid, p. 177.

Bannez, Salonius, Arragon and others, with whom Diana concurs, affirming it to be their common doctrine. Amicus (c) the Jesuit thus delivers it:

"It will be lawful for a clergyman or a religious person, to kill him who threatens to charge him or his religion with great crimes, when there is no other way of defence, as there seems to be none, if the accuser be ready to declare those crimes to great persons, unless he be killed."

He that observes this, will not wonder if they did not scruple to murder sir E. Godfrey, or that some priests were so forward to be his executioners; nay, it threatens those who are no way so dangerous to them and their religion, as his discovery was like to prove, if they had not prevented it by this their sinless expedient, a most barbarous murder. However, Gumenius (d) produces very many doctors in justification of it; and Caramuel defends it as not only the doctrine of Amicus, but of Peter Navarr, Sairus, Gordonius, Sancius, &c. and as a consequence of it, resolves another case thus: If a religious man, yielding to the frailty of the flesh, do lie with a mean woman, who counting it an honour to have prostituted herself to so great a person, does divulge it, and so disparage him, he may on this account kill her (e).

So that no sorts of persons must escape with life, who have not a great regard of their honour, who both by their principles and practices, are the greatest dishonour to the Christian name, of any, that ever pretended to it.

But to proceed, M. Serra concurring with Bannez, two doctors of great reputation amongst them, having declared it "lawful to kill him who goes to the judges to exhibit a false testimony," &c. a little after determines, "That the same will be lawful if one go to accuse one of a true, but secret crime, when by such accusation there is certain danger of death or disgrace." But he adds, "This is not to be publicly preached, because of the rudeness of the vulgar, as Soto advises; but after the fact, it may serve to quiet their consciences (f)," who have killed others upon such occasion; i. e. it may be made use of to keep them from repenting of their murders, persuading them that they are not sins to be repented of; they are lawful acts in the sense of the Roman doctors, or it may be meritorious, if they be heretics that are slain, and so they may be encouraged to repeat them as often as they see occasion. So that by their doctrine

(c) "Licitum est clerico vel religioso calumniatorem, gravia crimina de se vel de sua religione spargere minantem, occidere, quando alius defendendi modus non suppetit." De Justitia tom. 5, disp. 3, 6. sect. 7, num. 118. (d) Ibid. p. 191. (e) Ubi supra. "Idem erit si quis vadit ad me accusan(f). dum de crimine vero, sed occulto; ex cujus accusatione mihi certum periculum imminet mortis vel infamiæ," Vid, ibid. p. 194.

it is no sin to kill all the witnesses that bring in any evidence concerning this horrid plot, though their testimony should but endanger the life or reputation of one particular person; what murders will they not then think lawful to secure so many of all ranks and qualities as are engaged in this hellish conspiracy? The providence of God is to be adored and admired, and to this it must be ascribed, that the king's witnesses are not all murdered; conscience doth not, cannot restrain them from attempting it: for their principles have left them no conscience at all, as to these and many other horrid things; but their ill success in the murder of sir E. Godfrey may be some discouragement, God in mercy so over-ruling it, that what they made account would quite stifle all discovery of the plot, is become a most clear and pregnant evidence of it, as my Lord Chief Justice Scroggs (to whom the nation and the Protestant religion will owe honour while they have a being) well observes. But that others may not think their lives secure, who never appear against them as public witnesses, they teach, that private aspersions are counted a sufficient ground to murder men, though they be Papists (for Protestants may be lawfully murdered without the least shadow of a crime, but their religion). "He who by whispers and detraction does endeavour to wrong or to blemish any one, if the infamy and disgrace cannot otherwise be avoided, it will be lawful to kill him," so Peter Navarr (g); to the same effect Gaspar Hurtado declares it "lawful to kill him, who by detraction may inuch endamage us, unless he be slain (h);" and Banuez adds, "That this is true, although the defect which the detractor makes known be true, if it be secret, because then the discovery of such a defect is a great injury (i)." And therefore F. W. might well send instructions for the murdering several divines who had detected the errors of their doctrine, to the disparagement of their church; why might not he proceed in this way of vindication, when they count it not only lawful, but very compendious and most effectual? However hereby we may see, that their emissaries from St. Omers (who have led us a little out of the path, though not out of the way) have done but little of what they might have done lawfully, if their instructions had led them to it; though in truth they need no other instructions, not only to make swearing, but other feats lawful, than the common writings of their

(g)" Qui murmuratione et detractione injuriam maculamq; inferre conatur, licebit, si aliter infamiam et dedecus fugere non potest, occidere." De Restit. 1. 2, c. 3, num. 371 and 376.

(h) "Licitum esse occidere eum qui detractionibus nititur grave damnum inferre, nisi occidatur." De Justit. Disp. I. 1, diff. 11.

66

(i) Id esse verum quamvis defectus qui detractione publicatur, sit verus, si occultus, quia etiam tunc eum defectum pandendo fit gravis injuria." Vid. Guimenium ubi supra,

doctors. Let us now again come closer to our Jesuits.

Thirdly, they may use such mental reserves or equivocations, when they are urged by others not to use any, or when themselves profess and swear, that they use none. "So often as good cause occurs for which we may use ambiguous words or mental restrictions, the use of it is lawful, although he that interrogates do urge, that you will speak without ambiguity or restriction (k)," so Peter St. Joseph. "When one interrogates unreasonably by excluding equivocation, he that is interrogated may use equivocation, by adding some particle in his mind, by which the oath may be made true ()," so Bonacina and others in him. "As often as it is lawful in his own defence to use any equivocations, it will be also lawful, though he that interrogates do urge that equivocation be excluded," so Sanchez (m), alledging for it Sotus and Arragon; and a little after he adds, "The same I affirm for the same reason, how much soever the judge urges who interrogates unreasonably, so far as to make the examinant swear, that he doth not make use of equivocations, and that he intends that which he saith without any equivocation. For he may also swear, understanding secretly that he doth it, as far as he is obliged to speak clearly, and expound himself, or by forming some other thought, which may make his answer true." F. Parsons speaks fully in his treatise of Equivocations, approved by Garnet provincial of the Jesuits and Blackwell the arch-priest "If your incompetent judge shall further ask, whether you do not equivocate, you may answer no, but with another equivocation; if again suspecting you, he urges, whether this third time you do not equivocate, then the third time also say no, but with another secret equivocation, and so as often as he shall ask the like, likewise by equivocating say you

(k)" Quotis gravis causa occurrit, ob quam licet uti verbis ambiguis, vel mentali restrictione, ejusmodi usum esse licitum, etsi interrogans urgeat, ut sine amphibologia aut estrictione loquaris." De secund. præcept. art. 1. (1) Henriques, Arragon, Sanchez, et alii. Tom. 2, disp. 4, quæst. 1, punc. 12, num. 5.

(m) "Quare idem sentio ob eandem rationem, quantumcunque reduplicet iniquus interrogator, ut juret se nullâ æquivocatione uti, et absque omni prorsus æquivocatione id intelligere. Adhuc enim jurarc potest intelligendo ita ut planè debeat loqui et explicare; vel alind mente concipiendo quo veram id reddatur. Op. mor. lib. 3, cap. 6, num. 45, p. 32.

* Cum respondes incompetenti judici per æquivocationem, si ulterius petat utrum æquivocas an non, respondebis non, sed cuur alia æquivocatione; si adhuc suspicans te æquivocare, urgeat an non hâc ultimâ vice æquivoces? responde non, sed cum alia secreta æquivocatione; et sic toties quoties idem vel simile à te petet, responde toties æquivocando, Barnes de æquivocat. pag. 174.

do not equivocate:" To this purpose his words are represented by (n) divers, and particularly by Dr. Bernes a Benedictine, who says, That by Parsons doctrine; 66 way being once given to equivocating, you may without end in infinitum equivocate by speaking false, and swearing false. (o)" But hear this great doctor once more with the approbation of the greatest popish divines then in England: "For further direction of the party examined, let him admit the oath with a secret intention of equivocation, and if he be more urged to swear without equivocating, let him swear that also, (viz. that he doth not equivocate) but with the aforesaid intention of equivocation."(p) The Jesuits in their speeches seem very much concerned, that they may be believed; but being conscious, that their doctrine of equivocation has justly bereaved them of all credit with those that are acquainted with it, they thought it necessary here to disclaim it with oaths and protestations; and so to give

as

much assurance, as those whose credit is so desperately cracked, can give, that they used no equivocation; Two of the five expresly swear it; "And I do moreover declare, that this is the true and plain sense of my soul in the sight of him who knows the secret of my heart, and as I hope to see his blessed face, without any equivocation, or mental reservation;" so T. W. " And that you may be assured, that what I say is true, I do in the like manner protest and swear, as I hope to see the face of God in glory, that I do not, in what I say unto you, make use of any equivocation or mental reservation," so J. G. They affirm, that they did never design nor contrive the death of his majesty, and I am confident it was as much their design to gain credit herein, as ever any thing was since they were designers; and therefore they swear it too; ay, but they know that the world understands by their common doctrine, that they judge it lawful to equivocate in solemn oaths, and if they do equivocate, in what terms soever their oaths be delivered, they swear quite another thing than their words and expressions do import, or those that heard them do understand, and so if we believe them, we are merely cheated; for what they speak, is not that they swear, though those that hear them take it to be so; bet it is that which is spoken, together with something secret in the mind, added to it undiscernibly, whereby it becomes vastly different from what is exprest, or contrary to it; so that when we judging only by their words, do think, that they swear they had no intent to kill the king, that which they swear in their own sense may be their inten

(n) Dr. Morton of equivocation, p. 99. antilog. p. 13.

(0) At veró, ut docet Parsonius, tractatu de æquivocatione, semel data causa æquivocandi potes in infinitum falsum dicendo æquivocate ac adeó pejerare. Ibid.

(p) Treatise of Equivocations, cap. 10. in Morton, ubi supra.