It has long been settled in the courts of equity that a contract is not void because it is not reduced to writing. The statute does not in any way effect the substance of an agreement, but it simply prescribes as a rule that the same shall not be enforced upon oral proof alone. This is the case always when the contract remains executory on both sides. But when both parties have performed the terms and conditions of the contract, it is as valid and binding as though it had been reduced to writing, and duly signed. And so, likewise, if one party has fully performed his part of the contract, the statute furnishes no shield to the other to escape from a performance because it was in parole. To do so would make the law a protection to a fraud, the very thing it was intended to prevent.

It is conceded by the demurrer, that in this case there has been a complete performance by the ancestor of the plaintiffs, by his work and labor for the period of over thirteen years, contributing to some extent in the accumulation of the large estate left by John Ewing, Sr. And we may well enquire would it be equitable or just for the court to refuse to enforce the terms of the contract on behalf of John, Jr.? Could we so decree without aiding in the perpetration of a manifest wrong upon the plaintiffs and their deceased father, who was a party to and long labored in the performance of the agreement? If this question be answered by the letter and spirit of the decisions of our courts of equity ever since the enactment of the statute, the answer would be that the contract must be enforced, for it is not a case that falls within the terms and spirit of the statute.

Many things might be said as reasons why a contract such as is set forth in the petition might be presumed from the acts of the parties. The performance of the terms and stipulations as read in the acts of the parties, would be hard to account for in the absence of an agreement.

At one time the doctrine was well recognized in the courts of equity, that if a defendant by answer admitted the contract and then set up the statute of frauds as a defence, it passed for no defence to the action, for when the contract and a part performance was once admitted the chancellor would decree a specific performance notwithstanding the statute of frauds, and it was also doubted if the advantage of the statute could be taken by demurrer, for by the demurrer the facts plead in the bill were admitted. The doctrine now prevails however, that when the petition discloses the fact that th claim is obnoxious to the statute, it may be brought to the notice of the chancellor by demurrer, and if the decision of the court is adverse to the defendant upon his demurrer he may still have the advantage of a denial.

Under our code the demurrer admits to be true all the facts that are well plead, at the samė time securing to the party the right of making a more complete defence by answer after the demurrer shall be overruled. But taking the demurrer here as an admission of the facts set forth

in the petition, that there was a contract duly made and fully performed by the ancestor of the plaintiffs, it would be hard to find a good reason for excusing the other party from a performance on his part.

The demurrer keeps from the view of the court many facts and trains of facts that might be sufficient or inadequate to establish such a contract as a court of equity would enforce by decreeing its specific performance, but when the defendants rely upon a demurrer, they distinctly admit the facts of the petition, and if they are ample to demand relief the demurrer should be overruled.

Another question is made by the demurrer. That the contract between John Ewing, Sr., and Margaret Gushwa, was not to be performed within one year from the time it was made, and it was therefore obnoxious to the statute of frauds, which requires all contracts which are not to be performed within one year. to be reduced to writing and signed by the party to be charged.

The authorities upon this branch of the statute are abundant, that when the contract might be performed within one year it is not within the statute. The statute of descents makes a disposition of a man's estate at his death. The contract here was on the part of Ewing, Sr., for the care, custody and control of John, Jr., intended, no doubt, to be until he should arrive at the age of majority. But the law would inject the condition in the absence of any conditions to be performed by the representatives of the parties that the contract would be performed and terminate upon the death of John Ewing, Sr., and that he might have died within one year is beyond cavil.

In a case reported în 19 Pickering's Reports, 365, the facts were that a verbal contract was made to support a child then eleven years old until she should arrive at the age of eighteen years. years. This was held by the court to be a contract not within the statute because the party might have died within one year.

We think the statute furnishes no defence against the claim presented by the plaintiffs and the demurrer is therefore overruled.

Reed & Hoagland attorneys for plaintiffs. Uhl, Critchfield & Huston attorneys for defendants.

A Justice of the peace was very much puzzled a point of law which had been raised in a case over which he was trying. Finally he appealed to the attorneys, "You gentlemen understand the law, tell us honestly how the thing is." S. laid it down from his side of the case, and M. from the other, and a thoughtful pause followed as the judge compared the points. Finally the judge spoke. "Gentlemen, are you ready for the decision?" "We are." "Well, the decision of the court is, that one of you has lied.”

NEGLIGENCE-PRESUMPTION-ORDINARY COURSE OF THINGS.

U. S. CIRCUIT COURT, S. D. NEW YORK.

ROSE V. THE STEPHENS AND CONDIT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,

March 13, 1882.

1. The plaintiff was injured by the explosion of a boiler which was under the control of the employees of defendant; Held, that the jury might infer negligence from the fact of 'the explosion; a presumption of negligence is indulged as a legitimate inference whenever the occurrence is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not take place when proper care is exercised and is one for which the defendant is responsible.

2. The instructions to the jury niust be considered in their integrity and not in isolated parts.

On motion for a new trial.

The plaintiff was injured by the explosion of a steam boiler, which was being used by the defendant to propel a vessel chartered by the defendant to others, to be used for the transportation of passengers and freight. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.

WALLACE, J.

If the explosion resulted either from the carelessness of the employees of the defendant in charge of the boiler, or from the negligence of the defendant in sending forth an unsafe or dangerous boiler to be used where human life would be en dangered if it should explode, it is conceded the defendant was liable. It is contended, however, that it was error to instruct the jury that they might infer such negligence from the fact of the explosion, and it is argued that such a presumption only obtains when the defendant is under a contract obligation to the plaintiff, as in a case of a common carrier or bailee. Undoubtedly the presumption has been more frequently ap plied in cases against carriers of passengers than in any other class, but their is no foundation in authority or in reason for any such limitation of the rule of evidence. The presumption origThe presumption originates from the nature of the act, not from the nature of the relations between the parties. is indulged as a legitimate inference whenever the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things does not take place when proper care is exercised, and is one for which the defendant is responsible. Scott v. The London and St. Katherine Docks Company, 3 H. & C. 596; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567. In the present case the boiler which exploded was in the control of the emyloyees of the defendant. As boilers do not usually explode when they are in a safe condition and are properly managed, the inference that this boiler was not in a safe condition or was not properly managed was justifiable, and the instructions to the jury were correct. The instructions must be considered in their integrity and not in isolated parts, and so considered present the whole of the case fairly and correctly.

Motion denied.

It

Digest of Decisions.

TEXAS.

(Court of Appeals.)

J. J. CONN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. February 18, 1882. Theft-Principals-Charge of Court-Unauthorized Conduct of the Court.-1. It is the duty of the trial court to charge the law applicable to every phase of the case made by the evidence, or any part of the evidence, leaving the jury to pass upon the strength of the evidence, but the court should never charge a rule of law, though perfectly sound, which has no support in the evidence.

2. The jury, after having retired, may ask further instructions of the judge touching any matter of law. This should be done in a body in open court through their foreman, and the defendant should be made acquainted with such roquest. The court must inseruct upon the point presented in the request of the jury, and this must be done in writing. If not proper matter for instruction the court must inform the jury of this fact in writing.

3. The fact that a State's witness is related to one of the defendants, is no good and sufficient ground to authorize leading questions by the State's attorney, when the witness shows no disposition to evade or answer in doubtful or double sense, but answers frankly, plainly and pertinently each question propounded.

4. The conduct and remarks of the trial court, and of the prosecuting attorney, held to be highly improper and which are severely condemned.

SALLIE HILL V. THE STATE OF TEXAS. March 1, 1882. Murder-Manslaughter-Charge of Court.-1. The clerical omission trom the charge of the court of a word which would naturally and unmistakably supply itself from the context, and which could not possibly have confused or misled the jury, would not be ground for re

versal.

2. Where the evidence tends to show that the killing was done by the use of means not in their nature calculated to produce death, and that the defendant was not actuated by an intention to kill or by an evil or cruel disposition, then the killing could not be murder and the offense might be reduced to any grade of assault and battery, and the court should chalge upon this phase of the

case.

WILLIAM FRANKEL v. HEIDENHEIMER BROS. February 15, 1882.

Evidence-Res Adjudicata.-1. Whenever all that portion of the record pertaining to, and enough of it to show the action had in relation to facts stated in a plea of res adjudicata is offered in evidence, it should be admitted by the court, it being unnecessary that other portions irrelevant and unnecessary to the issue should be produced.

2. The applicability of the plea of res adjudicata depends upon the identity of the cause of action or matters of defense in issue, and not the identity or similarity of the grounds or points urged to support or maintain the action or matter of defense, and all the matters determined by the court are as fully concluded by the judgment as those considered and discussed, if the inatter put in issue has been determined by the court upon the mer

its.

TOM BROWN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. March 1, 1882. Amendment Affidavit-Information Agreement of Counsel-Practice.-1. The fact that the person making the affidavit upon which the'prosecution is founded, deposed to the best of his knowledge and belief and not positively to the facts stated, does not affect or invalidate the affidavit.

2. An information referring to the complaint upon which it is founded and alleging that it shows to the court the matter and thing charged against the accused, is fatally defective.

3. Quære. Whether an agreement by defendant's attorney allowing the amendment of an information, as to matters of substance, would be upheld in the face of the express language of the statute upon this subject,

GEORGIA.

(Supreme Court.)

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF AMERICUS V. MAYOR, ETC., OF AMERICUS. Sept. 27, 1881.

Taxes-Municipal Corporations-Duress.-To recover taxes paid to a municipal corporation it must appear that the tax was unauthorized, that the amount was actually received by the corporation, and that it was paid under compulsion, to prevent the immediate seizure or sale of plaintiff's goods or the arrest of his person. Voluntary payment (in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake) accompanied by protest will not suffice.

CONNECTICUT.

(Supreme Court of Appeals.)

THE AMERICAN RAPID TELEGRAPH Co. v. THE CONNECTICUT TELEPHONE Co. February, 1882

Mandamus-Telephone Company-Telegraph CompanyPatent.-The respondent having organized as a jointstock company to carry on a telephonic exchange system, at Bridgeport, purchased from a Massachusetts company, which owned the patent, the right to use its magnetic telephone for a certain period, under certain conditions, among which were that the respondent should not permit telegraph companies to use the system who had not purchased the right of the Massachusetts company. The petitioner, a telegraph company which had not purchased the right, prayed a writ of maddamus to compel the respondent to permit the petitioner to use the system. Held, that the respondent was not a common carrier of articulate speech, and that the writ must be denied.

LOUISIANA.

(Supreme Court.)

MUTUAL NATIONAL BANK v. RICHARDSON. Nov. 1881.

Partnership-Partner using Firm Name for Personal Advantage Validity.-A partner cannot use the name of the firm as security for the debt of a third person or of himself, without special authority from all composing the firm. A party receiving such security, under those circumstances, although not chargeable with actual mala fides, does so at his risk and peril and cannot hold the firm and its other members responsible, unless upon proof of knowledge, consent, or ratification.

NEW YORK.

(Court of Appeals.)

DILLEBER V. THE HOME LIFE INSURANCE CO. November 22, 1891.

Life Insurance-Evidence.-In an action on a life policy where the defence is a breach of warranty by reason of a fraudulent concealment of the fact that the assured had had well-defined symptons of consumption, it is competent, on cross-examination of a witness who has testified that certain facts did not necessarily indicate any disease of the lungs and that a hemorrhage in the previous year did not change his opinion, to include in the hypothetical question a hemorrhage occurring the month after the policy was issued to ascertain how far that fact would modify the opinion expressed as to a bleeding in the prior year.

In framing hypothetical questions to put to expert witnesses counsel are not confined to facts admitted or absolutely proved, but may assume any facts which there is any evidence tending to establish and which are pertineat to any theories they are attempting to uphold."

On cross-examination of an expert they may, in putting hypothetical questions, assume any pertinent facts whether testified to or not with a view of testing the skill and accuracy of the expert, subject, however, to the control of the court.

MICHIGAN.

(Supreme Court.)

L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co. v. BANGS. January, 1882. Railroads Negligence—Jumping off atʼa Station from Moving Train.-It is negligence for a passenger to jump from a train in motion in order to get off at a station which is his distination and where the train should stop; if injury results, his act is contributory negligence.

NEW JERSEY.

(Supreme Court.)

KENNEDY. v. MCKAY. June, 1881.

1. Tort-Innocent Vendor--Agent's Fraud--Action.An innocent vendor cannot be sued in tort for the fraud of his agent in effecting a sale.

2. Contract-Deceit-Rescission-Liability of Agent.In such cases, the vendee may rescind the contract and reclaim the money paid, and if not repaid may sue the vendor in assumpsit for it, or he may sue the agent for the deceit.

CALIFORNIA.

(Supreme Court.)

THE PEOPLE v. MILNE. January 24, 1882. Criminal Procedure-Indictment-One Attempt and Several Offenses-Validity.-Where an indictment sets forth the act, and the intent to commit two or more offenses according to the fact, it is not bad for duplicity. There is but one attempt alleged, though the object aimed at in the attempt be multifarious.

LXVTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO.

SYNOPSIS OF LAWS PASSED THIS SESSION.

APRIL 5, 1882.

S. B. 32. To amend Sections 6445 and 6447 of the Revised Statutes, to read as follows:

Section 6445, any railroad corporation of this State may condemn and appropriate to its own use, the interest and easement in, and quiet title to, any unfinished road-bed, or part thereof, lying within the State, and on the line of its proposed road, owned or claimed by any other railroad company or companies, person or persons, partnership or corporation, where such road-bed or part thereof has remained or shall thereafter remain, in an unfinished condition, and without having the ties or iron placed, and continued thereon for the period of five years or more, immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings to condemn or appropriate the same as herein authorized, and every such company or companies, person or persons, partnership or corporation, shall be made a party defendant to such proceedings to condemn or appropriate the same, and shall be required to answer therein, setting forth fully its or their title to or interest in such road-bed or part thereof, so sought to be appropriated or condemned, if any, it or they claim, to which answer the plaintiff shall plead issuably, unless it admit the validity of the defendant's claim; and in such case, if such party defendant be a non-resident of this State, or a foreign corporation, service of summons may be made by publication, under sub-division three, of section 5048 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, and that the terms, company, or companies, as used in this chapter, shall be held to embrace also person or persons, partnership or corporation, as used in this section.

Section 6447. Proceedings under this act may be commenced in the Probate Court, the Court of Common Pleas, or the Superior Court of any county in this State in which such road-bed or part thereof so sought to be appropriated or condemned may be situated; all or part only of such road-bed, within this State may be included in one proceeding, and when such proceeding is commenced in the court of common pleas or superior court, the same proceeding shall be had as is prescribed in this chapter for the conduct of the same in the Probate Court,

so far as the same may be applicable to such Common Pleas or Superior Court, and not excepted in this section, and the case shall, on motion, be taken out of its order, by the court or by any reviewing court, and determined without any unnecessary delay; and proceedings in error to such Common Pleas or Superior Court may be commenced directly in the Supreme Court, but the provisions of this chapter as to viewers, shall not apply to appropriations authorized by such sections, and when any railroad corporation shall commence proceedings under this act, the president of said corporation shall Inake, subscribe and file in the court where any such proceeding is had, a statement under oath, declaring that it is the bona fide intention of said corporation to complete and operate a railroad on the road-bed so sought to be appropriated; and if said corporation shall, for a period of one year after it shall have acquired rights to occupy the road-bed, fail to expend in and about the completion of a railroad thereon, a sum equal to twentyfive per centum of the total cost of completing the same, to be estimated by the commissioner of railroad and telegraphs, then, and in such case the said road-bed shall be open to appropriation and condemnation, under this act by any other railroad corporation. The word road-bed used in this act shall be held to include right of way, depot grounds and other easements connected therewith, and it shall be sufficient in the petition and proceedings under this act to designate the road-bed as the road-bed of the railroad corporation, by which the route of the road was located and established with the terminal points within which appropriation is sought.

POND BILL..

S. B. 12. An act to moe effectually provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors. It goes into effect on the first day of May next and provides:

When the place of business of any person engaged in the liquor traffic is located not within any village or city, nor within one mile thereof, the tax will be $100; when within a village having a population of less than 2,000 or within one mile thereof, $150; when within any other village or city, having a population of less than 10,000) inhabitants, or within one mile thereof, $200; when within any city of the second class, having a population of 10,000 inhabitants, or more, or within two miles thereof, $250; and when within any city of the first class, or within two miles thereof, $300.

Every person engaged in such traffic, and every person hereafter engaging therein, is required to execute to the State of Ohio his bond in the sun of $1,000, with at least two sureties, resident of the county, and each holding therein a freehold estate, not exempt from execution, worth at least double the amount of the bond above encumbrances, which bond shall have indorsed thereon a pertinent description of the lot or premises wherein said traffic is or shall be carried on together with the name of its owner, and the sureties thereon shall be to the acceptance of the probate judge of the county, who shall keep and record the same, together with the indorsement thereon, in a book to be by him kept for that purpose, which bond shall be conditioned for the faithful performance of all, and singular, the requirements of this act, and the probate judge shall receive in each case for his services under this act, to be paid by the person giving such bond, the sum of two dollars. If the tax be not paid the condition of the bond shall be deemed broken, and an action will lie thereon against the principal and his sureties.

Heavy penalties are annexed for all violations of the law.

It provides that the taxes arising from the liquor traffic shall be paid into the county treasury, and two-thirds thereof shall be credited to the townships, villages and cities from which the taxes were received, and the remaining one-third to the general county fund.

It also provides that the act shall not be construed or held to authorize or license in any way the sale of intoxicating liquors.

SUNDAY LAW.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, that the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether distilled, malt, or vinous, on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, except by a regular druggist, on the written prescription of a regular practicing physician, for medicinal purposes only, is hereby declared to be unlawful, and all places where such intoxi

cating liquors are on other days sold or exposed for sale, except regular drug stores, shall on that day be closed, and whoever makes any such sale, or allows any such place to be open or remain open on that day, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail or city prison not exceeding thirty days. In regular hotels and eating house the word "place" herein used, shall be held to mean the room or part of room where such liquors are usually sold or exposed for sale, and the keeping of such room or part of room securely closed shall be held, as to such hotels and eating houses, as a closing of the place within the meaning of this act.

Sec. 2. Said original section 6944 be and the same is hereby repealed.

Sec. 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

JANUARY TERM, 1882.

Hon. JOHN W. OKEY, Chief Justice; Hon. WILLIAM WHITE, Hon. W. W. JOHNSON, Hon. GEO. W. McILVAINE, Hon. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH, Judges.

Tuesday, April 18, 1882.

GENERAL DOCKET.

No. 50. City of Ironton v. Kelly and Wife. Error to the District Court of Lawrence County. LONGWORTH, J., Held:

Where the trustees of waterworks in a city, authorized and directed the digging of trenches in the streets for the purpose of laying water mains, in pursuance of a previous ordinance of council, and it is made the duty of the superintendent to cause such trenches to be dug and mains laid, the city is responsible for his negligent acts in doing the work causing injury, while such authority and direction remain unrevoked; notwithstanding the trustees, individually, while said work was being done, notified the superintendent that they would have nothing further to do with the work.

Judgment affirmed.

797. Ohio on relation of the Attorney General v. Rollin C. Powers et al. In Quo Warranto.

MCILVAINE, J. Held:

1. Common school districts and boards of education are not corporations within the meaning of section 1 of article 13 of the Constitution.

2. Under section 26, article 2, and section 2, article 6 of the Constitution, laws regulating the organization' and inanagement of common schools must have a uniform operation throughout the State. Judgment of ouster.

White and Johnson, J. J., did not concur in the 2nd proposition.

76. Scioto Fire Brick Company v. Erastus Pond. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. JOHNSON, J. Held:

A., by an agreement in writing, "leased" to B., "all the clay that is good No. 1 fire clay, on his land" described, for a term of three years, subject to the conditions that B. "shall mine, or cause to be mined, or pay for, not less than 2,000 tons of clay every year, and shall pay therefor, twenty-five cents per ton for every ton of clay monthly, as it is taken away." Held:

1. That this was a contract, which gave B. the exclusive right to mine and remove all the good No. 1 fire clay that was on the land, and not a lease of the land itself.

2. If clay of that quality, and in quantity sufficient to justify its being mined existed, B., on failure to mine at least 2,000 tons per year, each year while the contract was in force, was bound to pay for that amount, at the agreed price per ton.

3. But if, in fact, clay of that quality and in quantity sufficient to justify its being mined could not, by the use of due diligence be found on the land, then there was no obligation to pay the amount agreed on, in case of failure to mino. Cook v. Andrews, 36 O. St. 178 followed and approved.

4. Where it is an open question, whether such clay, was to be found on the land, and the exclusive possession of the clay lands was vested in the lessee or pur

chaser of the clay, for the purpose of ascertaining the fact, the burden is upon him, in order to defeat a recovery for the annual sums to be paid in case of a failure to mine and remove the same, to prove that such clay as is contemplated in the contract did not exist in minable quantity. Cook v. Andrews, supru.

Judgments of common pleas and district courts reversed and cause remanded.

6. Samuel Shorten v. Drake et al. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

WHITE, J. Held:

1. Where a debtor purchases real estate and causes it to be conveyed to his wife in fraud of his creditors, a bona fide mortgagee from the husband and wife, will not be affected by the fraud.

2. The possession of the husband and wife at the time of taking the mortgage will not charge the mortgagee with notice of the fraud; nor will he be affected by notice of levies made upon the property as that of the husband subsequent to the conveyance to the wife.

3. The levy of an order of attachment, in the absence of process of garnishment, has no greater operation than the levy of an execution.

4. Where, in a court of equity the fund in controversy is held for distribution, and the equities of the respective claimants are equal in point of merit, the distribution will be ordered according to the maxim, qui prior est tempore potior est jure.

Judgment reversed; and distribution ordered (1) in payment of the mortgage, (2) in payment of the execution, and (3) of the attachment.

72. The Trustees of the original surveyed township of Oxford, Butler County, Ohio, v. Thomas H. B. Columbia and Elsie Columbia. Error to the District Court of Putnam County.

OKEY, C. J.

1. Where a party requests that the court state separately the conclusions of fact and law under the civil code, 280 (Rev. Stats. 5205), and the request is not complied with, a judgment against such party should be reversed, unless it appear from the record that he was not prejudiced by the refusal.

2. Trustees of a township holding the title to lands granted to them by the general government for school purposes, are not exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations, in an action to recover possession of the premises prosecuted by them.

Judgment affirmed.

71. The Trustees ofthe original surveyed township of Oxford, Butler County, Ohio, v. Calvin L. Noble. Error to the District Court of Putnam County. Judgment affirmed on authority of case No. 72, in which the same plaintiffs are plaintiffs in error, and Thomas H. B. Columbia and Elsie Columbia are defendants in error.

56. Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company . Isaac J. Clark. Error to the District Court of Perry County. Judgment reversed on authority of Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co. v. McElroy, 35 Ohio St. 147. There will be no further report.

68. Edward Poor et al. v. Lucinda Burris et al. Error to the District Court of Jackson County. Judgment affirmed without penalty. There will be no further report.

140. City of Ironton v. Thomas D. Kelly. Error to the District Court of Lawrence County. Judgment affirmed without penalty; following No. 50 above reported. There will be no further report.

ment of the Common Please Court of Jefferson County. Motion granted and cause taken out of its order.

62. Elisha Wilkinson et al. v. Commissioners of Preble County. Motion to take cause No. 908 on the General Docket out of its order. Motion overruled.

63. Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati & Indianapolis Railway Co. v. Arthur Nazor. Motion for leave to substitute copies and withdraw original papers in cause No. 934 on the general Docket. Motion granted.

65. Ohio ex rel. the Attorney General v. The Standard Life Ins. Co. Motion to take canse No. 1047 on the General Docket out of its order. Motion granted and cause set for trial April 28, instant.

66. Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. The Middleport Mutual Aid Association. Motion to take cause No. 1045 on the General Docket out of its order. Motion granted and cause set for trial April 27, instant.

SUPREME COURT RECORD.

[New cases filed since last report, up to April 18, 1882.]

No. 1112. Henry Newbegin et al. v. Samuel Vanvlerah. Error to the District Court of Defiance County. Newbegin & Kingsbury for plaintiffs.

1113. Iron National Bank v. W. T. Lodwick, Assignee. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. Moore & Newman for plaintiff; W. A. Hutchins and J. W. Bannon for defendant.

1114. Chester Bedell v. Joseph Brown. Error to the District Court of Mahoning County. Jones & Murray for plaintiff; Van Hyning & Johnson for defendant.

1115. Levi Scudder v. H. H. Wallace, Adm'r. Error to the District Court of Butler County. S. Z. Gard and H. L. Morey for plaintiff; I. Robertson for defendant.

1116. Robert J. Turnbull v. Horatio Page. Error to the District Court of Franklin County. Lorenzo English for plaintiff.

1117. Charles Stoddard v. The State of Ohio. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County. Charles Stillwell for plaintiff; Attorney General Nash for defendant.

1118. Jacob Ridenour v. The State of Ohio. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County. C. H. Blackburn and others, for plaintiff; Attorney General Nash for the State.

1119. Elizabeth Barrett v. J. B. Hart. Error to the District Court of Ottawa County. T. L. Magers for plaintiff; T. J. Marshall for defendant.

1120. Hugh A. McNicol v. The Village of East Liverpool: Error-Reserved in the District Court of Columbiana County.

1121. Paul J. Kreitz v. The Citizens Savings and Loan Association. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County. Stone & Hessenmueller and F. C. Gallup for plaintiff; E. D. Stark for defendant.

1122. Newman Lumber. Co. v. John W. Purdum et al. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. Moore & Newman for plaintiff; H. W. Farnham for defendants.

SUPREME COURT ASSIGNMENT.

FOR ORAL ARGUMENT.

April 20th-No. 9. Julius Bowen et al.. v. C. L. Bowen et al. Error to the District Court of Washington County. April 21st-No. 34. Charles W. Rowland v. The Meader Furniture Co.

April 26th-No. 40. W. H. Crabill Ex'r v. Nancy Marsh.

April 27th-No. 1045. Ohio ex rel. v. The Middleburgh Mutual Aid and Life Association. Quo warranto. April 28th-No. 1047. Ohio ex rel. v. The Standard Life Association of America. Quo warranto.