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lween the one and the other. If, for example, one offers to sell a certain article for one hundred dollars, and the other, not having yet received the offer, should on his part propose to give two hundred dollars, the proposal to give the greater sum necessarily implies an assent to take it for a less, and the contract is complete at the lowest sum.

ART. 1802.- But a consent to give any thing else, although of a greater value than that contained in the offer, or to give the same or a larger sum at a different term of payment, does not imply an assent to the offer, and there is in that case no obligation.

Art. 1803. — The obligation of a contract not being complele, until the acceptance, or in cases where it is implied by law, until the circumstances, which raise such implication, are known to the party proposing; he may therefore revoke his offer or proposition before such acceptance, but not without allowing such reasonable time as from the terms of his offer he has given, or from the circumstances of the case he may be supposed to have intended to give to the party, to communicate his delermination.

ART. 1804. - If the party, making the offer, die before it is accepted, or he to whom it is made, die before he has given his assent, the representatives of neither party are bound, nor can they bind the survivor. But if the contract be accepted before the death of the party offering it, although he had no notice of it, the obligation is complete; but if the representatives assent to an acceptance of the surviving party in the first instance, or the survivor assent to an acceptance made by the representatives in the second instance, then it becomes a new contract between the representatives and the surviving party.

ART. 1805.-The proposition as well as the assent to a contract may be express or implied;

Express, when evinced by words, either written or spoken;

Implied, when it is manifested by actions, even by silence or by inaction, in cases in which they can from circumstances be supposed to mean, or by legal presumption are directed to be considered as, evidence of an

, assent.

ART. 1806.-Express consent must be given in a language understood by the party who accepts, and the words by which it is conveyed must be in themselves unequivocal : if they may mean different things, they give rise to error, which, as is hereinafter provided, destroys the effect of a contract.

ART. 1807.-Even when words are unequivocal and expressive of assent, they are not always obligatory, when from the context, if in writing, or from what in speech is equivalent to it, the words which immediately precede, or follow, it appears that the party did not intend to obligate himself.

ART. 1808.-Unequivocal words, expressive of mere intent, do not make an obligation.

ART. 1809.—A positive promise, that, from the manner in which it is made, shows that there was no serious intent to contract, creates no obligation.

ART. 1810.-Actions without words, either written or spoken, are presumptive evidence of a contract, whea they are done under circumstances that naturally imply a consent to such contract. To receive goods from a merchant without any express promise, and to use them, implies a contract to pay the value. If an offer is made of an article in deposit, and the article is received, the contract of deposit is complete. If a mandate is acted on, the mandatary is bound in the same manner as if he had accepted in writing. In all those cases and others of the like nature, all the conditions, which he, who gives or proposes, annexed to the delivery or the acceptance of the

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proposition, are also presumed to have been accepted by the act of receiving. If the merchant, in delivering the goods, declare that they must be paid for by a certain time, if the depositor designate how the deposit is to be kept, or the mandatary in what manner his commission is to be executed, he who receives and acts is obligated to the performance of all these conditions.

ART. 1811.- Silence and inaction are also, under some circumstances, the means of showing an assent that creates an obligation; if, after the termination of a lease, the lessee continue in possession, and the lessor be inactive and silent, a complete mutual obligation for con-: tinuing the lease, is created by the act of occupancy of the lenant on the one side, and the inaction and silence of the lessor on the other.

ART. 1812.-Where the law does not create a legal presumption of proposition, acceptance or consent from certain facts, then, as in the case of other simple presumptions, it must be left to the discretion of the judge, whether assent is to be implied from them or not.

S II.

What defects of Consent will invalidate a Contract.

ART. 1813.—Consent being the concurrence of intention in two or more persons, with regard to a matter understood by all, reciprocally communicated, and resulting in each party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it follows that there is no consent, not only where the intent has not been mutually communicated or implied, as is provided in the preceding paragraph, but also where it has been produced by

Error;
Fraud ;
Violence;
Threats,

S III.

Of Error, its Division and Effects.

ART. 1814.-Error, as applied to contracts, is of two kinds :

1. Error of fact; 2. Error of law.

ART. 1815.—That is called error of fact, which proceeds either from ignorance of that which really exists, or from a mistaken belief in the existence of that which

has none.

ART. 1816.—He is under an error of law, who is truly informed of the existence of facts, but who draws from them erroneous conclusions of law.

ART. 1817.-Errors may exist as to all the circumstances and facts which relate to a contract, but it is not every error that will invalidate it. To have that effect, the error niust be in some point, which was a principal cause for making the contract, and it may be either as to the motive for making the contract, to the person with whom it is made, or to the subject matter of the contract itself.

S IV.

Of Error in the Motive.

ART. 1818.— The reality of the cause is a kind of precedent condition to the contract, without which the consent would not have been given, because the motive being that which determines the will, if there be no such cause where one was supposed to exist, or if it be falsely represented, there can be no valid consent.

ART. 1819.-The error in the cause of a contract to have the effect of invalidating it, must be on the principal cause, when there are several; this principal cause

is called the motive, and means that consideration without which the contract would not have been made.

ART. 1820.-No error in the molive can invalidate a contract, unless the other party was apprized that it was the principal cause of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the transaction it must be presumed that he knew it.

ART. 1821.-But wherever the motive is apparent, although not made an express condition, if the error bears on that motive, the contract is void. A promise to give a certain sum to bear the expenses of a marriage, which the party supposes to have taken place, is not obligatory, if there be no marriage.

ART. 1822.– Thus too, if a suit be brought on an obligation purporting to have been made by the ancestor of the defendant, and, supposing it to be true, the defendant enters into a compromise or promise to pay, the compromise or promise are void, if it should be afterwards discovered that the obligation was forged.

ART. 1823.-In the same manner a compromise of a suit, and any obligation made in consequence of il, is void, if, at the time, but unknown to the parties, the suit be finally decided. But if the decision be not final, but subject to appeal or revision, the compromise is valid:

Art. 1824.—A compromise also is yoid, where one of the parties is ignorant of the existence of a paper, which, being afterwards discovered, shows that the other had no right, and this, whether the other party knew the existence of the paper or not.

ART. 1825.—But if the compromise be of all differences'generally, and there were other subjects of dispule, besides that in which the error existed, of sufficient importance to raise a presumption that, even if the error had been discovered, the compromise would still have been made, then such error shall not invalidate the contract.

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