under the junior judgment, and the plaintiff became the purchaser, though he knew, previously, of the existence of both the judgments. Afterwards, the defendant issued execution on the other judgment, and was proceeding to make a second sale of the land. The plaintiff filed his bill for an injunction, alleging that he purchased the land in full confidence that it would, by the first sale, be exonerated from all further lien by reason of the judgments in question. The bill was dismissed. Mr. chancellor Kent said, he assumed it as a settled principle of law and sound policy, that "a person cannot be permitted to disavow, or avoid the operation of an agreement, entered into with a full knowledge of the facts, on the ground of ignorance of the legal consequences which flow from those facts." He, however, observed, that admitting all that was alleged, the mistake was only as to a collateral point, and, that the purchaser was seeking, under that pretence, not indeed to vacate the sale, but to divest the defendant of his rights;a course of proceedings, certainly, which could claim no especial favor in a court of equity. Moreover, there does not appear to have been sufficient evidence of any mistake.

The case of Lyon v. Richmond' was, in no proper sense, a case of mistake of law. There a bill was filed for an injunction, on the ground that the plaintiffs had, by unfair and oppressive measures on the part of some of the defendants, been prevented from bringing a writ of error on a certain judgment, which there was reason to suppose, from a subsequent decision, would have been reversed, had a writ of error been brought. The question before the court would seem to have been, whether, as was alleged, there had been any unfair practices used. The chancellor said he had nothing to do with the question, whether the court would have reversed the decision, had a writ of error been

12 Johns Ch. 51.

prosecuted, but he proceeded to state, that "a subsequent decision of a higher court, in a different case, giving a different exposition of a point of law from the one declared and known when a settlement between parties takes place, cannot have a retrospective effect and overthrow such settlement." This language is often quoted, and we admit fully its force and justness; but what, in particular, it has to do with mistakes of law, is not so obvious. The law we understand to be what the regularly constituted judicial tribunals have declared it to be; and when it has been once expounded, that remains the law, until a different exposition has been given. The new exposition operates like the repeal of an old statute and the enactment of a new one; in which case, every deed is to be judged by the law in whose time it was done. The court took occasion to give some salutary cautions against mistaking the law, with a knowledge of which, it was said, every man is to be charged at his peril. The decree for dismissing the bill in this case, was reversed, by a bare majority, in the court of errors, on the ground that an unconscientious advantage had been taken of the circumstances of the plaintiffs.' It has been said, however, that this decision left untouched the doctrine of the chancellor, in respect to mistakes of law; which is very possible if the court confined themselves to the case before them.

3

In Storrs v. Barker, the defendant had brought an action of ejectment for certain land, which he claimed as heir at law of his daughter. This land, the daughter, a married woman, had, with the approbation of her father's family, devised to her husband, Foster, who after her death occupied the same, claiming under his wife's will, and finally sold it to the plaintiff, for a full and valuable consideration.

Lyon v. Tallmadge, 14 Johns. 526.

2 Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407.

36 Johns. Ch. 166.

The defendant repeatedly advised Foster to sell and the plaintiff to buy; told Foster he thought his title good under the will; and when asked, on behalf of Storrs, whether he did not claim the land by inheritance, replied in the negative. These are strong circumstances, in the face of which to attempt to turn another out of possession of land thus purchased, and peaceably enjoyed for several years. The defendant's attention had been again and again directed to the subject, he was asked expressly, by one who had a right to know, whether he did not claim the land by the very title he afterwards set up; and then was the time for him to inform himself of his rights. In a case of this kind, it would be against all conscience to allow a man, on any pretence, unless fraud had been practised upon him, to dispossess another of the very property for which he had himself induced him to pay his money. It is worth noticing, that in this, which is the latest of the three cases, the chancellor qualified, very materially, the doctrine he had before expressed as absolute. "It is rarely," he says, "that a mistake in point of law, with full knowledge of all the facts, can afford ground for relief;" and again, "ignorance of the law, with knowledge of the facts, cannot, generally, be set up as a defence."

Clarke v. Duches,' was an action to recover back a small excess of rent, which, in ignorance of his rights, it was alleged, had been overpaid by the tenant, for a time running back somewhat beyond the memory of man. The court said that, since the last settlement, the plaintiff had not paid as much as he owed; and that the statute of limitations attached to all accounts prior to that time. This would seem to cover the whole ground. But though the court considered this view of the case conclusive, they thought proper, ex abundante cautela, to go into a discussion

19 Cow. R. 674.

of the subject of mistakes of law. The idea of relieving against such mistakes, they discountenanced in most decided and unequivocal terms. In another case,' which, however, the court could not "consider as a case of mistake of fact or of law," it was stated to be "now generally conceded, that the mistake must be a mistake of facts and not of law," to entitle a party to recover back money.

There have been a few cases relating to the same subject, in other states. Among other matters, this was much considered in a case in Alabama; and the court expressed themselves strongly against granting relief on account of mistakes of law. There were several cases of the same kind. The plaintiffs believing they might, under a particular statute of the state, lawfully stipulate for any rate of interest that should be agreed on by the parties, had given their notes, bearing an exorbitant interest, and when their notes become due, had either paid them voluntarily, or suffered judgment to go against them without defence. Some years afterwards, it was decided, that the statute in question did not authorize an unlimited rate of interest in cases like these. Inasmuch as before the plaintiffs filed their bills for relief, their remedy at law was barred by the statute of limitations, and as they had a good legal defence at the time they paid the money; as no fraud was shown, and the notes had been paid in exact conformity to the original intention of all parties, the court held that there was no cause for interference.

3

In Wheaton v. Wheaton, a bill was filed to enjoin proceedings, in an action at law, on a note. The court said the mistake, if any, was simply that the plaintiff mistook the legal effect of a plain note of hand, and ignorantly supposed a note, payable by the terms of it in three years, to

1 Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend. 355. 39 Conn. 96.

2 Jones v. Watkins, 1 Stew. 181.

be in law a note payable at the death of the obligee, and then not to be paid, but delivered up to him as his share of his father's estate. They thought it would be not a little difficult to procure evidence of a mistake of such a character. We think so too. But if it could be done, it should seem the party would be entitled to relief under another kind of equity than mistake.

In Pinkham v. Gear,' chief justice Richardson regarded it as well settled, that no man can avoid his contract by an allegation, that he made it under a misapprehension of the law. By a mere allegation, without proof, undoubtedly he cannot. There are some other cases in which language is found favoring the doctrine, that mistakes of law are inexcusable. The subject, however, was so collateral and so slightly touched upon in them, that it is not necessary to do more than to refer to the cases."

What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from the authorities on this side of the question? We admit that, if those were the only requisites, there are cases enough, and the language found in some of them is strong enough to sustain any doctrine. But a very large proportion of that language was used, as we have endeavored to show, when it was not called for by the case under consideration; and, consequently, in point of authority, it rises little above mere dicta of the judges who used it. Many of the cases were confessedly put on other grounds, and most, if not all of them might have been;-for, undoubtedly, they were, in general, decided correctly, under the circumstances. We submit, on the whole, that in view of the reasoning on

13 New Hamp. 163.

2 See Hepburn v. Dunlop, 1 Wheat. 179; Elliott v. Swartwort, 10 Pet. 137; Brown v. Armistead, 6 Rand. 593; Williams v. Hodgson, 2 Har. & Johns. 474; Dickens v. Jones, 6 Yerg. 483; Hubbard v. Martin, 8 Yerg. 498; Buttle v. Griffin, 4 Pick. 6; Ladd v. Kenney, 2 New Hamp. 340; Norton v. Marden, 3 Shepley, 45.