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ings which it has in the examples. We begin with the preposition κατά.
The primary meaning of Kará is down. Now, all downward motion has a natural and fixed point, where it termipates ; namely, the surface of the earth. Here the falling stone and the falling fakes of snow stop; and here, when it has found the lowest possible point, the running brook ceases to flow. As, therefore, all downward motion has in nature a fixed point of termination, it follows, conversely, first, that all actions which are contemplated purely with regard to their termination in space may naturally be denoted by the preposition that signifies down. Hence, katandéw = to sail to land, because that is the natural point where the voyage terminates ; Karanéutw = to send from the inland to the sea-coast, because there the journey must end ; katakleiw = to shut, as a door, because the door-post is the fixed point where the motion ceases και καταπορεύομαι = to come back, that is, to the point which is regarded as the person's restingplace; katáraukis = a reflection, because the light has met an object and illuminated it. Secondly, actions contemplated merely with regard to their termination, though not in space, are naturally expressed by aid of this preposition. Hence karatéuvw = to cut in pieces, that is, till the cutting is done ; kategdiw = to eat up, consume,* that is, until the action ceases because there is nothing left to eat; katapeúyw = to take refuge, to escape, that is, to flee (peúyw), until the action comes to its natural end, which may either be by reaching some place where the pursuer cannot follow, and then it means to take refuge ; or, it may be, by distancing the pursuer, and then it means to escape.
From the foregoing analysis it is seen why kará, more than any other preposition, gives an intensive, and often a transitive force to the verbs with which it is connected. Other prepositions, as éri, após, point to an object in connection with the verb, but they denote some more specific relation than kará, and consequently do not so often give objective force to the verb. In this connection, we recognize the ground of the usage of Kará signifying according to, in conformity with, as κατά φύσιν, κατά τύχην. Ας down is the natural direction of things in space, every action that is done naturally, fitly, in its own sphere, may properly have this quality signified by the preposition down ; thus karà tò åndés, karà tò dikalov, and other like expressions.
* If it is said that katá here means down, then the lexicon is wrong in saying that Kateo diw means to eat up. The two expressions are perfectly distinct. The preposition up, here, has reference to the consumption of the object, the preposition down to some implied effort on the part of the ag
This analysis will rescue from the frigid interpretation that is sometimes given them a class of words in which Kará conveys the idea of disparagement, disapproval, condemnation ; as katakpívw = to condemn ; Karadokéw = to think against one. It has been said that, in this class of words, Kará has its primitive meaning, down. This is, at least, an unnatural interpretation, and entirely gratuitous. We have seen, that even in regard to actions which happen in space, kará often loses its primary, and bears a derived, meaning. In actions purely moral, then, we should much more naturally expect to find this derived signification. The word katakpivo signifies, strictly, to make one the object of a discriminating judgment; and this comes to be equivalent to condemn, by a well known mental law ; namely, that acts of judgment are called forth not by what is in harmony with ourselves, but by what in some way offends us. It is not the innocent whose conduct is marked for special notice, but the guilty ; hence, an act of judgment is, in general, an act of blame.
If with these brief indications of a logical treatment of the preposition, we open the lexicon, and examine the mass of explanations arrayed under the word, we shall see at once the want of a better method, and shall find more or less that is erroneous, and calculated only to mislead the student. The following is an instance of this : «τοξεύειν κατά τινος, κατά OKOTOW, etc., to shoot at, because the arrow falls down upon its mark.” Nothing can be worse for the student's mind than such pretended explanations as this. They cheat him of the knowledge they ought to impart, and what is worse, they substitute an absurdity in the guise of knowledge in its place. The notion of down has not the least share in the interpretation of the phrase in question. Grant that the arrow does descend somewhat before it reaches the mark, still this descent is so inconsiderable that it could form no appreciable part of the picture to the observer's eye ; consequently, it could never have suggested the necessity of employing a word to describe it. The true interpretation has already
been suggested ; Kará is employed because the mark is the point at which the action is to terminate ; and the genitive case is used, because the designed, and not the actual, termination is asserted.
We proceed now to examine the uses of the preposition åvá in connection with its primary signification as applied to things in space. The original meaning of ảvá is up. All upward motion has a natural and fixed point of departure ; namely, the surface of the earth. From this as its starting-point it extends into space without any definite limit, or point of termination. All upward motion, then, has a definite beginning, and no definite termination ; it follows, therefore, first, that actions in space which start from a fixed and known point, and pass into indefinite regions, may naturally be expressed by the aid of this preposition ; as åvandéw = to sail from port to sea, from a fixed and known point of departure into an indefinite region ; αναβαίνω = to go from the coast into the interior of a country, applied especially to an army landing, and making its progress into an unknown region ; åvolyw = to open, as a door. Secondly, actions contemplated as commencing will naturally be described by the aid of ảvá; as åvaralo = to kindle, to rouse ; dvodúpouai = to break out into wailing ; ávaxopeów = to begin a choral dance. Thirdly, as the natural motion of things is downward, an action which opposes a thing in its natural motion may be denoted by this preposition ; as åvaκρούω = to check, as a horse by drawing the reins, or as a ship by reversing the motion of the oars. By extending this idea, we come naturally to the notion of repeated action ; for if the opposing force be sufficiently increased, it will stop the motion of the thing it opposes, and reverse it, causing it to retrace its former course ; hence, in the fourth place, åvá gives the idea of repeated action ; as åvauerpéw = to measure again ; dvapáxouai = to renew the fight ; ávaxwpéw = to go back.
In the case of both these prepositions we have taken no notice of instances in which they have their primary signification, these being too obvious to require remark.
In some words, the force of ảvá and Kará in composition seems at first view to be nearly the same ; but here a close examination will show that each has its peculiar force. Thus, ivaipéw and Kabaipéw may both mean to destroy; but the former means to destroy by displacing, the latter by deNO. 135.
molishing. Consequently, whenever the existence of a thing depends solely on its position and relations, its annihilation may be expressed by avaipów ; for in that case, to remove is to annihilate; thus, δημοκράτειαν αναιρείν, not καθαιρείν. So, too, κατά την πόλιν, and ανά την πόλιν, Γmay both mean through the city; but the former expression would have reference to the completion of the action, while the latter would refer to its progress from the starting-point ; the former would naturally be used if the persons were acquainted with the city, the latter, if they were strangers ; the former with the aorist tense, the latter with the imperfect. These are only indications, in a single instance, of those nice distinctions in language which meet the observant scholar at every step of his progress. They suggest to us, if we may so call it, the intense vitality of language, – that it is organized and living to its minutesi' fibres; and dictionaries and grammars, after the most elaborate classification, can give us only the lifeless parts, instead of the breathing whole.
Without pursuing the subject before us at length, we will add a few examples, showing the importance, in the treatment of the prepositions, of a rigorous deduction from the primitive signification. The prepositions nepi and ůmép both govern the genitive, and both mean for ; as, nepi dóns, for glory; imrèp chevdepias, for freedom ; but each word retains here the traces of its original meaning. As tepi signifies about, it describes our action for a thing to which we have no special or exclusive right, just as our position in space about a thing does not prevent others from holding a similar position. But úmép is exclusive ; it describes action for that to which we have a special right, for what is rightfully our own, as standing over a thing is a natural indication that it is
Thus, Demosthenes says the war, at its beginning, was περί του τιμωρήσασθαι Φίλιππον ; but at the close, it was υπέρ του μη παθείν αυτούς κακώς υπό του Φιλίππου, because the latter was in its nature a thing for themselves to do exclusively of all other persons; the former, others might do as well as they.
When these prepositions have other significations than for, they still show on analysis distinct traces of their original meaning. Thus, in speaking of the judges of Socrates, Xenophon says, “In whatever things it was not manifest how he thought, - ουδέν θαυμαστόν, υπέρ τούτων περί αυτού παραγνώναι,
it is no wonder that on these points they misjudged about
him.' As that on, or over, which (imép) a man stands is essential to his position, the preposition mép is here used to mark the permanent relation between Socrates and certain points of duty and belief, which relation made up bis character ; while the transient relation of his judges to him is denoted by nepi. The prepositions anó and mapá, both with the genitive case, signify from ; but as napá, originally signifying beside of, denotes a more intimate relation than åtó, it is used when a thing is naturally resident in the person from whom it proceeds, -as an inheritance from a father, commands from a sovereign ; while ámó, meaning off from, denotes a merely superficial relation, and is used when one thing comes accidentally, as it were, from another.
The prepositions inó and após may both, with the genitive case, point to the remote agent, the person who causes the action; but úró merely denotes that the action takes place under the person's power ; após brings the remote and immediate agent face to face, and pictures the latter as receiving the command from the mouth of the other. Hence, the whole sad picture presented in the προς άλλης ιστoν υφαίνοις of Homer; where the captive Andromache must stand before the face of her mistress, take her commands, and go and do her bidding.
The preceding are but a few instances, which a full discussion of the subject would multiply, showing the importance of a strict logical method in treating of this part of the language. When we say, that this method is essential in order to make sure that the ordinary definitions of words shall be given correctly in the lexicon, it may seem that we assume too much ; the position, however, is strictly true. No amount of toil and care will save the lexicographer from palpable mistakes, unless he has the light of guiding principles. If he starts with an indefinite notion of a preposition, and does not, by logical forecast, keep the field of inquiry narrow before him, his lexicon will show confusion through the whole circle of words into which the preposition enters. Nowhere more than here should the inquirer remember, that prudens quæstio dimidium est scientiæ.
We have an illustration of this in hand. The verb åvaklaiw is defined in the larger lexicon before us, “ to weep aloud, to burst into tears ; also, with the accusative, to weep for, bewail, - both in Herod. 3. 14.” Now the natural question suggested by the analysis of the preposition is, Is the