covered; and the fact of plaintiff's deposit in bank, and loss of the use of the money, does not increase his equities, and as the issue of the patent is indefinite, and greater loss and inconvenience would result to defendant from enforcing the contract than to plaintiff by its abandonment, specific performance will not be decreed. It seems to be assumed by plaintiff, that if a valid and binding contract was created between himself and defendant, equity will as a matter of course decree a specific performance; but this is far from true. The law always awarded damages for breach of a contract, and that generally in transactions concerning personal property is the only remedy afforded. Equity will take hold of contracts for the sale of real property, and will enforce them specifically, but only when under all the circumstances of the case, and considering the relative situation of the | parties, it is equitable that it should do so. Now this defendant had given no authority to any one but George F. Work. George F. Work knew the exact state of his title, and he had a right to presume, when notified by the telegram of the offer made, that it contemplated the purchase of the land under the title and in accordance with the title that he held. He had had dealings with the land department at Washington theretofore; knew that often there was delay in the issue of a patent; and urgent for money, it is not to be supposed that he would approve a contract of sale with the idea that that contract was to remain unperformed for an indefinite time in the future, and to be dependent upon the perhaps distant issue of the patent. There was an obvious misunderstanding between the parties. He promptly offered to surrender every thing that he had from the plaintiff; and told him that he need not take the property. It may be true, as plaintiff says, that the misunderstanding was wholly on the other side-a matter between the defendant and his agent. It may be true that the contract was valid and binding; that the law presumes in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, that a perfect title is intended, and that the defendant was charged with notice; and especially that when the warranty deed was sent to him for execution he was bound to know that a perfect and legal title was intended to be conveyed. But notwithstanding all this the fact remains that there was a misunderstanding by the defendant in respect to the matter; and to enforce a specific performance under these circumstances might carry out the strict rules of the law, but would not be responsive to the dictates of equity. It would enforce the letter, but it would sacrifice the spirit. It is well to look a little further into the equities of these parties; and to determine their real equities we must have regard to the situation as it was when the lack of a patent was first discovered by the plaintiff, and before he made the tender. What would either party have suffered if the contract had been then abandoned? It is needless to inquire as to the present situation, for if it was inequitable to insist upon the contract at the very moment that the misunderstanding was discovered, then the plaintiff cannot increase his equities by doing an inequitable thing. If at the time of the discovery of the misunderstanding, he ought equitably to have abandoned the whole matter, it will not do for him now to say that he then placed money in the bank, and has consequently lost the benefit of that money ever since. Now at the time plaintiff had paid nothing. True he had given his check for $200, but not a dollar had been drawn upon it. If in the absence of testimony to the contrary, it may be presumed that he left the money in the bank, which otherwise he might have withdrawn and used, then all that he had lost was the use of that $200 for the two or three weeks pending the negotiations. On the other hand the defendant, if held to his contract specifically, would find (as he has found) his property tied up for months; possibly lose his investment in California, and forego the chances of a sale to some other party, who might not be so particular about the legal title. Certainly the injury to the defendant by insisting upon the contract was vastly more than the loss to the plaintiff by its abandonment. And again, defendant has not yet received his patent; nevertheless plaintiff is asking a decree for a specific performance. In other words, he is asking this court to compel a conveyance of the very title which, when offered, he declined to receive. True he asks that this court retain jurisdiction of the case and of the defendant until such time as the patent shall be issued, and that in the meantime he himself be relieved from the obligation to pay; in fact the bill has a twofold aspect-one to compel performance by defendant, and the other to delay payment by the plaintiff. Again as a general rule it may be observed in cases of this kind a leading inquiry as to who is seeking to avoid the contract. It may happen that a vendor under such a contract, seeing a chance to realize more on another sale, or believing in the rapid increase of value, seeks some technical excuse to avoid complying with his contract. When that is apparent, and the purchaser has acted in good faith, the court will readily enforce specific performance. It will punish the wrong-doer by compelling him to do that which he agreed to do. On the other hand, when the vendor is acting in good faith, is ready to perform that which he understood he had agreed to perform, to transfer all the title that he has, and the purchaser is the one who is making excuses, and seeks without present payment to hold his claim upon the property, then the courts will be very apt to say to him to pursue his remedy by an action at law, and let go his hold upon the property. Finally it may be observed that in matters of this kind courts not merely observe the words of the contract, but also have respect to the obligations of the golden rule, and that unless a plaintiff has done as he would be done by, it is useless for him to come into that forum where equity and good conscience reign supreme over the letter of the law. U. S. Cir. Ct., Neb., June 30, 1888. Rushton v. Thompson. Opinion by Brewer, J. WILLS TO CHARITY.-A will contained this clause: "The residue of my estate to be kept in reserve for further consideration in the way of charitable purposes, in a liberal way, not to any particular creed or sect of religion." Held, first, that the clause did not contain a gift of the fund, but reserved it for the further consideration of the testatrix herself; second, that if the fund was given, the gift was void, as no beneficiary was indicated, nor any person appointed to select such beneficiary. The legal rule that avoids a bequest of this general character under the conditions mentioned is too well established to admit of discussion. It is stated in all the text-books. Thus Jarman formulates it: "To constitute a charitable use there must be a donor, a trustee competent to take, a use restricted to a charitable purpose, and a definite beneficiary. In case of a grant or demise, when there is no party or parties designated who can take the property, or where they are so uncertain that the court cannot direct intelligently the execution of the trust, the property remains undisposed of, and falls to the heir or next of kin." In the present will, if there be a gift, it is "in the way of charitable purposes, in a liberal way;" and therefore unless we can say that some person has been indicated to make selection of the unnamed beneficiaries, the gift cannot be put in effect. The chancellor inferred that the clause points to the executors as the agents of this function. But the will is absolutely silent on the subject, and unless it is to be inferred that the executors are meant because of such silence, there appears to be no reason for such The very name of a scrivener outreaches him, and he is swallowed up in the praise, like Sir Hudibras in a great saddle. Nothing to be seen but the giddy feathers in his crown. Some say he's a gentleman, but he be comes the epithet as a swine's snout does a carbuncle, he is just such another dunghil rampant. The silly countryman (who seeing an ape in a scarlet coat, best [sic] his young worship and gave his lordship joy) did not slander his complement with worse application than he that names him a law giver. The cook that served up a rope in a pye (to continue the frolick) might have wrapped up such a pettifogger as this in his bill of fare. He is a will-with-a-wisp, a wit whither thou woo't. Proteus has not more shapes than he can perform offices. He can instruct with the counsellors, plead as an attorney; he has all the tricks and quillets of an informer, nay, and a bum too, for a need-in a conclusion. The fund is "to be kept in reserve for further consideration in the way of charitable purposes.' But who is to take the matter into "further consideration?" This question the testatrix very plainly has not answered. It may be that she thought that the law, through the agency of the courts, would make the necessary selection of the objects of her bounty, and distribute the moneys. It is not possible to hold, that as no trustee is designated for the purpose, therefore it is to be presumed that the executors were intended to act in that respect; for such a principle of construction would in effect be a revocation of the rule, that in cases of general bequests of this character a trustee must be indicated, for such juncture is always present when such gifts exist in a testamentary form. On both grounds the decree should be reversed. N. J. Ct. Err. & App., Aug. 7, 1888. Norcross' Adm'rs v. Murphy's Ex'rs. Opinion by Beas-word, he is a Jack-of-all-trades, and his shatter'd brain, ley, C. J. like a crackt looking-glass, represents a thousand fancies. He calls himself Esquire of the Quill, but to see how he tugs at his pen and belaboureth his halfamazed clyents with a cudgel of cramp words, it would make a dog break his halter. The jugling Skip Jack being lately put to his last shift, has metamorphosed a needle into a goose feather, and the sole of an old shoe into a sheet of paper, for the best of his profession have been forlorn taylors, outcast brokers, drunken coblers, or the offspring of such like rabble rout. He hugs the papers as the devil hugg'd the Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Celestine Mullins, respondent, v. Charles F. Chickering, and another, appellants.-Interlocutory judgment overruling demurrer reversed, demurrer sustained and the complaint dismissed-John A. Leslie, respondent, v. Jacob Lorillard and another, appel-witch, for they are an advancement of his science, lants. Order and judgment affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered for defendant on the stipulation with costs-William Bradt, appellant, v. Walter S. Church and others, respondents. Order affirmed with costs People, ex rel. Twenty-third Street Railroad, respondent, v. Rollin M. Squire, commissioner, etc., appellant. -Order affirmed with costs-Edmund D. Crossby, respondent, v. Calvin F. Cobb, appellant.-Judg- | ments affirmed with costs-In re Will of Ira Dayger. -Order affirmed with costs-Dwight S. Sweet, respondent, v. James N. Morris, appellant.-Order affirmed with costs-In re Petition of Hubert O. Thompson, commissioner, etc.-Order of General and Special Terms reversed and writ of peremptory mandamus ordered to be issued without costs-People, ex rel. West Side Railway Company, appellant, v. Joseph E. Barnard, comptroller, etc., respondent.-Order affirmed with costs-Silas H. Witherbee and others, respondents, v. John D. Slay back and another, appellauts.- -Order affirmed with costs-Michael E. Dunster and another, appellants, v. Patrick Kelly, respond. ent.- -Appeal dismissed with costs-John Hays, respondent, v. George W. Carr, impleaded, etc., appellaut. Order affirmed with costs--Elizabeth Patterson, respondent, v. John W. McCann, appellant.Judgment affirmed with costs-Cynthia Bronk, administratrix, appellant, v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, respondent. NOTES. THE CHARACTER OF A SOLICITOR IN 1675.-A correspondent has favored us with a copy of a printed pamphlet dated 1675, which he has unearthed in the course of some antiquarian researches, and which illustrates very curiously the reputation in which solicitors, as contrasted with attorneys, were then held. The pamphlet does not contain the name of any author, but, singularly enough, the title page bears the words "London: printed for K * 1675." The writer says: A solicitor is a pettifogging sophister, one whom by the same figure that a North Country peddler is a merchant man, you may stile a lawyer. List him an attorney and you smother Tom Thumb in a pudding. * * * * ** these frisk about him like a swarm of bees, yet he is a man of vast practice if he has but half a score of 'em. If his lowsie clyents chance to recover an old rotten barn or a weather-beaten cottage, he will be sure to have two-third parts for a quantum meruit. He is Lord Paramount among the shifting bailiffs, and a sworn brother to the marshall men, and is behind none of them at the extortive faculty, having the confidence to demand item for his pains and trouble, when all the while he does nothing but hover over a quart pot. He is as offensive to the attorneys as flies are to a galled horse, and whereas their ne plus ultrâ is ten groats, Mr. Solicitor forsooth claims double fees with authority, and if the clyent prove so saucy to deny it, he will rage like Tom of Bedlam, but if that will not prevail he'll cast a squeezing look like that of Vespasian. ** In the society of true and genuine lawyers he is like an owl among so many lapwings, and is no more fit to converse with them than a hog-herd is to preach a sermon or a cinder-wench to wait upon a countess. He writes a bill of costs in such worm-eaten characters that 'tis past the skill of a Rosicrucian to discover the apocaliptical meaning, yet for all that he will not abate you an ace of the summa totalis, and that, to be sure, shall be plain enough. Wherefore he may very fitly be called the inquisition of the purse, * * * and more than that, he scorns to cheat you in hugger mugger, but will not fail to do so before your face. He is like the man that cried, Any tooth good barber, rather then stand out for a wrangler, if he can pump no chink out of you. He will manage your cause for a breakfast, being a notable artist at spunging. Oh! he's a terrible slaughter man at a Thanksgiving dinner. He outstrives a bailiff in all his cheating faculties, and I know none outstrips him except his infernal grandfather. In fine he is the yeoman's horseleech, the gentleman's rubbing-brush, and the courtier's quid pro quo. He is the summum bonum of knavery; in judgment a meer pigmy; in shew the beard of a demi-blazing star. To be brief, he is like a lamp without oil, a trumpet without a sound, a smoak without fire, a fiddle out of tune, or a bell without a clapper; and differs from a lawyer as a shrimp does from a lobster, a frog from an elephant, or a tom tit from an eagle."-Solicitors' Journal. estate," and that Field "wished to pay him for his The Albany Law Journal. refusal to aid his presidential aspirations four years ALBANY, OCTOBER 27, 1888. CURRENT TOPICS. PAMPHLET entitled "The Terry Contempt " A contains the papers used on Terry's peti ago. This fellow and his wife are a pair of bad birds who should be kept caged. We are glad to see that the judges had back-bone enough to refuse the contemptuous and unrepentant application. Let this furious and unprincipled brace of adventurers be punished to the utmost extent of the law, so that it shall be understood that courts of justice are not to be bullied and assaulted and insulted in the discharge of their duty, even when they find it necessary to defeat the machinations and artifices of adventurers and conspirators, and denounce shameless effrontery, forgery and blackmailing. The affair singularly discloses what a thin veneer of civilization as yet covers the reckless passions and audacity of frontier society. tion to be discharged from imprisonment for contempt for his recent violent conduct in the United States Circuit Court at San Francisco, on the reading of the decision of the cases involving his wife's rights in the estate of the late Senator Sharon. The particulars of the scene in court are probably fresh in the recollection of all our readers. The gist of Terry's petition is that what he did was in self defense, and in resistance to an assault upon his wife; that he attempted to restrain his wife from her unseemly violence toward the court; and that he did not intend any "disrespect " toward the court; admitting that outside of the court-room, to force his way to his wife, he drew a "small sheath knife;" but nowhere expressing any regret for the occurrence, nor for his subsequent foul language toward the judges. The affidavits in reply contain overwhelming evidence against Terry. As a practical test in evidence, to show the judges the serious violence which they narrowly escaped, there are annexed to the answering affidavits pictures of the "small sheath knife," and the loaded forty-one calibre revolver found in Mrs. Terry's reticule, "life size," showing the knife to have been an unmitigated bowie, nine inches in length, the blade five inches long and triangular in shape. What Terry intended to do with this innocent "little hatchet " we cannot conceive, unless to pare his nails or pick his teeth. He was breaking the law in carrying it. As for his pretense that he tried to restrain his wife, two of the affidavits show that just before she rose to interrupt the court she whispered to him and he nodded affirmatively, whereupon she rose, and he made no attempt whatever to restrain or quiet her. When at the command of the court the marshal seized the furious woman to remove her, Terry struck him a violent blow in the face, breaking one of his teeth, and then tried to draw his tooth-pick, but for the moment was prevented. After he was disarmed and imprisoned he directed an attendant to tell the "bald-headed old son of a," Field, that he wanted some lunch. He substantially threatened to kill Field. His petition was denied, and he still languishes in durance. By a correspondence between him and his attorney it appears that he gave his "word of honor" that if the court would re- In these days of ill-ventilated and ill-lighted lease him he would avoid meeting any of the par- public buildings it is a pleasure to visit a municipal ties concerned," which we infer means that he edifice like that of Buffalo, which seems to be a would not murder them as he murdered Broderick. model in every respect. This edifice furnishes He declared however that "the decision was pur- rooms for all the county and city offices, and for chased and paid for with coin from the Sharon the Supreme, Superior and County Courts, and for In the judgment of Surrogate Ransom of New York it is worth more to be his chief clerk than a justice of the Supreme Court of this State (except in the city), or a Federal, Circuit or District Court judge, or a judge of any court of any State in the Union, except perhaps Pennsylvania. He wants a salary of eight thousand dollars for this precious person, whose name is Leary. He also wants five thousand dollars for "the first law assistant," and three thousand dollars for each of two additional "law assistants" (plumber and helper), five thousand dollars for the deputy chief clerk, five thousand dollars for the clerk of the court, five thousand dollars for the probate clerk, and sundry smaller sums for other "gifted" persons, making an aggregate of one hundred and ten thousand dollars for salaries. Truly the salary "is a tax" in the city of New York. It is no wonder that so many bright young rustics are drawn to the great city where such glittering prizes are hung up for those who get into the political swim. There are probably some two hundred practicing lawyers in the capital of this State, and we guess that not above a dozen of them regularly clear so much as eight thousand dollars a year. Not a clergyman gets above five thousand dollars, we believe. Few physicians do any better than the lawyers, and yet these persons are probably as "gifted" as these helpers in the New York Surrogate's Court. Mr. Surrogate Ransom's demand strikes us country people as extremely impudent. But why not? When there is a common council of Learys and other descendants of the Irish kings to award the moneys plundered from the unresisting natives, why should not the chief clerk possessing the magic name have eight thousand dollars a year, or twice as much, bedad, for VOL. 38 No. 17. the matter of that? the common council, and every room is light, airy We read in the London Law Journal: "The Whitechapel murderer, if such there be, has by invading the city boundary given rise to a curious illustration of the anomalies of local government Solicitors' Journal on this subject seems sounder to us. That journal says: "It is possible that the Home Office, in originally coming to the conclusion that it was unadvisable to offer rewards for the discovery of crimes, may have been influenced to some extent by the facts that such rewards have not in former times always gone to the person to whom the credit of the conviction is really due, and that great difficulty has sometimes arisen as to the person entitled to the reward. * *But while it may be unadvisable to offer rewards as a general rule, it should be remembered that in such cases as the Whitechapel outrages the importance of discovering the criminal outweighs all considerations of the difficulties and dissatisfaction which may arise from the mode of disposal of the reward." NOTES OF CASES. N Sherman v. Sherman, Iowa Supreme Court, which are now in process of being reformed. By September 7, 1888, it was held in an action on slightly widening the circle of his crimes he has had brought to bear upon him a resource of barbarism of late years relegated to the past." At this point we supposed, of course, that the writer referred to the alleged employment by the chief of police of bloodhounds to track the murderers, which had proved unsuccessful, owing perhaps to the want of a bit of clothing or some other personal appurtenance of the gentleman in question. But no. The writer proceeds: "The Home Secretary, in spite of clamor, has been steadfast in maintaining the practice inherited from his predecessors of refusing to try to catch criminals by offering large rewards. This is a policy which has now been adopted for the whole country, and it is obvious that if once broken in upon the whole mischief of information being held back by those who are waiting for the offer of a reward is revived. Unfortunately the understanding which has prevailed has only the sanction of the comity of the police authorities throughout the country, and it has no legal force. The city authorities, having the control of their own police, can revert to exploded expedients by dealing with crime from the commercial point of view with some show of right, but in point of law every private person may offer a reward for information leading to the detection of crime, and would be held to his promise in a court of law. An act of Parliament is necessary to save the administration of the law from the periodical reversion to quack remedies to which it is exposed." This shows a degree of sensibility, or rather sentimentality, which we had not looked for in a country which approves the whipping-post for certain offenders, and which certainly does not prevail in this country. It is difficult to see the impropriety in offering rewards to stimulate the activity of citizens not directly interested in the detection of criminals, and to reimburse them for loss of time and outlay of money. We are curious to know whether qui tam actions have gone out of vogue or fallen into disrepute in England. The views of the a note, the issue being whether plaintiff, the payee, had made defendant a gift of the note, and declarations made by plaintiff to defendant of an intent to make such gift having been admitted in evidence, that declarations by plaintiff, made to a third party shortly before the time of the alleged gift, expressing an intention to collect the note by legal means, there being no evidence of special design in making such statements, are not inadmissible as declarations made in plaintiff's interest, since they were made before any right had vested in defendant, and they tended to show that an intention to make the gift, if such existed, was changed before it was consummated. The court said: "The only object of the evidence introduced by the defendant tending to show that the plaintiff at some future time intended to give the note to the defendant was to strengthen and increase the probabilities that the gift was made at the time and as claimed by the defendant. Such evidence tended to show an intent to give only, and without more did not tend to establish the defense relied on. An unexecuted gift, it will be conceded, is not valid. In fact it cannot exist. But the evidence was material as showing an intent to give, and therefore had an important bearing on the question whether such intent had been consummated. The evidence proposed to be introduced had just an opposite tendency, and made it probable that while the plaintiff may have had the intent to make a gift such intention had been changed, and that about two hours prior to the time the gift is claimed to have been made the plaintiff intended not to make a gift but to insist on the payment of the note. Was the proposed evidence admissible? Counsel for the appellee insist it was not, because it was a declaration in favor of the plaintiff, and against the interest of the defendant. The declaration preceded the gift, and prior to the time any right had vested in the defendant, and we think the evidence was explanatory of the prior declarations of the plain tiff that he intended to give the note to the defendant. The intent of a person to do or not to do any given thing can only be shown by bis acts, declarations and conduct, and when declarations are introduced in evidence tending to show such intent, other and subsequent declarations tending to show a contrary intent, made prior to the consummation of the act, are admissible for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine what in fact the name of the person was, and thus making it probable or improbable that the act, whatever it may be in controversy, was consummated in accordance with the expressed intent of the party. This class of evidence constitutes an exception to the general rule, and may or may not be admissible, according to the circumstances of each particular case. It is difficult to establish a general rule applicable to all cases. The circumstances under which the declaration is made, its possible object, and whether made with an evident design and purpose, may affect its admissibility, and certainly will have an important bearing on the weight to be attached thereto. In the case at bar we discover no suspicious circumstances indicating an object or purpose on the part of the plaintiff except to express to a relative, with whom he was visiting, his then intention in relation to the note and what he intended to do with it, contradictory of and to any previous intent he may have had to give it to the defendant. Of course if a controversy had arisen at the time the declaration to Mathews was made between these parties as to the proposed gift or intention to do so; if such intent amounted to a vested right a different rule might prevail. The foregoing views, to a greater or less extent, are sustained by the following authorities: Darby v. Rice, 2 Nott & McC. 596; Miller v. Eatman, 11 Ala. 609; Stone v. Stroud, 6 Rich. Law, 306; Whitney v. Wheeler, 116 Mass. 490; Whitwell v. Winslow, 132 id. 307; Joyce v. Hamilton (Ind.) 12 N. E. Rep. 294; Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112; Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 248, note. Counsel for the defendant have cited many cases in support of this theory, but we think they are all distinguishable. In some the declaration was subsequent to the gift, and in none of them, we think, was the declaration sought to be introduced in evidence because contradictory to or as bearing on the question as to the existence of an unexecuted intent." In Re Lord Colin Campbell, Court of Appeals, March 3, 1888, 59 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 194, the debtor's bankruptcy was caused by his having incurred heavy costs in connection with divorce proceedings instituted by him against his wife and four corespondents, which proceedings were unsuccessful, and the costs of which he was ordered to pay. Held, that the bankruptcy had not been "caused by misfortune without any misconduct on his part within the meaning of the statute. Esher, M. R., said: "It is next to impossible to give any exhaustive definition of the word 'misfortune.' Many have been suggested, but putting it more in a nega tive than in an affirmative form, I think we must say thus much, that where the bankruptcy is not solely the result of some accident, over which or over the directly conducing cause of which the bankrupt has no control, it cannot be said to arise from misfortune. * * * The costs therefore which caused this bankruptcy were incurred in, and were the direct result of matters over which the debtor had control, and therefore I think that his appeal fails, because he has not shown that his bankruptcy was caused by misfortune." Fry, J., said: "I shall not attempt to give any exhaustive definition of either 'misfortune' or 'misconduct' as used in this section; it is too early in the history of this legislation; nevertheless we should, I think, make some essay toward a definition. It appears to me that for the purposes of the present discussion, 'misfortune' is equivalent to some adverse event not immediately dependent on the actions or will of him who suffers from it, and of so improbable a character that no prudent man would take it into his calculations in reference to the interests either of himself or of others. I will endeavor to illustrate my meaning. A man, who was reduced to poverty by an act of God destroying his property, might be said to have suffered from misfortune without any misconduct on his part. The prosperity of Job was overthrown by the simultaneous occurrence of four unusual events, the attack of the Sabeans, the inroad of the Chaldeans, the fire from heaven, and the wind from the wilderness, and his consequent poverty might have been regarded as in no way disqualifying him from holding any office of trust in his tribe. But on the other hand a man who gambles so that if he is unsuccessful he cannot pay his creditors, does not owe his situation to misfortune without misconduct, though he would probably say that he had been unfortunate in his play. It has been impressed upon us that the idea conveyed in the clause is a single idea, but to this I cannot agree. In my opinion there are two distinct ideas, and if the event which causes the bankruptcy is due partly to 'misfortune' and partly to 'misconduct,' it cannot come within the exemption. Applying these observations to the case in hand, it presents itself in this way: A man of slender means brings an action, and incurs expenses in support of it far beyond any thing he can pay should he fail. The action is unsuccessful, and under such circumstances that the court in its discretion visits him with costs, and he becomes bankrupt in consequence. Is the event which induced his bankruptcy, under these circumstances, misfortune without misconduct?' It is apparent from what I have said that I do not think |