ipso usu consumuntur: nam eae neque naturali ratione neque civili recipiunt usum fructum. quo numero sunt vinum oleum frumentum vestimenta. quibus proxima est pecunia numerata : namque in ipso usu adsidua permutatione quodammodo extinguitur. sed utilitatis causa senatus censuit posse etiam earum rerum usum fructum constitui, ut tamen eo nomine heredi utiliter caveatur. itaque si pecuniae usus fructus legatus sit, ita datur legatario, ut eius fiat, et legatarius satisdat heredi de tanta pecunia restituenda, si morietur aut capite minuetur. ceterae quoque res ita traduntur legatario, ut eius fiant: sed aestimatis his satisdatur, ut, si morietur aut capite minuetur, tanta pecunia restituatur, quanti eae fuerint aestimatae. ergo senatus non fecit quidem earum rerum usum fructum (nec enim poterat), sed per cautionem quasi usum fructum con3 stituit. Finitur autem usus fructus morte fructuarii et duabus capitis deminutionibus, maxima et media, et non utendo per modum et tempus, quae omnia nostra statuit constitutio. item finitur usus fructus, si domino proprietatis ab usufructuario cedatur (nam extraneo cedendo nihil agitur): vel ex contrario si fructuarius proprietatem rei adquisierit, quae res consolidatio appellatur. eo amplius constat, si aedes incendio consumptae fuerint vel etiam terrae motu aut vitio suo corruerint, extingui usum fructum et ne areae quidem usum fructum de introduced, though not precisely known, is supposed to lie between Cicero (on account of Top. 3 'non debet ea mulier, cui vir bonorum suorum usumfructum legavit, cellis vinariis et oleariis plenis relictis, putare ad se pertinere, usus enim, non abusus legatus est') and the enactment of the lex Papia Poppaea, which often speaks of usufruct of a part of a whole property. Doubtless the main object of the innovation was to enable testators to bequeath a general usufruct over all their property. That the right was not a usufruct proper is clear from the text (nec usufructus est' fragm. Vat. 46, 'non id effectum, ut pecuniae ususfructus proprie esset' Dig. 7. 5. 2. 1). Under the senatus-consult it could be created only by will (ut omnium rerum, quas in cuiusque patrimonio esse constaret, ususfructus legari possit' Dig. 7. 5. 1), and was extinguished only by death and capitis deminutio of the person entitled, Dig. ib. 9 and 10. §3. The jurists seem to have disagreed as to the effect of an attempt to cede a usufruct to a third person: Gaius (ii. 30) states the law in the same way as the text, and fragm. Vat. 75 agrees; but in Dig. 23. 3. 66 Pomponius writes 'si extraneo cedatur, nihil ad eum transire, sed ad dominum proprietatis reversurum usumfructum.' Upon 'et ne areae beri. Cum autem finitus fuerit usus fructus, revertitur scilicet 4 ad proprietatem et ex eo tempore nudae proprietatis dominus incipit plenam habere in re potestatem. V. DE USU ET HABITATIONE. Isdem istis modis, quibus usus fructus constituitur, etiam nudus usus constitui solet isdemque illis modis finitur, quibus et usus fructus desinit. Minus autem scilicet iuris in 1 usu est quam in usu fructu. namque is, qui fundi nudum usum habet, nihil ulterius habere intellegitur, quam ut oleribus pomis floribus feno stramentis lignis ad usum cottidianum utatur: in eoque fundo hactenus ei morari licet, ut neque domino fundi molestus sit neque his, per quos opera rustica fiunt, impedimento sit: nec ulli alii ius quod habet aut vendere aut locare aut gratis concedere potest, cum is qui usum fructum habet potest haec omnia facere. Item is, qui aedium usum habet, hactenus iuris habere intel- 2 legitur, ut ipse tantum habitet, nec hoc ius ad alium transferre potest et vix receptum videtur, ut hospitem ei recipere liceat. quidem, etc., Theophilus says ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδάφους, ἀλλ ̓ οἰκίας αὐτῷ παρεχωρήθη ὁ οὐσουφρούκτος. Tit. V. The points wherein usus differed from usufruct are clearly pointed out in §§ 1-4. The commonest mode in which the right was created was testament, and upon the principle 'in testamentis plenius voluntates testantium interpretamur' the powers of the usuary were then sometimes enlarged beyond their normal compass in order to give effect to the bequest: e. g. if the usus were bequeathed of a wood so distant that it would not pay the legatee to go and fetch the timber for personal consumption, he might sell it, Dig. 7. 8. 22. pr. On the same principle the legatee of the usus of a house might let such part of it as he did not require for himself and his family, Dig. ib. 2. 1, but not the whole : though the general rule was that a usuary could not transfer even the enjoyment of his right or any part of it, for to let another use a thing is not to use it oneself, and to do so for a merces is practically fructus. § 1. For the transfer by a usufructuary of the actual enjoyment of his right see the concluding note on Tit. 3 supr.: alii fruendam concedere, vel locare, vel vendere potest (usufructuarius) ... precario concedat vel donet' Dig. 7. I. 12. 2. § 2. Before Q. Mucius even the husband of a woman to whom the usus et cum uxore sua liberisque suis, item libertis nec non aliis liberis personis, quibus non minus quam servis utitur, habitandi ius habeat: et convenienter si ad mulierem usus aedium 3 pertineat, cum marito habitare liceat. Item is, ad quem servi usus pertinet, ipse tantum operis atque ministerio eius uti potest ad alium vero nullo modo ius suum transferre ei con4 cessum est. idem scilicet iuris est et in iumento. Sed si pecoris vel ovium usus legatus fuerit, neque lacte neque agnis neque lana utetur usuarius, quia ea in fructu sunt. plane ad stercorandum agrum suum pecoribus uti potest. 5 Sed si cui habitatio legata sive aliquo modo constituta sit, neque usus videtur neque usus fructus, sed quasi proprium aliquod ius. quam habitationem habentibus propter rerum utilitatem secundum Marcelli sententiam nostra decisione promulgata permisimus non solum in ea degere, sed etiam aliis locare. 6 Haec de servitutibus et usu fructu et usu et habitatione dixisse sufficiat. de hereditate autem et de obligationibus suis locis proponamus. exposuimus summatim, quibus modis iure gentium res adquiruntur: modo videamus, quibus modis legitimo et civili iure adquiruntur. of a house was given might not live in it with her, Dig. 7. 8. 4. 1: whether the usuary's liberti might be housed was a question to the time of Celsus, Dig. ib. 2. 1. With aliis quibus non minus quam servis utitur' cf. Dig. 7. 8. 4. pr. 'quos loco servorum in operis habet, licet liberi sint.' § 4. The ius stercorandi seems to correspond to the usus cottidianus of § I supr. § 5. It was a question among the jurists whether habitatio and operae servorum sive animalium were distinct rights from usus and usufruct: 'operis servi legatis usum datum intellegi et ego didici et Iulianus existimat' Clemens in Dig. 7. 7. 5; for the different views respecting habitatio see Ulpian in Dig. 7. 8. 10, and Cod. 33. 3. 13. Finally the distinction was admitted; the points of difference between these two rights and usus, which they most resemble, being that mentioned in the text, and that they were not extinguished by non-user or capitis deminutio, Dig. 7. 8. 10. pr. For the three iura in re aliena which were not servitudes see Excursus II at the end of this Book. § 6. Having described the natural modes of acquiring res (corporales) singulae in Tit. I Justinian takes occasion, after drawing the distinction between things corporeal and incorporeal in Tit. 2, to discuss an im VI. DE USUCAPIONIBUS ET LONGI TEMPORIS POSSESSIONIBUS. Iure civili constitutum fuerat, ut, qui bona fide ab eo, qui dominus non erat, cum crediderit eum dominum esse, rem emerit vel ex donatione aliave qua iusta causa acceperit, is eam rem, si mobilis erat, anno ubique, si immobilis, biennio He now returns to the civil portant branch of the latter, viz. servitudes. modes of acquisition, which are two in number, usucapio (Tit. 6), and donatio (Tit. 7). It has been already observed that in the Roman system civil are older than natural titles. Three of the former were obsolete before Justinian's time, or were abolished by him, viz. (1) Addictio in the wider sense, the making over of property to individuals in the name of the people by the decree of a magistrate, especially in the form of emptio sub corona (Gell. 7. 4), and sectio bonorum. (2) In iure cessio, a voluntary transfer effected under magisterial authority through the fiction of a suit at law, as in the English fines and recoveries. It is described by Gaius ii. 24, who tells us (25) that even in his day it had been abandoned for the conveyance of corporeal single things, though still used in manumissions (note on Bk. i. 5. 1 supr.), emancipations, adoptions (note on Bk. i. 11. 2 supr.), transfer of tutela legitima libertae (Ulpian, reg. 19. 11), creation of servitudes, and conveyance of the right to accept an inheritance (Gaius ii. 35-37). In Justinian's time it had altogether disappeared. (3) Mancipatio res mancipi (viz. land and rustic servitudes in Italy, slaves, domestic beasts of burden, free persons in potestas, manus or mancipium, and under certain circumstances a man's whole property in the aggregate (familia)) could be conveyed in full ownership only by this or in iure cessio; it is described by Gaius i. 119-122. Mancipation disappeared from the law of Justinian owing to his abolition of the distinction between res mancipi and nec mancipi, Cod. 7. 31. : Two other civil modes of acquisition still operative under Justinian are not here treated by him, viz. (4) Lex, which includes legacy (Tit. 20. pr. inf.) and caduca and ereptitia; Ulpian, reg. 19. 17. (5) Adiudicatio, the sentence of a judge in a iudicium divisorium, whereby property vests in the individual in severalty without the necessity of ordinary conveyance, Bk. iv. 17. 8 inf. The next Title, on the subject of usucapio, presupposes some knowledge of the Roman law of Possession. For this see Excursus III at the end of this Book. Tit. VI. Usucapio est adiectio dominii per continuationem posses tantum in Italico solo usucapiat, ne rerum dominia in incerto essent. et cum hoc placitum erat, putantibus antiquioribus dominis sufficere ad inquirendas res suas praefata tempora, nobis melior sententia resedit, ne domini maturius suis rebus defraudentur neque certo loco beneficium hoc concludatur. et ideo constitutionem super hoc promulgavimus, qua cautum sionis temporis lege definiti' Dig 41. 3. 2; it was as old as the Twelve Tables, in which it is called ususauctoritas. For its operation the following conditions were required to be satisfied :— (1) Usucapio, being a mode of acquiring dominium ex iure Quiritium, presupposes (a) that the person acquiring has the commercium: by this peregrini were excluded: 'adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas' (b) that the thing, which is to be acquired, is not only capable of being possessed, but is in commercio. This excludes free men (Gaius ii. 48), res divini iuris (ib.) and res publicae, in particular solum provinciale (ib. 46); the last, however, could be possessed (Savigny, Poss. § 9). In addition to this, certain things were prohibited by positive enactment from being acquired in this way, especially res furtivae and vi possessae (§ 2 inf.), res mancipi of women in agnatic guardianship, unless delivered by the woman herself with the guardian's auctoritas (Gaius ii. 47); res fiscales (§ 14 inf.); property of the emperor (Cod. 7. 38), and of minors (Cod. 7. 35. 3); res dotales under certain circumstances, and immoveable property of religious and charitable corporations. (2) The object must be 'possessed,' not merely detained, during the period required by law, and (3) The possession must have originated in a iusta causa or a iustus titulus (usucapio, non praecedente vero titulo, procedere non potest, nec prodesse neque tenenti neque heredi eius potest' Cod. 7. 29. 4; cf. the opening section of this Title), and have been accompanied at its inception by bona fides (§§ 1 and 3 inf.). Both of these expressions need a little elucidation. By the requirement of iusta causa is meant that the possessor must have got possession in some way which would have made him owner, only that in the particular case, owing to some external defect, acquisition of possession is not equivalent to acquisition of ownership; Justinian's language in the first lines of the text is misleading, as the chief use of usucapio was in cases where res mancipi were transferred by mere traditio (Gaius ii. 41), p. 187 supr. causae of course are numerous, the clue to them in the authorities being the word 'pro' (possidet pro soluto, pro empto, pro herede, pro donato, pro derelicto, pro legato, pro dote, etc.). By bona fides is meant a negative rather than a positive state of mind, i. e. ignorance, occasioned by excusable error, of the circumstances which prevent the acquisition of ownership ('qui ignorabat... alienum... bonae fidei possessor' Dig. 48. 15. 3. pr.); the cases in which its presence can be really a question are cases of materially defective acquisition, where the usucapio has to prevail against an actual (and not merely Quiritarian) owner, as e. g. if a Such |