legitimo matrimonio natus est. et ideo si quis per imperatorem sive apud praetorem vel apud praesidem provinciae non extraneum adoptaverit, potest eundem alii in adoptionem 9 dare. Sed et illud utriusque adoptionis commune est, quod et hi, qui generare non possunt, quales sunt spadones, adoptare 10 possunt, castrati autem non possunt. Feminae quoque adoptare non possunt, quia nec naturales liberos in potestate sua habent: sed ex indulgentia principis ad solatium liberorum 11 amissorum adoptare possunt. Illud proprium est illius adoptionis, quae per sacrum oraculum fit, quod is, qui liberos in potestate habet, si se adrogandum dederit, non solum ipse potestati adrogatoris subicitur, sed etiam liberi eius in eiusdem fiunt potestate tamquam nepotes. sic enim et divus Augustus non ante Tiberium adoptavit, quam is Germanicum adoptavit: ut protinus adoptione facta incipiat Germanicus Augusti nepos 12 esse. Apud Catonem bene scriptum refert antiquitas, servi si a domino adoptati sint, ex hoc ipso posse liberari. unde et nos eruditi in nostra constitutione etiam eum servum, quem

§ 8. One could not readopt an adoptive child whom one had emancipated or given in adoption, Dig. 1. 7. 37. 1, though this could be done with a natural child, in which case the latter was, in most respects, as if he had never left the family: but in relation to his own children, who had remained in their grandfather's power, his position was different : ... mortuo (avo) nepos in patris non revertitur potestatem' Dig. 1. 7. 41. Again, adoptive did not, like natural children, retain the ius liberorum after emancipation, Bk. iii. 1. 11 inf. For other minor differences between a natural and an adoptive child cf. Tit. 25 pr. inf., fragm. Vat. 169, 196, Tac. Ann. 15. 19.

§ 9. After Justinian's changes, described on § 2 supr., it was of course impossible for a spado to adopt plenè, because none could do this but a natural ascendant, and ex vi termini he could have no issue, but he could adrogate.

§ 10. The earliest instance of this quasi-adoption by women of which we know is that of Galba by his stepmother, Suet. Galba 4: it was first generally permitted by Diocletian and Maximian, in Cod. 8. 48. 5. Children thus adopted could of course not be in potestas, but the act produced the relation of parent and child, and thus conferred on the latter rights of intestate succession, and to bring the querela inofficiosi testamenti (Bk. ii. 18 inf.), if passed over in the adoptive mother's will.

§ 11. For the adoption of Tiberius by Augustus cf. Tac. Ann. 4. 57, Suet. Tiberius 15.

§ 12. It is not clear whether Cato was thinking of adrogation of a slave by his own dominus, or of the master's giving him in adoption to a third

dominus actis intervenientibus filium suum nominaverit, liberum esse constituimus, licet hoc ad ius filii accipiendum ei non sufficit.

XII.

QUIBUS MODIS IUS POTESTATIS SOLVITUR.

Videamus nunc, quibus modis ii, qui alieno iuri subiecti sunt, eo iure liberantur. et quidem servi quemadmodum potestate liberantur, ex his intellegere possumus, quae de servis manumittendis superius exposuimus. hi vero, qui in potestate parentis sunt, mortuo eo sui iuris fiunt. sed hoc

person, though certainly the words read in favour of the former view. According to that, his argument would seem to have been as follows:a slave can become free by a resolution of the people, without manumission by his dominus: consequently adrogation by his master (which took place populi auctoritate) must make him free too. But possibly Cato was thinking of the second case, which many of the older jurists regarded as quite lawful: alioquin si iuris ista antiquitas servetur, etiam servus a domino per praetorem dari in adoptionem potest, idque ait (Sabinus) plerosque iuris veteris auctores posse fieri scripsisse, Gellius 5. 19. Adoption (until Justinian) involved a vindicatio, as the adoptans claimed the adoptee as his son from his present father, and we may suppose that the jurists referred to by Gellius inferred from this vindicatio a tacit vindicatio in libertatem,' and treated the giving in adoption as equivalent to a manumission by vindicta. The words of Gellius, however, strongly suggest that under the late law slaves could not be given in adoption by their masters. The constitution referred to by Justinian is in Cod. 7. 6. 10.

The acta intervenientia were the official records of a magistrate or judge. Even under the Republic it had not been unusual for magistrates to cooperate in private dispositions by entering a minute of them in their records (gesta et acta), which entry served as irrefragable evidence of the transaction. Later, a special effect was in some cases given to such entries by statute (e. g. in testaments, and in the appointment of procurators), and after Constantine 'insinuatio' or entry in the acta was required by statute to give validity to many dispositions. Thus in Dig. 2. 4. 17 we have apud acta promittere (cf. Bk. ii. 7. 2 inf.): actis mandatum insinuare (Bk. iv. 11. 3 inf.): actorum testificatione conficere donationem (Cod. 8. 54. 7): apud acta contestari (Dig. 50. 2. 7. 3): interrogari et profiteri (Cod. 7. 16. 24); and judicial appeals were also registered in the acta, apud or inter acta appellare, Dig. 49. 1. 2. 4. The right to take acta belonged to municipal magistrates (Paul. sent. rec. I. 3. I, Cod. 1. 56. 2) as well as to magistrates with jurisdiction.

Tit. XII. What Justinian says about grandchildren not becoming sui

distinctionem recipit. nam mortuo patre sane omnimodo filii filiaeve sui iuris efficiuntur. mortuo vero avo non omnimodo nepotes neptesque sui iuris fiunt, sed ita, si post mortem avi in potestatem patris sui recasuri non sunt: itaque si moriente avo pater eorum et vivit et in potestate patris sui est, tunc post obitum avi in patris sui potestate fiunt: si vero is, quo tempore avus moritur, aut iam mortuus est aut exiit de potestate patris, tunc hi, quia in potestatem eius cadere non 1 possunt, sui iuris fiunt. Cum autem is, qui ob aliquod maleficium in insulam deportatur, civitatem amittit, sequitur ut, quia eo modo ex numero civium Romanorum tollitur, perinde acsi mortuo eo desinant liberi in potestate eius esse. pari ratione et si is, qui in potestate parentis sit, in insulam deportatus fuerit, desinit in potestate parentis esse. sed si ex indulgentia principali restituti fuerint, per omnia pristinum

iuris on the grandfather's death, if their own father is in the same potestas with them, must be qualified by what has been said above on Tit. 11. 8 in remarking upon Dig. 1. 7. 41.

§ 1. In the time of Gaius (i. 128) condemnation to loss of civitas took the form of aquae et ignis interdictio, which originally was merely a solemn confirmation of voluntary exile by which an accused civis withdrew himself from a criminal prosecution, and only subsequently came to be used, apart from that, as a form of punishment; see Livy 25.4; 26. 3, Cic. pro Caec. 33. 34. After Gaius it became more usual to inflict loss of civitas by deportatio in insulam, a sentence of banishment for life to either an island or some confined space on the mainland, Dig. 32. 1. 3. Deportation of either child or father put an end to potestas, because (Tit. 9. 2 supr.) 'ius potestatis proprium est civium Romanorum:' by losing his civitas the child lost his capacity of being in potestas, the father that of exercising it. In case of restoration by imperial favour, as mentioned in the text, it seems that at first only such rights were recovered as were expressly specified (Vitellius ab exilio reversis iura libertorum concessit, Tac. Hist. 2. 92), and this was true in particular of patria potestas: 'in insulam filio deportato, hacque ratione vinculo paternae potestatis exempto, si postea ex indulgentia divi Alexandri, ut proponis, reditus in patrium solum praecedensque dignitas restituta sit, potestas tamen patria repetita non videtur' Gordian in Cod. 9. 51.6; but this must probably be taken to have been overruled by Constantine in Cod. loc. cit. 13, 'in quaestione testamenti, quod deportati filius remeante patre fecisset, remotis Ulpiani atque Pauli notis Papiniani placet valere sententiam, ut in patris filius sit potestate, cui dignitas ac bona restituta sunt.' It will be observed that here the termination of the patria potestas was accompanied by capitis deminutio. In one or two

statum recipiunt. Relegati autem patres in insulam in po- 2 testate sua liberos retinent: et e contrario liberi relegati in potestate parentum remanent. Poenae servus effectus filios 3 in potestate habere desinit. servi autem poenae efficiuntur, qui in metallum damnantur et qui bestiis subiciuntur. Filius 4 familias si militaverit, vel si senator vel consul fuerit factus, manet in patris potestate. militia enim vel consularia dignitas patris potestate filium non liberat. sed ex constitutione nostra summa patriciatus dignitas ilico ab imperialibus codicillis praestitis a patria potestate liberat. quis enim patiatur patrem quidem posse per emancipationis modum suae potestatis nexibus filium relaxare, imperatoriam autem celsitudinem non valere eum quem sibi patrem elegit ab aliena eximere potestate? Si ab hostibus captus fuerit parens, quamvis 5 servus hostium fiat, tamen pendet ius liberorum propter ius postliminii: quia hi, qui ab hostibus capti sunt, si reversi

anomalous cases, however, the pater was deprived of his potestas as a punishment, without the child being capite minutus: e. g. for exposing his children, Cod. 8. 52. 2, for compelling them to prostitute themselves, Cod. 11. 40. 6, and for contracting an incestuous marriage, Nov. 12. 2.

§ 2. Relegation was banishment unattended with any loss of civil rights: 'relegati in insulam in potestate suos liberos retinent, quia et alia omnia iura sua retinent: tantum enim insula eis egredi non licet: et bona quoque sua omnia retinent praeter ea, si quae eis adempta sunt' Dig. 48. 22. 7. 2-4. So too Ovid says (Trist. 4. 9. 11) 'Omnia ... Caesar mihi iura reliquit, Et sola est patria poena carere mea.'

§ 3. For the poenae servus see on Tit. 3. 4 supr. Loss of liberty of course entailed loss of citizenship, whether the master were 'poena' or any one else, Tit. 16. 1 inf.

§ 4. There had always been certain dignities, by the attainment of which a child in power was released therefrom without undergoing capitis deminutio: thus a son who became flamen Dialis, and a daughter who became virgo Vestalis (Gaius iii. 114, i. 130) were released from power, though still remaining members of their old agnatic family. The Patriciate of the later Empire seems to have originated in the old practice of calling persons of advanced age pater as a compliment or token of respect, Horace, Ep. i. 6. 54-55, Νέρων . . . πατέρα αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ὀνομάζων Dio Cass. 63. 17, ‘ad Ulpianum praefectum praetorio et parentem meum' Alexander in Cod. 4. 65. 4. Besides the Patriciate, Justinian attached this effect also to elevation to sundry other high dignities, especially that of consul and bishop, Nov. 81. pr. 3.

...

5. The ius postliminii was an institution by which rights which under

fuerint, omnia pristina iura recipiunt. idcirco reversus et liberos habebit in potestate, quia postliminium fingit eum qui captus est semper in civitate fuisse: si vero ibi decesserit, exinde, ex quo captus est pater, filius sui iuris fuisse videtur. ipse quoque filius neposve si ab hostibus captus fuerit, similiter dicimus propter ius postliminii ius quoque potestatis parentis in suspenso esse. dictum est autem postliminium a limine et post, ut eum, qui ab hostibus captus in fines nostros postea pervenit, postliminio reversum recte dicimus. nam limina sicut in domibus finem quendam faciunt, sic et imperii finem limen esse veteres voluerunt. hinc et limes dictus est quasi finis quidam et terminus. ab eo postliminium dictum, quia eodem limine revertebatur, quo amissus erat. sed et qui victis 6 hostibus recuperatur, postliminio rediisse existimatur. Praeterea emancipatione quoque desinunt liberi in potestate parentum esse. sed ea emancipatio antea quidem vel per antiquam legis observationem procedebat, quae per imaginarias venditiones et intercedentes manumissiones celebra-batur, vel ex imperiali rescripto. nostra autem providentia et

ordinary circumstances would have been destroyed (by captivity) were merely suspended for an indefinite time, until the occurrence of some event. It has two aspects, passive and active. In the former, a person returning, or a thing recovered, from captivity is restored to the power in which he or it was previous to the capture: e. g. free persons in power (Bk. ii. 1. 17 inf.), slaves, land, ships, horses, and mules, Dig. 49. 15. 2. 3 and 19. 10, Cic. Top. 8. In its active aspect, a person who has been in captivity recovers all his previous rights, provided (1) that this was the intention of his return, Dig. 49. 15.5.3: (2) that he did not desert, or voluntarily surrender, or was not surrendered by the state: i.e. he must have been bona fide captured with arms in his hands: and (3) that the return did not take place during an armistice, Dig. 49. 15. 19. 1. In Gaius' time the exact position of children whose father died in captivity was not settled: 'si vero illic mortuus sit, erunt quidem liberi sui iuris, sed utrum ex hoc tempore quo mortuus est apud hostes parens, an ex illo quo ab hostibus captus est, dubitari potest' i. 129. The derivation of the word given in this section originated with Scaevola, and was accepted by Festus, Boethius, and Isidorus, but rejected by Sulpicius, Cic. Top. 8.

For the recovery of his tutela by a tutor under the ius postliminii see Tit. 20. 2. inf.; and for the application of the doctrine to testaments, Bk. ii. 12. 5 inf.

§ 6. Emancipation was not effectual unless three conditions were satis