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his wife. By the law of Belgium, Aug. 6, 1881, and by the law of France, June 26, 1889, it was made easier for foreigners who had married women natives of those states to acquire Belgian or French nationality respectively. The United States law, while holding that a woman marrying a citizen of the United States acquires his nationality, does not hold that an American woman on marrying a foreigner thereby becomes expatriated, unless she takes up her residence in her husband's state.1

(b) A state may acquire jurisdiction over persons by naturalization, which is an act of sovereignty by which a foreigner is admitted to citizenship in another state. The method of naturalization is in accord with local law and varies greatly in different states.2 The law of the United States prescribes that Congress has power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.”3 The foreigner desiring naturalization in the United States must declare on oath before a court "two years, at least, prior to his admission," his intent to become a citizen. After five years of residence he may obtain citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the United States and of renunciation of his former country. An alien who has resided in the United States the three years next preceding the attaining of his majority and who continues to reside in this country at the time of his application, may, after reaching twenty-one years of age, and after residing here five years including the three years of minority, become a citizen by making a declaration at the time of admission.4

1 U. S. Rev. Sts., § 1994; 1 Gould and Tucker, 479; 2 ibid., 178. 23 Pradier-Fodéré, 1656 ff. 3 Constitution of U. S., Art. I., § 8. 4U, S. Rev. Sts., §§ 2165-2174; 1 Gould and Tucker, 513; 2 ibid., 202.

(c) A state may acquire jurisdiction over persons by annexation of the territory upon which they reside. The territory may be acquired by cession, exchange, purchase, conquest, etc. The conditions of the transfer of allegiance from the state formerly possessing the territory is usually fixed by the treaty. This transfer is known as collective naturalization.

Ordinarily a right to choose the allegiance to either state is left to the inhabitants of an annexed territory. Removal from the new jurisdiction is usually required if the inhabitant does not choose to change his allegiance. If the inhabitant does not take any action, it is held that he thereby tacitly transfers his allegiance unless there are special treaty provisions.1

(d) The effect of naturalization, whatever the method, is to make the person a citizen of the state into which he is admitted, and over him that state has jurisdiction in all places outside the jurisdiction of the state whose allegiance he has forsworn.

There is conflict of the laws determining the relations to his native state of a person who has renounced his allegiance to one state by naturalization in another state. The general law is, that he becomes entitled to all the privileges of a subject of the state of his new allegiance, except that when he is within his first state he becomes liable for the performance of any obligation which he may have incurred prior to his naturalization.2

A state may determine what conditions must be fulfilled in order to constitute a valid severance of allegiance. Laws are diverse upon this subject. Many states 1 2 Pradier-Fodéré, 863; 3 ibid., 1671 ff.

2 Treaties of U. S., 1262; 2 Whart., § 181.

have maintained, and some still maintain, that allegiance is inalienable.1 England formally maintained this principle till 1870, and her attempts to enforce the principle brought on the War of 1812 with the United States.

In certain countries, as in the United States and Switzerland, minor children are held to follow the allegiance of their father in case of naturalization. The French law claims that the minor child's nationality is that of his birthplace. The subject has been determined in some instances by treaty stipulation, yet must be considered, like many questions of naturalization, as unsettled.

Many states distinguish in law and more in practice between that naturalization which carries with it protection of the state and allegiance of the subject (naturalisation ordinaire) and that naturalization which carries full political privileges (grande naturalisation).

(e) Incomplete naturalization. The fact that a person has taken the preliminary steps toward acquiring the nationality of a foreign state, by making a declaration of his intention or otherwise, may give the state to which the person has assumed an inchoate allegiance the right of protection of the declarant against third states, though not necessarily against the native state of the declarant. Of the privileges to be accorded to one who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, Secretary Marcy said, "The declaration, indeed, is prima facie evidence that the person who made it was, at its date,

1 Hall, § 71,
p. 240 ff.

22 Whart., § 175, Frelinghuysen to Wallace, March 25, 1887.
3 2 Whart., § 175, Bayard to Williams, Oct. 29, 1885.

domiciled in the United States, and entitled thereby, though not to all, to certain rights of a citizen, and to much more consideration when abroad than is due to one who has never been in our country; but the declarant, not being a citizen under our laws, even while domiciled here, cannot enjoy all the rights of citizenship either here or abroad;"1 and Mr. Marcy also says of the papers proving domicile, "And to this simple certificate . . . the European authorities are at liberty to pay such respect as they think proper."2

3

In 1853 a case arose in which the United States affirmed: "It is a maxim of international law that domicile confers national character; . . . international law looks only to the national character in determining what country has the right to protect. If a person goes from this country abroad, with the nationality of the United States, this law enjoins upon other nations to respect him, in regard to protection, as an American citizen." This statement was made in support of the position assumed by the United States in the case of one Martin Koszta. Koszta, a Hungarian refugee of 18481849, went to Turkey, was imprisoned, later was released on condition of leaving the country, went to the United States, declared his intention to become a citizen, and in 1853 returned to Turkey. He went into business at Smyrna, obtained there a traveling pass certifying that he was under protection of the United States, was seized, thrown into the sea by persons employed by the Austrian consulate, and was picked up by an Austrian

12 Whart., § 193, Marcy to Seibels, May 27, 1854.
22 Whart., § 193, Marcy to Fay, May 27, 1854.

8 2 Whart., § 198, Marcy to Hüselmann, Sept. 26, 1853.

man-of-war, Hussar.

The consul of the United States remonstrated, but the captain of the Hussar held Koszta. The chargé d'affaires requested the aid of a United States man-of-war, whose captain demanded Koszta's release. To avoid conflict in the port the mediation of the French consul was accepted, and Koszta was intrusted, pending settlement of claims, to the French consul. Finally Koszta was allowed to return to the United States, though Austria maintained her right to proceed against him if he returned to Turkey. The United States in this case undoubtedly took an extreme position in its claim of jurisdiction.

By an act of March 3, 1863, the United States declared that those who had taken the preliminary oath of intention to become citizens were liable to military service. Upon protest by foreign nations against this act of Congress, the President, by proclamation, announced that, as it had been claimed that "such persons, under treaties or the law of nations, retain a right to renounce that purpose, and to forego the privileges of citizenship and residence within the United States, under the obligations imposed by the aforesaid act of Congress," to avoid all misapprehension, the plea of alienage would be accepted for sixty-five days, during which time such persons as had only declared their intention to become citizens might depart.

The position in the Koszta case, where the claim to the, protection of the United States was made when the inchoate citizen was in trouble, and the claim of the inchoate citizens to renounce their allegiance when the state was in difficulties, show some of the problems to

K

16 Messages and Papers of President, 168.

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