fhadow of this ftratagem, they got ready in the harbour of Toulon a fleet of twelve men of war of the line, with the utmost expeApril dition, which convoyed an 18. army of about 11,000 men, under command of the Duke de Richlieu, to the island of Minorca. In a few days they opened April trenches before St. Philip's 25. fort.

This was done whilft the nation trembled under a fhameful pannic, too public to be concealed, too fatal in its confequences to be ever forgotten. The real invafion did not leffen our fears of the imaginary one; it threw us into a confufion that suffered us to be fenfible of nothing but our own weakness. We did not look upon ourselves fafficiently fecured by the arrival of the Hanoverian and Heffian troops, which the fame weakness had induced us to call to our affiftance. The miniftry feemed to have been infected with the common terror; for, though they had very early notice of the French defigns, fuch was the apprehenfion of the invafion, or fuch the ill-contrived difpofition of our navy, that Admiral Byng was not difpatched to the Mediterranean before the 5th of April, and then with a fquadron of no more than 10 fhips of the line.

The engagement with the French

fleet under M. Galiffoniere; May the retreat of Byng by which 12. the garrifon of fort St. Philip was cut off from all hopes of relief; the furrender of that June garrifon after nine weeks open trenches; the fentiments of the court and the public, on the different merits of the governor and the admiral; the oppofition of fome, who thought the one too highly honoured, and the

29.

other too feverely cenfured, and the measures which rather indignation at our loffes and difgraces, than a cool fenfe of things obliged us to take, are known to all the world. Our affairs were in fuch a condition that we were driven to the expedient of a court martial to revive the British spirit, and to the unfortunate neceflity of heddingtheblood Feb.14. of an Admiral, a perfon of a noble family, as a to the difcipline of our navy.

facrifice

1757.

From this melancholy picture, let us turn our eyes another way, and review the fteps by which this war came to involve the rest of the contending powers. The French, amongst the other plans they formed for diftreffing our affairs, made no fecret of their defign of attacking his Majefty's German dominions. These countries evidently had no fort of connexion with the matters which gave rife to the war. But being under a Sovereign fo remarkably affectionate to his native country; they judged he might be terrified into a relaxation of his rights in America, to preferve Hanover from the calamities with which it was threatened. Their politics, however, in this inftance proved as unsuccessful as they were unjuft. No motion was made towards an abatement in our claims with regard to America; his Majefly took other methods for the prefervation of the peace of Germany. His British fubjects by their reprefentatives, not more generously than reafonably, refolved to defend the Hanoverians if attacked in their quarrel. To anfwer this purpofe, the miniftry entered into a fubfidy treaty with the Emprefs of Ruff, in virtue of which he was to hold 55,000 men in readiness to be fent on a requifition wherever the Briti fervice required.

The alliance with Ruffia was chofen for reasons which were then fufficiently plaufible; though it is to be hoped they can never fubfift again. The long ill understanding between the King of Pruffia and our court, and his close connexion with that of Versailles, raifed no illgrounded apprehenfions that he night be induced to act a dangerous part on this occafion. Ruffia was therefore a proper ally, who had both a political and perfonal enmity to this monarch, and who would be fure to employ a great power with great vigour in fuch a caufe. But this fyftem was in a fhort time totally reverfed. The King of Pruffia had been too well apprised of the close conjunction of the courts of Peterfburg and Vienna, and of the real motive to that conjunction, to have the leaft defign of embroiling himfelf with England. Matters were therefore very foon explained, and the treaty between his Pruffian majefty and this court, to keep all foreigners out of the Empire, was figned at London in January 1756. Thefe treaties were cenfured as inconfiftentwitheachother; butinreality they were confiftent enough, aiming precifely at the fame object, to oppofe the fchemes meditated by France for difturbing the affairs of Germany.

If reflecting on the fentiments of thefe courts, there was fomething unexpected in the alliance between Great Britain and Pruffia; it was foon followed by another alliance of a nature infinitely more furprifing. The Empress Queen of Hungary, finding England in no difpofition to co-operate in her defigns, had recourfe to other meafures. The houfe of Auftria, which had formerly united Europe to preferve her from the power of France, now entered herself into the most intimate union

with that power. By this extraordinary revolution, the whole political fyitem of Europe affumed a new face; it was indeed a revolution fo extraordinary, that we shall be juftified if we interrupt the courfe of this narrative, to look back at the caufes which produced it.

The houfe of Brandenbourg, a little more than two centuries ago, was in a very humble condition. But by the part she took in the reformation, which put into her hands the eftates of the Teutonic order; by a marriage from which fhe acquired the dutchy of Cleves; and by

an

uncommon fucceffion of able Princes who carefully improved every turn in the affairs of Germany to their advantage, fhe raised herself by degrees to a confiderable ftate, to an electorate, and at laft to a royalty, not only in name but in power. The late King of Pruffia, in order to ftrengthen this power, though he paft almoft his whole reign in the moft profound peace, gave his whole attention to his army; frugal in all other refpects, in this alone he was expenfive; it was his bufinefs, and what was perhaps of greater moment, it was his only diverfion. Thus in a reign apparently inactive, there was always kept up an army of near 100,000 men, in as much exercife as they could have in peace, and formed with the most perfect difcipline.

When his prefent majefty came to the throne, he immediately fhewed a difpofition of employing effectually that military force which his father had spent his life only in forming and training. He managed his difpute with the Bishop of Liege by the fummary method of force; and feemed difpofed to carry all things with fo high an hand, as made him indeed much respected, but

much

accede; and he did fo far accede to it, as to fhew he perfectly agreed in his fentiments with thefe courts. But his fituation in the jaws of a formidable enemy, and the experience of paffed misfortunes, had rendered him fo wary, that he declined figning the treaty; but ftill, with the confent of the parties concerned, whom he fully convinced of his refolution to co-operate in all their measures. He defired and they agreed, that in the fuccefs of their arms he should have a share in the fpoil, on the footing of a treaty for the eventual partition of the May 18 'King of Pruffia's dominions 1745. made in the laft war. On thefe conditions the King of Poland without actually figning, was underftocd, and received as a party to the treaty of Petersbourg.

In confequence of these measures, all fort of means were employed to embroil the King of Pruffia's affairs in the north, and particularly to render him perfonally odious to the Czarina, When their machinations had taken full effect, and Ruffia was fixed in an unalterable enmity to that monarch, preparations of magazines and armies were made in Bohemia and Moravia; and the King of Poland, under pretence of

Emprefs at Versailles the ift of May 1756, a remarkable æra in the political hiftory of Europe.

The fecret articles of the treaty of Petersbourg, the fountain of the prefent troubles, and the steps taken to put that treaty in execution, though formed and carried on with as much fecrecy as earnestness, could notefcape the vigilance of his Pruffian majesty, who watched all their motions, and had perfect intelligence of their most hidden defigns. When therefore, he perceived that by the breach between England and France, the Emprefs Queen would take advantage of thefe troubles to avail herfelf of her alliances and. her armaments; he ordered his minister at Vienna to demand a clear explication, and proper affurances concerning the preparations he faw making: and receiving only a dry and equivocal anfwer, that the Emprefs had taken measures for her own fecurity and that of her allies and friends, the King believed himself no longer bound to preferve any terms; a dangerous war was to be kept out of his own territories at any rate; and being always in perfect readiness for action, he fell upon Saxony with a confiderable army.

At first the King of Pruffia feemed

ther about 16000 men, with which he occupied the ftrong and important poft of Pirna. The Queen of Hungary faw that the flood in need of yet ftronger fupports than these in the arduous bufinefs fhe had undertaken. She found that Great Britain, which had often done fo much for her diftrefs, would do little for her ambition: fhe therefore had recourfe to France, who joyfully accepting an alliance, that promifed to confound the whole Germanic body, concluded a treaty with the

fage for his troops, and an obfervance of the neutrality profeffed by the King of Poland; but as he had very good reasons to diftruft fuch a neutrality, he demanded as a fecurity, that the Saxon troops fhould quit the firong poft they occupied, and difperie themselves immediately. This demand was refufed, and the King of Pruffia in confequence of that refufal, immediately formed a fort of blockade about the Saxon camp at Pirna, with a view to reduce it by famine,

fince its inacceffible fituation rendered an attack unadviseable. There were in Bohemia two Auftrian armies under M. Brown and M. Picolomini; to keep thefe in awe, M. Schwerin had entered Bohemia from the county of Glatz; and M. Keith had penetrated into that kingdom on the fide of Mifnia. But the King of Pruffia, not entirely confiding in thefe difpofitions; and ftill apprehenfive that M. Brown might be able to convey fome relief to the Saxons, refolved to bring him to an action, to the fuccefs of which he knew his own prefence would greatly contribute. He therefore left the blockade of the Saxon army, joined his forces under Keith, and engaged Dec. 1.the Auftrians at Lowofitz. Here he obtained a victory, which though it was not undifputed with regard to the field of battle, yet with regard to the confequences it was as decifive as could be wifhed. M. Brown found it impracticable to relieve the Saxons, notwithstanding the judicious efforts he made for that purpose; and that army, after a vain attempt to retire from their

difficult poft, which had one fault, that it was as difficult to leave it as to force it, were obliged to furrender prifoners of war. The King of Poland quitted his German dominions; and the Pruffians took up their winter quarters in Saxony, feized upon the revenues, levied exorbitant contributions, and obliged the country to furnish recruits. This unhappy people faw their country exhaufted, and forced to bear the burthen of a war against itself. It was then, that the King of Pruffia confulting the rules of policy, more than thofe of politenefs, made himself mafter of the archives at Dresden, in doing which fome roughnefs was ufed towards the Queen; but he made himfelf amends for the clamour industriously raised on this pretence, by acquiring the originals of thefe pieces, which evinced to the world the reality of the defign against him, and which therefore in a great meafure juftified the means he had taken to come at them, as well as the extraordinary feverities he used towards the unfortunate Saxons.