⚫ defifted from them, by virtue of his full powers, and that in cafe the Hanoverian General had no pretence left for not executing the ⚫ convention of Clofter-Seven.' On the 17th of October, 1757, Count Lynar wrote to his Majesty's Electoral Minister, that Marshal Richelieu's courier was returned from Versailles with inftructions, which expressly faid, the court would hear of no terms of peace; that it was refolved to hold to the fcheme of explanation; and lastly, that it would less than ever defift from the condition of disarming the Heffians, and that it had rejected the offer of his Danish Majefty, to receive these troops into his terri

tories.

It was therefore neceffary to come to a determination on this head, or to wait to fee the war kindled up a-fresh. The battle of Rofbach happened on the 5th of November, foon after the arrival of that letter. The King could not foresee that France would then change her tone; he faw himself obliged to take measures, in confequence of the declarations which he had been informed of, by the letter of October 17, nor could he afterwards change them, when it at length pleafed the court of Verfailles to come down, though very little, from her unjust pretenfions. On one hand, he had already addreffed himself to his Pruffian Majefty, and on the other, the proceedings of France fhewed but too plainly, that he had reafon to be diffident of her fidelity. Befides,

is not true, that fhe defifted from the difarming of all the auxiliary troops. In Marthal Richelieu's letter of November 9, he makes only mention of the Heffians, and is filent with regard to the fate of

It is plain, that during the continuance of a negociation, and before every thing be regulated and concluded, the two parties have a power to renounce their engagements. If all difficulties had been removed by the convention of Clofter-Seven, what need was there of a new negociation? France perfifting to want further claufes, and explications to be added to it, gave the King an incontestable right to declare himself according to the nature of the fubje&t and circumftances.

Not content with having combated the motives, which engaged the King to take up arms, they criticize violently upon the manner in which that was executed. Had there been, fay they, any honourable way of withdrawing from the execution of that folemn act, it would have been to declare it void, by putting themselves in the fame pofition they were be'fore it was concluded; but inftead of that the most odioas

means were made ufe of to violate that capitulation fucceffively and with impunity. The time was spun out for three months, to find an opportunity to break the convention. The French army was fuffered to go to Halberstadt, and they waited till it was feparated by the bad feafon. They feized the opportunity of a repulfe to come out of the limits prefcribed them, under pretence of extending their quarters. They afterwards took advantageous pofts, under pretences equally 'contrary to the convention. They made all the difpofitions for the

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fiege of Harbourg, without any previous declaration of war; and having made all thefe preparations, and when they thought the enemy fufficiently weakened and deceived, to fight them with advantage, they declared that hoftilities were to be commenced, and that they confidered the convention as broken, while they were marching against them, and at6 tacking their posts.'

The more the author of the Parallel exhaufts his rhetoric in this fort of declamation, fo much the lefs regard doth he pay to truth. It is certain and incontestable, that the Hanoverians conformed on their part, in every refpect, to the convention, as it was figned. It was neither the King's Generals, nor Marshal Richelieu, who caufed it to be broken by their declarations; but the court of Versailles, which would not look upon the convention as obligatory, unless it fhould be extended to the difarming of the auxiliary troops, and unless the King would leave his country to the difcretion of his enemies, till a general peace, The King, therefore, had the fame right to look upon this affair as depending upon the refolution of the refpective courts, and to take his measures accordingly. He made use of that right. It was natural not to commit hoftilities as long as Count Lynar's negociation lafted; but that minifter, as the court of Versailles well knows, could never bring about negociations of peace, which was, however, the true intention of the fufpenfion of arms. Could it be thought strange, if the King, by virtue of the right which the inflexible feverity of his enemies gave him, determined himself, according to the events that happened, and

the victory gained over the French army at Rofbach? This event, however, did not influence his Majefty's refolutions. If any one will but calculate the date of thefe events, he will be convinced of the contrary. The battle of Rofbach happened on the 5th of November, and the motions of the Hanoverian army were renewed on the 26th of the fame month. The King could not have been informed at London, in fo short a time, of that fuccefs, to give orders to his minitter, to follicit the confent of his Pruffian Majefty, with regard to Prince Ferdinand, to whom the King offered the command of the army, fo as to receive the King of Pruffia's answer, to hear of the Prince's arrival, and cause hoftilities to be renewed. If the rules of good faith had not been fcrupuloufly observed, the French army might have been reduced to a more dangerous fituation than it really was. In what a critical fituation would it have found itself, if the King's troops, as they were fully authorized to do, had marched, on the firft difcovery of the defign to difarm the auxiliary troops, and, at the fame time that the battle of Rofbach happened, and when Marfhal Richelieu was at Halberstadt with his army, had attacked him in the rear? The operations of the army did not begin till after the King of Pruffia was gone into Silefia, and when the French were not only upon their guard, but the first columns of their army had even advanced beyond Lunenbourg, with defign to obtain, by open force, the unjust conditions propofed by the court of Versailles. As to the pretended preparations for the fiege of Harbourg, we know nothing at all of them. We do

not

not deny but the quarters of the troops were extended; but that we were obliged to do it through unavoidable neceffity, the quarters deftined to receive only the Hanoverian troops, not being, at the fame time, fufficient for those of Heffe and Brunswick alfo, which by a natural confequence of the proceedings of France, could not be feparated from the body of the army. Neither of the two French detachments were furprized; the two armies were affembled when the scene of operations was again opened, and in this refpect they were in the fame fituation as at Clofter-Seven. Nor was it in the year 1757, but the year following, that the French army was driven out of his Majefty's German dominions. The victory gained at Rofbach, the bad feason, the difeafes, and decrease of the French army, events which never followed from the King's refolutions, could not oblige his Majefty to maintain a convention, which in itself was not binding, and which France would not acknowledge as fuch, when it was a proper time.

guage: nor will we retort it, but pafs over the above, as well as many other reproaches equally odious and trifling. The French miniftry cannot be fo ignorant of the judgment, which their own nation forms of their principles, to doubt, that we might, if we had a mind, reproach them with their evil counfels aud measures, equally ruinous to France and Germany, in a manner which, even in France itfelf, would not fail to make an impreffion. It is, however, neceflary to add two remarks on what has been faid. Our days have produced a phænomenon, of which hiftory does not furnish us with an example; we have feen the houses of Auftria and Bourbon, uniting their forces to give chains to Europe, and especially to Germany. Providence does not want means to prevent this misfortune. This dominion fo eagerly fought for could not be exercifed in concert, if they fhould make themselves mafters of it. That alliance, the first years of which have flowed with rivers of blood, will occafion no lefs bloodfhed, when it comes one day to be broken; but the violent tumults, and the imminent dangers, with which the politic fyftem of Europe, and fo many kingdoms and ftates are threatened during this crifis, merit the most serious attention of thofe who are at the helm of government. Especially it is manifeft, that the Proteftant religion is in inevitable danger, notwithstanding the falfe proteftations given to the profeffors of it. The pretended fchemes of fecularization afcribed to his Britannic Majefty and the King of Pruffia, are fo illfounded, that they are taken upon the authority of an obfcure work, every page of which fhews the 04

author

author to have no right to be a negociator of peace. Never had the Catholic religion lefs to fear than at a time when its arms are united, and diffenfion reigns among the Proteftants. It is not the fame with regard to what the latter have to fear from their enemies. The designs of the court of Vienna to render the Catholic religion predominant in Germany, have been plainly exhibited by the reflections, and the advices of a very able minifter, who certainly would not have impofed upon his court, and who had his information from the fountain-head. The juftice of his discoveries has been proved by the event, for we see not one Catholic ftate of the Empire, but what have bowed the neck to this new fyftem, out of a zeal for religion, notwithftanding the real difadvantages that muft naturally follow. It is only answered to thefe arguments, that the treaty of Vertailles has been founded upon the treaty of Weftphalia. But are not the courts which have contracted these new engagements, free to change them at pleasure, and according to circumstances? Befides, if the Proteftant ftates, as they pretend, are bound to adopt the treaty of the peace of Weftphalia, in what fenfe the Catholics pleafe to give it is but too clear, that the Proteflants are already divetted of the most important privileges, granted to them by that treaty.

All the King's meafures will ever tend to the general fafety of Europe, to the liberty aud independence of the Empire, and the maintainance of the Proteflant religion. Neither the misfortune which his ellates of Germany have fuffered, nor the bafe treatment which he hath received from the court of

Vienna, nor the conduct of feveral of his co-eftates, which favour the unjuft defigns of that court, will ever be able to divert him from an end fo worthy of himself. He hopes that the Divine Providence will continue to blefs the arms which he has taken up in his own defence, and that it will make this the means of procuring peace to the Empire, and alfo of blafting the wicked defigns of those who have brought into it the flame of war, and have opened a scene of calamities, of which we have not feen an inftance fince the peace of Weftphalia.

Extracts from the manifefto of the court of France, lately published by authority at Paris.

This fophiftical and fcurrilloes piece confits of three parts: The first contains what they call preliminary eclairciffements: The fecond is called, Parallel of the King's conduct with that of the King of England, Elector of Hanover and the third contains the vouchers of the facts mentioned in the two former.

The first labours to prove the juftice of the King's fending his armies into Germany, and attacking the Elector of Hanover and Landgrave of Heffe-Caffel; and the reafoning in it would have fome foundation, if they had proved, that the King of Pruffia was the firft aggreffor, and confequently the firit infractor of the peace of the Empire. But this they take for granted, fo that the whole is founded upon a petitio principii, or what we call a begging the question, therefore deferves no notice.

As to the fecond part, after fome fcurrillous ftrictures upon the con

duct

duct of Hanover, with relation to the convention of Clofter-Seven, they proceed as follows.

"As it is chiefly from the King's alliance with the Emprefs Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, that the King of England, Elector of Hanover, has fought to take advantage for ftirring up the ftates of Germany against their moft Chriftian and Imperial Majefties, and cover with a fpecious pretext his pernicious attempts against the quiet and fafety of the Empire; the first thing must be to deface the falfe impreffions intended by him to be made on the public.

To this end it will be demonftrated, that this alliance which his Britannic Majefty has pretended to be fo very unnatural and fo dangerous for the Germanic liberty, has, on the contrary, been quite natural; that the Kings of England and Pruffia have them felves rendered it neceffary, and that if the liberty of the Empire is threatened with the greatest dangers, it is from those who have attacked it, and who in contempt of the Germanic conftitutions, and of whatever among Sovereigns is moft facred, labour to opprefs it, and not from those who defend it, pursuant to their engagements, in conformity to the refolutions of the Empire, and at the hazard of their own fafety.

It is manifest that on the first hoftilities in North America of the King of England against the French, the King formed the defign of confining himself to his own defence against the English, in order, were it poffible, to preferve to Europe in general, and the Empire in particular, the advantages of peace, of which he

found himfelf deprived by the injustice and ambition of his enemies.

But very different were the thoughts of other powers; the King of Pruffia, dazzled, as he himfelf owns, by the King of England's glittering promifes, quitted the alliance of France; and fuddenly came to light a particular treaty betwixt the courts of London and Berlin, containing the most dangerous views, and which, among other objects, impofed laws on the Princes of Germany, interdicting them the liberty of foreign fuccours, which is reserved to them by the Germanic conftitutions, in cafe of their being attacked.

These two courts indeed gave out, that this treaty tended only to the fupport of the tranquillity of Germany, and that it was the motive for the claufe expreffing, that they would fuffer no foreign troops to enter it under any pretence whatever; but as the Empire had in no wife commiffioned them with this care, and the King of Pruffia, in concert with the King of England, was making immenfe preparations of war, at a time when he had no enemies to fight, it was eafy to judge, that the real fcope of a claufe fo contrary to the Germanic conftitutions, was to hinder any oppofition coming from without Germany to the war which thofe two Princes had determind to kindle within, if they fhould not find the court of Vienna favourable to the project of exciting a general war, in which France might be implicated.

If the expreffion of this claufe drew a fufpicion on their views, they were entirely laid open by

the