4. Others regard it as an allegory, or a philosophical fable, either founded on some fact, or not, the object of which is to represent either the origin of sin through the predominance of sense over reason,1 or the loss of the golden age, or the transition of men from instinct to the use of rational liberty,3 or the pernicious effects of a longing after a higher condition, or perhaps several of these ideas at the same time.4

III. Gen. 2: 17. 3: 3, 11.

IV. Although Eve appears to have attributed the seductive conversation, to the natural serpent and not to the devil, still she might have resisted the influence of an unknown seducer, as well as if he had been known. And such resistance she did, for a while, actually make (ch. 3, 2, 3). But it was not even by an unknown enemy that Adam was tempted (1 Tim. 2: 14.); but he yielded to the influence of his wife, and ate of the forbidden fruit. Gen. 3: 6, 12, 17.

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Other effects of the fall on our first parents and their posterity.

But these were not the only consequences of the disobedience of our first parents. For this single (1) transgression produced a disorder [atağa(2), and this gave rise to a sinful disposition of their whole nature, which became itself a fountain

1 Jerusalem, Teller &c.

2 Schelling and Pott, Comment. de antiquo documento Gen. II. III.

3 See Kant's Conjectural beginning of the history of man, 1786.

4 Thiess' Variarum de cap. III. Geneseos recte explicando sententiarum, Spec. 1, Lubeck, 1789. and Eichhorn Bibliothek, Vol. 8, p. 1034 &c. and Beck's Comment. hist. &c. p. 389 &c.

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of other transgressions (3). Moreover, this sinful disposition [ άuagua Rom. 5: 12] was propagated by this one (4) individual, Adam, (to whom also it is peculiarly attributed), over the whole (5) human family; and through the instrumentality of this sinful disposition [dia ins aμaguas] death has been entailed on the whole race of man. It was in this way [ούτως or δια της αμαρτιας] that death, which would not have befallen man in a state of innocence, was extended to the whole human family; because, on account of [ep] the sinful propensity which is common to all, all are treated as sinful creatures, and subjected to the penalty of the violated law (6). All who are subjected to mortality, have this sinful disposition, on account of which man is treated as a sinful creature, and subjected to death (7). But many persons die before they could have imitated the examples of others, or have acquired the habit of sinning. Consequently, that sinful disposition from which our mortality results (8), must exist prior to such imitation or habit; and hence, although it gradually acquires more strength through the imitation of the wicked examples of others, and is confirmed by habits of transgression, still the disposition itself must be seated more deeply in our nature, and is even brought with us into the world (9). As the constitution of human nature is such that parents beget children in their own likeness (10), it was natural (11), that after those perfect dispositions and faculties with which man was created had been disordered by sin, the descendants of Adam would be born, not with perfect, but with his disordered dispositions and faculties (12). It was accordant with the laws of nature, that man being possessed of a sinful disposition [caps], should beget children in like manner inclined to evil. (John

IX. Innate depravity.-Psalm 51: 7, with a sinful nature [i] I was born, yea, even in my mother's womb I was possessed of it.1 In the work On the death of Christ (p. 645), this interpretation is vindicated against another which makes David merely mean, that he was an old, hardened sinner. And in the Dissertations on the historical books of the New Test. we have remarked, in commenting on John 9: 34, that the words εν αμαρτιαις συ εγενήθης όλης, may well be taken in their proper sense: "you were born in a sinful state (as this bodily deformity, your blindness, proves)."

Kant has asserted, that among all the representations of the propagation of moral evil, that is the most objectionable, by which it is regarded as being inherited from our first parents: for says he, in reference to moral evil, we can say, "quae non fecimus. ipsi, vix ea nostra puto," i. e. what we have not done ourselves, can scarcely be regarded as our own. In reply to this, we remark, Just as a particular natural or innate disposition or temperament, renders it more difficult for some men to fulfil the law, than others; so also it is by no means impossible that an undue propensity for the objects of sense (§ 56) may have been inherited from Adam by all his posterity, which renders it, if not impossible, yet very difficult for them to fulfil the law. This innate disposition, which is involuntary in us, and which renders it difficult for us to obey the law, is not (as Kant's objection presupposes) imputed to us as sin; but the guilt with which we are charged lies in this, that we do not surmount the difficulties which arise from it (§56).

[1 The version of this text given in the translation of Augusti and De Wette, harmonizes perfectly with the old and orthodox doctrine :

"Sieh in Schuld bin ich geboren,

"Und in Sünd' empfing mich meine Mutter." S.]

2 Vom radicalen Bösen in der menschlichen natur, S. 37. 3 Kantii Phil. Annot. p. 8.

X. 1 Cor. 15: 48, as the earthly, such are the earthly. Gen. 5: 3, Adam begat children in his own likeness [ina

XI. The propagation of this depravity is the natural result of a law of our nature, which is in itself salutary (Gen. 1: 28). And the unhappy effects of this law, on the descendents of Adam, can no more be charged on the Author of nature, than that misery can, which, in the course of the operation of these laws, is entailed on the innocent children of such parents as have by their wicked life contracted a hereditary disease.1

XII. In no other way than by the natural inheritance of the sinful propensities of parents by the children, could the necessity of dying have been extended to all men on account of the individual act of transgression by Adam (Rom. 5: 15-17). For it was from this one sin, that the sinful disposition of Adam proceeded; and through him this disposition, which involves the necessity of death, was propagated over the whole human family. This is the only interpretation which accords with the declaration of Paul (Rom. 5: 12-19), that άuaoria [depravity], and through duaoria, death, were entailed on the whole human family. Moreover, the doctrine of the propagation of depravity by natural generation from Adam, is closely connected with the important doctrine of the gracious provision of God for the redemption of the human family, and in various points of view, tends to throw much light upon this subject.3

Jost is disposed almost totally to reject the connexion between the propositions δι' ένος ανθρωπου ἡ ἁμαρτια, και δια της ἁμαρτιας ὁ θάνατος, i. e. the connexion between the mortality of mankind and the first sin of Adam, through the instrumental

2 Sup. cit. 651.

1 Uber den Zweck des Todes Jesu, S. 656. 3 See 55, 59, 65, 73, 116. Compare the Dissertation on the practical importance of the doctrine concerning the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit, 8. b.

IX. Innate depravity.-Psalm 51: 7, with a sinful nature [ing] I was born, yea, even in my mother's womb I was possessed of it. In the work On the death of Christ (p. 645), this interpretation is vindicated against another which makes David merely mean, that he was an old, hardened sinner. And in the Dissertations on the historical books of the New Test. we have remarked, in commenting on John 9: 34, that the words εν αμαρτιαις συ εγενήθης όλης, may well be taken in their 66 proper sense: you were born in a sinful state (as this bodily deformity, your blindness, proves).”

Kant has asserted, that among all the representations of the propagation of moral evil, that is the most objectionable, by which it is regarded as being inherited from our first parents: for says he, in reference to moral evil, we can say, "quae non fecimus. ipsi, vix ea nostra puto," i. e. what we have not done ourselves, can scarcely be regarded as our own. In reply to this, we remark, 3 Just as a particular natural or innate disposition or temperament, renders it more difficult for some men to fulfil the law, than others; so also it is by no means impossible that an undue propensity for the objects of sense (§ 56) may have been inherited from Adam by all his posterity, which renders it, if not impossible, yet very difficult for them to fulfil the law. This innate disposition, which is involuntary in us, and which renders it difficult for us to obey the law, is not (as Kant's objection presupposes) imputed to us as sin; but the guilt with which we are charged lies in this, that we do not surmount the difficulties which arise from it (§ 56).

[1 The version of this text given in the translation of Augusti and De Wette, harmonizes perfectly with the old and orthodox doctrine:

"Sieh! in Schuld bin ich geboren,

“Und in Sünd' empfing mich meine Mutter." S.]

2 Vom radicalen Bösen in der menschlichen natur, S. 37. 3 Kantii Phil. Annot. p. 8.