For the defendant were cited Harrington and Wife, Cro. Eliz. 486; 1 Roll. Abr. 847; Moor, 459; Noy, 57. A covenant that A. doth let, and that a lease shall be made accordingly, held to be a good lease immediately: what follows is only for further assurance. Malden's Case, Cro. Eliz. 33; Tisdale and Essex, Hob. 34; Dalison, 7. And they contended that it was plainly the intent of the parties to make a present lease. BAXTER V. BROWNE. And it was held by GOULD, BLACKSTONE, and NARES, JS. (absente DE GREY, C. J.), that this was clearly a good lease in præsenti, with an agreement to execute a more formal and perfect lease in futuro. The operative words let and set are in the present tense. A reference is made to this demise. There have been fourteen years' uninterrupted occupation under this instrument, and five or six of them since the lessor of the plaintiff's title accrued. He has accepted rent, and thereby given the defendant every reasonable hope of his acquiescence. Under such circumstances, if the words of the lease can import an immediate legal demise, the Court will support it as such: [ *975 ] and that it will, is evident from the cases cited, which we have looked into and compared. Therefore let there be Judgment for the plaintiff as to one moiety, for the de- farm in the oc cupation of B. of marsh land), vise in the same estate in marsh HOLDFAST on the demise of HITCHCOCK V. PARDOE, Esq. IN ejectment, tried at Chelmsford last Summer Assizes, before A devise to H. SMYTHE, C. B.; verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the fol- of an entire lowing case :-On the 1st of May, 1753, Martha Wakelin demised to Charles Bocock a messuage and certain closes in Lowlayton, all formerly in the occupation of one Ferril, and then of the said Charles Bocock. And also four half acres of common marsh lands in Shortlands, and a rood of common membered by marsh lands in Layton Marsh in Lowlayton aforesaid, contain- a subsequent deing together thirty-three acres and one rood, to hold for twenty- will of all the one years from Lady-day then past, at 50l. per annum. N. B. testatrix's marsh This was indorsed, "Lease of a farm at 50l. per annum, to lands to M., she "Charles Bocock;" and Shortlands was admitted on both sides having a large to be part of Layton Marsh. On the 1st of April, 1761, Mar- lands besides, tha Wakelin devised all her estates to her sister Ann Moore, which was let and died in 1763. On the 22d of February, 1766, Ann Moore to a separate devised to Mary Pannel and her heirs, all her other messuages, lands, and tenements, in Lowlayton (except the farm now in the possession of my tenant Bocock, and the premisses in the possession of Mr. Bristow, and the marsh lands); and to Elizabeth Hitchcock and her heirs certain lands in Monmouthshire, and the premisses in the possession of Mr. Bristow in Lowlayton, and her farm in the possession of Charles Bocock; and to the children of her late uncle Henry Moore, as jointtenants in fee, "all her lands lying in Lowlayton Marsh." And the testatrix died in August, 1766, seised of all the premisses in lease to Bocock; and also. of certain other marsh [976] tenant. HOLDFAST v. PARDOE. lands in Lowlayton Marsh, viz. 35 acr. 3 ro. 11 p., then in the occupation of William Warren. In July, 1767, the defendant purchased of the children of Henry Moore all the marsh lands devised to them as aforesaid, and took possession as well of the said 4a. 1 r. in the possession of Bocock, as of the 35 a. 3r. 11p. in the occupation of Warren.-Qu. Whether the said 4a. 1r. are included in the devise to Elizabeth Hitchcock, the lessor of the plaintiff? And, if so, whether the subsequent devise of all the testatrix's lands in Lowlayton Marsh to the children of Henry Moore be not a revocation of the preceding devise pro tanto, so as to vest the same in the children of the said H. Moore? This case was argued by Glyn, for the plaintiff, and Walker, for the defendant. But per DE GREY, C. J., and tot. Cur.-There is no doubt of the intention of the testatrix. She never meant to dismember her farm in the occupation of Bocock, and expressly devises it by that name to Elizabeth Hitchcock; so that it is clear these parcels of marsh land are included in that devise. Nor is there any reason to think she intended to revoke it in part, by her subsequent devise of all her marsh lands to the children of Moore. The four acres and a quarter were probably necessary to make Bocock's farm complete, and if divided from it, might do it a material injury. And the testatrix had another estate, consisting entirely of marsh lands, in the occupation of another tenant; which is sufficient to satisfy the latter devise without infringing upon the former. She considered Bocock's farm as one entire thing, and her lands in Layton Marsh as another. The whole Court therefore unanimously ruled, that the () As to what will pass in a will by the word "farm," see Lane v. Earl Stanhope, 6 T. R. 345; Doe v. Earl of Lucan, 9 East, 448. See also Down v. Down, 1 B. Mo. 80, 7 Taunt. 343; Roe v. Bird, post, 1301, and Gulliver v. Poyntz, ante, 726: and also Goodtitle v. Southern, 1 M. & S. 299. [ 977 ] so alters their property, that SCOTT v. SHEARMAN and Others. Condemnation TRESPASS against five Custom-house officers for breaking of goods in the and entering the house of the plaintiff at Harwich, and searchExchequer is so conclusive, and ing and rummaging the same, and taking away certain of his goods. On Not guilty pleaded, the cause was tried at Chelmsford Assizes in Lent, 1774, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, damages 1007., on this special case reserved :-The defendants, (who were all known to be Custom-house officers), on the 24th of August, 1773, entered the plaintiff's house in the day-time, in the company of the plaintiff, under pretence of an information against run goods, and demanded of the plaintiff and his wife their keys, which they refused to deliver, and desired to see their information, which Shearman refused to produce, and threatened, if they would not give up the keys, trespass will not again. he would break open the locks, and accordingly got a constable, to whom he produced his writ of assistance, and broke open the locks of the chambers, closets, and drawers, and took away twenty pints of Geneva in one case bottle, and ten pints with rue steeped therein in another case bottle, which was brought that morning at five o'clock from on board the plaintiff's vessel (which was just arrived from Flushing, where she had sold a cargo of fish), and was part of the ship's stores. The defendants gave in evidence a copy of the record of condemnation of the same Geneva in the Court of Exchequer, Michaelmas Term, 1773: and that the said Geneva, when seized, was immediately lodged in the King's storehouse.— Qu. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover? This case was argued last Michaelmas Term, before GOULD and BLACKSTONE, Js., by Glyn, for the plaintiff, and Walker, for the defendants. SCOTT V. SHEARMAN. The questions made were principally two-1. Whether the original entry of the defendants without a constable was tortious; *and 2. Whether the condemnation in the Exchequer [ *978 ] was conclusive evidence to the jury; Glyn contending that it only was conclusive in respect to the forfeiture of the goods, but that it did not protect the officer from answering for his misbehaviour in an action of trespass. No authorities were cited on either side; but it seemed to be agreed to be a new case. GOULD, J., thought the whole was to be considered as one transaction: that there was no misbehaviour on the part of the officers: that the case did not import an entry against the will of the plaintiff, but rather the contrary. And he inclined to think the condemnation was conclusive evidence, but desired to have another argument. BLACKSTONE, J., agreed, that there was no special misbehaviour on the part of the officers, provided the seizure was legal, from the goods being uncustomed or prohibited, a fact which the jury have found in the negative. But he doubted how far the condemnation in the Exchequer was conclusive as to other collateral matters, distinct from the property vested in the Crown: and wished to have the case argued again, that this matter might be thoroughly considered. It was accordingly argued again in this Term, but no new lights were thrown upon the question by any thing alleged at the bar. And it was now held by the whole Court (DE GREY, C. J., GOULD, BLACKSTONE, and NARES, Js.), that there was no misbehaviour on the part of the defendants, and that the condemnation in the Exchequer was conclusive evidence to the jury in an action of trespass for seizing the goods condemned. BLACKSTONE, J., who had conceived a doubt upon the former argument, thought it incumbent on him to deliver his reasons at large for changing the inclination of his first opinion, viz. "It being asserted by the counsel for the plaintiff, and not denied by the counsel for the defendants, that there was no au SCOTT บ. SHEARMAN. thority to be found on either side, I at first inclined to think, *that Brother Glyn's distinction was right; and that the condemnation upon default of the owner might be conclusive in [*979 ] rem, so that the right of the Crown to the goods should never be contested again; but not conclusive in personam, in case the owner could prove they were in fact not seizable, and chose to bring an action against the person seizing for damages, by way of collateral remedy. But, upon full consideration, I am now convinced, that there is no ground for such a distinction. The only possible ground that the plaintiff can rely on in the present case, which is unaccompanied with misbehaviour, or any unwarrantable violence, is, that the goods were not in truth liable to be seized by the laws of the Customs; although,_by the plaintiff's default, they have been condemned in the Exchequer. But I take this condemnation to be conclusive evidence to all the world, that the goods were liable to be seized; and that therefore this action will not lie. 1. Because of the implicit credit which the law gives to any judgment in a Court of record having competent jurisdiction of the subject matter. The jurisdiction in this case of the Court of Exchequer is not only competent, but sole and exclusive. And though it be said, that no notice is given to the owner in person, and that therefore he is not bound by the condemnation, not being a party to the suit, yet the seizure itself is notice to the owner, who is presumed to know whatever becomes of his own goods. He knew they were seized by a revenue officer. He knew they were carried to the King's warehouse. He knew, or might have known, that by the course of law, the validity of that seizure would come on to be examined in the Court of Exchequer, and could be examined no where else. He had notice by the two proclamations, according to the course of that Court. He had notice by the writ of appraisement, which must be publicly executed on the spot where the goods were detained. And having neglected this opportunity of putting in his claim, and trying the point of forfeiture, it was his own laches, and he shall for ever be concluded by it, not only with respect to the goods themselves, but every other collateral remedy for taking them. For it [ *980] would be nu gatory to debar him from recovering directly the identical goods that are condemned, if he is allowed to recover obliquely damages equivalent to their value. 2. Because, the property of the goods being changed, and irrevocably vested in the Crown by the judgment of condemnation, (as is clear beyond any dispute, and conceded on the part of the plaintiff), it follows, as a necessary consequence, that neither trespass nor trover can be maintained for taking them in an orderly manner. For the condemnation has a retrospect and relation backwards to the time of the seizure. The spi rituous liquors that were seized, were therefore, at the time of the seizure, the goods and chattels of his Majesty, and not of the plaintiff, as in his declaration he has (necessarily) declared them to be; since neither trespass nor trover will lie for taking of goods, unless, at the time of the taking, the property was in the plaintiff. SCOTT V. SHEARMAN. This reasoning is supported by authorities expressly in point. In Gibert's Treatise of the Exchequer, cap. 13, it is clearly shewn in what manner these informations in rem, which were instituted in order to give the Crown possession of its ancient prerogative revenues of wrecks, deodands, estrays, and the like, by degrees came afterwards to be applied to the forfeitures enacted by the statute law for offences against the laws of the Customs and Excise. And it is expressly laid down, p. 186, that, "the very seizing of the goods is notice to the claimer, "and an undertaking to proceed to condemnation according to "the rules of the Court." The retrospect or relation backwards in these informations was the same as in the Inquests of Office. And there is in Keilw. 68 b, in the King's Bench, 21 H. 7, a remarkable case of the retrospect in the case of a deodand. The King's officer had seized the instrument of death immediately after the accident; but no inquisition was had till a year afterwards, when the goods were found to be a deodand. Upon trespass brought against the officer for seizing the goods, the Court held, that the inquisition related back to the death; that the seizure therefore was lawful, and no action of trespass would lie. *The case also of fugitives' goods is a [ *981 ]. strong instance to shew how conclusive the law esteems the judgment of forfeiture to be, when pronounced by a legal and competent tribunal. If the Coroner's Inquest finds a man guilty of homicide, and that he fled for it; though he may traverse the crime, and be acquitted of the felony, yet he cannot traverse the flight, by which his goods are forfeited to the King; 8 Ed. 4, 4; 1 Hal. P. C. 416; 2 Hal. P. C. 64. And therefore, though the petty jury expressly acquit him of both the felony and the flight, their verdict as to the flight shall be void; for they ought not to enquire of the flight, after it has been once found, and the forfeiture vested in the Crown by the Coroner's Inquest; Fitz. Abr. Forfeiture, 35; Staundf. P. C. 183, and Prerog. 46; Dyer, 238 b; 2 Hal. P. C. 301. The reason given in some of the books why this Inquest is not traversable, like other Inquests of Office, is because of the notoriety of the Coroner's Inquest super visum corporis, at which the inhabitants of all the neighbouring vills are bound to attend; and so the finding of the flight is but in effect recording the absence of the party. There is surely as much notoriety of the information in the Exchequer against uncustomed goods; and the absence or default of the party shall be equally conclusive against him. But the legal decision of this question doth not rest on theory or analogy only. It hath been determined over and over in the very point. Vanderbergh and Blake, Tr. 13 Car. 2, in the Exchequer, Hardr. 194, it was held, that the seizure and proclamation are sufficient notice to the owner; and that neither trover nor action for malicious information, nor other action which may blow off the judgment by a sidewind, will lie after a con- |