1880.] NOTE ON EASTERN AFFAIRS. 99 office in 1880. Nothing can be more fair than to let him tell his own story, with such omissions, where others still living are concerned, and such notes as may be desirable or necessary. It is unfortunate that the whole of the piece cannot be given to the world. But every one knows how impossible it is to produce a version of oral discussions in which all persons concerned will agree; and this reason, not to mention the etiquette which protects, or should protect, Cabinet Councils, must reduce a most valuable document to fragments. In this Note, which we are reluctantly compelled to mutilate, Sir Stafford writes: "I have no thought of making an elaborate exposition of the foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Administration, but I wish to preserve a few things which were not generally known, or which may easily be forgotten or misrepresented. Writing without the various memoranda before me, and after the lapse of three or four years, I may easily myself have forgotten some points; but I will try to put my recollections into shape. "The troubles in the east of Europe began with the Herzegovinese insurrection in 1875. Little notice was taken of this insurrection at the outset. We were abroad for some weeks in the autumn, and the only reference to the matter which I can recall was in a paragraph in the 'Figaro,' in which the writer describes the Parisians as wondering whether la Herzegovine was the name of a new ballet-dancer or of a musical instrument invented by Herz. "As the autumn advanced, and the inability of the Porte to suppress the disturbances became more and more apparent, our attention was naturally aroused. At length the Andrassy Note was drawn up, and our concurrence was requested." 1 "We were unanimously in favour of adhering to the Note. Parliament subsequently approved our course, Lord Granville and Lord Hartington seeming a little jealous of our following the lead of Austria, and putting in a word on behalf of the independence of the Ottoman Empire, Gladstone, on the other hand, cordially approving our acting with the other Powers, and expressing his hope that we were going seriously to press for Turkish reforms. I remember Disraeli's wondering what he meant by his rather curious speech, which at the moment seemed somewhat uncalled for; but it is worth looking back to as containing the germ of much that he has said since." 2 "In the month of May the three Powers proceeded a 1 In the Andrassy Note of Dec. 30, 1875, Austria, Germany, and Russia demanded that the Porte should grant promised reforms, hinted at further complications in Servia and Montenegro, and urged collective European action. 2 Mr Gladstone, in his speech of Feb. 8, 1876, had said, "Europe, the Christian conscience, and the conscience of mankind, will expect some other sort of security for great and dreadful grievance than mere words can afford; and however desirous we may be to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, that integrity and independence can never be maintained effectually unless it can be proved to the world, —and proved not by words but by acts,—that the Government of Turkey has the power to administer a fair measure of justice to all its subjects alike, whether Christians or Mohammedan.” 1880.] NOTE ON EASTERN AFFAIRS. 101 step further, and drew up the celebrated Berlin Note, or, as it was afterwards called, the Berlin Memorandum. It was presented for acceptance to the Governments of England, France, and Italy, and an answer was requested by return of post. France and Italy agreed at once." The Memorandum advocated a two months' armistice in Herzegovina, negotiations for peace, a mixed Commission to distribute aid, Christians and Turks to keep their arms, consuls and delegates of the Powers to watch over the promised reforms and the return of refugees to their homes. Sir Stafford next states, at some length, the reasons which induced the Government not to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum : "It seemed to demand impossibilities, and was not in our judgment well qualified to attain its object. We therefore declined to make ourselves responsible for it; but we intimated that we should not offer any objection to the other Powers proceeding upon its lines without us. We have been much blamed for contenting ourselves with the rejection of the Note, without proposing any alternative course of action. I remember feeling at the time that we ought to make some alternative proposal." Sir Stafford Northcote then describes his own scheme, and the assent and dissent which it provoked; but this is not matter for publication. He goes on: "But the revolution which soon after took place at Constantinople 1 seemed to change the whole face of things, 1 It ended in the murder of the Sultan. and we began to hope that all would go well. The action of England had produced a good effect abroad, and it seemed probable that our influence with the new Government of Turkey might lead to considerable improvements in her administration. The Berlin Memorandum was laid aside, and, if peace could be maintained, time might bring about a better state of things. The principal dangers to be guarded against were an attack upon Turkey by Russia alone, or by Russia and Austria conjointly, or a war between Turkey and Servia and Montenegro. There seemed no real ground for apprehending the former contingency, after the stand which England had shown her readiness to make. As to a war with Servia, it was pretty sure to end in her defeat, if she were not secretly supported by a stronger Power. The great object was, therefore, to bring the influence of the Powers to bear on Servia to induce her to keep the peace. And this it seemed probable that we should have effected, if it had not been for the lamentable Bulgarian atrocities,' and their contre-coup in the English agitation." The Bulgarian atrocities were committed throughout May. The 'Daily News' published a letter on them from Constantinople, on June 23; Servia declared war on July 1. "It was undoubtedly most unfortunate that . . we were kept in almost entire ignorance until the public were startled by the horrible accounts given in the 'Daily News'; and we were at first disposed to believe that these accounts were monstrously exaggerated. The Prime 1880.] "WHAT IS THERE TO LAUGH AT?” 103 Minister, when questioned about them, meant to say nothing more than that he could not believe them; but very unfortunately the House caught up an expression which he rather carelessly made use of, and laughed as if he had said a good thing, thus giving the public an impression that he treated these horrors lightly. I was sitting next him at the time he spoke, and heard him say to himself rather angrily, 'What is there to laugh at?'" The reference is probably to Mr Disraeli's reply on June 28, or to that of July 10: "Oriental people seldom resort to torture, but generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious way." The whole speech is at variance with the flippancy of this one unhappy expression, which, indeed, was tacitly apologised for by what followed. "Gladstone was not in the House, I think, when the last discussion on this subject took place on Evelyn Ashley's motion. It would have been better if he had been, and if he had made his attack where it could have been properly answered. He took the unfortunate course of a violent extra-parliamentary series of pamphlets and speeches, denouncing the conduct of the Government in the most outrageous and exaggerated manner. Answers were given; but they were of no avail, because they could not be given face to face, and it was easy to ignore them. The mischief done in England, indeed, was not very great. The public knew what this sort of party declaration was worth; and they were perfectly aware that the Conservatives and the Government were just as indignant with |