Principles.

The controlling decisions of the courts of the various states not only reflect the variety and differences in the systems of taxation, but are themselves sometimes inconsistent and irreconcilable on identical questions. For the most part, however, they concur in recognizing and establishing the following principles in regard to county taxation:

(1) The county must be authorized by statute to levy the tax, 115

(2) It must be levied by the county board designated and empowered to perform that function.116

(3) There must be an official record of the levy.117

(4) The tax can be levied only upon persons and property or privileges within the limits of the county.118

(5) The tax must be for a public purpose and a county object.119

(6) There must be an assessment made by the officer or officers lawfully authorized to perform that function.120

115 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 7 Am. Dec. 145; Daily v. Sw ope, 47 Miss. 367; LARAMIE CO. v. ALBANY CO., 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552; Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. (U. S.) 330, 18 L. Ed. 177; CALDWELL v. JUSTICES, 57 N. C. 323; City of Philadelphia v. Flanigen, 47 Pa. 21.

116 Bright v. Halloman, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 309; West v. Whitaker, 37 Iowa, 598; Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. 224.

117 People v. Canal Co., 48 Cal. 143; Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141; Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 268; Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59. 118 See note 102.

119 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. County Court, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637, 62 Am. Dec. 424; Leavenworth County Com'rs v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, 12 Am. Rep. 425; State ex rel. North Missouri C. R. Co. v. County Court, 44 Mo. 504; Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. (U. S.) 327, 18 L. Ed. 177; Hill v. Forsythe Co., 67 N. C. 367; Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91, 21 Am. Rep. 586.

120 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Brogden, 74 N. C. 707; Stokes v. State, 24 Miss. 621; Middletown v. Berlin, 18 Conn. 189; Granger V. Parsons, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 392.

(7) There must also be an official record of this assessment. 121

(8) The tax levied must be equal and uniform upon all taxable objects in the county, or, if a local tax, upon all property and persons to be especially benefited thereby.122

(9) The official acts of county officers de facto in matters of taxation are valid and binding.128

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL.

27. Legislative delegation to the county of the inherent taxing power of the state, with the power to appropriate county revenues, may be repealed at any time by the legislature and resumed by the state, provided contractual obligations to third parties are not thereby impaired.

Counties do not acquire vested rights in the powers conferred upon them. As remarked by Nelson, J., in People v. Morris,124 "It is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power conferred by the legislature can become a vested right, as against the government, in any individual or body of men." It has accordingly been held that the legislature may repeal a grant of power to levy and collect wharfage which

121 Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass. 429; Bailey v. Ackerman, 54 N. H. 527; People v. Railroad Co., 49 Cal. 414; People v. Hagadorn, 104 N. Y. 516, 10 N. E. 891; Roe v. St. John, 7 Neb. 139; Downing v. Roberts, 21 Vt. 441.

122 City of East Portland v. Multnomah Co., 6 Or. 62; Sanborn v. Rice Co., 9 Minn. 273 (Gil, 258); Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349, 24 Am. Rep. 308; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis. 37, 8 N. W. 833; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. Ed. 1090.

128 State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; Laver v. McGlachlin, 28 Wis. 364; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 554, 91 Am. Dec. 299; Cushing v. Frankfort, 57 Me. 541; Washington Co. v. Miller, 14 Iowa, 584; Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark.

564.

124 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 335.

had been pledged by the corporation, together with other revenues for the payment of bonds issued to obtain money to maintain and improve the wharf; 125 and generally it is said that the legislature has the same power over the revenues of a county as over the immediate funds of the state.126 And so in regard to a fund set apart for disabled officers, it was said by Mr. Justice Field in Pennie v. Reis: 127 "The direction of the state that the fund should be for the benefit of the police officer or his representative, under certain conditions, was subject to change or revocation at any time at the will of the legislature. There was no contract on the part of the state that its disposition should always continue as originally provided. Until the particular event should happen upon which the money, or a part of it, was to be paid, there was no vested right in the officers to such payment." It has likewise been held that the legislature may require a county to deliver a certain portion of its revenue levied and collected for county purposes to a municipality within its borders to be used for street repairs, even though the Constitution of the state forbade the legislature to authorize counties to levy taxes for any other than county purposes.128 So, also, it has been held competent for the legislature to direct restitution to the taxpayer of all property exacted from him by taxation, into whatever form the property may have been changed, so long as it remained. under the control of the corporation.129 In California it has been held that the legislature may refuse to provide funds to pay an existing indebtedness of the county, and may provide a county fund out of which the holders of the county paper may obtain fifty per cent. of the face value of the same when

125 City of St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo. 351.

126 Duval County Com'rs v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 South. 339, 29 L. R. A. 416; Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., 12 Ill. 1.

127 132 U. S. 464, 10 Sup. Ct. 149, 33 L. Ed. 426.

128 Duval County Com'rs v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 South. 339, 29 L. R. A. 416.

129 Tippecanoe Co. v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 23 L. Ed. 822.

ever the county may choose to approve it.130

But a county

owing a debt of moral obligation to another county for certain expenses previously incurred may be compelled by act of legislation to satisfy the claim.131 So, also, a county may be compelled by the legislature to levy taxes to build and maintain a bridge over a stream within its boundaries,132 to improve levees,138 and even to issue bonds for the purpose of raising money to be expended in the construction and maintenance of highways within its limits.18 The courts have likewise in numerous instances maintained that it is competent for the legislature to compel a public corporation to levy a tax to pay to an individual a debt which is just and honorable, though not binding in law, nor even enforceable in equity.135

180 People v. Morse, 43 Cal. 534.

181 Lycoming Co. v. Union Co., 15 Pa. 166, 53 Am. Dec. 575. 132 Carter v. Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236.

133 Eastern S. A. R. Co. v. Railroad Co., 52 N. J. Law, 267, 19 Atl. 722.

134 Jensen v. Board, 47 Wis. 298, 2 N. W. 320; People v. Board, 50 Cal. 561.

135 TOWN OF GUILFORD v. SUPERVISORS, 13 N. Y. 144; People v. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228; People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. GASLIGHT CO., 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. Ed. 521; Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, 119 N. Y. 204, 23 N. E. 542; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 219, State v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 441; Vasser v. George, 47 Miss. 713; Sanborn v. Rice Co., 9 Minn. 273 (Gil. 258).

In the leading case above cited, of TOWN OF GUILFORD v. SUPERVISORS, the claim had been expressly rejected by the voters at an election authorized by special act of the Legislature, which declared that their action should be final and conclusive. Judge Cooley justifies the legislative action in this case upon the ground that it is the right and duty of the state to see that the powers which it confers upon public corporations are not abused to the injury of those who have relied upon them, and to prevent repudiation by them of their just obligations. Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.) 685.

For an elaborate opinion holding the contrary view, see State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, 9 Am. Rep. 622.

28. Within the class of public quasi corporations are included, besides counties, all involuntary political subdivisions of the state made for the convenience and efficiency of civil administration, and also all public organizations of officers clothed with governmental authority, and charged with the performance of public duties.

Two elements enter into the consideration of a quasi corporation-territory and persons.1 A corporation being a body of individuals, the latter element is the essential one. Distinct territorial limits, if not absolutely essential, will generally be found in every such corporation. The town, township, school district, road district, and drainage district are familiar illustrations of minor quasi corporations; and in general it may be said that whenever the legislature lays off a distinct subdivision of the state, either under general or special law, for some particular governmental purpose or purposes, without the request or consent of the inhabitants, and invests them with the powers necessary therefor, a

2

11 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 40: Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 294. HARRIS v. SCHOOL DIST., 8 Fost. (N. H.) 58; Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23; Inhabitants of Fourth School Dist. v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193; Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403; Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303