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Specific Funds.

These separate funds represent the assessment and appropriation of annual revenues to specific objects, and are severally devoted to those purposes.39 The financial agents or officers of the corporation must administer those funds in accordance with the general rules of the council setting them apart to specific purposes.40 They have no power to divert these funds. to different objects, and may be liable for so doing."1

RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.

154. Creditors may by contract obtain a vested interest in municipal funds so that the same cannot be taken from them either by municipal or legislative action.

It often happens in the administration of municipal affairs that contractors doing work of improvement for the municipality have been promised compensation out of certain municipal funds; or that a loan of money has been obtained upon the credit of some specific municipal fund; or that creditors of the municipality have been induced to refund their existing obligations at a lower rate of interest, or even to reduce the principal of the debt, upon guaranty of payment out of some specific source of municipal revenue. This stipulation may appear

of a special fund, cannot be collected against the city generally, though the remedy to collect from the special fund is lost. Wilson v. Aberdeen, 19 Wash. 89, 52 Pac. 524.

39 People v. Wood, 71 N. Y. 371; Bates v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224, 15 Pac. 732.

40 Schultze v. Manchester, 61 N.
v. Cook, 43 Neb. 318, 61 N. W. 693;
Fed. Cas. No. 1,663; Priet v. Reis, 93 Cal. 85, 28 Pac. 798.

J. Law, 513, 40 Atl. 589; State
Boro v. Phillips Co., 4 Dill. 216,

When a draft or warrant drawn by the proper officer, and in due form, is presented to a treasurer, it is no part of his duty to inquire into the legality of the consideration for which it was given. Wolf v. Oller, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 235.

41 Blair v. Lantry, 21 Neb. 247, 31 N. W. 790; City of East St. Louis v. Flannigen, 34 Ill. App. 596. See Bates v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224, 15 Pac. 732; Priet v. Reis, 93 Cal. 85, 28 Pac. 798.

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either in the contract or the municipal ordinance, or the statute under which the action is taken. In all such cases, unless the fund pledged is strictly governmental in its nature, so as to be incapable of being pledged, the creditor obtains a vested interest in the fund,43 which is protected by the contract clause of the federal Constitution; and his right cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation, either by the state or the municipality. Sinking funds have been held to be peculiarly within the protection of this constitutional provision, and any legislation void which tends to impair the creditor's contractual security.45 The same doctrine may be applied with equal force to any other special municipal fund which has been likewise pledged as security for municipal debt, though in some cases the creditor has been denied the full measure of this constitutional protection. But a pledge of the entire municipal revenues,

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or of the ordinary revenues employed in performing strictly governmental functions, would be obviously void as an unwarranted surrender of sovereign power; 48 in other words, such

42 Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 22 C. C. A. 171, 34 L. R. A. 518; DAVIS v. NEW YORK, 14 N. Y. 506, 67 Am. Dec. 186.

43 PORT OF MOBILE v. WATSON, 116 U. S. 289, 6 Sup. Ct. 398, 29 L. Ed. 620; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. Ed. 1090; WOLFF v. NEW ORLEANS, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. Ed. 395; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426, 22 Am. Rep. 321.

44 City of Memphis v. U. S., 97 U. S. 293, 24 L. Ed. 920; SHAPLEIGH v. SAN ANGELO, 167 U. S. 646, 17 Sup. Ct. 957, 42 L. Ed. 310. 45 Board of Liquidators of City Debts v. Municipality, 6 La. Ann. 21; KELLY v. MINNEAPOLIS, 63 Minn. 125, 65 N. W. 115, 30 L. R. A. 281.

46 VON HOFFMAN v. QUINCY, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 535, 18 L. Ed. 403; City of Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 705, 18 L. Ed. 560; WOLFF v. NEW ORLEANS, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. Ed. 395.

47 City of St. Louis v. Sheilds, 52 Mo. 351.

48 Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611, 84 Am. Dec. 314; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344, O Am. Rep. 80; Brick Presbyterian Church Corp. V. Mayor, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 538; Rittenhouse v. Mayor, 25 Md. 336; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 22 C. C. A. 171, 34 L. R. A. 518.

STANFORD LAW LIDIMINE

a contract would be void as against public policy, and therefore not protected by the federal Constitution.**

EXPENSES.

155. Municipal expenses include all such items as are incidental to the proper exercise of corporate functions in administering the government of the municipality, and, if within the scope of the municipal powers, are within the discretion of the governing body.

The details of administration in a municipality are so varied and numerous as to render classification or special regulation impossible. They are, however, generally committed to the discretion of the municipal council,50 but in some instances to that of special officers. For example, it has been held that a stenographer's fees for reporting, under the direction of the city attorney, the trial of a case against a police officer, was a proper item of municipal expense, though the city was not a party to the suit, since such matters must be left to the discretion of the city attorney, and he was acting within the apparent scope of his authority.52 But the discretion vested in the council will not validate a claim for items of expenditure obviously not municipal, such as giving banquets,5 providing

49 Sandusky City Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St. 481; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; LYNN v. POLK, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 121; East Saginaw Mfg. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 410; Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C. 226; Mott v. Railroad Co., 30 Pa. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 664.

50 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 94; Kendall v. Frey, 74 Wis. 26, 42 N. W. 466, 17 Am. St. Rep. 118; White v. Mayor, 119 Ala. 476, 23 South. 999. Ante, § 71.

51 Ante, § 65.

52 City of Chicago v. Williams, 80 Ill. App. 33.

53 Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R. I. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 648; Commonwealth v. Gingrich, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 286.

entertainment for guests,

buying military uniforms,

ex

penses of delegates to a municipal convention,56 and the like. 57

BUDGET.

156. A classified statement of annual appropriation of municipal revenues, commonly called a budget, is required in many states, as the measure of lawful municipal expenditures during the year.

The object of this budget, obviously, is to ensure an orderly, systematic, and economical administration of municipal affairs, and the executive officers of the municipality are required to conform their operations to this budget, and limit their expenditures to the sum appropriated to the various departments

54 Black v. Detroit, 119 Mich. 571, 78 N. W. 660.

55 Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray (Mass.) 502.

56 Waters v. Bonvouloir, 172 Mass. 286, 52 N. E. 500.

57 City of Tyler v. L. L. Jester & Co. (Tex.) 74 S. W. 359; State ex rel. Crowe v. St. Louis, 174 Mo. 125, 73 S. W. 623, 61 L. R. A. 593; In re Town of Eastchester, 53 Hun, 181, 6 N. Y. Supp. 120; Kingman v. Brockton, 153 Mass. 255, 26 N. E. 998, 11 L. R. A. 123; The Liberty Bell, 23 Fed. 843; City of New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 556; HODGES v. BUFFALO, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 110; Greenough v. Wakefield, 127 Mass. 275.

Where a city council, without authority, authorized the payment of a claim of a member for expenditures made by him in company with others on a trip to various cities investigating municipal affairs in pursuance of an ordinance, the city comptroller properly refused to approve a warrant drawn in payment of such claim. James v. Seattle, 22 Wash. 654, 62 Pac. 84, 79 Am. St. Rep. 957.

But charges for labor and material furnished in the building of a city jail, services in guarding quarantined patients, publishing notice and printing ballots of election, feeding impounded stock, boarding city prisoners, insurance on city buildings, services in making assessment rolls, postage and stationery for officers, city printing and necessary expenses of the city clerk, are held valid, though the city had exceeded the limit of its indebtedness, as such were necessarily expenses incurred in maintaining its existence. Gladwin v. Ames, 30 Wash. 608, 71 Pac. 189.

STANFORD LAW LIDIVAT

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or kinds of municipal work." But the courts of the various states express diverse views as to the object of such statute and the municipal power thereunder. In Illinois and Colorado o municipalities are held to be limited in expenditure to the budget appropriations. In Connecticut 61 it is held that the statute is intended for protection of the city against its officers, and that the council may incur expenditures not provided for by the budget; and in Nebraska 62 the budget limit has been held not to include money authorized to be borrowed for specific purpose on sanction of the legal voters. It has also been held that unwarranted expenditures for municipal objects may be ratified by the council, and a claim therefor be thus validated. 63

58 Spaulding v. Arnold, 125 N. Y. 194, 26 N. E. 295; State ex rel. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. New Orleans, 40 La. Ann. 299, 3 South. 584. The amount placed on the budget for the annual expenses of a municipal corporation when collected by taxes levied therefor must be applied to the purposes specified in the budget. Parish Board of School Directors v. Shreveport, 47 La. Ann. 1310, 17 South. 823. See Badger v. New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 804, 21 South. 870, 37 L. R. A. 540.

59 Culbertson v. City of Fulton, 127 Ill. 30, 18 N. E. 781.

60 Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo. 483, 18 Pac. 736.

61 Whitney v. New Haven, 58 Conn. 450, 20 Atl. 666.

62 State v. Martin, 27 Neb. 441, 43 N. W. 244.

63 Barrett v. Mobile, 129 Ala. 179, 30 South. 36, 87 Am. St. Rep. 54; MILLS v. GLEASON, 11 Wis. 470, 78 Am. Dec. 721; City of St. Louis, to Use of Creamer, v. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133; Burrill v. Boston, 2 Cliff. 590, Fed. Cas. No. 2,198; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127 (Gil. 119), 97 Am. Dec. 226; Bolles v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759, 7 Sup. Ct. 736, 30 L. Ed. 786.

But where it is in excess of the constitutional limitation it cannot be ratified. Balch v. Beach (Wis.) 95 N. W. 132.

See, also, McGillivray v. District, 112 Wis. 354, 88 N. W. 310, 58 L. R. A. 100, 88 Am. St. Rep. 969.

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