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preme Court of New York has carried this doctrine to the extent of sustaining a statute passed levying a tax upon the property of a corporation, and appropriating the same to the payment of a private demand against the town, which had been expressly rejected by the voters of the town at an election held. under legislative authority for that purpose, and intended as a settlement of the right. Judge Cooley says this authority may be defended upon the ground that it is the duty of the state to enforce just obligations for the public benefit which have been incurred in the exercise of public power conferred upon a corporation." But it is equally well settled by repeated decisions that it rests with the inhabitants of a municipality to determine conclusively whether a debt shall be incurred for purely municipal purposes; 70 also that a corporation cannot be compelled to become a stockholder in a railway company, or other private corporation; 71 and in the celebrated Detroit Park Case it was ruled that a public park was a matter of municipal concern, and that the levy of a tax for the purchase and improvement of such parks could not be 713; TOWN OF GUILFORD v. CORNELL, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 615; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 219; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. CLARK, 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. Ed. 521; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; People v. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228; Lycoming County v. Union County, 15 Pa. 166, 53 Am. Dec. 575; State v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 441. The following cases declare the right of the municipality to a trial in due course of law: Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283; Sanborn v. Commissioners, 9 Minn. 273 (Gil. 258); State v. Tuppan, 29 Wis. 664, 9 Am. Rep. 622. See, also, Cooley, Tax'n, 687.

68 TOWN OF GUILFORD v. CORNELL, 18 Barb. 615. See, also, Carter v. Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. CLARK, 95 U. S. 654, 24 L. Ed. 521; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 322, 21 L. Ed. 597; People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490, 8 Am. Rep. 141.

69 Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.) 685.

70 People v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128, 13 Am. Rep. 480; PEOPLE v. DETROIT, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226.

71 People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128, 13 Am. Rep. 480.

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enforced by the legislature without the consent of the municipality. The only exception to this wholesome doctrine is to be found in the state of Pennsylvania, wherein, under direct legislative act sustained by the courts, the people of Philadelphia were unwillingly compelled to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars annually for the erection of the city hall "upon a scale of magnificence better suited for the capital of an empire than the municipal buildings of a debt-burdened city." " The same act which declared that the city must have these fine buildings appointed certain citizens a body of commissioners for their erection, and made this body self-perpetuating, and authorized it to make contracts for the construction of the buildings, and to make requisitions on the common council for the expenses thereof, the citizens of Philadelphia having no vote or voice whatever as to the subject.74 This, of course, could only be defended upon the idea that the city hall was not municipal, but governmental, property, over which the state had supreme control. Between Pennsylvania at one extreme and Michigan at the other, the other states stand in a middle position of greater safety, even if greater doubt, as to the administration of the law.

PROPERTY.

69. Public property held by a municipality for the benefit of the general public may be controlled and administered by the state as supreme trustee for the public; but property actually acquired by a municipal corporation in the course of administration, and held for the benefit of the municipality, is not subject to the absolute control of the legislature.

72 PEOPLE v. DETROIT, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202.

78 PERKINS v. SLACK, 86 Pa. 283.

741 Dill. Mun. Corp. 74a. The city hall which Pennsylvania thus forced her chief city to build has well been described as "surpassing in extent and grandeur the townhalls and cathedrals of the Middle Ages."

Here, again, the dual nature of a municipal corporation is disclosed, and difficulties arise in regard to paramount authority over municipal property, not in stating the principle, but in its practical application. Contentions inevitably arise over the question, What is strictly municipal property, and what is governmental property; or what property is held by the municipality for the benefit of the general public, and what for the local benefit? The adjudged cases do not point out any distinct line of separation for these two classes of property, and in the confusion of cases upon this subject it is not wise to attempt to formulate any definite rule of law whereby to distinguish them, other than that suggested in the text. In Michigan, where the right of local self-government is fully recognized and protected by constitutional provision, Judge Cooley says: "It is immaterial in what way the property was lawfully acquired, whether by labor in the ordinary vocations of life, by gift or by descent, or by making profitable use of a franchise granted by the state; it is enough that it has become private property, and it is then protected by the law of the land." It is hardly proper, in other states where home rule is not so highly favored, to speak of any municipal property as private property. It is, however, essentially trust property. the municipality being the trustee, and the people of the locality the cestuis que trustent of strictly municipal property.76 Of this class of property Judge Dillon expresses the opinion: "That while the legislature has full power of legitimate regulation and control, it cannot deprive them (that is, in essence, the people of the locality at whose expense it has been acquired, or for whose benefit it was granted) of such property. It is in effect fastened with a trust for the incorporated municipality as long as the legislature suffers it to live, and for the benefit

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75 City of Detroit v. Plank Road Co., 43 Mich. 147, 5 N. W. 275. 76 NICHOL V. NASHVILLE, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 252; Small v. Danville, 51 Me. 359; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Maxmilian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468; Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375.

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of the people of the locality if the corporate entity which represents their rights shall be dissolved." " In New York it was decided that certain real estate held by the city in fee simple absolute under ancient grant, upon which at great expense the city had constructed reservoirs, could not by legislative action be converted into a public park without compensation to the city.78 Upon the dissolution of a municipal corporation, as we have seen, so much of its assets as are not stamped with the strictly public character will be taken possession of and administered for the benefit of creditors of the corporation by a receiver appointed by the legislature, or by the court of chancery."

PUBLIC THOROUGHFARES.

70. The legislature has general control over all streets, canals, rivers, and bridges, and other public thoroughfares, and may compel the municipality to make such expenditures thereon for their improvement as it deems best for the public welfare.

Public thoroughfares are, of course, matters of general as distinguished from local concern. The legislature, therefore, may prescribe what improvements thereon shall be made for the public convenience, and may require the corporation to pay the expense of particular improvements required by it. 80 The legislature may use the compulsory power of taxation, or even compel the issuance of bonds by a municipality, for the purpose of raising money to pay for the construction and maintenance of a bridge or a canal, or wharves or levees in the city

771 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 68a.

78 Webb v. Mayor, 64 How. Prac. 10. See, also, Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch (U. S.) 52, 3 L. Ed. 650; PEOPLE v. INGERSOLL, 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178; 2 Kent, Comm. 257.

79 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 170.

80 People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Portland, & W. V. R. Co. v. Portland, 14 Or. 188, 12 Pac. 265, 58 Am. Rep. 299; Daley v. St. Paul, 7 Minn. 390 (Gil. 311).

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limits. And in Massachusetts it has been held that the legislature may charge the cost of an authorized public improvement upon the municipal corporation chiefly benefited thereby.82 In Maryland and some other states, so important is this duty to maintain streets and highways that it may be enforced by mandamus at the suit of a private person without showing special interest or injury.88 The municipality, however, is usually held to be subject to judicial supervision in the exercise of its discretionary power over streets. The power of the legislature over streets is so great that it may, so far as the public is concerned, determine to what use they may be put, even to the authorization of a nuisance in them; 85 and in Pennsylvania the power of the legislature to authorize a turnpike gate to be established in a city street has been supported by judicial decision. As a consequence of this, street railways are operated in every city of the country, some by horses and others by electricity. Usually, the legislature requires that the street railway companies shall obtain their franchise from the city; 87 but these franchises may be conferred by the legislature directly, without regard to corporate

81 Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 63 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 783; Guilder v. Otsego, 20 Minn. 74 (Gil. 59); THOMAS v. LELAND, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 65.

82 Inhabitants of Norwich v. Commissioners, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 60. 88 Pumphrey v. Baltimore, 47 Md. 145, 28 Am. Rep. 446.

84 Sutton v. Snohomish, 11 Wash. 24, 39 Pac. 273, 48 Am. St. Rep. 847; Texarkana v. Leach, 66 Ark. 40, 48 S. W. 807, 74 Am. St. Rep. 68; Douglass v. City Council, 118 Ala. 599, 24 South. 745, 43 L. R. A. 376.

85 State v. Luce, 9 Houst. (Del.) 396, 32 Atl. 1076; Bedell v. Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 367, 4 Am. Rep. 688; Cleaveland v. Railway Co., 42 Vt. 449; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472, 9 Atl. 871, 2 Am. St. Rep. 618; State v. Parrott, 71 N. C. 311, 17 Am. Rep. 5.

86 Stormfeltz v. Turnpike Co., 13 Pa. 555.

87 State ex rel. Laclede Gaslight Co. v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 31 S. W. 594, 31 L. R. A. 798.

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