56 properly cleanse the Wellington Dock, whereby a vessel was imbedded in harbor mud, and, with its cargo, was badly damaged. And in another case want of funds was held no defense to such an action, because the commissioners had power to levy a tax, and thereby obtain the necessary funds.57 Similar rulings have been made in this country in regard to overseers of highways 58 and to municipal corporations.59 56 MERSEY DOCK TRUSTEES v. GIBBS, L. R. 1 H. L. 93. This interesting and instructive case is given in full in 1 Thomp. Neg. 581. It is thus digested: "The principle on which a private person or a company is liable for damages occasioned by the neglect of servants applies to a corporation which has been intrusted by statute to perform certain works, and to receive tolls for the use of those works, although those tolls, unlike the tolls received by the private person or the company, are not applicable to the use of the individual corporators, or to that of the corporation, but are devoted to the maintenance of the works, and, in case of any surplus existing, the tolls themselves are to be proportionally diminished." 57 Hartnall v. Ryde Commissioners, 4 Best & S. 361. 58 Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113. 50 Erie City v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. 385, 60 Am. Dec. 87; Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236; Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 385; City of Milledgeville v. Cooley, 55 Ga. 17. Part II. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. CHAPTER V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. 34. Municipal Corporations—Distinguishing Elements-Prescription. 35. The State. 36. The Territories. 37. History. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DISTINGUISHING ELE MENTS. 34. The municipal corporation is a perfect public corporation, established under and by virtue of a sovereign act of legislation, uniting the people and land within a prescribed boundary into a body corporate and politic for the purposes of local and self-government, and invested with the powers necessary therefor. It is perfect as contradistinguished from the imperfect quasi corporation, the county, district, or township, loosely organized under general law into a governmental agency for local administration of the state authority within a subdivision of the state, which in strictness cannot be said to be incorporated, though the statutes of many states declare them to be corporations. The municipal corporation is duly incorporated not primarily to enforce state laws, but chiefly to regulate the local affairs of the city, town, or district incorporated by 1 Ante, §§ 7-10; BOARD OF COM'RS OF HAMILTON CO. v. MIGHELS, 7 Ohio St. 109; Talbot County Com'rs v. Queen Anne's Co., 50 Md. 245; Manuel v. Commissioners, 98 N. C. 9, 3 S. E. 829; Schultes v. Eberly, 82 Ala. 242, 2 South. 345; Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590, 14 N. W. 833; Rogers v. People, 68 Ill. 154; Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23; Pulaski Co. v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 54; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa, 264; HILL V. BOSTON, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332. (110) 5 proper legislation and administration. It is lawfully and fully empowered so to do. Practically it may fall far short of perfection, but in the eye of the law it is the only ideal of a complete public corporation. Its object is public, though incidents connected with it may be of private nature, and so far forth it is subject to the rules of liability controlling private corporations in the ownership of property, while the quasi public corporation is of a private nature and object, with incidents only that are public. The municipal is the 2 Cuddon v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 143; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; PEOPLE v. MORRIS, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; PEOPLE V. HURLBUT, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103; East Tennessee University v. Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166; State v. Milwaukee, 20 Wis. 87. 3 Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 138; STATE v. DENNY, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L. R. A. 65, and 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252, 4 L. R. A. 79; PEOPLE v. HURLBUT, supra; PEOPLE v. DETROIT, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202; Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105; Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen (Mass.) 407, 81 Am. Dec. 670; State v. Tryon, 39 Conn. 183; Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 Ill. 533; Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87; Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga. 184; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. (N. S.) (La.) 409, 16 Am. Dec. 189. 41 Thomp. Priv. Corp. 22; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406; PEOPLE v. MORRIS, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; Appeal of Bennett's Branch Imp. Co., 65 Pa. 242; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, 1 Am. Rep. 215. BAILEY V. MAYOR, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Corn. 1; Commonwealth v. Philadelphia, 132 Pa. 28S, 19 Atl. 136; Wagner v. Rock Island, 146 Ill. 139, 34 N. E. 545, 21 L. R. A. 519; STATE v. DENNY, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L. R. A. 65; PEOPLE v. HURLBUT, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103. Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Brumm's Appeal (Pa.) 12 Atl. 855; Town of Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12, 67 Am. Dec. 748; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Webb v. Mayor, 64 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 10; NICHOL v. MAYOR, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 252; PEOPLE v. DETROIT, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202; United States V. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 332, 21 L. Ed. 597. 7 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Marion Co., 36 Mo. 294; Goodnow V. Ramsey Co., 11 Minn. 31 (Gil. 12); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Davidson Co., 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637, 62 Am. Dec. 424; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37; Ray Co. v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236; LARAMIE CO. v. ALBANY CO., 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552. But see Smith V. Myers, 15 Cal. 33; MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. only corporation standing as the representative of the purely public corporation. 8 It is established under law; i. e., it may be created by special charter enacted by the general assembly, without popular expression or action from the inhabitants of the territory, as well as by their request or consent; indeed, municipalities have been incorporated in direct antagonism to the expressed wish of the people.10 Or it may be voluntarily organized by the residents of a specified territory under general incorporation laws, enacted for such purpose, and author 77; CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. IOWA, 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. Ed. 94; State v. Gas Co., 37 Ohio St. 45. 8 Elliott, Mun. Corp. §§ 12, 13; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 21, 37, 44, 54; Clark, Priv. Corp., Appendix; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 349; PEOPLE v. BUTTE, 4 Mont. 179, 1 Pac. 414, 47 Am. Rep. 346; STATE v. CURRAN, 12 Ark. 321; Taylor v. Newberne, 55 N. C. 141, 64 Am. Dec. 566; Smith v. People, 154 Ill. 58, 39 N. E. 319. • Inhabitants of Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 58; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 330; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa (8 Clarke) 82; Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; BERLIN v. GORHAM, 34 N. H. 266; People v. Wren, 5 Ill. 269; PEOPLE v. MORRIS, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; State ex rel. Dome v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. 359; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; State v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho, 1, 45 Pac. 462; In re Narberth Borough, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 29; De Hart v. Atlantic City, 62 N. J. Law, 586, 41 Atl. 687. 10 Elliott, Mun. Corp. § 14. "The erection of such a corporation is in truth simply the creation of a new instrumentality of government." Elliott, Roads & S. p. 313; PEOPLE v. BUTTE, 4 Mont. 179, 1 Pac. 414, 47 Am. Rep. 346; Inhabitants of Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 58; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; STATE v. CURRAN, 12 Ark. 321; People v. Wren, 5 Ill. 269; Coles v. Madison Co., 1 Ill. (Breese) 154, 12 Am. Dec. 161; Warren v. Mayor, 2 Gray (Mass.) 84; PEOPLE v. MORRIS, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 325; Spring Valley Waterworks v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 434; Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 23 How. (U. S.) 381, 16 L. Ed. 488; State v. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709, 41 N. W. 654; New York Fire Dept. v. Kip, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; Proprietors of Land of Southold v. Horton, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 501; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82. In the izing the erection of a municipality by such means.11 first case the charter is the test and measure of the granted powers; in the latter they are to be found in the general corporation statutes. The difference between the two is only in the mode of organization. When fully incorporated, both are equally perfect public corporations. It is a "sovereign act of legislation," because in this country no other power in the state may create the corporation.12 The power may not be delegated to any inferior body.1 The general assembly or legislature of the state alone possesses 11 Von Phul v. Hammer, 29 Iowa, 222; Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 24 Am. Rep. 421; City of Wyandotte v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603; Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St. 124; City of Lafayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70; State v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho, 1, 45 Pac. 462. 12 Chandler v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 10, 44 Am. Dec. 732; United States v. Ins. Co., 22 Wall. (U. S.) 99, 22 L. Ed. 816; Clarke MILLS v. WILLIAMS, 33 N. C. 558; People v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; v. President, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 351. City of East St. Louis 13 City of St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 22 S. W. 470, 20 L. R. A. 721; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92, 55 Am. Dec. 385; McCrowell v. Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 16 S. E. 867, 20 L. R. A. 653; Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 336; V. Wehrung, 50 Ill. 28; Mayor of City of Md. 499; Danforth v. Mayor, 34 N. J. Law, itants of Nantucket, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 433. land v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540, and Matthews v. City of Alexandria, CS Mo. 115, 30 Am. Rep. 776, where the cities empowered to build and regulate wharves undertook to confer the right upon lessees or contractors. 1 Thomp. Priv. Corp. § 110; State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750; In re Incorporation of Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 1033, 33 L. R. A. 638; Territory v. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 23 Pac. 405, 8 L. R. A. 106; STATE v. ARMSTRONG, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 634. The power to organize or perform ministerial functions under the law authorizing incorporation may he vested in courts or official boards. EX PARTE CHADWELL, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 98; Greeneville & P. R. Narrow Gauge R. Co. V. Johnson, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 332; Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 97; State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81; Clark, Priv. Corp. p. 41, note; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) pp. 137, 248. ING.CORP.-8 |