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THE EXTRA SESSION OF CONGRESS, AND THE MILITARY EVENTS
OF THE SUMMER OF 1861.
First ANNUAL MESSAGE.- ARTION OF CONGRESS,--SLAVERY AND Oon.
FISCATION.–Tue Dereat At Bull Run.--TREATMENT OF THE SLAVERY QUESTION.-GENERAL FREMONT AND THE PRESIDENT.-THE TRENT AFFAIR.
In pursuance of the President's proclamation of the 15th of April, Congress mot in extra session on the 4th of July, 1861. The Republicans had control of both houses, counting thirty-one votes out of forty-eight in the Senate, ind one hundred and six out of one hundred and seventy-eight in the House ; there being, moreover, five in the Senate and twenty-eight in the House who, without belonging to the Republican party, supported the Administration in its efforts to preserve the Union. Hon. G. A. Grow was elected Speaker of the House ; and, on the 5th, the President communicated to Congresshis first Annual Message, as follows :
Felloro-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives :
Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of legislation.
At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the
ed within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the Post-Office Department.
Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, custom-houses, and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and about them, bad been seized, and were held in open hostility to this Government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and neai the Florida coast, and Fort Suinter, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolinu. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition, new ones bad
been built, and armed forces had been organized and were organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.
The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in and near these states were either besieged or menaced by warlike preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by well. protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the best of its own, and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow found their way into these States, and had been seized to be used against the Government. Acoumulations of the public revenue, lying within them, bad been seized for the same object. The Navy was scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate reach of the Government. Officers of the Federal Army and Navy had resigned in great numbers; and of those resigning, a large proportion bad taken up arms against the Governinent. Simultaneously, and in connection with all this, the parpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed. In accordance with this purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each of tbaso States, declaring the States, respectively, to be separated from the National Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of these States had been promulgated; and this illegal organization, in the charaoter of the Confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign Powers.
duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the consumination of auch attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made, and was declared in the Inaugural Address. The policy chosen looked to the exhaus tion of all peaceful 'measures before a resort to any stronger ones. It sought only to hold tbe public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to colloct the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at Government expense, to the very people who were resisting the Government; and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the people, or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, every thing was forborne, without which it was believed possible to keep the Government on foot.
On the 5th of Marob (tho present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th of February, and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was by that Department placed in his bands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the writer, that reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered neoessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good
and well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the efficers of his command, and their momoranda on the subject were made enclosures of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of the ariny and the navy; and at the end of four days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient forco was then at the control of the Government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely inilitary point of view, this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.
It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the circumstances, would be utterly ruinous ; that the necessity under which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our National destruction consummated. This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison; and ere it would be reached Fort Pickens might be re-enforced. This would be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was, that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late Adniinistration (and of the existence of which the present Administration, up to the time the order was dispatched, had ouly too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the troops. To now re-enforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter, was impossible-rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture, the Government had a few days before commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended in this oontingency, it was also resolved to notify the Governor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or in case of nn
attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.
It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was In no cense a matter of self-defence upon the part of the assailants. They well know that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew—they were expressly notified--that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They know that this Gov erninent desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and iminediate dissolution-trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion, and the ballot-box for final adjustment; and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object to drive out the visible anthority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution. That this was their object the Executive well understood; and having said to them in the Ipangaral Address, “ You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors," he took pains not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power of ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the assailants of the Government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight, or in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort, sent to that harbor years before for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, "immediate dissolution or blood."
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question, whether a constitutional republic or democracy, government of the people by the same people--can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question, whether discontented individDals, too few in numbers to control administration, according to organic law, in any case, can always, upon the pretences made in this case, or on any other pretences, or arbitrarily, withont any pretence, break up their Government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forees us to ask, “Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness ?” “Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"
So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist force employed for its destruction hy force for its preservation.
The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratify. ing—surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet none of the States commonly called Slave States, except Delaware. gave a regiment through regular State organization. A few regiments have been organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise, and received into the Government service. Of course, the seceded States, so called (and to which Texas bad been joined about the time of the inauguration), gave no troops to the cause of the Union. The Border States, so called, were not uniform in their action, some of them being almost for the Union, while in others—as Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas-the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most remarkable-perbaps the most important. A convention, elected by the people of that State to consider this very question of disrupting the Federal Union, was in session at the Capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fel). To this body the people had chosen a large majority of professed Union men. Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter many members of that majority went over to the original disunion minority, and with them adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether this change was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter, or their great resentment at the Government's resistance to that assault, is not definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance for ratification to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then somewhat inore than a month distant, the Convention and the Legislature (which was also in session at the same time and place), with leading men of the State not members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State were already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously forward all over the State. They seized the United States armory at Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Gosport; near Norfolk. They received-perhaps invited-into their State large bodies of troops, with their warlike appointments, from the so-called seceded States. They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alli ance and co-operation with the so-called “Confederate States," and sent members to their Congress at Montgomery; and, finally, they permittod the insurrectionary Government to be transferred to their capital at Rich inond.
The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to inake its nest within her borders; and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regtet, as the loyal citizens have in due form claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recognize and protect as being Virginia.
In the Border States, so-called-in fact, the Middle States-there are those who favor a policy which they call “armed neutrality" that is, an arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing ono way,