CHAPTER XV. LORD LANGDALE'S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE ON the 2nd of December, 1847, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into, and report to the House, on the taxation of suitors in the courts of law and equity, by the collection of fees, and of the amount thereof, and the mode of collection, and the appropriation of fees in the courts of law and equity, and in all inferior courts, and in the courts of special and general sessions in England and Wales, and in the Ecclesiastical courts, and courts of Admiralty; and as to the salaries and fees received by the officers of those courts, and whether any, and what, means could be adopted with a view of superintending and regulating. the collection and appropriation thereof. Before this Committee Lord Langdale was examined on the 7th of February, 1848; the substance of the principal points in the evidence he delivered on the occasion is as follows: "I have long been of opinion that the courts and offices of law, so far as they depend on the organization, establishment, and management of officers, ought to be treated like every other important department of Government, and be paid by, and kept under the superintendence and control of Government; and that there is no more reason for charging the particular expense of judicial and legal services upon suitors, than there is for charging the expense of any other public services upon the particular persons who have occasion to apply to the Government for such services. The legal department is amongst the most important branches of Government. This establishment is maintained for the benefit not only of the particular persons who require remedies for the wrongs they have endured, but also for the common benefit and security of all who live under the protection of the law. It does not seem to me to be expedient, or even just, to charge the particular individuals who already are in distress by reason of the insufficiency or inefficiency of the law and the conduct of wrong-doers, with the further expense of maintaining the establishment by which the law is to be declared, and the wrong-doers are to be prevented from pursuing their course of injury. I think, therefore, that it is the proper duty of the Government to pay those expenses. It seems to me quite wrong to make any addition which can be avoided to the suffering already occasioned by the inadequacy of the laws. All judges, officers, and ministers should be paid by the public, and I think by salaries. What reason can be given why the suitors of the Court of Chancery should be charged with the salary of the Lord Chancellor, with the salaries of two Vice-Chancellors, with VOL. II. Q the salaries of the Masters, and of various other officers? I conceive that all these are officers and ministers which the Government is bound to provide; they are employed in the most important public services, and I know no reason why the expense of them should be exclusively charged upon the suitors. All the salaries are not so charged. The salary of the Vice-Chancellor of England is paid out of the consolidated fund, so is that of the Master of the Rolls. When the Rolls estate was vested in the crown, the Government consented to an arrangement by which the Master of the Rolls ceased to have even a nominal interest in fees. I think all salaries ought to be in like manner paid by the public; and further, that compensation paid to persons for losses occasioned by reforms or improvements ought also to be paid by the public, for whose benefit the reforms are made. It frequently happens that for the purpose of correcting abuses, and putting an end to unnecessary expenses, it is necessary to make changes by which individuals without having committed any fault, or any fault of which they could be aware, may be subjected to great losses, and perhaps be deprived of the only employment to which they have been accustomed from early life. They have passed their lives within the view of those who seem at least to have sanctioned the practices which grew up; and when a reform is required and contemplated, and the known effect of it will be to deprive such persons as I have adverted to of their means of subsistence, I suppose that considerations of justice and mercy, and the interests of reform itself, will induce most men to conclude that a fair compensation ought to be allowed: and if it be so concluded, should not the compensation be considered as the price paid for a public benefit the benefit of that reform which your own sense of justice would not permit you to effect without paying the price? and should not the Government, which is the purchaser for the benefit of the public, discharge the purchase money? It is not thus, however, that compensations for losses occasioned by reforms in the Court of Chancery have been provided for. If grievances have had to be there remedied by reforms causing losses, and requiring compensations, it has been necessary to prolong at least the pecuniary part of the grievance, in order to work out the compensations. I beg leave to mention the example of the late Six Clerks' Office. The constitution of that office was an undoubted grievance; not only a grievance in itself, but it stood as an effectual obstacle against any effectual reform in some of the other offices. It was most important to get rid of it; and, as I think, absolutely necessary to provide compensations for those whose emoluments, long sanctioned by acquiescent authority, were about to be taken away. The Government, however, would pay nothing, and would guarantee nothing, and, therefore, it became necessary to consider whether, for want of compensation, the intended reform should be abandoned, and the grievance left as it stood, or whether the compensation should be provided by a temporary pecuniary burden on the suitors, so that the suitors might have the immediate benefit of so much of the reform as did not consist of mere pecuniary relief, and might after an interval, and by slow degrees and successive steps, obtain that full measure of relief which might have been obtained at once if this burden had not been imposed. Having been required to advise on that subject, I was then, as I am now, of opinion that it would be much wiser to continue for a time the expense (which I consider to be a grievance), and let the burden gradually wear away as the compensations fell in, than to abandon an important reform, and permit the grievance to remain indefinitely without effectual remedy. A great outcry was, naturally enough, made by those who did not thoroughly understand the subject; but there is reason to be well satisfied by the result. The business is transacted in the reformed offices with incomparably greater efficiency and satisfaction; the way to many other reforms is facilitated; the fees which are taken from the suitors in the reformed offices are already less by 11,000l. a-year than the amount of fees levied in the unreformed office; and the amount of the salaries paid to the new officers, of the large compensations paid to the old officers, and of other expenses, is already less by 5000l. a-year than the amount of the fees which were received by the old officers before the reform. Without affirming that the Act of Parliament provided the best mode of settling the compensations, and disapproving, as I do, of the compensations being charged on the suitors, I can have no doubt that the reform has resulted in great benefit to the suitors. If the compensations had been paid by the Government, that benefit would, of course, have been much greater." He was of opinion that all the officers of the Court of Chancery, without exception, should be paid by salary |