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Plans for further action.

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in accordance with the maxims of most officers of the day: and 3d, a needless adherence to military rules on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, which made his force a target for the Indians to shoot at.*

One circumstance connected with this battle, and one of no inconsiderable interest, has been but lately brought to light, and may even now, perhaps, be doubted; it is the presence of Joseph Brant, Thayendanegea, -the great Captain of the Mohawks. Until this was announced in 1838, by Colonel Stone in his life of that Chieftain, the Little Turtle, Mechecunnaqua, Chief of the Miamis, had been universally regarded as the leader at St. Clair's, as he had been at Harmar's, defeat. Mr. Stone's information was derived from Brant's family; but as there might have been error in the tradition, as it is very improbable that he should have been there, and no whisper from any source have got abroad in all the time since elapsed, -as he had been before and was afterwards a messenger and advocate of peace, and as to believe him at St. Clair's defeat would be to believe him guilty of needless disguise and deception,- we cannot but doubt the correctness of the tale told Mr. Stone. But whoever led the savage forces, led them with ability and valor, and in no recorded battle did the sons of the forest ever show themselves better warriors.

It was on November 4th that the battle took place; on the 8th the remains of the army reached Fort Washington; on the 9th St. Clair wrote to the Secretary of War; on the 12th of December the information was communicated to Congress; and on the 26th of December General Knox laid before the President two reports, the second of which contained suggestions as to future operations. After noticing the policy of the Government toward the native tribes, the futility of all attempts to preserve peace, and the justice of the United States claim, the Secretary proceeds,

Hence it would appear, that the principles of justice as well as policy, and it may be added, the principles of economy, all combine to dictate, that an adequate military force should be raised as soon as possible, placed upon the frontiers, and disciplined according to the nature of the service, in order to meet, with the prospect of success, the greatest probable combination of the Indian enemy.

Although the precise manner in which the force to be raised should

* Wayne and Harrison, as all know, avoided this trouble by their open order of battle. Stone's Brant, ii. 313.

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Plans of General Knox.

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be employed, cannot be pointed out with propriety at this time, as it will depend on the circumstances of the moment, yet it may not be improper to observe, that, upon a review of the merits of the main object of the late campaign, to wit: the establishment of a strong military post at the Miami village, with the necessary posts of communication, the necessity and propriety thereof remain the same; that this necessity will probably continue until we shall be possessed of the posts upon Lake Michigan, of Detroit, and Niagara, withheld from us by Great Britain, contrary to treaty. Without remarking upon the principles of this conduct, it may be observed generally, that every arrangement in the power of the United States, for establishing the tranquility of the frontiers, will be inferior to the possession of said posts. That it is, however, considered, that, if the said posts were in our possession, we ought also to have a strong post at the Miami village, in order to render the protection effectual, and that the posts above-mentioned will require garrisons whensoever they shall be given up.

The subscriber having deliberately contemplated the present state of affairs upon the frontiers, from the south to the north, having recurred to the past in order to estimate the probable future events, finds himself constrained by his public duty, although with great reluctance, to state, as the result of his judgment, that the public service requires an increase of the military force, according to the following arrangement:

That the military establishment of the United States shall, during the pleasure of Congress, consist of five thousand one hundred and sixtyeight non-commissioned, privates and musicians.

That the said non-commissioned officers and privates shall be enlisted to serve three years, unless sooner discharged.

That the said troops be organized as follows:

One squadron of cavalry, of four troops, each of 76 non-commissioned and privates,

It should be a stipulation in the engagements of these men, that they should serve on foot whenever the service requires the

measure.

One battalion of artillery, of four companies each, to consist of 76 non-commissioned and privates,

Each company of artillery to have, as part of its composition, ten artificers each, including the pay of artillerists to have ten dollars per month.

Five regiments of infantry, one of which to be riflemen entirely, each of three battalions; each battalion of four companies; each company of 76 non-commissioned and privates; amounting, for each regiment, to 912,

304

304

4,560

5,168

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Plans of General Knox.

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That, in addition to the foregoing arrangement, it would be proper that the President of the United States should be authorized, besides the employment of militia, to take such measures, for the defensive protection of the exposed parts of the frontiers, by calling into service expert woodsmen, as patrols or scouts, upon such terms as he may judge proper. That he be further authorized, in case he should deem the measure expedient, to engage mounted militia for defensive operations, for such time, and on such terms, as he may judge equitable. That he be further authorized, in case he should deem the measure expedient, to employ a body of Indians belonging to tribes in alliance with the United States, to act against the hostile Indians; and that he be authorized to stipulate such terms as he shall judge right.

That it does not seem essential, at this time, that there should be any special appropriations for the defensive protection, the mounted militia, or the employment of Indians, although the actual expenses for those objects may amount to considerable sums, because the estimates, before mentioned, comprehend the entire expense, for one year, of the proposed establishment as complete. But, let the exertions to complete it be ever so great, yet it is probable a deficiency will exist, which will of course occasion a less expense. The moneys, therefore, which may be appropriated to the establishment, and not expended, may be applied to the extra objects above mentioned. If, however, there should be a deficiency, it may hereafter be provided for. That the nett pay of the private soldier, at present, free of all deductions, is two dollars per month. But, as the experience of the recruiting service, of the present year, evinces that the inducement is insufficient, it seems necessary to raise the pay to three dollars per month, free of all deductions; and the non-commissioned officers in proportion. The rifle corps will require more. But whether, under present circumstances, even the additional pay, and an extension of bounty to eight dollars, would give such an impulse to the recruiting service, as to fill the battalions immediately, remains to be tried. Nothing has been said upon an increased pay to the commissioned officers, because a memorial upon that subject has been presented to Congress. But it cannot be doubted that a small increase would be highly grateful to the officers, and probably beneficial to the service. The mounted militia is suggested to be used during the preparation for the main expedition, (and afterwards, if circumstances should render it indispensable.) The effect of such desultory operations upon the Indians will, by occupying them for their own safety, and that of their families, prevent their spreading terror and destruction along the frontiers. These sort of expeditions had that precise effect during the last season, and Kentucky enjoyed more repose, and sustained less injury, than for any year since the war with Great Britain. This single effect, independent of the injury done to the force of the

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Pacific Offers to the Iroquois.

1790-95. Indians, is worth greatly more than the actual expense of such expeditions. But, while it is acknowledged that mounted militia may be very proper for sudden enterprises, of short duration, it is conceived that militia are utterly unsuitable to carry on and terminate the war in which we are engaged, with honor and success. And besides, it would be ruinous to the purposes of husbandry, to keep them out long, if it were practicable to accomplish it. Good troops, enlisted for a considerable period, armed and well disciplined in a suitable manner, for the nature of the service, will be equal, individually, to the best militia; but, when it is considered to these qualities are added, the obedience, the patience, the promptness, the economy of discipline, and the inestimable value of good officers, possessing a proper pride of reputation, the comparison no longer holds, and disciplined troops attain in the mind, and in actual execution, that ascendancy over the militia, which is the result of a just comparative view of their relative force, and the experience of all nations and ages. The expediency of employing the Indians in alliance with us, against the hostile Indians, cannot be doubted. It has been shown before, how difficult, and even impracticable, it will probably be, to restrain the young men of the friendly tribes from action, and that, if we do not employ them, they will be employed against us. The justice of engaging them would depend upon the justice of the war. If the war be just on our part, it will certainly bear the test of examination, to use the same sort of means in our defence, as are used against us. The subscriber, therefore, submits it as his opinion, that it would be proper to employ judiciously, as to time and circumstances, as many of the friendly Indians as may be obtained, not exceeding one thousand in number.*

In the necessity for a competent army all seem to have agreed, but it was the wish of Washington that before this army was organized every effort should be again made to prevent bloodshed. Colonel Pickering, in his meeting of June and July 1791, with the Iroquois at the Painted Post, had among other things proposed that certain Chiefs should, in the following January, go to Philadelphia while Congress was in session and shake hands with their newly adopted father.

The importance of the proposed visit became more evident after the news of St. Clair's discomfiture, for the fidelity of the New York Indians even, was doubted. On the 20th of December, 1791, accordingly, we find Knox writing to the Rev. Samuel Kirkland, the Iroquois missionary,† pressing through him the invi

* American State Papers, v. 198-199.

+ See ante, p. 144.

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Instructions to Pond and Stedman.

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tation given by the commissioner, and especially urging the presence of Brant. To aid the proposed peace-measures, a respectful and kind message was sent to the Senecas on the 7th of January, 1792; while, to guard against surprise, means were adopted to learn the purpose of a great council called at Buffalo creek, and also to ascertain the intentions of the tribes on the Wabash and Miami. This was done in part through the agency of the Reverend Mr. Kirkland, and partly by the mission of Captain Peter Pond and William Stedman, who, on the 9th of January, two days before Knox's two plans above referred to were laid before Congress, received their instructions as secret messengers or spies among the western Indians; from those instructions we quote a few paragraphs.

Repair to Niagara and Detroit, without suffering your business to escape you, until the proper time. When at Detroit, assume the characters of traders with the Indians-a business Mr. Pond is well acquainted with. Mix with the Miami and Wabash Indians. Find their views and intentions, through such channels as your discretion shall direct. Learn the opinions of the more distant Indians. Insinuate, upon all favorable occasions, the humane disposition of the United States; and, if you can by any means ripen their judgment, so as to break forth openly, and declare the readiness of the United States to receive, with open arms, the Indians, notwithstanding all that is past, do it. If such declaration should be made, at the Miami or Wabash, and be well received, you might persuade some of the most influential chiefs to repair to our posts on the Ohio, and so, from post to post, to this place.

But, if you should be so fortunate as to succeed in persuading the chiefs of the Miami and hostile, and any other neighboring tribes, to repair here, every possible precaution must be taken by you, and by the commanding officer of the troops, who is hereby required to afford the necessary escorts, in order to guard the Indians from being injured by the whites.

While among the Indians, or at Niagara, or Detroit, endeavor to find out the numbers and tribes of the Indians who were in the attack of General St. Clair, and their loss, killed and wounded; what number of prisoners they took; and what they did with them; what disposition they made of the cannon taken, arms, tents, and other plunder; what are their intentions for the next year; the numbers of the association; how they are supplied with arms, ammunition, and provisions.

You will readily perceive, that the information required must be given me at the earliest period possible. You will, therefore, let me know, by some means which you must devise, your arrival at Niagara,