366 Effect of St. Clair's Defeat. 1790-95. ing we got to a camp of packhorsemen, and amongst them I got a doughboy or water-dumpling, and proceeded. We got within seven miles of Hamilton on this day, and arrived there soon on the morning of the sixth.* Thus were all the plans, hopes and labors of Washington, Knox and St. Clair, in reference to the Indian campaign, in one day, overthrown. The savages, again victorious, could neither be expected to make terms or exercise forbearance; and along the whole line of the frontier there were but few that did not feel anxiety, terror, or despair. In its effects this was a second * B. Vancleve, in American Pioneer, ii. 150. We give in illustration the following.-Representation from the inhabitants of the town of Pittsburg, dated, Pittsburgh, December 11th, 1791-Sir: In consequence of the late intelligence of the fate of the campaign to the Westward, the inhabitants of the town of Pittsburg have convened, and appointed us a committee for the purpose of addressing your Excellency. The late disaster of the army must greatly effect the safety of this place. There can be no doubt but the enemy will now come forward, and with more spirit, and greater numbers, than they ever did before, for success will give confidence and secure allies. We seriously apprehend that the Six Nations, heretofore wavering, will now avow themselves; at least their young men will come to war. Be that as it may, the Indians at present hostile, are well acquainted with the defenceless situation of this town. During the late war there was a garrison at this place, though, even then, there was not such a combination of the savage nations, nor so much to be dreaded from them. At present, we have neither garrison, arms, nor ammunition to defend the place. If the enemy should be disposed to pursue the blow they have given, which it is morally certain they will, they would, in our situation, find it easy to destroy us; and, should this place be lost, the whole country is open to them, and must be abandoned.-A. Tannehill and others, to the Governor of Pennsylvania. Memorial from the inhabitants of the county of Westmoreland, Washington, Fayette, and Alleghany, to the Governor of Pennsylvania:-To his Excellency Thomas Mifflin, Esq., Governor of the State of Pennsylvania: -Your Excellency is well aware of the great extent of our frontier; and, when you consider the high degree of spirit which the savages, animated by two successive victories, entertain, you may more easily conceive, than we can describe, the fears which pervade the breasts of those men, women and children, who are more immediately subject to their barbarities and depredations. Had the people a sufficiency of arms in their hands, they might, in some measure, defend themselves until the General Government, to whose care the common defence is entrusted, should adopt efficient steps for that purpose. At the same time, we beg leave to state to your Excellency, what occurs to us as the most speedy and effectual mode. When the extent of country to be protected is taken into view, we conceive that eight hundred effective men will not be deemed more than sufficient. They should be active partisans, under experienced officers, and provided with good rifles, to suit the grand object of meeting the enemy upon equal terms; of scouting, and giving the alarm when needful. Such a body should have encouragement proportioned to the price of common labor in this country, which averages at fifty shillings per month, as the pay allowed to In Braddock's battle of one thousand two hundred men, seven hundred and fourteen were killed and wounded; in St. Clair's, of fourteen hundred men, eight hundred and ninety-four of Braddock's officers, eighty-six in number, sixty-three were killed and wounded; of St. Clair's, sixty-one out of about an equal number, (86 to 90.) 1790-95. Causes of St. Clair's Defeat. 367 Braddock's defeat, was it so in its causes? General Knox assigned as the chief reasons of St. Clair's overthrow,-1st, the deficiency of good troops: 2d, the want of appropriate training among those he (St. Clair) had: 3d, the lateness of the season. The committee of the House of Representatives which examined the matter, upon the 8th of May 1792 reported the causes of the catastrophe of the previous November to have been, in their opinion, 1st, the delay in preparing estimates, &c., for the defence of the frontiers, and the late passage of the Act (March 3d,) for that purpose: 2d, the delay caused by the neglects in the Quartermaster's department: 3d, the lateness of the season when the expedition was commenced: and, 4th, the want of discipline and experience in the troops. This Committee also expressly declared General St. Clair free of all blame in relation to every thing both before and during the action. Will the causes thus assigned fully explain the defeat? In answer it may be observed, even by one wholly ignorant of military matters, that the late passage of an act of Congress,—the want of proper measures by the Quartermaster, and the lateness of the season were obviously not among the leading causes of the rout of November 4th, 1791; these things might have prevented the accomplishment of the plan for erecting a fort at the Miami Village, even had St. Clair been the troops of the United States would not be a sufficient inducement to able bodied men, possessing the requisite qualifications. We suggest these general ideas from our knowledge of local circumstances, which they who are at a distance, unacquainted with the actual situation of the western country, cannot so well perceive. It is not our wish to enter into a minute detail, being convinced that your Excellency is not only fully acquainted with, but feelingly alive to, those impressions, which a state such as ours must give rise to; nor can we apply to any person more proper than yourself to procure that assistance which it requires. From the Representatives of the County of Ohio to the Governor of Virginia :-Sir: The alarming intelligence lately received, of the defeat of the army in the western country, fills our minds with dreadful fears and apprehensions, concerning the safety of our fellow-citizens in the county we represent, and we confidently hope will be an excuse to your Excellency, whose zeal has been so frequently evinced in behalf of the distressed frontier counties, for the request we are now compelled to make. In the course of last year, upwards of fifty of our people were killed, and a great part of our country plundered, notwithstanding the aid afforded by the Pennsylvanians, who joined the Virginians in our defence. The success of the Indians in their late engagement with General St. Clair, will, no doubt, render them more daring and bold in their future incursions and attacks upon our defenceless inhabitants; those adjoining the county of Harrison, extending a hundred miles; covering the county of Monongalia; and we conceive that not less than sixty or seventy men will be sufficient to defend them. Through you, sir, we beg leave to request this assistance. (American State Papers, v. 215. 216. 222.) American State Papers, v. 198. + American State Papers, xii. 38, 39. 368 Causes of St. Clair's Defeat. 1790-95. victorious on that day, but they did not cause his defeat. Was it then the want of good troops? We think a re-perusal of the General's letter will show that his troops were not worthless by any means; the action began about six o'clock, and lasted til half-past nine,-this could not have been the case with undisciplined troops, unless they had possessed at least the raw material of soldiers, and had been men who, well situated, would have done well. However much, then, the troops may have been wanting in a proper training, it seems clear to us that this alone would not explain the fortune of the day unless the enemy had been present in overwhelming numbers; and such was not probably the case, the best evidence we have going to show that the Indians were but about 1000 in number,† while the Americans were 1400. Leaving then the reasons officially assigned, we suggest that to the reader ignorant of military science it seems that two striking causes of the melancholy result are unnoticed by the Secretary of War and the Committee of Congress: viz., the surprise by the Indians, who were in no degree expected by the army; and the confusion introduced at the outset by the flying militia. Had the attack been expected, the troops prepared, all chance of confusion avoided, and had the very able officers who commanded been obeyed,—with all the disadvantage of raw troops, the event might have been, probably would have been, wholly different. We are then led to ask, how it happened that the troops were surprised:—were proper measures taken to guard against surprise?—The militia, as St. Clair says, were a quarter of a mile in advance of the main army, and beyond the creek; still farther in advance was Captain Slough, who, with a volunteer party of regulars, went out to reconnoitre; and orders had been given Colonel Oldham who commanded the militia to have the woods thoroughly examined by the scouts and patrols, as Indians were known to be hanging about the outskirts of the army. In all this St. Clair seems to have done his entire duty as far as sickness would permit him; could he have seen in person to the essential steps it would have been better. During the night Captain Slough, who was a mile beyond the militia, found so large a November 4th, sunrise is about half after six. + American State Papers, xii. 37.-The Secretary of War in December 1791, estimated the Indians at 3000, but the Committee of the following May, having his and other evidence cut the number down to 1040.-American State Papers, v. 198.-American State Papers, xii. 44. 12 1790-95. Causes of St. Clair's Defeat. 369 body of savages gathering about him, that he fell back and reported his observations to General Butler. But the General, for reasons unexplained,* made no dispositions in consequence of this information, and did not report it to the Commander-in-chief.Colonel Oldham also obeyed his orders, the woods were searched, and the presence of the enemy detected, but he too reported, through Captain Slough, to General Butler, beyond whom the information did not go. The consequence was that in the morning the army was taken unawares and unprepared. But even thus taken there was a great chance of victory for the United States troops, had they not been thrown into disorder at the outset by the flight of the militia; and this leads us to notice the coincidence of common sense uninformed by technical knowledge, with practiced military skill, for both (after Harmar's experience of 1790 with the western militia,)—would have forbidden the step taken by St. Clair, when he posted his militia in a body in front of the other troops. The experience of Hardin, under Harmar, had demonstrated that militia could not be trusted as a military force opposed to Indians, however brave the individuals; as in the war of the Revolution their untrustworthiness as troops, when opposed to * He was killed in the battle. St. Clair and Butler were not on good terms at the time. (St. Clair's Narrative, 31 to 36.) Various stories are told as to General Butler's death: some (see John Johnston's paper in Cist's Cincinnati Miscellany, ii. 299,) say he was killed by a son of his own, a half-breed Shawanese chief; Stone (Life of Brant, ii. 310,) says he was badly wounded, and being left on the field asked Simon Girty to kill him, but that he refused, and an Indian then put him out of his pain; taking his scalp and heart as trophies: - others (Butler's Kentucky, 204) say he was wounded and taken into the American camp, and there, while his wounds were being dressed, killed by an Indian, who in his turn was instantly slain. This last account seems to be disproved by J. Matson who says, that in the following winter, when Wilkinson sent a party, (of which he was one,) to the field of St. Clair's defeat, they found, as was thought, Butler's body "in the thickest of the carnage."—(Cist's Cincinnati Miscellany, ii. 31.) Colonel Semple, however, (St. Clair's Narrative, 221) deposes that he saw four soldiers putting General Butler, after his fall, into a blanket. General Butler had been an Indian trader at an early day; the "Letters of an American Planter" contain a map of the Scioto, taken from his Journal; it gives the names of eight Indian towns on the upper Scioto; they were Mamacomink, Puckshenoses, Maquechaick, Blue Jacket's town, Pecowick, Kispoko, Waccachalla, and Chillichatee: these were on Deer Creek, Alleman Creek, &c. + Deposition of Captain Slough in St. Clair's Narrative, 213 to 219.--Marshall's Kentucky, i. 380.-St. Clair's report P. S. in American State Papers, v. 138. (Slough is misprinted Hough.) There was an Indian camp three quarters of a mile in extent in advance of the position of the militia. (See report of February 1791, in Dillon's Indiana, i. 308.) Oldham and Slough were convinced the army would be attacked in the morning, (St. Clair's Narrative, pp. 215, 217;) yet Oldham took no measures in consequence, and sent his report to St. Clair in a very indifferent way, and through others. He was killed in the battle. Had St. Clair received his account he says he should have attacked the Indians. (Narrative, 135.) 370 Causes of St. Clair's Defeat. 1790-95. regulars had been experimentally proved:-* and common sense, if free, unfettered by technical rules, would we think have prevented St. Clair placing his militia as he did. With this we say skill agrees, for we find, John Armstrong, the victor of Kittaning, and an experienced Indian warrior saying,-"placing the militia in a body over the brook, permit me to say, was an unwarrantable step, where two or three small pickets would have served a better purpose." And he adds, in words which suggest a third real cause of defeat, "It seems probable, that too much attachment to regular or military rule, or a too great confidence in the artillery (which it seems formed part of the lines, and had a tendency to render the troops stationary,) must have been the motives, which led to the adopted order of action. I call it adopted, because the General does not speak of having intended any other, whereby he presented a large and visible object, perhaps in close orders too, to an enemy near enough to destroy, but from their known modes of action comparatively invisible: whereby we may readily infer, that five hundred Indians were fully sufficient to do us all the injury we have sustained, nor can I conceive them to have been many more. But tragical as the event has been, we have this consolation, that during the action our officers and troops discovered great bravery, and that the loss of a battle is not always the loss of the cause. In vain, however, may we expect success against our present adversaries, without taking a few lessons from them, which I thought Americans had learned long ago. The principles of their military action are rational, and therefore often successful. We must in a degree take a similar method in order to counteract them." If these views are sound, there was no such neglect on St. Clair's, as there was on Braddock's part; no overweening selfconfidence, or disregard of sound advice; there was nothing, absolutely nothing, to excuse the abuse and persecution to which he was afterwards subjected; but there was, 1st, apparent neglect on the part of General Butler and Colonel Oldham, leading to a surprise; 2d, a mistaken position assigned the militia by St. Clair, Militia men, like the members of a mob, want that feeling of confidence in the collective force of the troop which sustains the regular soldier; each man, however brave, knows himself unable alone to oppose the enemy, and he feels for the moment as if he were alone. + Armstrong's letter of December 23d, 1791, to Washington.-Sparks' Washington, x. 223.-Note. |