356 Instructions to St. Clair. 1790-95. or by the desultory operations, you will commence your march for the Miami village, in order to establish a strong and permanent military post at that place. In your advance, you will establish such posts of com munications with Fort Washington, on the Ohio, as you may judge pro per. The post at the Miami village is intended for the purpose of aweing and curbing the Indians in that quarter, and as the only preventive of future hostilities. It ought, therefore to be rendered secure, against all a tempts and insults of the Indians. The garrison which should be stationed there ought not only to be sufficient for the defence of the place, but always to afford a detachment of five or six hundred men, either to chastise any of the Wabash, or other hostile Indians, or to secure any convoy of provisions. The establishment of such a post is considered as an important object of the campaign, and is to take place in all events. In case of a previous treaty, the Indians are to be conciliated upon this point, if possible; and it is presumed, good arguments may be offered, to induce their acquiescence. The situation, nature, and construction of the works you may direct, will depend upon your own judgment. Major Ferguson, of the artillery, will be fully capable of the execution. He will be furnished with three five and a half inch howitzers, three six pounders, and three three-pounders, all brass, with a sufficient quantity of shot and shells, for the purpose of the expedition. The appropriation of these pieces will depend upon your orders. Having commenced your march, upon the main expedition, and the Indians continuing hostile, you will use every possible exertion to make them feel the effects of your superiority; and after having arrived at the Miami village, and put your works in a defensible state, you will seek the enemy with the whole of your remaining force, and endeavor, by all possible means, to strike them with great severity. It will be left to your discretion whether to employ, if attainable, any Indians of the Six Nations, and the Chickasaws or other southern Nations. Most probably the employment of about fifty of each, under the direction of some discreet and able chief, would be advantageous, but these ought not to be assembled before the line of march is taken up, because they are soon tired and will not be detained. The force contemplated for the garrisons of the Miami village, and the communications, has been from a thousand to twelve hundred non-commissioned officers and privates. This is mentioned as a general idea, to which you will adhere, or from which you will deviate, as circumstances may require. Tha garrison stationed at the Miami village, and its communications, must have in store, at least six months good salted meat, and flour in proportion. It is hardly possible, if the Indians continue hostile, that you will be suffered quietly to establish a post at the Miami village; conflicts, therefore may be expected; and it is to be presumed that disciplined valor will triumph over the undisciplined Indians. In this event it is probable 1790-95. Instructions to St. Clair. 357 that the Indians will sue for peace; if this should be the case, the dignity of the United States will require that the terms should be liberal. In order to avoid future wars, it might be proper to make the Wabash, and thence over to the Miami, and down the same to its mouth at Lake Erie, the boundary, excepting so far as the same should relate to the Wyandots and Delawares, on the supposition of their continuing faithful to the treaties. But, if they should join in the war against the United States, and your army be victorious, the said tribes ought to be removed without the boundary mentioned. You will also judge whether it would be proper to extend the boundary, from the mouth of the River au Panse of the Wabash, in a due west line to the Mississippi. Few Indians, besides the Kickapoos, would be affected by such a line; this ought to be tenderly managed. The modification of the boundary must be confided to your discretion, with this single observation, that the policy and interest of the United States dictate their being at peace with the Indians. This is of more value than millions of uncultivated acres, the right to which may be conceded by some, and disputed by others. The establishment of a post at the Miami village will probably be regarded, by the British officers on the frontiers, as a circumstance of jealousy it may, therefore, be necessary that you should, at a proper time, make such intimations as may remove all such dispositions. This intimation had better follow than precede the possession of the post, unless circumstances dictate otherwise. As it is not the inclination or interest of the United States to enter into a contest with Great Britain, every measure tending to any discussion or altercation must be prevented. The delicate situation of affairs may therefore render it improper at present to make any naval arrangement upon Lake Erie. After you shall have effected all the injury to the hostile Indians of which your force may be capable, and after having established the posts and garrisons at the Miami village and its communications, and placing the same under the orders of an officer worthy of such high trust, you will return to Fort Washington on the Ohio. It is proper to observe, that certain jealousies have existed among the people of the frontiers, relative to a supposed interference between their interest, and those of the marine States: that these jealousies are ill founded, with respect to the present Government, is obvious. The United States embrace, with equal care, all parts of the Union; and, in the present case, are making expensive arrangements for the protection of the frontiers, and partly in the modes, too, which appear to be highly favored by the Kentucky people. The high stations you fill, of commander of the troops, and Governor of the Western Territory, will afford you frequent opportunities to impress the frontier citizens of the entire good disposition of the General 358 St. Clair prepares for Campaign. 1790-95 Government towards them in all reasonable things, and you will render acceptable service, by cordially embracing all such opportunities.* Under these instructions St. Clair proceeded to organize his army. At the close of April he was in Pittsburg, toward which point troops from all quarters, horses, stores, and ammunition were going forward. The forces, it was thought, would be assembled by the last of July or first of August. By the middle of July, however, it was clear that the early part of September would be as soon as the expedition could get under way; but the commander was urged to press every thing, and act with the utmost promptness and decision. But this was more easily urged than accomplished. On the 15th of May, St. Clair had reached Fort Washington, and at that time, the United States' troops in the west amounted to but two hundred and sixty-four non-commissioned officers and privates fit for duty; § on the 15th of July this number was more than doubled, however, as the first regiment, containing two hundred and ninety-nine men, on that day reached Fort Washington. General Butler, who had been appointed second in command, was employed through part of April and May in obtaining recruits; but when obtained, there was no money to pay them, nor to provide stores for them. In the quarter master's department, meantime, every thing went on slowly and badly; tents, pack-saddles, kettles, knapsacks, and cartridge boxes were all "deficient in quantity and quality." Worse than this, the powder was poor or injured, the arms and accoutrements out of repair,** and not even proper tools to mend them. And as the troops gathered slowly at Fort Washington, after wearisome detentions at Pittsburg and upon the river, a new source of trouble arose in the habits of intemperance indulged and acquired by the idlers: to withdraw them from temptation, St. Clair was forced to remove his * American State Papers, v. 171. + American State Papers, 176. Letter of May 12th. The original plan had been to have all ready by July 10. (St. Clair's Narrative, 7.) § American State Papers, xii. 36. Seventy-five at Fort Washington, forty-five at Fort Harmar, sixty-one at Fort Steuben, and eighty-three at Fort Knox. ¶ American State Papers, v. 36. 42. ** American State Papers, 36. 42. St. Clair's Narrative, p. 9 to 13. ++ American State Papers, xii. 36. 37. Of six hundred and seventy-five stand of arms at Fort Washington, (destined by St. Clair for the militia,) scarce any were in order; and with two travelling forges furnished by the quartermaster there were no anvils. 1990-95. St. Clair marches North. * 359 men, now numbering two thousand, to Ludlow's station, about six miles from the Fort; by which, however, he more than doubled his cost of providing for the troops. Here the army continued until September 17th, when, being two thousand three hundred strong, exclusive of militia, it moved forward to a point upon the Great Miami, where Fort Hamilton was built, the first in the proposed chain of fortresses. This being completed, the troops moved on forty-four miles farther, and on the 12th of October commenced Fort Jefferson, about six miles south of the town of Greenville, Darke county. On the 24th the toilsome march through the wilderness began again. At this time the commanderin-chief, whose duties through the summer had been very severe, was suffering from an indisposition which was by turns in his stomach, lungs and limbs; provisions were scarce, the roads wet and heavy, the troops going with "much difficulty," seven miles a day; the militia deserting sixty at a time. Thus toiling along, the army, rapidly lessening by desertion, sickness, and troops sent to arrest deserters, -on the 3d of November reached a stream, twelve yards wide, which St. Clair supposed to be the St. Mary of the Maumee, but which was in reality a branch of the Wabash, just south of the head waters of the stream for which the commander mistook it. Upon the banks of this creek the army now about fourteen hundred strong, encamped in two lines. The right wing, says St. Clair, in his letter to the Secretary of War, after the battle,-composed of Butler's, Clark's, and Patterson's Battalions, commanded by Major General Butler, formed the first line, and the left wing, consisting of Bedinger's and Gaither's battalions, and the second regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Darke, formed the second line, with an interval between them of about seventy yards, which was all the ground would allow. The right flank was pretty well secured by the creek; a steep bank, and Faulkner's corps, some of the cavalry, and their picquets, covered the left flank. The militia were thrown over the creek, and advanced about one quarter of a mile, and encamped in the same order. There were a few Indians who appeared on the opposite side of the creek, but fled with the utmost precipitation, on the advance of the militia. At this place, which I judged to be about American State Papers, xii. 37. The cost per ration at the Fort was six and threequarter ninetieths of a dollar-at the station, fifteen and one quarter: the former had been contracted for. This includes the garrisons of Forts Washington and Hamilton.-(St. Clair's letter of October 6. American State Papers, v. 136.) St. Clair's Journal. (American State Papers, v. 136-7.) 360 St. Clair's Defeat. 1790-95. fifteen miles from the Miami village, I determined to throw up a slight work, the plan of which was concerted that evening with Major Fergu son, wherein to have deposited the men's knapsacks, and every thing else that was not of absolute necessity, and to have moved on to attack the enemy as soon as the first regiment was come up. But they did not permit me to execute either: for, on the 4th, about half an hour before sunrise, and when the men had just been dismissed from parade, (for it was a constant practice to have them all under arms a considerable time before day light,) an attack was made upon the militia. Those gave way in a very little time and rushed into camp through Major Butler's Battalion, (which, together with a part of Clarke's, they they threw into considerable disorder, and which, notwithstanding the exertions of both those officers, was never altogether remedied,) the Indians following close at their heels. The fire, however, of the front line checked them; but almost instantly a very heavy attack began upon that line; and in a few minutes it was extended to the second likewise. The great weight of it was directed against the centre of each, where the artillery was placed, and from which the men were repeatedly driven with great slaughter. Finding no great effect from our fire, and confusion beginning to spread from the great number of men who were falling in all quarters, it became necessary to try what could be done by the bayonet, Lieutenant Colonel Darke was accordingly ordered to make a charge with part of the second line, and to turn the left flank of the enemy. This was executed with great spirit. The Indians instantly gave way, and were driven back three or four hundred yards; but for want of a sufficient number of riflemen to pursue this advantage, they soon returned, and the troops were obliged to give back in their turn. At this moment they had entered our camp by the lest flank, having pushed back the troops that were posted there. Another charge was made here by the second regiment, Butler's and Clarke's battalions, with equal effect, and it was repeated several times and always with success: but in all of them many men were lost, and particularly the officers, which, with so raw troops, was a loss altogether irremediable. In that I just spoke of, made by the second regiment and Butler's battalion, Major Butler was dangerously wounded, and every officer of the second regiment fell except three, one of which, Mr. Greaton, was shot through the body. Our artillery being now silenced, and all the officers killed except Captain Ford, who was very badly wounded, and more than half of the army fallen, being cut off from the road, it became necessary to attempt the regaining it, and to make a retreat, if possible. To this purpose the remains of the army was formed as well as circumstances would admit, towards the right of the encampment, from which, by the way of the second line, another charge was made upon the enemy, as if with |