they are in the same position with regard to the water line; our free board is as great, and in some cases greater; our broadside guns are carried as high, and generally higher; our rate of ammunition supply is as rapid, and in many ships more rapid; and (greatest surprise of all) the open ammunition hoist to the turrets is not peculiar to our own Navy, but is found in several of the crack battle ships and cruisers of other navies.

That the above comparison is a high testimony to the quality of our ships will be recognized when we mention that the cross sections cited are of such ships as the British Royal Sovereign, Majestic, King Edward, and Dreadnought, and the Japanese Asahi, Mikasa, Kashima, and Aki; and we may mention just here that even in the case of the two crack battle ships, Mikasa and Asahi, of the Japanese fleet, the broadside guns are only about 12 feet above the water line, as against from 14 to 15 feet on our own ships. So also, in the comparison with contemporaneous French ships, it is found that the thickness and position of our armor belts is fully as satisfactory; that the armoring of the top sides is greatly superior, and that in respect of the free board only and the heights at which the guns are carried have the French ships any so-called advantage. That lofty guns and towering top sides have been adopted at the expense of stability is shown by the fact that, with one exception, the French-type Russian battle ships which fought in the battle of the Sea of Japan proved their topheaviness by turning turtle and going to the bottom. Furthermore, the one French-type ship, the Orel, which was captured by the Japanese, was changed by them to the American type by cutting down her decks and lowering her gun positions, as is clearly shown in the illustrations on page 241 of this issue.

According to press dispatches, Rear-Admiral Evans has sent to the Department a report upon the behavior of our ships during the Pacific cruise, in which certain suggestions are made with reference to the questions of armor belts, turrets, freeboard, etc., which are now in debate. The report contains the opinion of a naval constructor detailed especially to watch the behavior of the vessels, and of various seagoing officers in charge of the ships. In due course, when this report becomes available, we hope to give a review of its salient features. According to press dispatches, Naval Constructor Robinson noted that although, in the main, the voyage was made in quiet weather the ships at times rolled sufficiently to expose the unarmored bottom below the belt, and hence the suggestion of some of the officers that the belt be made wider is accompanied with the stipulation that the bottom of the belt be left in its present low position. It is suggested that the additional weight due to wider belts be compensated for by the removal of "what is termed superfluous weight." We believe that no small reduction of weight can be made in this way, for it is a notorious fact that our ships carry, in the way of comforts and conveniences for officers and men, much weight that is not to be found in foreign battle ships. It is also stated that Rear-Admiral Evans "recommends taking off the after bridges;" though why he should do this, when it was at his earnest insistence, and in opposition to the strong wish of the construction department, that an extra flying bridge was built aft on the Connecticut for his special use, we are at a loss to understand. Commenting on the suggestion of some of the commanding officers that the belts might be raised from 6 inches to a foot higher (which,

by the way, would bring them just where they were designed to be before extra weights were added during construction) Admiral Evans says:

But even this is open to question, for it has been noted that even when heavily laden and in the smooth to moderate seas, which have thus far characterized this cruise, the ships frequently expose their entire belt and the bottom plating beneath. It must be remembered that even a 5 or a 6 inch shell, of which there would be a great number, could inflict a severe and dangerous injury if it struck below the belt, while otherwise the water line, even with the belt entirely submerged, is, on account of the casemate armor and coal, immune to all except the heaviest projectiles.

The fact is that under the sea conditions in which battles may be fought a belt 8 feet in width, if considered alone, is too narrow to afford the desired protection wherever it may be placed, and the question becomes an academic discussion, with certain arguments on each side.

It is understood that on the latest ships this question is of little import, as the citadel armor is but 1 inch less in thickness than on the water line, and for those ships already built it is believed that when the bridges are removed and all weights which would be landed should war break out are taken into consideration, the ship will rise to the 6 to 12 inches, which is believed to be the maximum that it could be desired to raise them.

If, as is reported, the admiral states that the broadside guns "can only be used to advantage when the battle ships are not steaming more than 10 knots," we can only say that bad, indeed, must be the case of the battle ships of other navies, the majority of which carry these guns from 1 to 3 feet nearer the water than do our own ships.

The country is to be congratulated on the fact that the recent wild and baseless criticism of our ships should have been made just when the fleet was starting for the Pacific. In spite of the fact that most of it was either false or grossly exaggerated, it has done an incalculable amount of good; for, as a result of the discussion and investigation which has followed, a large amount of information has been made public regarding our ships, which scarcely could have become known in any other way. Not only have they now a more intelligent knowledge of our Navy, but the confidence of the people of the United States in the excellence of our ships has been greatly strengthened. As a further indorsement, there has come the brilliant success achieved by Admiral Evans and his officers and men, in bringing that fleet through its 14,000-mile trip, in perfect order and two days ahead of the schedule time.

1st Session.

No. 435.

REFUSAL OF NATIONAL BANKS IN NEW YORK CITY TO FURNISH CURRENCY FOR NEEDS OF INTERIOR BANKS.

LETTER

FROM

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,

TRANSMITTING,

IN RESPONSE TO A SENATE RESOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 18, 1908, COPIES OF ALL LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AND THE TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE REFUSAL OF THE NATIONAL BANKS IN NEW YORK CITY TO FURNISH CURRENCY FOR THE NEEDS OF INTERIOR BANKS.

APRIL 14, 1908.-Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be

printed.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, April 13, 1908.

SIR: In response to Senate resolution dated February 18, 1908, reading as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed to inform the Senate if any national banks outside the city of New York complained by telegrams or letters to the Treasury Department, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Treasurer of the United States, or the Comptroller of the Currency between October first, nineteen hundred and seven, and November fifteenth, nineteen hundred and seven, of the refusal of national banks of New York City to pay in cash New York exchange or to respond to calls for reserves; and if so, the Secretary is directed to send to the Senate copies of all such telegrams and letters and answers thereto,

I beg to inclose herewith, by direction of the President, copies of all letters and telegrams received by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer of the United States relative to the refusal of the national banks in New York City to furnish currency for the needs of interior banks. I also transmit copy of a letter from the Comptroller of the Currency showing that his office does not appear to have received any letters or telegrams making complaint of the nature stated against New York City banks.

The copies of letters herewith inclosed are 51 in number and were received from 43 different banks. Forty-one of the communications

were not answered in writing. Where the letters were so answered copies of such answers are transmitted.

In this connection it may be said that the fact that many of the complaints received were not answered by letter should not be taken as an indication that no effort was made to relieve the difficulties of those banks. To save time, banks in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other places were called over the telephone and requested to help out the interior banks complaining, wherever possible. As pointed out in my annual report and in my response to the Senate resolution of December 12, 1907, the responses to the Department's requests were in most cases prompt and liberal.

The Department, as far as the Government revenues were concerned, refrained in all cases from pressing the banks for an immediate turning into the Treasury, in cash, of their receipts on account of revenues. On the 1st of December, however, a telegram was sent to the chairmen of clearing-house banks in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco, calling upon the banks in those cities to resume, on December 4, 1907, payment into the Treasury, in cash, of the revenues as fast as they were collected. A copy of this telegram is transmitted herewith. The method pursued by the Department in dealing with the individual depositary banks, together with the efforts made by the banks in the subtreasury cities, to supply currency were so far effective as to prevent disastrous embarrassment to the banks in question.

The issue of Panama Canal bonds and 3 per cent certificates of indebtedness in due time gave further relief to the situation. Many of the bonds and certificates were subscribed for by banks in the central reserve cities for the express purpose of taking out additional circulation, to be shipped to their correspondents in interior cities.

I also inclose a table prepared in the office of the Comptroller of the Currency, showing the amount of reserve required to be held and the amount held on December 3, 1907, by the banks from which complaints were received. The amount of reserve held is stated, so as to show separately the amount with agents and the amount in the respective banks. The table shows that of the 43 banks named in the table only 8 were below the legal requirement on the date mentioned, and that the percentage of deficiency was small. Nearly all of the others were in exceptionally strong condition.

The ascertainment of the facts called for by this resolution has required the careful examination of a voluminous correspondence. Respectfully,

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.

1.

GEO. B. CORTELYOU,

Secretary.

[Telegram.]

OWENSBORO, KY., November 5, 1907. Refusal of assistant treasurer at St. Louis, New York, and other places to accept anything but cash is very hurtful to business interests and affects seriously the national banks. We are asking speedy relief from this situation.

Hon. GEORGE B. CORTELYOU,

Washington, D. C.

C. C. WATKINS, Cashier National Deposit Bank.