STATEMENT IN REFUTATION OF ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS.

Mr. HALE presented the following

STATEMENT OF REAR-ADMIRAL CONVERSE IN REFUTATION OF ALLEGED DEFECTS IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF CERTAIN NAVAL VESSELS OF THE UNITED STATES.

FEBRUARY 19, 1908.-Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C., February 6, 1908.

SIR: In compliance with your verbal instructions I have the honor to submit the following statement in regard to certain criticisms which have appeared from time to time in the public prints and elsewhere purporting to describe matters connected with the Navy and which, from their character, would seem to have been prepared by persons whose knowledge of the subjects discussed was limited and incorrect. These articles have undoubtedly caused wrong impressions, which a statement of the facts may in a measure correct.

In investigating this matter recourse has been had to the official records of the Department; to the reports made by officers of our Navy and of foreign services well qualified to pass upon the subjects handled; to professional and other publications of acknowledged authority and high standing, and to other sources also recognized as authoritative.

The records and correspondence bearing upon the designs of our earlier battle ships are voluminous and complete; and it is apparent that the subject was thoroughly considered and discussed during the preparation of the designs of these vessels, and although decided differences of opinion appear, there seems to have been ample justification for the designs which finally received the approval of the Department

It is not claimed that mistakes have not been made or that our ships are without faults; but in view of the then state of the art of battle-ship building, this fact is not to be wondered at. It is remarkable that the mistakes were so few and that none were really serious. In this respect our record will compare most favorably with that of foreign services.

BATTLE DRILLS.

Battle drill is the exercise or drill of the ships of the fleet individually or collectively for the purpose of training to meet the enemy under the conditions probable or liable to occur in battle. These

S D-60-1-Vol 32—13

conditions are varied and numerous, and no human being can foresce or foretell them. The training should, therefore, be along those lines which are deemed most favorable to us for meeting and defeating an enemy under the circumstances upon which we consider that he is likely to make his attacks. To this end our Navy has for some years past, so far as possible with the ships available, endeavored to solve practically problems of attack and defense of our coasts, and in carrying out this policy has worked alone, at other times in cooperation with the Naval War College, which has devised and studied these problems, and still at other times with the Army and Militia. It has been the practice in our Navy in the conduct of fleet and squadron operations to have a special board of officers devise and outline the contemplated scheme, but the carrying out of the details under the general plans has been left to the wisdom and discretion of the commander in chief and the commanding officers under him. The following extract from an order of the Secretary of the Navy will give an idea of the instructions and the manner of execution:

The object of the maneuvers is to gain experience useful in war and it is therefore desirable that all drills and exercises during the winter shall be carried out under the conditions pertaining to actual war.

Squadron and fleet operations have, in accordance with the abovequoted instructions, been consistently carried out, so far as practicable, under war conditions. Scouting expeditions were sent to get in touch with the enemy and report his movements to the heavy battle fleet; signal stations were established at prominent headlands and on islands along the coast; torpedo attacks were made by both surface and submarine torpedo vessels; forts were engaged; and at temporary naval bases guns were landed and mounted, mines planted, picket boats kept patrolling, guard ships established for protection of mine fields against attacks by an enemy, and many other details incident to war conditions, which are too numerous to attempt to mention.

Drills by divisions (four ships) and squadrons (eight ships) have been carried on whenever ships could be assembled for the purpose; but in a small navy such as ours, with ships required virtually at all times to guard our varied interests in widely scattered parts of the globe, the assembling of the necessary number of ships for drill has been frequently and much hampered. In the spring of 1903 it was practicable for the first time since the construction of the "New Navy" to obtain a squadron of eight battle ships-the least number necessary for properly performing squadron drills-and since then those eight battle ships have been so far as possible kept together for drill purposes. In the spring of 1907, by the completion of new vessels, this number was increased to sixteen battle ships, thus completing two squadrons, which when united formed a fleet. It then, for the first time, became possible to hold and carry out fleet tactics, which was begun in July and August last. In September it became necessary, on account of target practice and needed repairs to separate the ships temporarily, and later on to fit them for their voyage to the Pacific coast, upon which they are now engaged. Before the eight battle ships were available (in the spring of 1903) fleet drills assimilating war conditions were carried on with cruisers, gunboats, torpedo boats, and such other vessels as could be brought together and used, and frequently the necessary number of vessels for conducting operations were obtained by assigning steam launches,

by doubling the distance between ships and supposing vessels in the intervening vacant spaces, and in other similar ways.

Owing to want of similarity in size, speed, handiness and other tactical qualities of the vessels employed, drills of this nature were most unsatisfactory, and productive of little benefit either in training officers to handle ships or in developing tactics.

In addition to the hundreds of times when ships were drilled at sea and in port in tactics, as shown by the reports of officers engaged therein and by the entries in the log books, the following instances of "battle drills," that is, drills such as would be useful and perhaps necessary in battle, have been conducted since the summer of 1900:

September, 1900.-The North Atlantic Fleet, in cooperation with the Army, carried out a series of maneuvers in Narragansett Bay, and also submarine boat operations in conjunction with the fleet.

Summer, 1901.-Extensive maneuvers were held in and about the waters of Long Island Sound.

August, 1902.—A fleet-search problem assimilating the search for a hostile fleet attempting an attack upon the New England coast was carried out.

August and September, 1902.-Combined Army and Navy maneuvers for the attack and defense of the south coast of New England were carried out.

December, 1902.-The combined North Atlantic, European, and South Atlantic squadrons carried out search problems for assumed hostile fleets in the vicinity of Culebra.

December, 1902, and January, 1903.-The Asiatic Fleet operated in the attack upon seizure and defense of Subig Bay, Philippine Islands.

July and August, 1903.-The North Atlantic Fleet conducted another search problem for a hostile fleet assumed to be operating against the New England coast. August, 1903.-The fleet held joint maneuvers with the Army off Portland, Me. February and March, 1903.-Fleet maneuvers were carried out in the vicinity of Culebra.

June, 1905.-Joint Army and Navy maneuvers were held in Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River, the ships attacking and the Army defending.

July, 1905.-Atlantic Fleet carried out a search problem for a hostile fleet, assumed to be intending an attack along the New England coast.

January, 1906.-A fleet-search problem between assumed hostile fleets were conducted in the Atlantic Ocean between Hampton Roads and Culebra.

February, 1906.-Another fleet-search problem between assumed hostile fleets was carried out in the Caribbean Sea.

March, 1906.-Fleet tactics using tentative tactical signals were carried out in the vicinity of Guantanamo.

July, 1906.-Tactical drills were conducted with the fleet operating along the New England coast.

January and February, 1907.-The Atlantic Fleet conducted fleet tactics in the Caribbean Sea and vicinity, and the Asiatic Fleet similar tactics in far eastern waters. July, August, and September, 1907.-The Atlantic Fleet conducted fleet tactics off the Atlantic coast.

In addition to and not included in the foregoing list of exercises and operations are those conducted during the past several years by the three torpedo flotillas and the submarines, which have acted at times independently of the battle ships and at other times in conjunction therewith. At present there are four torpedo-boat flotillas and two submarine-boat flotillas in service, and it is anticipated that excellent results will be obtained from the exercising and operating of these flotillas under the plans and schemes contemplated.

It may be added in connection with the foregoing partial list of battle drills, that the squadrons of vessels taking part therein were commanded during the various years above referred to by RearAdmirals Farquhar, Higginson, Sumner, Barker, Evans, Sands, and Sigsbee, all of whom saw active service during the civil war, and the

commanding officers under them in almost all cases had similar experience during that war or in the war with Spain. It is only natural that such men as these, having gone through active hostilities themselves, would conduct battle drills with the ships under their command on the practical lines which their own experience and study had taught them. Whether considered of any merit or not by amateur critics in our own country, foreign navies and foreign publications of acknowledged professional standing have not failed to note and pay attention to these exercises.

It has been stated that there is no navy in the world which has had so little battle drill as ours and that since the Spanish war in 1898 the American Navy has had only "ten days of actual battle maneuvers-about sixty or eighty hours-in nine years.' The assertion that no navy in the world has had so little drill as ours is, in view of the actual facts of the case, as above shown, very erroneous and misleading. In regard to the assertion that since 1898 only ten days of actual battle maneuvers have been carried out by the Navy, attention is invited to the foregoing list of principal squadron and fleet exercises since 1900, which were carried out under conditions assimilating, so far as practicable, those to be expected and anticipated to occur in actual war and were consequently battle maneuvers or drills in all respects, based upon carefully studied plans of what an enemy might attempt and how best such attacks might be met and repulsed. Considering the force available, it was not possible in peace times to have had more effective or realistic battle drills than such as these.

Now that we have an assured fleet of sixteen battle ships, consisting of two squadrons of eight vessels each, it will be possible to carry out practically, systematically, and continuously schemes of fleet tactics and naval operations; but it is necessary that every effort be made to keep not less than this number of vessels together at all times, if that state of efficiency which our Navy is now rapidly tending toward, and which the people of our country have a right to expect, is to be maintained and fostered. The personnel of our Navy in ambition and professional knowledge is second to none in the world, and now that the opportunity-heretofore denied us, by reason of lack of the requisite number of similar ships-has been reached we should make every possible endeavor to maintain this favorable condition, and in a comparatively short time the results from study, practice, and exercise of our fleet will leave us, perhaps, little to be criticised or desired professionally when compared with other navies.

FREEBOARD OF AMERICAN SHIPS.

Since the designing of our first battle ships of the Indiana and Kearsarge classes, which, by the way, were more properly considered as coast-line battle ships as distinguished from those of succeeding classes, which were seagoing battle ships, it has been the policy with increase of speed and length of vessel to add to the height of the freeboard, until in our latest ships now under construction the forecastle deck has been given a height above a load water line of 25 feet 9 inches. Some criticism has been made from time to time because our earlier ships were not as high out of the water as some foreign vessels, but this is not a disadvantage so great as might appear or as many

have tried to have the public believe. The Indiana and Kearsarge classes are too low forward for efficient fighting at sea in fairly heavy weather, but the remainder of our battle ships could without doubt give a good account of themselves in a fight at sea in any weather in which it is at all likely for fleets to engage. Our later designs of ships are fully the equal in regard to desirable or effective freeboard as foreign vessels.

In a recent magazine article criticisms were made of our ships with respect to their freeboard which, in some respects, to say the least, were hardly in accord with the facts. The statements of the heights of the freeboard made in this article, so far as regards vessels of our Navy are approximately correct, but the claim made by the author of the article referred to that

All modern battleships in foreign navies have forward decks from about 22 to 28 feet above the water.

is very far from the truth, as the following table, made from the most reliable data obtainable of representative battle ships of the navies named will show, which gives the freeboard abreast the forward turret:

Of the above type ships taken as representative of the British, Japanese, French, and our own navies, it will be noted that but one has a freeboard as high as 28 feet, as stated by the writer of the article, while the vast majority have a freeboard less than the minimum height fixed by this critic. On the whole it would hardly be claimed, after an examination of this table, that the freeboard of our ships is so woefully short of what it should be or below the standard set by foreign services. It might be added as a question for serious consideration in connection with the matter of high freeboard and high gun positions that the Russian battle ships Borodino, Kniaz Suvaroff, Oslybia, and Alexander III, approximating 27 feet 0 incheshigher than any of our own ships now in service or any of the type ships shown in the above table, excepting possibly the Dreadnaught capsized or were otherwise sunk in the battle of the Sea of Japan, and this after only a comparatively short fight.