the rest of Europe conclude, that nothing confiderable was Will. III. to be expected from England. In this they were but too 1700-I. well feconded by the parliament, as will presently appear. III. 731. On the 18th of March, the king fent a meffage to the The king ac commons by Mr. fecretary Hedges, importing, "That his quaints the parliament "majefty having directed Mr. Stanhope, his envoy extra- with thefe ordinary and plenipotentiary at the Hague, to enter into proceedings. "negotiations in concert with the States-general, and other Pr. H. C. potentates, for the mutual fecurity of England and Hol"land, according to an address of their house to that effect; " and that Mr. Stanhope having tranfmitted to his majesty "copies of the demands made by himself and the deputies "of the States, upon that fubject, to the French ambassa"dor there; his majefty had thought fit to communicate "the fame to the commons; it being his intention to ac"quaint them from time to time with the ftate and progress "of these negotiations, into which he had entered pursuant "to their addrefs." treaty. Ibid. When this message was confidered by the commons on the Addrefs on 21st of March, and the proposals of Mr. Stanhope and the the partition Dutch deputies to the French ambaffador were read, they refolved, that the treaty of partition be read likewife; which being done, they voted, "That an humble address be pre"fented to his majefty, to return the thanks of this houfe "for his gracious meffage, wherein he is pleased to com"municate his royal intentions to acquaint this house from "time to time with the ftate and progrefs of those negotia"tions, into which his majefty has entered pursuant to the "addrefs of this houfe: and alfo to lay before his majefty "the ill confequences of the treaty of partition (paffed un"der the great feal of England, during the fitting of parlia"ment, and without the advice of the fame) to this king"dom and the peace of Europe, whereby fuch large terri"tories of the king of Spain's dominions were to be delivered "up to the French king." When this addrefs was prefented to the king, he fomewhat refented the unkindnefs of it, and thought there was much more reafon to complain of the perfidious breach of the treaty, than of the making of it. However, without taking any notice of that part of the addrefs, he returned the following anfwer: "That he was glad that they were pleafed with "his communicating to them the state of the negotiations he "had entered into; and that he fhould continue to inform "them of the progrefs that fhould be made in them; and he "always willing to receive their advice thereupon, being G 2 fully Will. III." fully perfuaded, that nothing could contribute more ef1700-1."fectually to the happinefs of the kingdom, and the peace "of Europe, than the concurrence of the parliament in all "his negotiations, and a good understanding between him "and his people." The parti charged in house of lords. Burnet. But the lords had, before this, on the 17th of March, ention treaty tered upon the confideration of the partition treaty, the debate being begun by Sheffield, marquis of Normanby, and the reft of the Tories. This they managed with great dexterity, while the matter was as much neglected by the king, who went that day to Hampton-Court, where he ftaid some time. By this means no directions were given, and those who had been concerned in the treaty, were involved in great difficulties before the court was aware of it. The king either could not prevail with his new minifters to cxcufe the treaty, if they would not juftify it; or he neglected them fo far, as not to speak to them at all about it. Thofe who attacked it, faid, they meant nothing in that but to offer the king advices for the future, to prevent such errors as had been committed in that treaty, both as to matter and form. They blamed the giving fuch territories to the crown of France, and the forfaking the emperor. They alfo complained of the fecrecy, in which the treaty was carried on, it not being communicated to the English council or miniftry, but privately tranfacted by the earls of Portland and Jerfey. They blamed likewife the putting the great feal, firft to blank powers, and then to the treaty itfelf; which, the king's new minifters faid, was unjust in the contrivance, and ridiculous in the execution (a). To all this it was answered, that, there (a) The treaty was likewife treated with great feverity of language in the books and pamphlets of that time. Davenant, in his Effay upon the Balance of Power,' reprefents, that the authors of the treaty, "knew "well enough that it must bring "difficulties almoft infuperable upon any future miniftry. "They could not (fays he) but "forefee, that the prodigious "increase of power and strength 66 which the partition treaty, "had it taken effect, gave to "the French, would to the lat there not being a force ready and fufficient to hinder the Will.III. French from poffeffing themselves of the Spanish monarchy, 1700-1. which "and kingdoms, than probably "they could have obtained by "the fword, attended ftill with "victory in the course of a hun"dred years? But the emperor "did not acquiefce in it. Por"tugal temporifed, but would "poffibly have declared against "it, if any ftrong alliance had "been formed. The Conclave "began to tremble. Venice did not think it fafe; and all the "princes and ftates of Italy began to find it high time to enter "into alliances for their common prefervation. Of all this, "war muft have been the confe"quence." Dr. Drake, in his 'Hiftory of the laft Parliament,' endeavours to fhew, that the late king of Spain's will was the product of the partition treaty; and that, if France had abode by that treaty, the balance of Europe had been as effectually broken, as it was by their acceptance of the king of Spain's will. Under this fecond head he remarks, that," the "poffeffion of Naples and Si cily, and all the Spanish de"pendencies on the coast of "Tufcany, with the adjacent. "iflands, Santo Stephano, Por"to Hercole, Orbitello, Tela mone, Porto Longone, Piom"bino, Final, with the marquifate belonging to it, Fontarabia, St. Sebaftian, with "the whole province of Gui"pufcoa, &c. gave the French "fuch a number of good har"bours in the Mediterranean, "that the advantages of them, "improved with their ufual ap "plication and judgment, muft "have made them in a fhort "time abfolute masters of the "Mediterranean, and, in confequence of that of the ocean "alfo. How far this would have gone towards that univer"fal monarchy, which France "fo paffionately longs for, the "meaneft capacity may judge. By this means the pope, the "Tufcan, the Genoese, and "the Spaniards, had been di"rectly locked up; not a fhip "belonging to any of them "durft have peeped out of har"bour without a French pafs. "The Spanish Flota would con"ftantly and inevitably have "been at their mercy; for all "their commerce with the Weft"Indies muft neceffarily have "ceased, and the king of Spain, "how much foever he might "have ftomached it inwardly, "must have lain as ftill as king "Log, while the French played "at leap-frog over him. The "leaft fhew of refentment would "have furnished them with a pretence to feize on the trea"fures of the Weft-Indies, and, "like a kind neighbour, to "have convoyed the galleons "into their own harbours." Will. III. which they were prepared for, the emperor had defired the 1700-1. king to enter into a treaty of partition, and had confented to every lid; that it was a difingenuous one; that great services were done to France by it; that it was carried on without the confederates; that the parliament was not confulted in it; that the balance of Europe was loft by it; that the archduke fhould have been fent into Spain, which would have prevented that treaty; that the treaty produced the will of the king of Spain; and that the Spaniards complained of the treaty. However, the treaty had fome advocates in print, and particularly the author of Two letters to a friend concerning the partition treaty,' republished in the third volume of State Tracts, p. 184. Bishop Burnet had fome hand in these letters, in the former of which the occafion of the treaty is thus ftated: "We "and the Dutch had got thro' a war at a vaft charge, and "with infinite danger. We "faw the weakness of Spain in "the business of Barcelona. "There was no reckoning on "them as capable of making "a ftand, if the king of France. "were freed from a war, fince, "when that preffed him on all "hands, yet with a small army "he could at his leifure take that important place. Had Spain any intrinfic ftrength to "refift, there was time enough given them to have brought "it all together. If, I fay, "France then with fo fmall a were fo weary of taxes, and "fo jealous of a ftanding army, "that we brought down our "land-force, first to twelve thou"fand, and then to feven. Our "fleet kept proportion to our army. The Dutch did not "difarm fo faft; yet they had "no force to fpare; and, to be "fure, they would unwillingly "engage every article of it, except that which related to the duchy of Will. III. Milan. But the king, not thinking that worth the engaging 1700-1. 46 "engage in the quarrel deeper "than we did. While the de"bates concerning the army were on foot, the ill health "of the king of Spain was not forgot to be mentioned, and "the danger of the progrefs "that the French might make, "if we were reduced to fuch an "incapacity of protecting the Spaniards, was often repre"fented, but was often rejected "wish indignation, as an arti"fice of the court to get an army kept up. Things be"ing in fuch a state, might not "the king think, that what was "left for him to do, was to "make the best bargain he "could" The author then proceeds to fhew, that," how "bad foever the partition might "be, it seemed ftill more de"firable to yield up fome parts "of the Spanish monarchy, than "to let France conquer it, or " rather take it all. Spain it"felf, the Weft- Indies and Flanders, were the branches "of that monarchy, in which we were chiefly concerned ; and; while these were kept "intire in the fame hands, our "interefts were pretty fafe. It "is known, that, what advan"tage foever the Spanish gran"dees may make of the domi"nions in and about Italy, "Spain itself is not the stronger " or richer for them, but much "to the contrary. It is true, "their interefts at Rome are "fortified by them; but we "are little concerned in those. "It was not to be imagined, rope in war upon yet flighter, "and that faw how fure they "were of conquering fo feeble an enemy, and fo weak a rival, would let all this go for nothing. They did not fear a new alliance against them; they knew well the temper "both of the English and Dutch: "they therefore pretended to "the Italian dominions. If the king had been in condition to "have talked roundly to them, I certainly that had been both "the wifeft and beft method. "But those who feem now the "moft inflamed against the par"tition treaty, know in their “confciences, that they them"felves would never have en king in poffeffion of, perhaps, all the Spanish mo"narchy (as, no doubt, by "what we have feen, he would "foon have been, upon the "death of the king of Spain) "if they had discovered, that "offers had been made to have "compounded for that whole "fucceffion, by yielding up the "dominions in Italy, but that "the king and his minifiers had |