THE PRASANGA-MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL.

43

by causal connexion, Samvriti: in order not to fall into extremes. For, not to say of what has never existed, to be; and of the truly existing, not to be; this is to take a middle way, Madhyama.' This dogma is formulated as follows:-"By denying the extreme of existence is also denied, in consequence of conditional appearance, the extreme of non-existence, which is not in Paramartha." The arguments in proof of this thesis are most circumstantial; the following most curious syllogisms occur in Jam yang shadpa's work:

1. If the plant grew by its own specific nature, it
would not be a composition, Tenbrel; it is de-
monstrated, however, that it is a composition.
2. If anything in nature were self-existent, we should
certainly hear and see it; for the sensation of
seeing and hearing would in this case be abso-
lutely identical.

3. The quality of being general would not be pe-
culiar to many things, because it would be an
indivisible unity, as such a unity we should be
obliged to take the ego, if there were an ego.
4. The plant would not be compelled to grew anew,
because it would continue to exist.

2

5. If any Skandha, as sensation, were self-existent,

They are also called, on account of this theory, "those who deny existence (nature)," in Tibetan, Ngovonyid medpar mraba.

2 The Buddhists enumerate five essential properties of sentient existence, which are styled Skandhas, or Silaskandhas, in Tibetan, Tsulkhrim kyi phungpo, "the aggregates of morals." They are: 1. The organized body; 2. Sensation; 3. Perception; 4. Discrimination; 5. Consciousness. See Burnouf, Index, voce Skandha; Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, pp. 388, 399-424.— For the Tibetan designations of the five Skandhas see "Buddhistische Triglotte," by A. Schiefner, leaf 9.

another Skandha, as e. g. the organized body, would be also self-existent; but it is impossible to produce by the self-existence of sensation that of the organized body, because the plastic power and the object to be formed are identical.

2. The Alaya has an absolute eternal existence; those treatises do not teach the right doctrine which attribute to it only a relative existence.

3. Not only the Arhats, but also simple men, if they have entered the path, can arrive at the rude comprehension of the sixteen kinds of the four truths by "very evident (earnest) meditation" (Tib. Naljor ngonsum); but those systems are considered wrong which pretend, as the Hinayana, that the knowledge (Vishnana) derived from such meditation (which is nothing but a manifestation of the Alaya) be not liable to errors (Sansk. Vikalpa, Tib. Namtog). Even the Arhat goes to hell in case he doubt anything. This reproach is meant to be made to the schools by which the Arhats are admitted to Nirvana under any condition.'

4. The three periods: the present, the past, and the future, are compounds, correlative to each other. The Buddha has declared: "A harsh word, uttered in past times, is not lost (literally destroyed), but returns again;" and, therefore, the past time is the present time, as is also the future, though as yet it has not come into existence. 5. The Buddha has two kinds of Nirvana: Nirvana with remains and Nirvana without remains; the latter

The means of avoiding the error have been more fully developed by mysticism in the exigencies of Vipasyana and Samatha. See p. 54.

THE PRASANGA-MADHYAMIKA SHOOL.

45

kind only is entire extinction of personality, or the state where the notion of ego ceases, where the outward and inward man is destroyed. In this state, the Buddha has assumed the body Dharmakaya, in which there is neither beginning nor end; whilst in the Nirvana with remains he has obtained only the Nirmānakāya body, in which, though rendered impervious to outward impressions, he has not yet thrown off habitual errors (the influence of passions), of which nothing remains in the other kind of Nirvana.

The Prasangas admit as orthodox the greater part of the hymns in the Tanjur, and those of the Sūtras which are contained in the Kanjur; in these, they say, the true meaning of the word of the Buddha (viz. the Madhyamika doctrine) is explained. There exist a large number of such books, the most important of which are the seventeen books of the Prajnāpāramitā, then the Akshayamatinirdesa, the Samādhirāja, the Anavataptapariprichchhā, Dharmasamgīti, the Sagarapariprichchha, the Manjusrivikrīdita, the first chapter of the Ratnakūta, and the chapter of Kasyapa, which is quoted by Nagarjuna and his disciples in support of their dogmas.1

It is remarkable to see at what extravagances Buddhist speculation has arrived by its tendency to follow abstract ideas without the consideration of the limits presented by bodily experience and the laws of nature. But the case is rather not an isolated one; we meet instances of analogous dreams in ancient and modern times.

1 Wassiljew in his examination of the most important Mahāyāna Sūtras, pp. 157-202, presents an analysis of the Manjusrīvikridita and the Ratnakūta.

CHAPTER VI.

THE SYSTEM OF MYSTICISM.

GENERAL CHARACTER. THE KALA CHAKRA SYSTEM; ITS ORIGIN AND DOGMAS.

THE contact of the Buddhists with their various pagan neighbours gradually introduced into their creed ideas foreign to Buddhism, and the consequence of this was the rise of a new system full of mystic modifications. We see already in the later Mahāyāna schools, particularly in the Yogacharya branch, a more general yielding to the current superstitious notions; but the principles of mystic theology such as we find them in the actual Buddhism of the present day have chiefly been developed in the most modern system, which originated independently of the earlier ones, in Central Asia. Its theories were afterwards even engrafted upon later productions by a subsequent incorporation, to such a degree, that without a knowledge of this system, we should often

GENERAL CHARACTER.

47

be almost at a loss how to understand the Mahāyāna sacred books.

European orientalists use to apply to this third system the name of Yogacharya; and if we bear in mind, that Yoga means in Sanskrit "abstract devotion, by which supernatural faculties are acquired," it becomes evident that they were led to do so by the conformity of the name with the system to which they applied it. But Wassiljew has clearly proved in his work, that Yogacharya is but a branch of the Mahāyāna system, and he therefore substituted the name of "Mysticism," which I have also adopted. This name was chosen because this system places meditation, the recital of certain prayers, and the practise of mystical rites above the observance of precepts and even above moral deportment.

Mysticism appears for the first time as a specific system in the tenth century of our era; it is called in the sacred books Dus kyi khorlo, in Sanskrit Kala Chakra, "the circle of time." It is reported to have originated in the fabulous country Sambhala (Tib. Dejung), "source or origin of happiness." Csoma, from careful investigations, places this country beyond the Sir Deriáu (Yaxartes) between 45° and 50° north latitude. It was first known in India in the year 965 A.D.; and it was in

1 Wilson, "Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms," see the article Yoga. 2 See Csoma, "On the origin of the Kala Chakra system," Journ. As. Soc. Beng., Vol. II., p. 57. "Grammar," 192. "Analysis," As. Res., Vol. XX., pp. 488, 564. Compare also Burnouf, "Introduction," Section V. Hodgson, "Notice on Buddhist Symbols," R. As. Soc., Vol. XVIII., p. 397. Wilson, "Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus," As. Res., Vol. XVII., p. 216-29.