panies to provide that their contract should be construed in accordance with the laws of another state.

The second question in controversy is whether the provisions of Subdivision First, Section 1, of the Standard Provisions Law prohibits a company from extending the time for the payment of premiums, like taking the so-called premium notes for a period beyond the days of grace, which by their terms, or by the terms of the policy, forfeit the contract if not paid when due. There is no objection to a premium note which is accepted by the company as absolute payment of the premium for a definite period. The objectionable feature arises, for example, when a com pany takes a premium note for ninety days for an annual premium which, if not paid in ninety days, by its terms or by virtue of the terms of the policy contract, lapses the policy, the lapse so far as non-forfeiture values are concerned dating back to the due date of the premium. It seems to be conceded that a note or contract which declares a forfeiture for the nonpayment of premium notes when due and still leaves the note in force for its full face is at least inequitable if not uncollectible except as to the earned portion of the premium. The courts of this state have held the insured liable for the face of a thirty day premium note for an annual premium where the application and policy both state that the giving of a note should not be construed as payment and that non-payment when due should avoid the policy.

Marskey v. Turner, 81 Mich. 62.

Subdivision First of Section 1 of the Standard Provisions Law requires a policy to contain:

"A provision that all premiums shall be payable in advance, either at the home office of the company or to an agent of the company, upon delivery of a receipt signed by one or more of the officers who shall be named in the policy."

The words "payable in advance" certainly were intended to have some meaning in the Standard Provisions Law. I construe them to mean that the company must have in its possession at the end of the period of grace named in its policy something that it is willing to treat as payment of the premium or else it must declare the policy lapsed for nonpayment of premium subject, of course, to the non-forfeiture provision. The construction contended for by counsel representing the affected companies would leave the words "shall be payable in advance" without force. It would also be practically nullify Subdivision Second of Section 1.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that you should not approve policies containing provisions allowing premium notes to be taken which are not treated as payment of the premium, but declare the policy lapsed for the non-payment of any premium note when due. This ruling would not affect one of the companies represented at the hearing which accepts premium notes for quarterly premiums on a due date of the annual premium, which notes are, by their terms void immediately on a due date of the quarterly premium so that they never become an obligation of the insured while there is a default on his policy. Very respectfully yours,

JNO. E. BIRD,

Attorney General.

COMMERCIAL FISHING LAW. Act 153 Public Acts of 1907 makes it unlawful to use for the purpose of commercial fishing any boat or tug except a row boat that is unlicensed. This act applies to an employee who is actually engaged in operating an unlicensed boat. Tugs, boats or launches used solely in the buying up of fish and the gathering of fish of different stations but not actually used in fishing operations need not be licensed. See also opinion of July 28.

July 16, 1909. Mr. Merlin Wiley, Prosecuting Attorney, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your letter of the 7th inst., calling attention to Act 153 of the Public Acts of 1907, and submitting the following questions:

"1. Is an employee working upon a non-licensed fishing tug amenable to said act, said employee not having any part in the management, ownership or control of said tug?

"2. Is a launch used for the purpose of transporting fish from the fishing grounds to market used in the purpose of commercial fishing within said act?"

In reply to your first question would say that Section 1 of said Act 153 of the Public Acts of 1907 makes it unlawful to use for the purpose of commercial fishing or for the purpose of catching fish to be offered for sale in any of the waters bordering on this state any kind of a boat, tug or launch, except row boat, without such boat being registered and license issued therefor in the manner provided therein. It is my opinion that this act applies to an employee who is actually engaged in operating a boat and using the same for the purpose of taking fish, regardless of the fact as to whether he is the manager or owner and having full control thereof at all times or not. Your question is not clear in this particular. It is my opinion that no person would have authority to use an unlicensed tug in actual fishing operations, although such person might be an employee of the actual owner or manager of the boat. The act is aimed to prevent commercial fishing with unlicensed boats, and the fact that the person using such unlicensed boat in commercial fishing is not the actual owner or manager having full control thereof at all times, would not relieve him from the penalties therein provided.

In answer to your second question would say that the title to said Act 153 of the Public Acts of 1907, reads as follows: :

"An act to regulate and license fishing with tugs, launches or boats in the waters bordering on this state."

In construing the act in question it cannot be given a broader construction than the title indicates. We have advised the State Game and Fish Warden that tugs, launches or boats used solely in the buying up of fish and the gathering up of fish from the different stations, which is not actually used in the fishing operations, need not be licensed. This ruling, I think, should be confined to the taking of fish from the different stations, where the setting of the nets, the raising of the same and the bringing of the fish to the shore station is confined to other boats. If a tug, launch or boat is used to convey the nets from the shore station to the fishing ground and for the purpose of bringing the fish from the fishing grounds to the shore station, such boats should be licensed, in my

opinion, although some other boat, like a row boat, is used in assisting the larger vessel in the actual setting of the nets or lifting the same. Each case would have to stand upon its particular facts, and where the facts show that a boat is used in the actual fishing operations, independent from the picking up of fish at the different shore stations and conveying them to market or some central point of shipment, the boat should be licensed.

LAW GOVERNING SALES OF STATE TAX HOMESTEAD LANDS. It is within the power of the Auditor General, as intended by Act 130 of the Public Acts of 1907, to issue a certificate of error against deed of land sold as state tax homestead land and reinstate tax liens where such land was not subject to sale as such.

July 16, 1909.

Hon. Oramel B. Fuller, Auditor General, Capitol, Lansing.

Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your communication of the 1st inst., relative to the application of William Gaffney of Bay City for the issu ance of a certificate of error, under Act 130 of the Public Acts of 1907, against State tax homestead deed issued to said Wm. Gaffney, under Section 131 of the General Tax law, as amended, for Lots 1 and 2, Block 150, Daglish Addition of Portsmouth, City of Bay City, according to the recorded plat thereof. It appears that these lots were deeded to the State of Michigan September 21, 1904, under Section 127 of the General Tax Law; the years for which certain portions of said lots were held being referred to in your letter, but which I do not deem important to incorporate herein. The Examiner's report, under Section 127, shows that the East 2 of East half of Lot 1 is occupied; the occupant, as shown by the petition of Wm. Gaffney, being Mary Shawl, who claims title by warranty deed. It also appears that said Lots 1 and 2 were appraised under Section 131 of the General Tax Law by the Commissioner of the State Land Office and sold by him to Wm. Gaffney as one parcel; the affidavit of Wm. Gaffney setting forth the fact that at the time of such sale on March 12, 1908, the Commissioner of the State Land Office announced in his presence to prospective purchasers that said Lots 1 and 2 would be sold as one description. The said Wm. Gaffney became the purchaser at such sale and by reason of such occupancy now requests that his purchase be canceled, under said Act 130 of the Public Acts of 1907. Accompanying the petition is the release to the State of Michigan by said William Gaffney and Catherine Gaffney, his wife, of the lots in question, together with an affidavit setting up the fact that said lots were advertised as one description and sold as aforesaid. You request my opinion as to whether or not you are authorized to cancel such sale and refund the purchase price.

Act 130 of the Public Acts of 1907, was passed by the legislature for the purpose of canceling sales of State tax homestead lands made by the Commissioner of the State Land Office under Section 131 of the General Tax Law, as amended, in cases where the land sold did not

belong to the class of lands liable to sale thereunder and restoring the tax liens thereon in favor of the State. Section 2 provides as follows: "In any case where it shall be shown by due proof satisfactory to the auditor general that lands purchased by the petitioner in manner set forth in paragraph one of this act are in fact actually occupied by the person having the record title thereto at the time of making and record: ing the determination relating thereto by the auditor general and the commissioner of the state land office under the provisions of Act 107 of the Public Acts of 1899, and at the time such sale was in fact made to the petitioning purchaser, and that such purchaser never obtained possession or any beneficial use of such land, and that he acquired no title thereto by such purchase, for the reason that at the date of such determination and such sale the same was in fact occupied land within the meaning of the statutes under which said sale was assumed to be made to such purchaser, the auditor general shall cause the money paid therefor to the State of Michigan to be refunded to the purchaser with interest thereon at six per cent per annum."

It is evident that at least that portion of said lots 1 and 2 which was occupied by the holder of the original title, as shown by the Examiner's report, was not subject to deeding to the State of Michigan under Section 127 of the General Tax Law. Neither could the same be lawfully made subject to the provisions of Section 131 of the General Tax Law.

Under the facts as shown, the whole of Lots 1 and 2 were advertised by the Commissioner of the State Land Office as one description and sold as such. I know of no authority on the part of the Auditor General under said Act 130 of the Public Acts of 1907, to issue a certificate of error against a portion of a description under facts similar to those involved in this matter. It appears that a portion of these lots, shown to be occupied, have a dwelling house thereon, while the balance of these two lots seem to be vacant property.

The case of Meagher v. Dumas, 143 Mich. 639, to which you call my attention, has no application to the facts under consideration. There the court very properly held that ejectment would not lie to recover possession of property deeded as State tax homestead land by the Commissioner of the State Land Office, which was actually occupied within the meaning of the State [statute].

If Mr. Gaffney wished to rely upon his State tax homestead deed, he could no doubt maintain title for that portion of Lots 1 and 2 which was not occupied. Where land has been deeded under Section 127 of the General Tax Law which was not subject to such deeding to the State and sold by the Commissioner of the State Land Office with land that might have been lawfully deeded to the State, as one parcel, particularly where bids were refused on that portion of the land subject to deeding, I can see no other way out of the dilemma than for the Auditor General to issue a certificate of error under said Act 130 of the Public Acts of 1907, and to reinstate the tax liens for which the land has been returned. Such action would, in my opinion, be clearly within the intent and purpose of said act, which amply provides, in Section 5, for charging back the amount refunded.

I return herewith the petition for cancellation, together with release and affidavit of William Gaffney. Respectfully yours,

JNO. E. BIRD,

Attorney General.

CORPORATIONS. CUMULATIVE VOTING LAW. The Cumulative Voting Law applies to building and loan associations.

July 16, 1909.

Hon. Frederick C. Martindale, Secretary of State, Capitol, Lansing. Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your letter of the 8th instant in which you request the opinion of this department as to whether Act 141, Public Acts of 1907, the cumulative voting law, applies to the election of directors in building and loan associations.

This law applies to "any corporation under any general law of this state other than municipal insurance and banking corporations." It also contains this proviso:

"Provided further, That associations formed for social, yachting, hunting, boating, fishing and rowing purposes, under act number twenty-two of the public acts of eighteen hundred eighty-three, approved April ten, eighteen hundred eighty-three, entitled 'An act to authorize the formation of clubs for social purposes,' the same being section seven thousand seven hundred thirty-three to seven thousand seven hundred thirty-nine, both inclusive, of the Compiled Laws of eighteen hundred ninety-seven, or under section seven thousand six hundred sixty seven of the Compiled Laws of eighteen hundred ninety-seven, may elect a portion of their directors for a longer term than one year, as may be provided in their by-laws."

The Supreme Court has held that this statute applies to mutual life insurance companies.

Atty. Gen. v. Looker, 111 Mich. 501.

It was held not to apply to partnership associations limited in

Atty. Gen. v. McVichie, 138 Mich. 387,

but the decision was placed upon the ground that a partnership association limited was not a corporation within the meaning of this act. It was held not to apply to banks in

Atty. Gen. v. Bridgman, 134 Mich. 379,

but the decision was placed upon the ground that the provisions of the banking law enacted at the same session as the amendment to the cumulative voting law repealed the cumulative voting law so far as it applied to the election of bank directors. The legislature seemed to think it neces sary to expressly except certain classes of corporations from the provisions of the act either at the time of its original enactment or by subsequent amendment. The fact that these express exceptions were deemed necessary leads me to believe that the courts would hold that all corporations not expressly excepted were intended to be included within the provisions of the enactment.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the cumulative voting law, Act 141, Public Acts of 1907, applies to the election of directors in building and loan associations.