which all human exertion, and all human power, were subject even in such an empire as Great Britain. Admitting, therefore, in the most extensive degree, the responsibility of his majesty's ministers on this subject, he felt no apprehension at the prospect of meeting the charge of the rt. hon. gent. upon it. He felt confident, that it would be proved they had redeemed the pledge given by them to parliament in the last session; that they had carried on the struggle and applied the abundant resources of the country in a manner which, on mature reflection, appeared most likely to secure the object in view, an opinion which even past experience served only to confirm. He felt bold, therefore, in declaring that whenever the rt. hon. gent. should bring the subject before the House in a tangible shape, he should be fully enabled to prove, that his majesty's government had acted on the fallest conviction of the course, that would be most conducive to the success of the cause of Spain; and, if that cause should not succeed, the failure would result, not from any neglect on their part, but from greater engines of destruction having been brought against that country than it was in the power of Great Britain to afford means of defence. This was too large, too interesting, and too important a subject to be broken down in a debate of that sort. Opinion upon it must depend on considerations, that could not be superficially examined. But he must be permitted, however, to say a few words upon the subject; and here he must observe, that it was not very easy to collect the rt. hon. gent.'s sentiments as to the course of military policy which ought to have been adopted towards Spain. The right hon. gent. had described two modes in which our military assistance might have been afforded the one by furnishing the Spaniards with arms and ammunition merely; the other, (that which had besides been adopted by his majesty's government,) that of sending to their aid a regular military force. The right hon. gent. expressed his partiality for that species of warfare, recommended in their List of Precautions, by what he called the Supreme Junta. He certainly did recollect the paper alluded to by the right hon. gent. but it was circulated long before the Supreme Central Junta had an existence. The writer was unknown; it had no kind of authority; and it was impossible to ascertain, whether it expressed the general sentiments of the

nation. The right hon. gent. deprecated the introduction of a regular army to assist an irregular force. Certainly, early in the war, the Spanish troops were local and irregular; but this force was soon found to be ineffective. Even in Andalusia a regular army had been established, and it was not until they got a regular army, that the Spaniards were enabled to make an effectual struggle, and to reduce the power of the enemy by the defeat of Dupont at the memorable battle of Baylen. The course of events decided the question between a regular and an irregular force. When Madrid was evacuated, and the provinces purged of the French, every province felt the necessity of advancing its troops, and they had consequently been advanced and consolidated in the centre of the kingdom. His majesty's ministers bad, therefore, no option-the option had been made by Spain. They had chosen the mode of regular warfare, and it would have ill-befitted the character of Great Britain to have shrunk from the contest, and to have said to the Spaniards: "We will give you money, we will give you stores, but we will not hazard our blood in your defence.” Such language would indeed have been most ungenerous towards our allies, and most unworthy of the spirit and general feeling of this nation, in support of the Spanish cause. What had this country to do with the prudence or imprudence of the Spaniards adopting the system of warfare laid down in the Precautions?" Whether Spain was to contend against France in irregular warfare or by regular war, was a inatter for her own option; and she had at that time made her option for regular war, and for giving battle to her enemies in the field. It was, therefore, the duty and policy of this country to support her cause in the same manner. The speech of the right hon. gent. was rather of a prudent cast, and not in that animated stile, in which another right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), had, in the last session, represented the aiding Spain as paramount to all other duties. The right hon. gent. who spoke this night, seemed to think it was very improper and imprudent for a British army to enter Spain, without having some cautionary towns and forts surrendered to us, to secure retreat in case of calamity. For his part, he knew of no town of that sort which could be surrendered, except Cadiz; for as to Ferrol, it was not a town capable of answering the object proposed, nor of

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protecting the embarkation of an army. Now, as it was evident, that if we were to make any operations at all, they must be in the North of Spain, he could not conceive that a proposal would be well received in that country for surrendering a town quite without the line of our military operations. If we had made such a proposal to that generous and high-spirited nation, he could not conceive that we could have thrown a greater apple of discord to disturb the harmony of cordial cooperation. As to another disposition of the forces which had been mentioned, that of sending sir Arthur Wellesley's force of 9000 men to the Pyrenees, to cut off the communication between the 60,000 French troops who were in Spain, and the rest of the 500,000 disposable troops, of which the right hon. gent. stated the enemy's army to consist, the bare statement of such a plan must convince the House of its absurdity. If the right hon. gent. had really no other advice to offer to the House and the country than what he had stated, he rejoiced that his majesty's government had adopted other measures. As to the complaint which the right hon. gent. had made of want of regular information, he could assure him, that it was his wish to lay before the House, as early as possible, every information that would not be prejudicial to the public service; and he was happy to state, that he saw no objection to the fullest information being granted with respect to the transactions in Portugal, one of those topics to which the right hon. gent. had promised to call the attention of the House. He also thought, that very shortly the fullest information might be given with respect to our operations in Spain; and he was sure, that when the time of discussion should arrive, he would be perfectly ready to meet the right hon. gent. either upon the principles or upon the details of the question. As to the idea which had been thrown out, of the propriety of directing our forces to Spain in the first instance, instead of Portugal, he must say there never was a fallacy more absurd than the idea of a very inferior force occupying the passes of the Pyrennees, and cutting off entirely the communication between two armies infinitely superior. This fallacy seemed to arise from the idea that an army, when once landed, could put itself on march the next morning, to attack the enemy. There were some persons who appeared to think that an army once landed could act as

speedily as a ship when it has left the port. The difference, however, was very great: the ship had nothing to do but to go with the wind, and meet the enemy; whereas an army when landed had much difficuly in collecting provisions, and the means of transporting their necessary baggage. If the present administration were, however, to have waited till every thing was ready for the reception of our armies, they must have stood as still as the last vigorous administration, who actually did nothing while in office.-lle would venture to say, from the melancholy experience of the fate of general Blake's army, that if a British army had landed at St. Andero, and scrambled as far as gen. Blake advanced, none of them would ever have come back. He was convinced that there was not a single military man who would support the idea of a campaign in the Pyrennees, for a British army. The right hon. gent. had stated, that the expedition which had atchieved the deliverance of Portugal had been sent to sea, to seek its fortunes, without any particular direction from government. The fact, however, was directly the reverse, because, most unquestionably the expedition under sir Arthur Wellesley did sail with a most precise and determinate object. It had been ordered to go immediately to the Tagus, without stopping at Corunna. This direction was given in consequence of precise information received from sir C. Cotton, (which, however, afterwards turned out to be unfounded,) that there were no more than 5000 French troops in Lisbon and the other forts upon the Tagus, and that sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition would be sufficient to dislodge them. The expedition then had been sent out with a precise object, and with precise instructions, but it would hardly be contended, that government should have tied up the hands and the discretion of such a meritorious officer as sir Arthur Wellesley so completely as to say, that he must on no occasion take advantage of any favourable circumstances which might occur in the varying and fleeting fortune of the war, without waiting until he had made a direct communication to government upon the subject, and had received their answer. It appeared to him that floating armies, under the command of trust-worthy officers, might be of great service, even when acting according to the circumstances of the times, without any particular directions from government; and he was confi

dent that in this manner the corps of gen. Spencer had been of considerable service in marching from Seville to Ayamonte, and stopping a portion of Junot's army that was coming to the relief of Dupont. As to the attacks which had been made upon him for not having sent sufficient cavalry with the Expedition, he was ready to strengthen the right hon. gent.'s argument, and to admit, that it was only by accident that any cavalry at all had been attached to it. It was not supposed that cavalry was a proper description of force to send with those floating expeditions, which might be a long time at sea, before they found a favourable opportunity for landing. Some of the cavalry, however, which were in Portugal, had happened to come from the Mediterranean. He should always protest against the notion that we were never to engage an enemy, unless we were equal or superior to him in cavalry. He would ask the House, would they wish to blot out from the page of our history, those brilliant victories which we had gained when much inferior in cavalry? At the glorious battle of Alexandria, sir Ralph Abercrombie had but 150 dragoons, and the French had 2,400 cavalry; and at the battle of Maida, sir John Stuart had no cavalry at all. In the expedition to Portugal, the government had made sufficient provision even of cavalry. Our army would have been superior to the enemy in this respect, if the cavalry which was in Mondego Bay on the 20th (the day before the battle) had landed. The 18th dragoons were also very near. He would allow, however, that if sir Arthur Wellesley had had the cavalry on that day, upon which he routed the French, perhaps more completely than ever they had been routed on a former occasion, [Cries of hear! hear!] the result of that victory would have been still more glorious. Although he was free to confess this, yet he must entirely resist the idea of government having neglected its duty in any particular. He believed the House must now recollect what was the temper of the country at the time that there appeared a delay in the sailing of the expedition under sir A. Wellesley from Cork. Whatever was the enthusiasm which prevailed in the public mind, for the immediate co-operation with the Spaniards, ministers would have been much to blame if they had not acted upon the information which they received from sir C. Cotton of the state of Lisbon and the forts upon the

Tagus. He could assure the right hon. gent. that for his own part, after having been attacked for four or five months upon this subject, in a mode, that he cer tainly had not resorted to to defend himself, he should be extremely glad to have an opportunity of making that defence for himself and his majesty's government, and that the fair case should be laid before parliament. He could assure the right hon. gent. also, that although his sagacity might enable him to lay his fingers on some fault in the present government, yet he felt confident that his majesty's ministers could prove to the satisfaction of the House and the country, that they had not been negligent in the great trust which had been reposed in them: and no greater personal favour could be conferred upon him than in giving him the opportunity of defending those measures for which he felt himself so highly responsible. As to the inconsistency which was stated between the disapprobation of his majesty of some parts of the Armistice and Convention, and the joy which his ministers had manifested in the usual manner, on hearing the news of the evacuation of Portugal, he thought this was a charge which might be easily explained. He believed, that every body had heard with joy the brilliant victories of our army, and the delivery of Portugal from the oppression and tyranny of France. If the right hon. gent. himself did not feel joy on those topics mentioned in the Speech, he could not conceive upon what grounds he had concurred in the Address. If, upon the receipt of the news of the deliverance of Portugal, ministers had not thought it proper to announce the intelligence by the usual demonstrations of joy, their silence would have been considered unfair with respect to the generals who negociated the Armistice and Convention. It would have appeared as if the whole weight of ministers and of his majesty's government was against them. It was not at all extraordinary, that his majesty's opinion on a question submitted to a military tribunal, should not be expressed in his Speech from the throne; but if the right hon. gent. chose to seek information in another manner, it would not be difficult to obtain it. As to the Answer which had been given to the Address of the city of London, he believed the right hon. gent. would find it very hard indeed to persuade the city of London that his majesty's ministers were actuated by any other view in the advice