tions his Majesty's disapproval was expres- by a right honourable friend (Mr. T. Grensed. Was it to the substantial points of ville) not now in the House. It was then, the Convention of Cintra, or was it to we were told by him, that by having transthose Articles which recognized the titles ports when they were not wanting, we of the head of the French government, and were sure to have them at hand in the the general who in Portugal commanded moment of urgency. By what fatality I the French army? It is not a little surpris- ask the noble lord is it, that all his characing to be told that his Majesty had de- teristic energy seems to have set upon the clared his disapproval, whilst at the same present state of things? (Hear, hear, hear!) time no explanation is given of the points Is this the testimony, which under the to which it was directed. But it would be administration of the noble lord, Great far more surprising to find that this House Britain exemplifies to the continent of was not determined to canvass the whole Europe, of her military powers, and of the of this transaction, in order fully to ascer- strength and comprehension of those who tain what were the points which called for manage her resources? Indeed, if their censure, and to whom the delinquency was eflects had not proved most lamentable to to be attributed. (Hear, hear!) But it the security of Europe, and the character was not only in sending the British troops of this empire, it would afford a most proto Portugal in preference to Spain, that lific source of ridicule to review the ministhe vigour of the King's ministers was il-terial operations of the noble lord. An lustrated. It was also to be traced in the army sent without instructions, without various equipments of the army. It was plan, almost destitute of cavalry, and defelt in the want of artillery, in the derange-ficent in stores; the artillery not fit for ment of the commissariat, in the scanti- the operations which should have been ness of the cavalry force. (Hear, hear, pursued, whilst the horses, (the accounts hear!) If the newspapers be correct in given of the state of which, if it were not their accounts, the defence of all the gene- for the melancholy consequences, were rals employed in Portugal, for acceding truly ridiculous) were represented as blind to the disgraceful Convention of Cintra, and lame, and some even as dying of old rested principally upon the ill provided age. These, at least, are the statements state of the British army, and its inability of the general officers whom the noble on that account to fulfill the object for lord had selected; and if they are not sawhich it was appointed. And, yet, the tisfactory to himself, he alone is to blame ministers who planned and sent out that for their inaccuracy, having appointed Expedition are the men, on whose able and three commanders in chief with a rapidity energetic exertions this House and the greater than the relays of post horses, from country is now called upon to rely, for the whom, of course, no very intelligent acproper and successful management of these counts were to be expected.-Now, let us vigorous efforts which his Majesty's Speech examine the reasons stated by the genehas told us are necessary to bring this aw- rals for acquiescing in the Convention. ful contest to a favourable result. Is it Time, say they, was thus obtained to fornot more consistent with common reason? ward the British army to Spain. The Is it not more suited to the duties we owe Convention was signed definitively on the the British people to presume, that from 30th of August; and yet the British army the experience of the past, such men are was not ready for action in Spain for two unsafe to trust with the destinies of the months, nay, some of the troops did not future; Was the noble lord (Castlereagh) leave Portugal for ten weeks after. Is it opposite so stinted as to that species of only for the conveyance of the troops of force or so stinted as to the means of its France that the noble lord can find transconveyance, that for a British army, des- ports? These he can convey in British tined to act in the field against the enemy, shipping, to be again, almost immediately he could only obtain 200 cavalry? Who on their debarkation, employed in Spain, that reverts to the proceedings of this whilst by that very measure he subjects, House, in the last session, but must re- in a dreadful season, the British army to a member that noble lord, almost with tears march of 500 miles. It is impossible to in his eyes, and in a tone of despondence pronounce adequately upon that disgracethat arrested commiseration, regretting ful measure; there is so much in every the exhausted state in which he asserted part of it of mystery, enigma and riddle. that department of the public service was, We are now told, that his Majesty has through a feeling of false economy, left expressed his formal disapprobation of sympathising with the national feeling, ap` some parts of the Convention; and yet his ministers thought proper to fire the Tower guns in approbation of it. His Majesty, it appears, had a different feeling of what affects the honour of the country and the glory of the British army, and I most sin-pated a complete triumph over the Lord cerely believe it, from that entertained by those ministers, who conceived it right to proclaim with all the demonstrations of public rejoicing, this stain upon both. His Majesty protests against being deemed a partner with his servants in this disgraceful transaction; and has this night announced to his Parliament that he has formally disapproved of it. Early in the progress of the hostile operations in Spain, I believe in the month of July, a document was published by the Supreme Junta of Seville, under the title of Precautions, which fixed upon a plan of warfare, and also conveyed instructions to the inhabitants of Spain, as to the manner in which they were to conduct their hostility against the enemy. Biscay, Castile and Navarre were the parts of the peninsula pointed out as the most proper theatre for hostile exertions. These were the points most important to engage the consideration of the patriotic leaders, and, of course, of the auxiliary force which was naturally to be expected from this country. Now, if his Majesty's ministers had condescended to hold a little intercourse with the Supreme Junta, or have allowed the army to remain in England till they actually knew something of the state of Spain; or, if sir Arthur had even corresponded with the Junta, they, and we too, would have learned, that the most important duty to be performed was the defence of the north of Spain, and the passage of the Pyrenees; and then, instead of being worsted, the army so sent might have been used for the most beneficial purposes, so as to make the French retire within the frontiers of France. I am certain that was the plan of warfare which would have been most essential to the safety of Spain. The Convention of Portugal having taken place, his Majesty's ministers thought proper to cause the Tower guns to be discharged, in token of the satisfaction they felt, until they found that all the rest of his majesty's subjects entertained a contrary feeling upon the transaction. The public displeasure was loud and general; every patriotic heart felt the stain cast upon his country's honour; every tongue uttered the complaint. It did so turn out, too, that the first city in the empire, the city of London, If it giving assistance to the Spaniards, there|pular feeling. That was perhaps the feelwere, as I before stated, two modes of pro- ing of the moment, but ministers were ceeding. What the opinions of the Spa- bound to consult for the permanent interests niards themselves are I profess myself of the public, and it was therefore their totally ignorant. The fact is, that this duty to investigate and ascertain by every ignorance does not proceed from any want possible mode, whether they ought to of diligence on my part in making inqui- risk an English army at all in Spain, or ries; but for want of any authentic source confine their assistance to the supplies I from which information could be procured. have mentioned. I do not wish to impute Did the Spaniards make application for a blame to them for having sent a British regular force to be sent into their coun- force to Spain, if the Spaniards themselves try, or for money, arms, ammunition, applied for it, and if it was the opinion of clothing, and all other necessaries to ena- competent judges, that there was a probable them to prosecute the war against bility of enabling them thereby to keep such armies as France had the power of the field against their powerful enemy. pouring into their country? I ask this We have instances in our history of our question, because if Spain with such assis- having been before in a similar situation tance could not carry the point of keeping and under similar circumstances. The inout any fresh reinforcements, there was dependence of the United Provinces was little probability of preventing that coun- effected principally by the assistance of try from being over-run. In investi- England. Queen Elizabeth for her own gating this matter we should have consi- safety, against the designs of Spain, assisted dered what was the amount of the dispo- those who revolted against its tyranny and sable force of France. To guide us in oppression; and I wish that ministers had regard to this point, we have a recent adverted, in the present instance, to the document to refer to for information. In conduct of that wise princess, and her wise papers which were laid before Parliament administaation. None of the present miin the beginning of the year 1806, just nistry can think themselves disgraced by after the failure of the third coalition, there a comparison with lord Burleigh; and yet appears a Memoir from the court of Vienna we find that queen Elizabeth, pressed as to that of St. Petersburg, stating the amount she was by the power, the rancour, the of force which France could probably persevering hostility of Spain, did not habring against the allied Powers. From zard the whole force of her dominions, nor this document it appears that the French proceed to send any number of troops aforce was then estimated at 500,000 men, broad, without some assurance of safety in exclusive of the imperial guards, which case of disaster. She, by the advice of consisted of 15,000 men. This was the her ministers, took care to possess what opinion of the court of Vienna before were called cautionary towns, and thereby France had over-run Germany and Poland assured herself of a retreat, and gained a and some other countries of Europe, and safe point whither to send reinforcements, previously to her connection with Russia. as well as a security that the United ProThe disposable force of France must, vinces should not abandon her in the contherefore, have been since considerably test in which they were engaged. I know increased; and it was consequently most not what has taken place between the material for this country, before it adopted English and Spanish governments upon any measure whatever, to consider well the that subject; but, I perceive, that in his propriety of employing her troops in Spain, Majesty's late Declaration it is stated, that where there was a likelihood of such im- certain obligations, exist which are consimense numbers being brought against dered equally binding as the most solemn them. Never, I believe, was sympathy so treaty. From what I yet know of the strong, as that evinced in England in matter, I cannot agree in the propriety of favour of the Spanish cause. Yet, though any such sentiment: I should not, howsuch had been the enthusiasm of the na- ever, think of abandoning them in the tion at large, and however ardent the peo-hour of misfortune; but I cannot admit, ple might be in lending assistance to support such a glorious struggle, it was the duty of those, who were intrusted with the management of the national force, to consider in every point of view the propriety or impropriety of complying with the poVOL. XII. that we should consider our present obligations in the light of a solemn treaty; for what is the nature of such an engagement? It is entered into in a moment of hurry and precipitation; it has not been laid before us, and therefore, is, as yet, un E authorised by Parliament; and, consequntly, you may approve or disapprove, you may grant or refuse the supplies for carrying it into effect. Upon the whole, therefore, I know not how an engagement of this sort is to be considered as equally binding as the most solemn treaty. But we now understand, that a formal treaty has been negociated, which it is intended to lay before the house, and until that be done I cannot decide upon its merits or propriety. I dare say the house would naturally be inclined to receive, with the fondest partiality, every thing apparently tending to the advantage of the Spanish cause: but, sir, the state of our warfare, under such circumstances as I have already stated, and as his Majesty's ministers have conducted it, is truly extraordinary. If the Spaniards preferred that mode of warfare, which was of a desultory nature, instead of a continued warfare, then the British army could not have been of the least use in Spain; for a British army there must necessarily have pursued a plan wholly different from that of the Spaniards. I know not which system of warfare was proper to be adopted; but I say the two systems are completely incompatible. The Spaniards, in their own country, and pursuing a desultory mode of attack, have the power of disper, sing and rallying again, as occasion might require; but this is not the case with a regular army. If you combine the two modes you must necessarily destroy the energies and efficacy of one of them. We have already seen this exemplified in the Spaniards. We have seen their regular army defeated, and almost destroyed by the enemy; while in another quarter we have found their irregular force very successful; which shews that the two modes of fighting are perfectly inconsistent.-Now, sir, let us see what has been the vigour of ministers upon this occasion. By vigour, I presume, is meant a prompt energetic use and application of the public force. Will you tell us of one instance of such promptitude and energy? I presume you cannot say it was displayed in Portugal; nor in Spain by sir John Moore's coming into the field after the Spanish army had been defeated? It was not then useful, because it was unable to keep the field by itself. It is an extraordinary circumstance, that the Convention of Portugal is made to rest in a great degree upon the speedy applicability of the British army in Spain, and yet the general of that army, sir Hew Dalrymple, tells you there was no preparation made for its reception in that country for some considerable time after the Convention was concluded. Can it then be said, that the object of the Convention was carried into effect, or that any time was gained by it? If such measures deserve the name of being energetic, or useful, I am at a loss to know what sort of measures would be deemed the contrary.As to that part of the speech which relates to Sweden, I have only to observe, that this country is placed in such a situation that I do not see how we can refuse to give the stipulated supply; but I cannot help la menting, that there is not the smallest probability of any good arising from Sweden continuing to persevere. We are told that the king of Sweden deserves our supe port the more, because he refused the overtures made to him from Erfurth, relative to excluding the Spaniards from the negociation. Perhaps he deserves the applause of mankind for his bravery and perseverance; but what good, I may ask, can he thereby render to Spain or England? When this vote of supply was proposed last year, I ventured to say, that the most prudent use Sweden could make of the money, was to procure a peace for herself, as it was totally impossible for her to resist her enemies, or be of the least advantage to her allies. Nothing can be more hurtful to us in the eyes of the world than endeavouring to involve the smaller countries in Europe in hostilities with France. The immense superiority of our naval power, our commerce, and prodigious wealth, enable us to look to a long continuance of war, perhaps with safety; but what is that to the powers of the Continent? Their resources are not great; they have no means of offence against France; and what advantage can we derive from the misfortunes of other countries? Instead of being the arbiters and protectors of the Continent, we should, by so doing, be holding up ourselves as the cause of the ruin of other nations.-Having said thus much upon what comes under our notice in the speech itself, I must now take the liberty of making an observation or two upon what the speech omits to state-I mean in regard to what relates to the United States of America. Much corrcspondence has taken place betwixt the American government and this country, as well as between America and France; and we know that a direct overture was lately made by that power to us, and by us rejected. When the last session of be able to enter more fully into the discussion of the affairs of Spain. I have no desire to disturb the unanimity of the House on this occasion, though I thought it my duty to state distinctly my sentiments upon the various topics to which I have adverted, and for the full discussion of which other opportunities will arise. The particulars to which I wish to call the attention of the House on a future occasion. are the disgraceful Convention in Portugal, the conduct of Minis ers in regard to the Spanish war, and also their conduct with respect to America. With the assistance of my friends, I intend, as soon as possible, to bring these matters before parliament for discussion and inquiry. After this previous notice of my intention, I cannot surely be accused of making a factious opposition, in order to interrupt the progress of public business, and without promoting the genuine interests of the country. parliament concluded, we left America in a state of hostility and alienation, apparently with great probability of a connection with France leading her into a state of war with us. The commerce of America has suffered much-her own measure of embargo, (whether wise or not) is in itself a prodigious restraint on her trade, and indeed nearly tends to its total annihilation. It was always alleged that we were justified in our Orders in Council, because that neutral power had not taken the necessary steps to obtain from France a revocation of her Decree. The American government however seems to have conducted itself with much activity on this subject. An application was made to France, which I think seems to acquit that government of any wish to favour France more than England, and also of any desire to do any thing more than was necessary for protecting her own interest. America now tells us, that she will take off the embargo with regard to England, and enforce it as far as regards France, the latter power being the first transgressor against her commerce; and that we shall thereby have all the advantage of her trade confined to us.-The right hon. gent. opposite, in an answer, assigning his reason for refusing that proposition, states, what I think rash and unjustifiable, that his Majesty cannot avoid hostility with America, by a concession, not made to America, but to France. Now, do the facts of the case bear him out in this assertion? Did she not enable you' by that offer, to make your own Orders in Council infinitely more efficacious than they otherwise could have been? America suffered in her commerce; you suffered also; and you formerly said, that America had not applied to France to recal her decree she has now made that application, and yet you will not accede to her proposition. The right hon. gent. assigns for his conduct another reason, which, if he does not review with wisdom and discretion, must, with deference to bim, seem to imply a degree of levity and intoxication, arising from momentary success; he tells the Americans, that the system of blockade is harmless, and is now broken up into contemptible fragments. If the plan to be adopted with America is to be continued in this way, I am not surprised that his Majesty's speech should have been silent on the subject.-When the papers, which have been promised, shall be laid before the House, I shall then Lord Castlereagh then rose. He observed that the declaration with which the rt. hon. gent. concluded his speech, that he would not oppose the Address that had been so ably moved by his hon. friend, and his farther declaration, that the various points on which he had briefly touched should become the subjects of subsequent discussion, released him from the great and irksome task of entering minutely into an examination of the statements which the right hon. gent. had ventured to make. The right hon. gent. seemed particularly impressed with the conviction, that in the cause intrusted to his majesty's government (and never was there a cause more deeply interesting), there had been shewn a total want of wisdom and vigour, and that this country and Europe had no chance of salvation but by a change of the men who were to conduct the affairs of the state in the present most critical and important period. Whatever might have been the want of vigour in his majesty's present ministers, so much complained of by the right hon. gent., he believed the country would not have much more to hope for if the reins of government should fall into the hands of the right hon. gent. and his friends, who had given. such ample proofs of zeal and anxiety for the welfare and interests of the country, by deserting all those, who were then ailied for the defence of the cause of Europe. No great parliamentary recollection was necessary to carry back the mind to those periods, when the rt. hon. gent. and his |