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in Spain, there were sent, exclusive of the
10,000 men liberated in the north of Eu-
rope under the command of the marquis
Romana, no less a force than 45,000 or
50,000 men, nearly 50,000 rank and file
into the Peninsula. Besides this army go-
vernment had issued orders, that the forces
in the Mediterranean should send out de-
tachments to act in Catalonia, though sub-
sequent circumstances interposed to pre-
vent those detached troops from rendering
that service, which it was then intended to
employ them in. If, then, an army of
45,000 men be thought sufficiently consi-
derable in its extent, the next question for
the house to consider would be, did they
give that army a proper direction; that
army once in Portugal, did it from thence
get a proper direction? He put the ques-
tion this way, for he did not want to revive
the debate upon the Convention, and there-
fore he should follow the example of the
right hon. gent., and pass over that part.
The right hon. gent was ready to admit,
that the north of Spain was the best scene
for our co-operation, but he assured the
right hon. gent. he was not now going to
the Pyrenees. He could conceive a man
of common sense going to Saint Andero,
but he could not conceive a man of sound
sense, going to the Pyrenees.
He was
going merely to that question put by the
right hon. gent., as to what could have de-
tained the British army so long during the
interval, previous to the 16th of October,
the day on which they made their first
movement on their march from Portugal to
Spain. If the right hon. gent. had taken
the information he (lord C.) had offered
him, he could have been enabled to have
answered his own question; but it was to
be taken into consideration what was the
difficulty of carrying an army beyond Co-
runna after the month of September. The
port of Saint Andero might have been
thought preferable; but that port was ex-
tremely small; and he put it to the house,
in what situation an army would have been,
with 40 or 50,000 French in the neigb-
bourhood of Vittoria, that army but half
equipped, and all the transports gone
away.-As to the question respecting the
delay, he had at an early period of the
campaign in Portugal directed that a com-
munication should be opened with the
Spanish Generals on the subject of the co-
operation of the British army in Spain.
That communication had accordingly been
opened with general Castanos, but the let-
ter, acquainting him,with the circumstance,

was really animated by the spirit of pure |
patriotism; if she was in earnest in the
great work of her own delivery, that she
had the elements of her own salvation
within herself; that she therefore did not
want British soldiers to fight her battles;
that she was sufficiently powerful as to men;
and that our co-operation need go no fur-
ther than supplies of arms, money, cloth-
ing, ammunition, and whatever other ne-
cessaries might be wanting. Than this
opinion, he was free to confess he knew
nothing more unwise. Nothing could
have tended more effectually to con-
firm that reproach which had been dealt
out by the enemy against us, than that
we should not in this instance have
taken an active part ourselves. It would
have looked too, like that selfish policy
with which we had been charged, if
while we were urging and exhorting, by
every means in our power, a people to de-
fend themselves against a powerful enemy,
if whilst we were lavish of our money and
stores, we should yet decline to embark
our best treasure in a cause which we af-
fected to call glorious and to esteem invin-
cible. There was another extreme more
congenial to the feelings of this country,
though not in his opinion more reconcila-
ble with sound policy: it was, that there
was no medium between a great effort, and
the whole effort, and recommended that
not a soldier should be kept at home.
Without taking any notice of the effects
that such a measure might produce at home,
if in such a case our efforts should be at-
tended with disaster (and disaster must in
all cases be provided against) yet, putting
the possibility of disaster out of the ques-
tion, the thing would be in itself impracti-
cable. There was a limit beyond which
they could not go: in short, they must
necessarily keep within the limits of the
national credit, and there need no more be
said in answer to this second opinion, than
that it was impossible to act upon it.
Then the question, to which they were
come, was, whether the effort, which had
been made by his majesty's ministers to
co-operate with our allies in Spain, had
been sufficient; and the assistance thus
given would be best judged of by being
considered in a three-fold relation: First,
as to its extent; secondly, as to its course;
and thirdly, as to its ability. In reference
to its extent; when information had been
first received by his majesty's ministers,
that a supply of British troops was wished
for to act in concert with the native armies

same question was discussing in London, and it is not a little remarkable that the very same decision was agreed to, at the same time, in both places ;-the marquis of Romana's opinion upon this subject was in writing, and was ready to be laid upon the table of the house. This was a circumstance of such strong and singular coincidence, that he left it to the consideration of gentlemen, if it did not carry with it in its coincidence a strong evidence of its

had not been received till after the conclu- | sion of the Convention of Cintra. On the 14th Sept. lord Wm. Bentinck was sent to attend the Supreme Central Junta, whichwas installed at Aranjuez, on the 24th of the same month, in order to confer with them upon the subject. On the 25th of Sept. orders had been sent to sir Hew Dalrymple to move forward with his army towards the north of Spain; and on the same day sir David Baird received orders to embark for Ferrol or Corunna. It was not, how-propriety. It appeared then, that lord Wm. ever, till the 29th of September, that the Bentinck's letter was dated the 29th of first letter from lord Wm. Bentinck was September, and on the 9th of the following written, containing the Answers of the Su-month sir David Baird sailed; and again, preme Junta to certain Questions, which he had been directed to submit to them, as well with respect to the entrance of the British army into Spain, as in regard to the manner in which it should be employed there. The Answers thus received were, that the fate of Spain depended on an early co-operation of a British force; and to the second question, that which was most important in a military point of view, was, that they wished our forces to be concentrated as one British army; and general Castanos received orders to confer with lord Wm. Bentinck as to the best mode of carrying those wishes into effect. It was proposed that the army in Portugal should make for Burgos, by the route of Salamanca, and sir David Baird debark his troops at Corunna This intelligence was received at Lisbon on the 8th of October; and here he was free to acknowledge that one of the lamented consequences of the Cintra Convention had been the occupation of the transports, which might perhaps have been otherwise employed; but by that Convention 20,000 tonnage of transports were engrossed in conveying to France 25,000 of French troops; but at the same time he wished it to be distinctly understood, that still there had been transports that might have served to convey our army by sea, to the northern provinces of Spain; but sir John Moore decided otherwise, and in making the very judicious decision that he had made, he was influenced by abstract reasons, not merely by any inconvenience arising out of the occupation of so large a tonnage of transports. Had he gone by

şea to Corunna, he would have had to march his army through Gallicia, the poorest province in Spain, and the least calculated to supply an army that was to provide itself on its march. While the question respecting the operations of the British forces in Spain was pending at Madrid, the very

that on the 17th of September we received
the intelligence of the Convention of Cin-
tra, and that on the 25th of the same
month the Instructions were sent out for
the army in Portugal to march. He could
not see where ministers had been guilty of
unnecessary delay.-As to that of the
troops not being immediately permitted to
land, he could only say, that from a prior
and distant application made to his majes-
ty's government for British troops on the
part of the Juntas of Gallicià and Oviedo,
ministers had a right to expect that no ob
stacle would have been thrown in the way
of
any troops they might have afterwards
sent. Our troops under general Baird
having sailed on the 9th of Oct. he (lord
C.) had previously wrote a letter to gene-
ral Broderick in Gallicia, acquainting him
with the expeditions then going out, and
requiring him to try every means to secure
them accommodations on their landing,
and provide for their continuing their
march. is letter, though addressed to
general Broderick, was, in case of his ab-
sence, to be opened by captain Kennedy.
General Broderick was then in Gallicia
with gen. Blake. Capt. Kennedy accord-
ingly opened the letter, acted upon it, and
acknowledged the receipt of it on the 1st
of Oct. He (lord C.) wrote also to general
Leith on the 30th of Oct. and to lord Wm.
Bentinck, then on the frontiers of Leon. In
consequence of these letters the necessary
communications had been made to the re-
spective Juntas, but he was sorry to say,
that the Juntas had, in fact, neglected to
act according to them. He did not wish to
censure or complain of their conduct, but
such was the fact. After the landing it was
proposed to the marquis Romana to change
the destination of his corps from Corunna,
with which he complied, and there was
then an army, including the Asturias and
Blake's, and Romana's, of from 50 to 60,000

men.-The right hon. gent. had given way to an expression of surprize, that the movements of the British army should have been so slow, and those of the French com. paratively so rapid: but the surprize of that right hon. gent. would probably cease when he recollected the difference between an army fully equipped and one not equipped;-between an army that can seize upon every thing on its way that can facilitate its march, whether provisions or carriages; and an army that cannot have any such resource; and another consideration, too, not to be forgotten, was, that the roads in France, where the greater part of this expedition was manifested, were of a very superior quality to those of Portugal, through which our armies had to march. On the 14th of Nov. sir John Moore arrived at Salamanca, and never was an army, considering all the fatigues it had under-Ile could not conclude without advertgone, all the hardships sustained, all the difficulties surmounted, to be found in a more perfect state of discipline, or in better condition. He was joined by sir D. Baird on the Douro, and though the Spanish armies under Romana and that of Estramadura, had, prior to the arrival of sir John Moore, suffered severe reverses, still it was an unfair test of the general spirit of the people. They had at that period the most difficult task imposed upon them, that could devolve to a nation in such circumstances; it was at the same time to make head against a powerful enemy, and to make a government.-There was certainly one circumstance much to be regretted that they did not put one person at the head of their army, so as to make it one great machine in the hands of some one powerful leader, and not have its force divided and broken down into small and insulated bodies. When gen. Moore árrived first at Salamanca, he had reason to expect that Buonaparté would have directed his force against the British troops, rather than against Madrid: and there was great reason to hope every thing from the spirit, which, according to gen. Hope's report, whose column had passed through Madrid, was prevalent in that city. They shewed every symptom of the greatest zeal and energy. He admitted that there was more languor in the northern provinces, but Castile had always been that part of Spain that had distinguished itself most in every patriotic ebullition. After the march of the army from Salamanca, the only object was to draw off the force of the enemy from pushing his conquests to

the South, and surely never was a diversion more completely effected. It had left the whole south of Spain free, and given it a repose for six weeks or two months. When sir John Moore had suspended his retreat, his subsequent march to Sahagun and Saldanah was not proceeded upon on mere abstract grounds. Sir John Moore had received a letter, intercepted by a corps of cavalry, to which his hon. relative (gen. Stewart) belonged; the letter was Berthier's, promising reinforcements to Soult, but when he had got to Sahagun, and discovered that Buonaparté was bearing down on him from Madrid, he then had no option but to retire on Astorga, at the same time that he felt no doubt, that if he could have come upon Soult, the result would have been worthy of his great character.

ing to that part of the right hon. gent.'s speech, that seemed to imply that our losses in Spain had been more than what had been stated by his hon. relation; he believed that statement would be found to be correct; as to the artillery, he denied that the French got a single piece: what could not be carried off had been spiked; there was certainly a trifling escort with a few pieces of artillery on their way to Romana's army; this he apprehended had fallen into their hands, and it was of those they had so vaunted. He ridiculed the notion of our military character being lost in consequence of the late reverses, and asked if the disgraces of Vimiera and Corunna were to be blotted from the memories of Englishmen? If, however, they were anxious for inquiry, they might go into a Committee that would occupy them three months; but nothing was a greater mistake, than the supposition that those who called for inquiry, meant that they wanted information (Hear!). He left it with confidence to the house to say, whether any case had been made out to justify the motion of the right hon. gent.; and where no case was made out no enquiry could be called for.

Mr. Tierney observed, that there never was a speech which called so much for animadversion as that which the noble lord had just closed. The noble lord said that there was no prima facie case against ministers. There were, however, few men in England who would agree with him in that opinion; there would not one, he believed, be found to agree with the noble lord, if the whole country were to be polled

over. The prima facie case was this; that | availing.--The noble lord had said, that England had sent out to Spain an army of it was degrading to the house to go into a 53,000 men, and that they had returned committee to enquire into this subject. again under the fire of the French cannon! Was it degrading to do that which alWhat had this army done in the peninsula most every man in the country must that had not been undone? If he had elo- feel to be the duty of the house of comquence sufficient, he might describe in mons?-But then the noble lord said, glowing terms the victories of sir A. Wel- "Why don't you wait for the Papers?" lesley in Portugal; but the prima facie The reason was obvious, the motion was case was, that, owing to the councils of not a censure upon the government; what ministers, all that he and others had done was called for was a Committee of Inquiry, was in vain; and that we had no hopes of and there the noble lord would have an maintaining ourselves in Portugal, except opportunity of producing all the docu-it was the good pleasure of Buonaparté ments which he might think material for to leave it in our possession; for he pre- his own justification. To move for docusumed the noble lord would not venture to ments from day to day, as the noble lord state that Buonaparté might not, if he proposed, could furnish no accurate inforpleased, be now in as complete possession mation either to the house or the public; of Portugal as he was twelve months ago. for after one set had been produced, anoAfter all the promises of the noble lord, ther set might appear necessary, and so aud the mighty hopes that were held out, the matter might be protracted to the end the little prima facie case tlrat remained of the session. What he wanted was viva was this, that the almost unparalleled voce evidence; he wanted to examine offibravery of our troops had not been able to cers who had served under the gallant save the country from disgrace (loud cries Moore, to learn what were his sentiments of no! no! and hear! hear! from the mi- on the subject; he wanted to know how nisterial benches). He could not be un- the troops had been equipped; what was derstood to mean that any slur attached to the nature of the commissariat; and whethe army or its officers. But this cheer ther it was not so grossly ignorant of the was truly kind now; for never had he method of supply that the army was starvheard any speech from a secretary of state ing in the midst of plenty? (Hear! hear!). so little cheered as those which the noble The noble lord then came to details, and lord had delivered on the present and on a nothing, he said, could be done till the former occasion (a laugh and cries of hear! Supreme Government was constituted at hear!). Our failures were not owing to the Aranjuez, in September. But had not the army, but to the military councils which noble lord the means of ascertaining what his majesty, unfortunately for the country, they might require by a previous commuhad chosen. And while he paid the truest nication with those, who, it was well tribute of applause to the bravery and skill known, would form part of that governof the former, he could not look at the ment? Might he not form some idea of imbecility of the latter without indigna- what the wants of the Spaniards would be, tion and contempt. If he were merely and make his preparations accordingly? to state the case, it would bear him out in But the noble lord plainly said, that sir what he said. After all the boasting of David Baird's troops were not ready till the noble lord and his colleagues; after the end of September.-What a confession all the hardships to which our army had was this from the noble lord, who talked been exposed, the only triumph was, that so much of vigour and promptitude, and we had got most of our troops back again! of transports upon transports! But, he The noble lord, it must be confessed, was certainly did confess, that the troops were a man of a most singular disposition, for not ready to sail till the close of Septemhe was pleasant on this occasion; and ber, and, if this should appear to be the what served to make others sad, made him case, on inquiry, then the noble lord was merry (hear hear!). The noble lord had culpable. Two years had not elapsed talked of his right hon. friend's prudence since a draft had been made from the miin bringing forward this motion while helitia of nearly 40,000 men, with a view to had his troops together. He sincerely wished the noble lord had followed that policy with regard to Spain, and brought the troops there to act in a body at a period when their exertions would have been

any contingency or emergency of this sort; but the noble lord said, that nothing could be done till October. On that point, he differed very much in opinion from the noble lord, as he might have known before

what might be wanted to enable him to a situation was sir John Moore placed! he be in a state of forward preparation. must have been utterly at a loss whether Then the noble lord shifted the plan of to assist sir David Baird, or gen. Hope; the campaign from himself and his col- and there they were without any general leagues, upon the Junta of Spain, and ge- plan till the 5th of Dec. when sir John neral Moore, abroad; and upon the mar-Moore gave an order to advance, in consequis Romana, and somebody else, not men-quence of being joined by the cavalry tioned, at home. Nothing, he allowed, and artillery under gen. Hope, whom he was more wise than to afford the Spaniards believed to be one of the best officers in such a shelter to fall back upon in case of the service; and he might appeal to this defeat, as that which would be furnished very operation for the truth of this asserby the British army. But how had the tion. The French, however, during all noble lord set about this? General Baird this time, were not idle. They had got was at Corunna, general Moore at Sala- to Madrid: but to account for the rapidimanca, and general Hope at Aranjuez, and ty of their movements, the noble lord said the troops of all these generals thus formed that they took every thing they wanted. a central army, which had to occupy the And why did not we secure every thing space of 300 miles (Hear! hear!). Now, we wanted? And the question was the though he confessed his ignorance of mi- more appropriate, inasmuch as we were in litary affairs, in the exercise of mere com- a friendly country; the French in a hosmon sense, he could not but think all this tile one. All this called for inquiry; and very extraordinary.-But supposing this the noble lord pointed to his documents. mode of proceeding to be good, the ques- Suppose these were to implicate the ruling tion was whether, from the delays that had persons in Spain and Portugal, whom taken place, it was not madness to perse- could the house summon for explanation? vere in it? It was said, that it was in con- Could they call for the bishop of Oporto? sequence of instructions from Morla, that (a laugh). Never was there such a course the plan had been adopted, and that the of abominable lies as had been circulated army occupied these points. Morla was with respect to these transactions in the then War Secretary, and judging from month of November. Buonaparté, it was what had since been learned respecting said, and particularly by those most atthat person, it was likely that such had tached to the government, was utterly been the case. The consequence, how-ruined; all his schemes had failed, and ever, of this arrangement had been, that no part of the British army arrived on the edge of the scene of action, until the 2d of December. On the 13th of October, after the arrival of gen. Baird at Corunna, an application was made by the Junta of Gallicia to the Supreme Junta, in consequence of the necessity of which general Baird was obliged to remain on board his ship till the 26th, when an order arrived to suffer his men to land by divisions of 2,000 at a time. And the landing was not completed till the 6th of November, When the army was landed, the general, as his right hon. friend had stated, wanted money, and was obliged to send somebody (col. Gordon he believed) to Lisbon, to procure a supply. He further believed that gen. Baird, when he got to Corunna, was without instructions as to his future proceedings. He got information, however, from sir John Moore, that he was to meet him. Now this might be wise in theory, but when the French patroles came up to the lines of these armies, common sense proved that the plan ought not to have been persevered in. Then, in what

nothing was heard of but universal insurrection of the Spanish nation: It was said, that he was at last caught; that he had made a false move; that sir John Moore had got behind him, and that his destruction was inevitable. But to the noble lord's very great surprise, Buonaparté pushed forward to Madrid without stopping to attack our armies. But it did not appear very surprising, that Buonaparté, who wanted to get the crown of Spain for his brother, should push forward to the seat of government with as much dispatch as possible. The noble lord thought that Buonaparté had committed a great error in not waiting to attack our armies. But the object of Buonaparté was to drive us out of Spain; and he did not much risk that by securing another object, and the event was, that he secured them both. The noble lord, perhaps, ought not rashly to set his own opinion against that of Buonaparté in a military question. Buonaparté was an usurper, an upstart, a tyrant, and a great many other bad things, but still it was impossible to deny, but this wicked man had some skill in military

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