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instance, so far as I am informed, has such a recommendation of clemency failed to be approved and given effect by yourself.

(1) The extent of such recommendations as to number of sentences will be found by taking the total number of sentences for all offenses classified by length of term, noting the number of these sentences recommended for reduction by clemency by the Judge Advocate General's office, and then reckoning the percentage of offenses of each length thus reduced. This gives the following results:

TABLE IV-DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCE REDUCTIONS BY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFFICE, ACCORDING TO LENGTH OF ORIGINAL SENTENCE

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The important thing to notice about the table is that it shows 12 per cent of the total sentences to have been reduced by clemency exercised on recommendation of the Judge Advocate General. I see no reason to doubt that this 12 per cent is ample enough to cover all the individual cases in which an excessive severity would have been apparent on the face of the record.

The above table shows the reduction in its relation to the sentences of different lengths. The table shows that the largest percentage of reduction occurred in the sentences of medium length, and that the smallest percentages of reduction occurred in the sentences of shortest and of longest periods.

This result is perfectly natural and appropriate. The shortest sentences are those in which there would be the least call for reduction by clemency on the ground of excessive severity. The longest sentences are those in which the reduction on the ground of excessive severity

would presumably not bring them to an extremely low period and
therefore in which the time for recommending such reduction had
presumably not arrived.

(2) How much total reduction did this action effect in the
total length of all the sentences acted upon? This will afford some
gauge of the thoroughness of the action in the nature of clemency.
Table V below shows the number of sentences recommended for re-
duction, the total years of the original sentences, the total years re-
duced on recommendation of the Judge Advocate General's office, and
the net years of sentence as actually served. The figures are given.
for the nine principal military offenses, as well as for the total of
all offenses:

TABLE V-REDUCTIONS OF SENTENCES RECOMMENDED BY CLEMENCY DIVISION, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OFfice, According to Amount of REDUCTION, JANUARY 1, 1918 TO DECEMBER 31, 1918

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Referring to the table for details as to the specific offenses, I will point out here merely that for all offenses, military and civil, total reduction effected was a reduction of 3,876 years out of an original period of 4,331 years, or a reduction of 891⁄2 per cent. In other words, action of this office, in effecting reductions in the 1,147 sentences selected on their merits for reduction, cut them down to 10.50 per cent of their original amount. Presenting the same result in another form, the average original sentence, of these 1,147 sen

tences, was for a period of 3.78 years (or nearly 4 years), and the average sentence served as reduced was only 0.40 of one year, or less than 5 months.

These figures, as to reduction effected in the length of the sentences, demonstrate that the action of this office was a radical one, and must have served to eliminate any excessive severity in those. sentences. That the sentences selected for such recommendations of clemency included all of the sentences meriting the term "severe," neither I nor anyone else would be in a position either to affirm or deny without an examination of every record.

How extensive is the scope of reduction now undertaken for all sentences, by the special clemency board recently appointed at your instance, has already been told.

NOTES ON THE PROCEDURE OF

COURTS-MARTIAL

LEWIS K. UNDERHILL1

In an article on "The Military Courts of Paris," which occurred in this JOURNAL, Vol. IX, No. 1, May, 1918, pp. 5-31, there appeared a comparison of the procedure of the American and the French military tribunals. In this comparison a number of adverse comments were made on certain alleged features of the American procedure. In view of the fact that the writer appears to have been in error on a number of these points, a brief review of the procedure of American courts-martial may be of interest.

These are three classes of courts-martial-general, special, and summary. Their jurisdiction is the same, except that only a general court-martial may try a commissioned officer, or a capital offense. In practice, the summary courts-martial do not try soldiers for the more serious non-capital offenses; the special court handles offenses somewhat more serious than those dealt with by the summary court. The punishing power differs widely: a summary court may adjudge only confinement at hard labor for three months and corresponding forfeiture of pay; a special court may adjudge confinement and forfeiture for six months; only a general court may adjudge death, dishonorable discharge, or confinement or forfeiture in excess of six months. (Articles of War, 12, 13, 14-39 Stat. 650.)

Certain commanders may appoint summary courts-martial; certain others may appoint special courts; others appoint general courts. This power is regulated by A. W. 8, 9, 10. Contrary to the view expressed in the cited article (p. 10), neither general, special, nor summary courts-martial are appointed, as a rule, for a single case. Usually the order appointing the court directs the court to meet for "the trial of such persons as may be properly brought before it." The life of any court is of indefinite duration; it is frequently terminated only by the transfer of the members away from the station where the court has been directed to meet. The fact that a court is not appointed, as a rule, for each case, appears to be recognized by the writer of the

1 Major, Fiftieth Infantry. Formerly Instructor of Law, U. S. Military Academy; now commanding Department of Military Science and Tactics, University of California, Berkeley, Cal.

article elsewhere (p. 12), as he complains, not without reason, that the court must be sworn anew "each time a case is to be tried."

When a case is to be brought to trial, charges are preferred by a commissioned officer, corresponding to the information of civilian procedure. The officer who investigates the case is not, as alleged in the cited article (p. 9), the officer appointed "to hold a summary court" -unless by pure coincidence. The charges are forwarded "by the officer preferring them to the officer immediately exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which the accused belongs" (Manual for Courts-Martial, par. 75), i. e., the officer competent to appoint a summary court-martial and to approve the sentence of such a court. This officer is frequently the regimental or post commander of the accused. The officer determines from the nature of the charges whether to refer them to the court which he has appointed for trial, or whether to forward them to higher authority with a view to trial by a special or general court. If he decides to forward them he must conduct, or appoint some subordinate officer to conduct, a preliminary investigation. The investigating officer, who is appointed anew for each case, and who corresponds in a measure to a committing magistrate, examines the witnesses, and affords to the accused an opportunity to make a statement if he so desires-warning him, however, that whatever he says may be used against him (M. C. M. par. 76; ibid. par. 225). He then returns the papers in the case to the officer who directed the investigation, with his opinion as to whether the charges can be sustained. The officer who directed the investigation adds his own opinion and recommendations, and forwards the papers to authority competent to appoint a special or general courtmartial.

The officer competent to appoint a general court-martial is usually a division or department commander, who has on his staff a member of the Judge-Advocate General's Department. This staff judgeadvocate determines whether the charges are in proper form, and recommends such modifications as he may deem necessary. The commanding officer then indorses the charges to the judge-advocate of some general court-martial, usually one already in existence, for trial. The trial judge-advocate serves a copy of the charges on the accused, who selects counsel and is given reasonable time to prepare his case. The trial judge-advocate-not the president of the court, as alleged in the cited article (p. 11)-receives the other papers in the case, and is thus rendered familiar with the expected evidence for the prosecution. The president does not have the "dossier," as alleged (p. 12):

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