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Cincinnati. Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas. Construction

Contract.

CHANCERY_Continued.
9. A purchaser at a sale made under such a decree, acquires a good title.-

Ibid.
10. The subject matter of the suit being within the jurisdiction of the court,

the defendants may be made parties by publication, and if notice be
thus given, and the court pass upon the sufficiency of the notice, the

same cannot be impeached collaterally. Ibid.
11. A court of chancery is the appropriate forum for an administrator to

assert his claim to property transferred by his intestate to defraud his

creditors. Benjamin v. Le Baron's Administrator, 517.
12. A court of chancery will not set aside a conveyance upon allegations of

fraud, unless the charges are clearly and satisfactorily sustained. -

Christmas et al. v. Spink et al., 600.
13. A judgment creditor having a lien upon land, when sold for taxes, can-

not file a bill in chancery to avoid the sale as invalid, without first re-
funding the amount of the tax, penalty and interest, or offering to do
so. Gillett v. Webster et al., 623.

See MISTAKE.
CINCINNATI.
1. The city council of Cincinnati has power to license and regulate draymen,

and may require a reasonable sum by way of excise on the special em.

ployment. City of Cincinnati v. Bryson, 625.
2. The power to license and regulate confers no taxing power over the dray-

men. Ibid.
CLERK OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

1. See Pleas and PleaDING, 1, 2. Writ 1.
CONSTRUCTION.

1. Of Contracts. See Contract.
2. Of Deeds. See DEED.
3. Of Statutes. See STATUTES.

4. Of Wills. See WiLL.
CONTRACT. '
1. To rescind the contract and recover back the consideration, a thing re-

ceived in payment of no value need not be returned to the other party.

Taft v. Wildman, 123.
2. If A sell land to B, to receive payment in cash and certificates of discharge

from the army, assigned to A, he may sue for the original consideration,

quo ad hoc those certificates. Ibid.
3. The words of a grant, “give him the privilege of excavating and draw-

ing down said creek as low as he pleases at all times," convey to the gran-

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(CONTRACT—Continued.)

· tee the right to divert the whole water from the bed or natural channel

of the stream. Potter v. Burton, 196.
4. If A obtain goods from B by false pretences, and give therefor an accepted
- draft upon C, an accommodation acceptor, B may rescind the contract i

and it is no defence to an action of replevin instituted against a stranger
in whose possession the goods are found, that the draft had not been

returned to A. Frost v. Lowry et al., 200..
CONTRIBUTION... .
1. The co-signers of a note, joint and several in its terms, which fell due in

1807, and on which a suit was severally instituted in 1814, against an-
other co-obligor, and judgment recovered, and afterwards suffered to lie
dormant sixteen years, and then revived and finally paid, thirty-eight
years after it became payable, cannot be compelled to contribute.

Williamson's Admr v. The Admir of Rees et al., 572.:
2. In such case, lapse of time would be bar to a recovery by the holder, and

an indirect liability does not exist where the relation of co-sureties has
ceased to exist. Ibid.,; ,,?

CORPORATIONS."
11. In the absence of express legislative provision, the forfeiture of a charter

of a corporation can only be established by judicial action, and cannot
be inquired into collaterally. - Receivers of Bank of Circleville v. Ren-

ick et al., 322.
2. A municipal corporation, like an individual, is liable for injuries result-

ing to the property of others from the acts of such corporation, though
acting within the scope of its corporate authority, and without any cir.
cumstances of negligence or malice. McCombs v. The Town Council

of Akron, 474. '
3. The City of Cincinnati has power to license and regulate draymen, and

may require a reasonable sum by way of excise, on the special em-

ployment. Cincinnati v. Bryson, 625. .
4. The right to license and regulate confers no taxing power over the dray-

men. Ibid.
5. A special action on the case may be maintained for a fraud resulting in

damage, and it is no defence that the fraudulent acts were done in the
. .. capacity of corporators. ' Bartholomew v. Bently et al., 659.

See Onio Railroad COMPANY.

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County Commissioners. Crimes and Criminal Proceedings. Debt. Deed.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
1. The county commissioners of a county may sue for and recover money

due to the county. Ohio, use of Commissioners of Hamilton county,

v. Piatt et al., 15.
CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
1. If a wife join with her husband in the commission of a crime less than

murder, she is presumed to act under the coercion of her husband, and

in law is not guilty. Davis et al. v. The State, 72.
2. On the trial of a person charged with passing counterfeit bank notes, it

is competent to prove he has passed other counterfeit paper, without pro-
ducing such paper, if it be out of the jurisdiction of the court. Reed

v. The State, 217.
3. The existence of a bank whose paper is alledged to have been counter-

feited may be proved by reputation. Ibid.
4. For the purpose of proving a bargain and sale, the declarations of the

parties thereto, at the time, are a part of the res gesta, and competent
evidence for the accused, to rebut the inference of guilt, arising from

the possession of stolen property. Leggett v. The State, 283.
5. During the term of the Court of Common Pleas, a single judge of that

court has not power to let to bail a person in custody charged with a

criminal offence. Powell v. The State, 579.
6. A recognizance thus taken is void. Ibid.
7. A recognizance to let to bail on the allowance of a writ of error, after

conviction, is not authorized by the act allowing writs of error in crim-
inal cases, and is therefore void. The State v. Clark, 595.

See Forgery. EVIDENCE, 6. JURY, 1.
DEBT.

See PLEAS AND PLEADINGS, 7. Action, 1.
DEED.
1. The attestation of a deed, that the same was “sealed and delivered” in

the presence of the subscribing witnesses, is sufficient. Lessee of Fos-

dick v. Risk, 84.
2. A deed conveying “all right, title interest or claim to any land descended

toʻme from A or B,” is sufficiently descriptive to pass title to any land
or equitable estate which the grantor inherited from A or B. Barton's

Lessee v. Morris' Heirs, 408.
3. The intention being plain, parol evidence is admissible to identify the

land, but not to prove an intention different from the terms of the deed.
Ibid.

Description. Devise. Divorce and Alimony. Downs. Ejectment.
(DEED-Continued.)
4. The penalty of an official bond cannot be inserted by a third person after

the execution by the obligor, in his absence, without an express author-
ity under his hand and seal. Ohio, use of Rosett et al., v. Boring et

al., 507.
DESCRIPTION.
A deed conveying “all right, title, interest or claim to any land descended

to me from A or B,” is sufficiently descriptive to pass title to any legal
or equitable estate which the grantor inherited from A or B. Barton's

Lessee v. Morris' Heirs, 408.
DEVISE.

See WILL, 3, 4, 5.
DIVORCE AND ALIMONY.
1. A case in divorce, or for divorce and alimony cannot be appealed from the

Common Pleas to the Supreme Court. Laughery v. Laughery et

al., 404.
2. But if in such case a third person is made defendant, such defendant may

appeal so much of the case as affects his interest. ibid.
DOWER.
1. If a husband in his lifetime pay for land, and procure the deed to be made

to his children in fraud of his creditors, and after his death the convey-
ance is avoided at the instance of his creditors, his widow is not entitled

to dower in the premises. Miller et al. v. Wilson et al., 108.
2. Where land is mortgaged by the husband and the condition is broken

before the marriage, and the equity of redemption is released by the
mortgagor during coverture, his widow is not entitled to dower after

his decease. Rands and wife v. Kendall, 671.
3. The interest of the mortgagor, after condition broken, is but an equity

which may be released by the husband, and his release will bar his

wife of dower. Ibid.
EJECTMENT.
1. Under the occupying claimant law, if the claimant elect to convey the

land and receive its value as assessed by the jury, it is necessary that
he tender a deed with covenant of warranty ; but it is not necessary the
deed should be made by himself, provided it convey the title, Lessee

of Wilkins' Heirs v. Huse et al., 285.
2. In such case, the occupying claimant is not entitled to interest upon the

valuation, until his election is made. Ibid.
See OccurYING CLAIMANT, 1. JUDICIAL SALE, 3, 5. LIMITATIONS,

STATUTE OF, 5.

Equity of Redemption. Error. Estate. Estoppel.

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.
Where the condition of a mortgage has been broken, the equity of redemp-

tion, on the death of the ancestor, does not descend to the heir, but may
be settled or compounded by the administrator. Heighwuy v. Pendle.

ton, 735..
ERROR.
1. Under the act of March 12th, 1845, no bond need be filed with the Clerk

of the Supreme Court previous to the issuing of a writ of error. Bar-

ker v. Cory, 9.
2. When the facts of a case are submitted to the Court of Common Pleas

without the intervention of a jury, and error intervenes in applying the
law to such facts, the judgment will be reversed. Bissell v. Couchaine,

58.
3. It is not error for the Court to omit to instruct the jury on a point of law

arising in the case, unless requested by counsel. Taft v. Wildman,

123.

4. Where the error assigned is that the defendant in error was dead at the

rendition of judgment, the executor or administrator must be made

party defendant. Cisna's Administrator v. Beach, 300.
5. Service upon the attorney after the death of the party is invalid. lbid.
6. A bond filed in a case in error, must be filed before the Supreme Court

obtains complete jurisdiction of the writ, or it is too late to operate as a
supersedeas, and is invalid either as a common law or a statutory bood.

Bayless v. Belmont Bank af St. Clairsville, 606.
ESTATE. . . . . .
1. A devise of really to A and his heirs, to be used by the devisee for life,

with remainder over to a third person, will not vest the fee in the first
devisee, if such construction would defeat the manifest intentions of the

testator. King's Heirs v. King's Administrator, 559.
2. The word heir, in a will, if such be the clear intent of the testator, may

be construed child, and he take as purchaser. Ibid.
3. A similar devise of personalty, if such be the clear intent of the testator,

will vest such personally, after the determination of the life estate, in

the child as purchaser. Ibid.
ESTOPPEL.
1. A trustee who conveys a naked legal title, under a defective power, by

order of the cestui que trúst, with the usual personal covenants of war
ranty, and whose conveyance passes no title by reason of the defects in
his power, is by his covenants estopped from setting up title against his

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