to transport the horses, ammunition and troops designed for the conquest and devastation of our colonies? That therefore the American captains and sailors on board of them will serve in the expedition? And after what I have said, can you allow this without injuring your neutrality? Can you without injuring us, furnish to our enemies an arm to aid them in their conquests? You are not uninformed that the English military marine is furnished by that of commerce: but if a foreign nation furnishes that marine with auxiliaries for its service, it is clear that she so much augments the force of the military marine and also when transports and other unarmed vessels are placed among those of commerce and serving in a military operation, it is certain that the nation furnishing these vessels with seamen, contributes to the increase of the military force of a belligerent power. Can she do this without compromit ting her neutrality, and is not this the case now that your citizens are serving on board of English vessels ?

What I have said is I conceive sufficient to prove that the United States should not permit their citizens to man any English vessel whatsoever: but it is necessary that I should answer some of the observations you have advanced in support of a contrary opinion.

I need not make any remark on the distinction you admit between an armed and an unarmed vessel; it is, I conceive, destroyed by the reasoning presented to you; but I should call your attention to the identity you wish to establish between that which at present gives rise to my complaints, and a previous circumstance in order to prove that the Americans having ranged themselves under the French flag, could not be prevented from putting themselves under that of Great Britain. But, sir, how do you find an analogy in two cases which are dissimilar? Be pleased to recollect that the vessels which sailed from your ports under the escort of French ships of war, were not American but French property, and that if any others bearing your flag, took advantage of that escort, it was to avoid (if you please) the piracies of the English who then. seized your vessels, and not to aid us in a military operation. Is it therefore impartial to permit American seamen to aid the military operations of the English?

To support the system of neutrality pursued by the government in not prohibiting your seamen from serving on

board of English vessels, you then suppose, sir, that your seamen have served on board of ours. But you are not ignorant that the pay of American sailors is higher than that of our mariners: when a man labours for a livelihood, he will not quit a station in which he finds much profit for one less lucrative. Seamen therefore have not spontaneously quitted your vessels, to enter on board of ours; neither force nor violence have been used to obtain themnever have seamen been impressed in France-never have our officers at sea exercised this atrocious act with regard to neutral nations. By your supposition, therefore, one might be supported in tolerating an infraction of the neutrality of the United States.

I conceive, sir, that having proved to you that American vessels purchased by the English, being English property, your seamen cannot serve on board of them, I may conclude that the United States cannot, without compromitting their neutrality, permit their citizens to serve the enemies of France.

I shall not make any reflection upon the last sentence of your answer. "I shall conclude that whatever consequence may result from the measures which are the subjects of your letter, these measures the government of the United States have no right to restrain."

It is the province of my government to which I shall send your letter, to explain and to draw the consequences resulting from it. Accept, sir, the assurance of my esteem, P. A. ADET.

No. 130.

From the Secretary of State to the Minister Plenipotentiary of France. Department of State, Muy 25, 1796. SIR,-I intended long since to have returned an answer to your letter of the 11th of March, in which you renew your objections to the purchase and exportation of horses by the British from the United States. It was some time before it was in my power to consider your remarks and examine the authority of Galliani, which you quoted; but that consideration and examination convinced ine, that the line of conduct which the government of the United States had prescribed to itself, was that which it ought still to

pursue. I considered the right of the citizens of the United States to sell and export contraband goods to any of the belligerent powers, as incontrovertibly established in our commercial treaty with France. The arguments which I drew from this source, and which in my view contained a demonstration of this right, you have passed over in silence, and recurred to the authorities of Vattel and Galliani, especially of the latter on the rights and duties of neutral powers. These authorities, however, appear to me as little to support your claims, as the articles of the commercial treaty formerly adduced.

Referring to Vattel, book 3. ch. 7. (the object of which entire chapter is to delineate the rights and duties of neutrality) your first remark is, that the 113th section, which you quoted, has no relation to the 110th, cited by me. But permit me to observe, that it would be a novel mode of interpreting an author, to take up a single paragraph, and detach it from all his other remarks and reasonings in the same chapter and on the same subject. Doubtless (as the same author says elsewhere) "we ought to consider the whole discourse together, in order perfectly to conceive the sense of it." (b. 2. ch. 17. § 285.) In both the sections cited (110 and 113) the rights of neutrals to trade in articles contraband of war is clearly established; in the first by selling to the warring powers, who come to the neutral country to buy them; in the second, by the neutral subjects or citizens carrying them to the countries of the powers at war and there selling them.

The same just rule of interpretation applied to the discourse of Galliani on this subject, will exhibit a result not less justificatory to the conduct of the United States.

Your first quotation from that author is a marginal note, importing, that if a belligerent power cannot seize contraband articles sold to an enemy, it may nevertheless object against it, complain of it as an injury, and demand and do itself that justice, which an injured sovereign has a right to

exact.

To this I will subjoin a passage from the 4th section of the same chapter and book which you have cited: "I repeat it then once for all, that neutral nations must observe the most conscientious sincerity, as well in refraining from the sale of contraband of war, as from all exportation of it, except only in the cases I have above spoken of." A

recurrence to these exceptions, and to the other observations of this writer will show, that his doctrine does not oppose the principles adopted by the government of the United States. It would be too tedious to recite all his reasoning on this subject. I shall content myself with quoting a few of his remarks.

Book 1. ch. 9. § 3. "Much greater is the number of those, who believed that every belligerent power possesses essentially the right of forbidding neutral powers to sell arms and warlike stores to its enemy; and that this is a full right, that is, a right of strict justice. They do not distinguish the circumstance, when the neutral powers carry on trade with one of the belligerents, and supply it with arms and warlike stores, and when with perfect impartiality they trade with both. In the first case, the preference of one party is apparent, and thenceforward the slighted and neglected party begins to possess a right in regard of the neutral state: for friendship with it is at an end: but as in the other case friendship does not appear to have ceased, there is not yet to be discovered any reason to act inimically on this account towards a friend."

"And in truth this reflection has led many writers to conclude, that neutral powers cannot be forbidden to exercise a free trade even in contraband, as long as they exercise it in an impartial manner, with both belligerent parties, or are willing to do so. I too cannot say that they decide very unjustly."

"I say then, that for those nations, who have not otherwise bound themselves by express compact, it is not a duty of strict right to carry no contraband articles to the belligerent powers. For, if even a belligerent power had a full and complete right to set itself against such trade, yet between two sovereigns, who are placed in the situation of natural equality, freedom and independence, the full right of the one is not annulled by the full right of the other. And in regard of neutral nations, the renunciation of their own convenience in favour of the greater convenience of another, is only a duty of equity, but not of essential and strict right."

"Hence it follows, that we must often inquire and distinguish, whether the trade in those goods, which are called contraband, is of greater or less importance to the nation, which exercises it. In the first case, since we are discussing

a duty of favour, which admits of infinite gradations, we cannot confidently expect an extraordinary and very af fecting sacrifice, as we may when it extends only to a s. all inconvenience."

Then follow, what the author states as the true positions on this matter, some of which you have cited:

1. When a belligerent nation desires a friendly neutral nation to carry no contraband to its enemy, it must formally disclose its wish; silence importing a satisfaction in the natural state of things.

2. When it has thus disclosed its request, it must itself renounce all pretensions to be furnished with contraband goods.

3. When a neutral state has entered into a treaty of peace and commerce with one of the belligerent powers, stipulating to carry no contraband to the enemy, there is always a condition implied, that the like goods shall be denied to both the belligerent powers without distinction.

4. "Consequently the belligerent state, which has never disclosed to its neutral friend, that it did not see with contentment the latter supplying its enemy with contraband of war, and much more if it has availed itself of this privilege, has bought arms and other sorts of military stores, or what is of more account, has received from it soldiers, recruits, horses, has no further right to expect, that the neutral should not show the like to the enemy.

5. "And finally I say, that the desire expressed to the neutral state, that it should not, during the war, carry any contraband of war to the belligerent powers, must always be followed, when it does not induce a very great and intolerable inconvenience; in as much as what tends immediately to the destruction of mankind is with better reason refused than permitted: and therefore this desire, much more than its opposite, comports with true impartiality, sincere friendship, and the good of mankind."

I will cite only one more passage from Galliani, which appears to be the result of his considerations on this subject.

B. 1. ch. 9. § 4. "If we reflect more upon it, it must be acknowledged, that the first position of the principle, which I have above established, recurs, that belligerent powers have no full right to make this demand (not to carry contraband to the enemy) as also, that there lies no duty of