them, as in those which have been mentioned, abundant reason to justify the government and the tribunals..

Mr. Adet's complaints are not confined to imputations of injustice experienced by French privateers and their prizes from our courts.

First, "He protests against the violation of the 17th article of the treaty, in contempt of which the American tribunals, have taken cognizance of the validity of prizes made by French ships of war or privateers, under pretext of original armament or augmentation of armament in the United States, or of capture within their line of jurisdiction." But his predecessor Mr. Fauchet,* after saying that our admiralty courts interfered in prize cases on the ground of "seizure within the jurisdictional line of the United States, or of armament or augmentation of armament of the capturing vessels in their ports," immediately adds, " on this subject, sir, you request me to specify to you a circumstance in which a prize was arrested, which did not come under that denomination, and you take the trouble to establish, that they have a right to intervene in every case that can be brought under those heads. In the first place, sir, Inever have, at least to my recollection, contested the right of your courts, or of the government, to interfere in matters of the nature of those you mention: but I complain of the facility with which prizes have been thrown into those two classes, which do not belong to them." He then says that he could cite a great number of affairs to which he alludes; but contents himself with mentioning only two. The first is the case of Talbot, of which I have already given some details, and which, with the documents referred to, will show this to have been an unfortunate instance to support his complaint. The other is that of the prizes of the Citizen of Marseilles, also already mentioned, and which will not justify a complaint; for although the final decision, was in favour of the privateer, yet the sentence of the district court was not reversed in the circuit court, but upon the introduction of new testimony; and the supreme court allowed no damages, because the testimony was so ambiguous, as to justify the appeal.

But quitting the contradictory declarations of the French ministers; and referring you to the letter dated Angust

*Letter June 8th, 1795.

16th, 1793, from the Secretary of State to our minister at Paris, (which has been published,*) for the reasoning of our government on this subject, and the demonstration of their right and duty as a neutral power, to prohibit any of the belligerent powers arming their vessels in our ports, consequently to restore to their proper owners, prizes taken and brought in by vessels so unlawfully armed, or when taken within our line of jurisdiction, I will only add here-That the principle of the rules on this subject, first adopted by the President on the most mature deliberation, received afterwards the sanction of Congress, by their act of the 5th June, 1794, and of the judges in all their judicial proceedings, in the prize causes in question. If then the 17th article of the French treaty has been violated, the executive, the legislature and the judges of the federal courts, have all deliberately concurred in the violation. This no American citizen will be inclined to believe; and we might suppose, that the consideration of such concur rence in one opinion would any where produce a pause, and some diffidence in pronouncing it erroneous. Neither the rules adopted by the President, nor the act of Congress, have made a new law respecting such prizes: they have only directed the modes of proceeding to fulfil our neutral duties, agreeably to the universal law of nations. The judges have applied this law; but not without due attention to the obligations of our treaties, which they regard as supreme laws of the land.

Second, Mr. Adet "protests against the violation of the 17th article of the treaty, in contempt of which, English vessels, which had made prize on Frenchmen, have been admitted into the ports of the United States." The construction of this part of the 17th article, for which Mr. Adet, after his predecessor Mr. Fauchet, contends, is this-That if a national ship of war, of the enemies of France has at any time, and in any part of the globe, made prize of a French vessel, such ship of war is to be allowed no shelter or refuge in our ports-unless she is driven in through stress of weather; and then she is to be made to depart as soon as possible. On the contrary, the construction adopted by the Executive of the United States, and expressed in the rules before mentioned, which had been transmitted to

* State Papers, vol. i. p. 137.

the collectors in August, 1793, was this-That privateers only of the enemies of France were absolutely excluded from our ports, except as before when compelled to enter through stress of weather, pursuant to the twenty-second article of the treaty; while the national ships of war of any other nation were entitled to an asylum in our ports, excepting those which should have made prize of the people or property of France, coming in with their prizes.

On the 9th of September, 1793, the Secretary of State, thus expressed to the British minister the determination of the executive-"The publick ships of war of both nations, (French and English) enjoy a perfect equality in our ports, -First, In cases of urgent necessity-Second, In cases of comfort and convenience-and, Third, In the time they choose to continue-and though the admission of prizes and privateers of France is exclusive, yet it is the effect of treaty, &c."*

In support of our construction of the treaty, it has been observed, That, "the first part of the seventeenth article, relates to French ships of war and privateers entering our ports with their prizes: the second contrasts the situation of the enemies of France, by forbidding such as shall have made prize of the French: intimating from this connection of the two clauses, that those forbidden, are those which bring their prizes with them." To these observations I will add,-That if the literal construction contended for by the French ministers were admitted, then although the publick ships of war which had made prize of French people or property would be excluded from our ports, yet the prizes of such publick ships might be received, and they might be sold too; for the prohibition in the twenty-second article of the treaty, applies only to priva teers and their prizes; while the government of the United States judged that the seventeenth article was intended to exclude the prizes made on the French, by publick ships of war as well as those made by privateers; and gave directions accordingly to have them excluded. Further, if it had been intended to exclude from our ports the publick ships of war of the enemies of France, coming without my prize, then they would doubtless have been compre

* State Papers, vol. i. p. 169.

Secretary of State to Mr. Fauchet, September 7, 1794.

hended in one provision with the privateers in the 22d ar ticle; for privateers are thereby excluded, whether they come with or without prizes. But publick ships of war are not comprehended, or at all referred to in the twentysecond article; whence the conclusion is fair, that it was not intended to forbid them coming alone; and consequently, that the exclusion provided in the 17th article applies to them only when they would come into our ports with their prizes; this last clause of the same article being in its form opposed to the first clause, which admits the entrance of French ships with their prizes. Besides if a publick ship of war of the enemies of France comes into our ports without any prize, how is it to be known whether she has or has not made prize of the people or property of the French? Who is to erect a tribunal to investigate and pronounce on the fact? But if she comes with a prize, the case presents no difficulty; she brings with her the evidence which goes to the exclusion of her and her prize.

I must now advert to some others of Mr. Adet's charges against the government of the United States. First, "It (the government of the United States) put in question, whether it should execute the treaties, or receive the agents of the rebel and proscribed princes." And is there any thing in this unjustifiable or extraordinary? Was it easy for a nation distant as ours, to obtain promptly such accurate information as would enable it duly to estimate the varying condition of France? In 1791, the constitution formed by the constituent assembly was accepted by Louis XVI.; it was notified to the United States in March, 1792. Congress desired the President to communicate to the king of the French, their congratulations on the occasion. In August, 1792, the king was suspended. In September, royalty was abolished; and in January, 1793, Louis xvi. tried and condemned by the convention, suffered death. Was it easy to keep pace with the rapid succession of such revolutionary events? And was it unlawful for our government, under such circumstances, even to deliberate? I do not find that information of the death of the king was received from our minister at Paris, until May 1, 1793. The news, however, had previously arrived, in such a manner as to attract the attention of government, for in April the President had determined to receive a minister from the French Republick. And it is remarkable, that

this was before he knew that a minister had arrived in the United States. This promptitude in deciding a leading question, does not bear any strong marks of hesitation. And was there no merit in this ready determination to acknowledge the French Republick? Had it been before acknowledged by any power on the globe? How long did France hesitate to acknowledge the Republick of the United States? A year and an half. And under what circumstances was the acknowledgment finally made? After the capture of a whole British army appeared to have established our independence. But of this more hereafter. In matters of importance, (and what could be more important than the decision of a neutral and allied nation on questions perhaps involving war or peace?) Is it the part of wisdom to reject all deliberation, even on points which do not obviously present difficulties? Will not prudence dictate to him who is to decide great national questions, rather to deliberate long than risk the consequences of hasty decisions?

Second, "It made an insidious proclamation of neutrality."

I have already remarked, that this proclamation received the pointed approbation of Congress; and I might truly add, of the great body of the citizens of the United States. And what was the general object of this proclamation? to preserve us in a state of peace. And have not the ministers of France declared that their government did not desire us to enter into the war? And how was peace to be preserved? By an impartial neutrality. And was it not then the duty of the chief Executive to proclaim this to our citizens, and to inform them what acts would be deemed departures from their neutral duties? This was done by the proclamation. It declared it to be the duty, interest and disposition of the United States, to adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers: it warned the citizens to avoid all acts which might contravene that disposition: it declared that whosoever of the citizens should render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing or abetting hostilities against any of those powers, or by carrying to any of them articles deemed contraband of war, would not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment and forfeiture: and that