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tuation, alone prevented the appear- would be pressed into the service to ance of fifty-four ships of the line in transport troops from France into the Channel, and the landing within this country? Four or five guarda week of Napoleon, at the head of ships half-manned, and twice or thrice 130,000 men, on the shores of Sussex. as many war-steamers, that could be We had then 120,000 regular troops, immediately fitted out! How could 180,000 admirable militia, with 200 they instantly withstand forces three gans ready for the field in the British times as great, which France at the islands, besides 300,000 volunteers. moment could array against us? And With such means of defence the final if they got the command of the Chanissue of the contest at that time could nel by this sudden start for one week, not be considered as doubtful, with what would avail us our fifty sail of whatever damage, loss, and anxiety, the line lying unmanned in ordinary, it would unquestionably have been our noble Mediterranean squadron, attended in the mean time. But what our 280,000 sable warriors in Hindocould be expected if the French, by stan, our magnificent colonial settlethe adoption of a similar plan for de ments which encircle the globe ? coying our fleets away, or from having 150,000 admirably disciplined troops their naval forces better in hand and would be landed on our shores, Lonmore ready, effected a landing with a don taken, Woolwich captured, our similar force, or even one of half its credit ruined, the Queen and Govern amount, at this time, and we, without ment flying into Scotland, and the dennding our naval depôts, could not nation in unutterable consternamuster 10,000 men to oppose them, and tion-in sackcloth and ashes lamentpreserve London from capture, and ing its former supineness, and, it Woolwich, with the stores of an would almost seem, judicial blindempire, from devastation ?
ness. But it would all be in vain : Everything in such an emergency the thing has been done, and cannot would depend, not upon the amount be undone; our empire has been taken of force ultimately and in a prolonged from us, and given to another people. contest at the disposal of either of the If 30,000 or 40,000 French only, contending powers, but on the amount with seventy guns, were to be landed which either could immediately bring to-morrow on the coast of Sussex, it to bear upon the point of attack. may be asserted, without the fear of Now, in this respect, there cannot be contradiction, by any man capable of a doubt that the French, though in- judging on the subject, that they ferior upon the whole in naval re- might within a few days reach Lonsources, would at first be greatly and don, with or without a battle, and beto a most alarming degree our superi- come masters of the seat of governors. It is the maritime conscription ment, our treasuries and arsenals. which secures to them this great ad- Our generals, how determined and able vantage; and till we have some soever, our soldiers, however resolute corresponding maritime reserve force, and patriotic, would be constrained to of somewhat equal amount, to fall abandon the capital, as Kutusoff did back upon in the event of a war sud- Moscow, to preserve the nucleus of denly breaking out with France, we an army wherewith to contend, by the never can be considered as in any de- aid of the country, with the enemy in gree secure from invasion. Louis the interior. The Duke of Wellington Napoleon has 54,000 men on the and Lord Hardinge-the victors of coast of France enrolled in maritime Waterloo and Ferozeshah, the men corps, trained to gunnery and naval whom nothing can daunt, would be war, inured to the sea, and capable forced to do this to save the empire. of being assembled in twenty-four from subjugation. The victors of hours, by orders sent down from Paris, Cressy and Azincour, those of Talaat their different rallying points, from vera and Vitoria if still alive, would be Bayonne to Dunkirk. What force constrained, weeping and gnashing have we, ready and at hand, to meet their teeth, to obey the terrible orders. the ten or twelve sail of the line, Inferiority of force, produced by for.. twice as many war-steamers, and mer blindness and the sway of pacific: seventy ordinary steamers which ideas, would compel the grievous:
VOL. LXXII.-NO. CCCCXLI.
alternative. And let any man, and fifteen sail of the line and thirty warmost of all the members of the Peace steamers, perfectly manned, sailing in Congress, figure to themselves the the Channel, and an army of 60,000 state of the country, with London regular troops, and 140,000 regular mitaken, the Thames blockaded, Ports- litia, ready in the south of England to mouth besieged, Woolwich plundered, march to any point which might be the Bank pillaged, the Queen and seriously menaced, this would be by Government taken to flight, and a far the most effectual way of providwar contribution of £20,000,000 laid ing for our safety. And if Mr Cobden and levied by the threat of military and the Peace Congress can persuade execution on the metropolis !
their friends in Parliament to adopt What then is to be done in this these really efficient means to prevent emergency, exposed to this frightful the flames of war breaking out, we danger, and with these slender and have no doubt the Duke of Northumwholly inadequate means to ward it berland, the Duke of Wellington, and off ? France has troops enough on Lord Hardinge, will be too happy to her seaboard, or within twelve hours' adopt their plans, and abandon their transport of it, to embark 100,000 men. own designs now and for ever. But if She has steam vessels in plenty to bring this is impossible, and if it is notorious them over : one single night would that a majority in Parliament cannot suffice for the passage--a day for dis- be prevailed on by any consideration, embarkation. At Boulogne, in 1805, however urgent, or any danger, howMarshal Ney repeatedly embarked ever pressing, to vote an addition of his corps of 25,000 men, with all their more than £400,000, or £500,000 for horses and artillery, in ten minutes and additions to our national defencesa-half.* Our navy, on its present and since, despite all our boasted reduced Peace Establishment, can- riches derived from Free Trade, we not be relied on to prevent the are constantly told that more cannot enemy eluding their vigilance, or be afforded by 28,000,000 of British to resist them, in the first instance subjects, though during the war at least, (and there is no second in- 18,000,000 provided funds for the stance here,) with success if their army and navy to three times the approach is descried. The risk of amount now annually voted-the the most dreadful loss and suffering, only question that remains is, What in such an event, is certain : ultimate is next best? We do not hesitate to ruin to the empire, in the most say, in answer to this all-important favourable view for us, by no means question, that the next best is the improbable. What then is to be Militia Bill which Government, on done to avert a calamity so dread- the advice of the Duke of Wellington ful, and menacing, not only incalcul- and Lord Hardinge, have brought forable loss, if not total destruction, toward and that, unless the constithe British empire, but irreparable tuencies return such a Parliament as injury to the interests of humanity in will enable them to carry that meaevery part of the globe?
sure into full operation, our days as a No man of sense, or even in his people are numbered, and our empire senses, can make but one reply: A 15 van over to the Medes and large addition to our armed for capable of being brought immediat
mid by persons unacinto action, both by sea and 1
ilitary matters, (but the one thing needful. With
each as are,) of the all our resources
i en masse to crush an are useless
inunder should audaciously apthey onls
Des s ; and of the needlessus the
loquence, of making any eders or being at any expense
time. We will answer of the nation rising en masse
and crushing the invader if unprepared. Tirailleurs or Chasseurs de VinThey would rise up and most of them cennes, as individually brave, armed run away. They would do so, though with as good rifles, at least as good possessing each individually the marksmen, aud far more experienced courage of Wellington or Hardinge, in their military duties. Supposing simply from being unacquainted with that our rifle clubs neutralised, by fighting, and destitute of the confidence their fire, that of an equal number of which conscious skill and training in French light troops-and that is that art can alone confer. A few of surely the most favourable view to the bravest would stand and be shot take of the case-what would remain or cut down—the immense majority to stop the advance of the main army would seek to save themselves by of 80,000 men and 120 guns, which flight. The first round of cannister, would advance under cover of the the first biting fire of Tirailleurs, the cloud of sharpshooters who preceded first thundering charge of horse, would its columns ? Nothing could do so send them, with the exception of a few but regular troops, nearly as numergallant men, to the right about. It ous and as well disciplined as is no imputation on the courage of themselves. our countrymen to say they would, There is no doubt that the militia while unskilled, do this: all mankind whom the bill of Lord Derby proposes in similar circumstances would do the to embody would be very different same. The Romans of the Tenth from regular soldiers, and could by Legion, the Old Guard of Napoleon, no means be relied on to move under when undisciplined, would have acted fire, or in presence of the enemy in in exactly the same manner. Self-con- the field. But the great advantage fidence is the foundation of resolution with which their organisation would be in every crisis, civil or military, and attended, would be that they might, it can only be acquired by conscious like the Prussian Landwehr, be inskill and prowess. Look how a mob trusted with the garrison duty with of men, especially Englishmen, indi- the aid of a few regulars, and thus vidually brave, stand the onset of a liberate the troops of the line now handful of disciplined soldiers.
absorbed in that service. Three good Sharpshooters or riflemen trained artillerymen, with five militia moderto the use of the Minié rifle, and ately instructed in their duties, could practised in firing at the target, would work each gun. Twenty-five thoube much more efficient than any levée sand men would be liberated from the en masse, and, as auxiliaries of regular fortresses by the marching an equal troops, might be of considerable ser- number of militia into them. For vice; but it requires no serious argu- THE COST OF FIVE THOUSAND REment to show that it is as auxiliaries GULAR SOLDIERS WE WOULD ADD only they could be trusted to; they THIRTY THOUSAND TO OUR EFFECnever could be trusted to stand the TIVE FORCE. This is an immense, shock of regular troops in the field. in fact an incalculable, advantage. In truth, although, if accumulated in It would raise the force available to sufficient numbers, they would, in a cover London at once from ten thouprotracted campaign, prove a great sand to forty thousand men ;-a small impediment to the movements of an force indeed to be turned out by so invading army, and might inflict a great an empire to defend its existconsiderable loss upon him in desul- ence, its glory, its wealth, its possestory skirmishes; yet to withstand a sions, but still as much as in the sudden forced march from the coast to present supine and infatuated state London, which is the thing to be of the public mind it is possible to dreaded, they would be of little real get Parliament to agree to. Certain service. Suppose ten or fifteen thou- it is, that in no other way than this sand of them could be assembled by bill proposes would it be possible, at beat of drum in the metropolis and so little a cost, to produce so great counties immediately adjoining, to an addition to our effective force. aid in repelling the invader, they There is no soldier will doubt that would be immediately encountered he would rather, in the field, have by an equal number of the French fifty thousand men who had been
drilled for ninety days, than eighty battle in 1784, and who himself has thousand who had been drilled for done so much to instruct his country fifty ; but that does not solve the and all Europe in gunnery. question. The point is not which is most serviceable in the field and for “What has been said above," says Sir the duties of a campaign, but, which Howard Douglas, “relates only to the is most likely to render the whole protection afforded by the naval forces of regular force in the country available Great Britain ; to which alone, and irreagainst the enemy. The larger num.
spective of the internal defence and secu
rity of the empire, the present work has ber is indispensable for this. Eighty
been confined. The author is, however, thousand men would be little enough
fully aware that it would be unsafe to to garrison the fortresses, keep quiet
rely solely on either the naval or the the manufacturing towns, guard the
military resources of the country for the railway posts, keep up the communi preservation of her independence, in the cations, and restrain rebellion in Ire event of her being threatened with foreign land. If, by discharging those vari. invasion, and that it can only be by ous most important duties, they could means of both that we can, in all times enable nearly the whole of our regular and under all circumstances, maintain force to be advanced to the front to our position as a first-rate European power. meet the enemy, the country might be
“ It would be out of place, in a work saved, even if sixty or seventy thou
relating essentially to gunnery, to enter
at large on the consideration of the insuffisand invaders were landed on our
ciency of the military force of the nation, shores. But as, at least, the whole of
and the want of fortified positions, by the eighty thousand would be required
which the progress of an invading army in such an event, for the duties of the
inight be arrested, or even retarded. fortresses or interior, any lesser force, This may be a matter for future discussion. though better disciplined, would com. But the author is induced to touch incipel the deduction of a large part of dentally upon this important subject by the regular army, and therefore more the perusal of a remarkable pamphlet than nentralise all the service it could which has just appeared, entitled 'De render. Every military man, every
la Défense Nationale en Angleterre,' man even moderately acquainted with
by Baron Maurice (Paris, 1851 ;) in which military affairs, knows that if forty
that writer (an officer of Engineers in the
service of the Swiss Confederation,) after thousand regular troops are to be
making an enumeration of the naval and assembled to meet the enemy in the
military strength of Great Britain, and field, in defence of a country, at least
comparing the artillery of this country double that number must be stationed with that of France (pp. 58-60,) estiin garrisons or left behind to guard mates briefly the chances of success for depôts, protect convoys, and keep up France in an invasion of England, (p. 68, communications. Napoleon invaded &c.,) and gives a project for putting the Russia with five hundred thousand invasion in execution ;disclaiming at men, but he never had more than a the same time any intention of predicting hundred and thirty thousand men in
a fatal issue for this country, for which any one field ; and out of two hun
he professes the highest esteem.
Describing the fundamental principles dred and forty thousand effective men
on which the defence of a country depends, who composed the military force of M. Maurice states, (page 115, &c.,) that Louis XIV., he never was able to if the country attacked be like France or draw together above eighty thousand England, one whose existence depends on in the field to make head against the the security of its capital, it is important armies of Eugene and Marlborough, that this metropolis should be protected who, on their side, were equally weak at least from a coup-de-main after the ened by the necessary garrisoning of loss of a battle ; and he repeats the folfortresses and detachments to their lowing observations by Napoleon in vol.ix. rear.
of his ‘Memoirs : '- If, in 1805, Vienna We cannot conclude without quot
had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would ing the following admirable and just the corps commanded by Kutusoff would,
not have decided the issue of the war ; observations from a most able and at Vienna, have waited for the other corps experienced military officer, whose of the Russian army, which were then at father taught British seamen the Olmutz, and for the army of Prince breaking of the line in Rodney's Charles, which was advancing out of Italy. If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the sperity — the last interrupted only army, which was defeated at Jena, would within these few years—bave inured have rallied there, and the Russian army the English to so much comfort, and would have joined it. If, in 1808, Madrid
such good living, that no one could be had been å fortified place, the French
got to enter the army who was put army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommosierra, would
on the Continental pay and fare. A not have marched upon that capital,
Cossack gets 8s. 6d. a-year of pay, leaving in its rear Salamanca and Valla
alles out of which he is obliged to furnish dolid, the English army of Sir John himself with white-starched neck Moore, and the Spanish army of Romana :
cloths. A French soldier's pay is and these Anglo-Spanish armies might, under 5d. a-day, and, after deducting under the fortifications of Madrid, have what is stopped off for rations, &c., united themselves to the armies of Aragon he has somewhat about id. a-day to and Valencia ;'-and the author might enjoy himself! What a temptation have added what had been the fate of to such brave disciplined starving Lisbon as well as Madrid, and what, men, London with its £20,000,000 in consequently, the issue of that righteous the bank in solid gold! When Free and retributive war in the Peninsula, which Great Britain undertook for the
Trade has made us as poor as the independence of the nations in that part.
French, and money, in consequence, of the world. had not the Great Duke goes as far, we shall be able to raise our ordered the construction of the lines of armies as cheaply, because our people Torres Vedras. Lastly, if Paris, in 1814 will be reduced like them to the lowand 1815, had been fortified, so as to est point consistent with existence; have been capable of holding out but one but we cannot hope for a similar reweek, what an influence would it not have duction till it has worked that melanhad on the destiny of Europe !' And what choly change upon our people. is now the state of the French metropolis Let it not be supposed that there is in that respect ? "In conclusion, M. Maurice tells the
any danger, in stating the facts we
have now brought forward in regard world that England has reason to place confidence in her good fortune, and in the
to our unprepared state, of making the maritime supremacy which a long struggle
French acquainted with them. They has given her : but that it would be wise know them perfectly already, as well in her to consider that she is not invul- as any of our officers at the Horse nerable. Steam-navigation, railroads, Guards or Ordnance Office. There and the electrical telegraph, he continues, is not a gun mounted, nor a battery have powerfully increased her defensive traced out, nor a ditch cleared, nor a resources; but at the same time they glacis levelled at Portsmouth, Plyincrease the means of attacking her, and mouth, or Sheerness. that information prepare the way that leads to her shores. is not immediately forwarded to Paris England, trusting to the prospect of a
by French officers or agents on the long peace, has enormously extended her
spot. The only people who are ignocommercial enterprises; but thirty-five years of peace have passed, and if a war
rant of, or rather, though aware, inshould suddenly break out, is she pre
sensible to them, are Mr Cobden and pared to meet it? Such, he adds, is the the Manchester school of politicians. thought which has presented itself to the They are so infatuated with the belief minds of some of the most eminent men of universal peace that nothing will of Great Britain."--(P. 138.)
open their eyes till London is taken,
or Plymouth in flames. Our real It is often asked in Parliament, how danger is not in Paris, but in Manit happens that, with the large sums chester; it is not the strength of our annually voted in Parliament for the neighbours, but our delusive idea of army, we have so few efficient men security, which is our real danger. to produce; and how does it hap- The nation has within itself ample pen that, wbile a French soldier costs means of averting all danger, if it £38 per annum, an English one would only make use of them; if it is costs, taking everything into view, ruined, it will not be from its want £82? We answer in one word, be- of strength, but from its want of cause we are twice as rich as they, and foresight. therefore money will only go half as To conclude, let the people of Engfar. Long ages of peace and pro- land reflect, and reflect deeply, ou