ground of there being a single stamp, which was overruled at the trial, and afterwards by the court of King's Bench. In the other case (1), the paper contained a variety of independent lettings of land between the landlord and a number of his tenants, one of whom was the defendant; the stamp was affixed opposite the defendant's name, and it appeared from the receipt of the stamp-officer, that the money was paid for affixing it after the commencement of the action, and only a short time before the trial; the instrument also appeared, when produced in evidence, to be cancelled with black lead pencil marks as to every name except that of the defendant, and it was not proved that the instrument was not so cancelled at the time when the stamp was affixed. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the single stamp was intended to be applied to the contract with the defendant, and consequently that the paper was admissible. "If, indeed," said Lord Ellenborough C. J. "the instrument had been required to substantiate the several contracts with the different tenants, no doubt there should have been a stamp affixed to each, although the same terms of agreement applied to all; one stamp has been only held to be sufficient upon an instrument affecting the separate interests of several, where there has been a community of the same subject-matter as to all the parties. But here it sufficiently appears from the circumstances of the case, that the stamp was meant to be applied to the defendant's signature." When a stamped instrument has been once used for one Alteration of stamped purpose, it cannot be altered without a new stamp. If the instrument. parties have altered their original intention, and make a new instrument different from that which they originally contemplated, a new stamp will be necessary (2). If a bill of exchange, for example, has been once effected, and has issued in a perfect form from the drawer to the acceptor, by whom it was returned with his acceptance to the drawer, (1) 13 East, 241. See also, Wad- (2) 15 East, 418. dington v. Francis, 5 Esp. N. P. C. 182. it cannot be altered without being re-stamped. Thus, in the case of Bowman v. Nichol (1), where a bill of exchange had been drawn on a proper stamp, payable 21 days after date, and, while it continued in the hands of the drawer, was altered with the consent of the acceptor to be made payable 51 days after date, and was again altered to 21 days after date, subsequently to the time of its becoming payable according to its original form; the court of King's Bench held, that, at the time when the last alteration was made, the operation of the bill, as it originally stood, was quite spent; that it was a new and distinct transaction between the parties; and that there ought to have been a new stamp. So where a promissory note, payable by the defendant to the plaintiff or order (2), was originally expressed to be for value received, but, on the day after it had been signed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, was with the consent of the parties altered by the addition of the words" for the good will of a lease and trade," the Court held, that the alteration was a material one, because it was evidence of a fact, which, if necessary to be inquired into, must otherwise have been proved by different evidence, and also because it pointed out the particular consideration for the note, and put the holder upon inquiring, whether that consideration had passed; a new stamp was therefore necessary, for the want of which the note could not be received in evidence. The same rule is equally applicable to the case of an accommodation bill. (3) By the 13th section of the stat. 35 G. 3. c. 63., (relating to stamp-duties on sea-insurances,) it is provided, “that nothing in that act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the making of any alteration, which may lawfully be made in the terms or conditions of any policy of insurance duly stamped, after the same shall have been underwritten, (1) 5 T.R. 537. See also Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320. Cardwell v. Martin, I Campb. 79; 9 East, 190, S. C. Bathe v. Taylor, 15 East, 412. Calvert v. Roberts, 3 Camph. 343; the case of an accommodation- (2) Knill v. Williams, 10 East, 43. 343 or to require any additional stamp-duty by reason of such alteration, so that such alteration be made before notice of the determination of the risk originally insured, and the premium or consideration, originally paid or contracted for, shall exceed the rate of 10 shilling per cent. on the sum insured, and so that the thing insured shall remain the property of the same persons, and so that such alteration shall not prolong the term insured beyond the period allowed by this act, and so that no additional or further sum shall be insured by means of such alteration." On the construction of this clause, in the case of Kensington v. Inglis (1), where the policy was "on goods and specie on board of ship or ships sailing between the 1st of October 1799, and the 1st of June 1800, being the property which should first sail to a certain amount, and upon the vessels carrying the goods," and a memorandum was written on the policy, and subscribed by the defendant, on the 11th of June 1800, before any notice of the determination of the risk had been received, by which memorandum it was agreed to extend the time of sailing to the first of August following, in this case the court of King's Bench held, that the memorandum did not require a stamp; for although the time of sailing was extended, yet no new subject of insurance is introduced by the memorandum, but the object insured continues the same. In another case (2), which occurred upon the same clause, where the policy was originally "on ship and outfit,' from London to the South Seas, but after the sailing of the ship was altered by consent of the underwriters, and declared to be "on the ship and goods," instead of ship and outfit, the Court determined that as the outfit, originally insured, was essentially different from goods, which were afterwards made the subject of insurance, the policy in its altered state required an additional stamp. The question is, said Lord Ellenborough C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, whether that part of the pro (1) 8 East, 273. (2) Hill v. Patten, 8 East, 373. vision, vision, which requires that "the thing insured shall remain the property of the same person" has been in this case complied with. The words, "the thing insured shall remain the property," appear properly to require and apply to one identical and continued subject-matter of insurance; such subject-matter all along remaining the property of the same proprietor, and to be ill-suited to a case like the present, where the thing last insured is, not only in fact, but in name and kind, (as a specific subject of insurance) essentially different from the thing first insured, and which begins also to have an existence at a different and much later period than the other, and when the thing first insured scarcely, or in a small degree only, remains or continues to exist at all." But where an alteration is made in an instrument with the consent of all parties, in order to correct a mistake, and to make the instrument consistent with the original intention of the parties, there it has been held, that a fresh stamp is not necessary. Thus, in the case of Kershaw v. Cox (1), where a bill had been drawn, payable to the defendant but not payable to order, the defendant, on the day after the bill was drawn, indorsed it over to the plaintiff, without adverting to the omission of the words " or order;" on the same day the plaintiff returned it to the defendant to get the omission rectified, and the drawer then inserted the words; here there was strong evidence to shew, that the omission was by mistake, for the bill was intended to be negotiable, and, as such, immediately indorsed, as if it had been drawn payable to order, and, as soon as the omission was discovered, it was rectified by the proper parties; the learned Judge, therefore, who tried the cause, left it to the jury to consider, whether the words afterwards added had been originally intended to have been inserted, but were omitted by mistake; and, the jury finding this to be the case, it was ruled, that a fresh stamp was not required. The point was (1) 3 Esp. N. P. C. 246, cor. Le Blanc J., cited 10 East, 435, and 15 East, 417. after afterwards brought before the Court of King's Bench, on a motion to enter a nonsuit, and the alteration was adjudged to be allowable under the stamp acts; having been made merely for the purpose of rectifying a mistake in drawing the bill contrary to the intention of the parties. In another case, which occurs upon this subject, where an action was brought against the defendant as acceptor of a bill of exchange (1), it appeared that the defendant and another person being indebted to the plaintiff, agreed to give him a bill of exchange, to be drawn by the one and accepted by the other (the defendant); instead of this they sent him a promissory note made by the one and indorsed by the other, which the plaintiff immediately returned, that it might be altered into a bill of exchange according to the agreement, and the alteration was accordingly made; an objection was taken, on the ground, that the instrument required a fresh stamp; but Lord Ellenborough C. J. ruled, that the stamp impressed was sufficient to render the instrument available, since it had not been negotiated as a promissory note, and the alteration might be treated as the correction of a mistake, according to the terms of the original agreement. So, when a bill of sale of a ship, in reciting the certificate of registry, stated Guernsey as the port, where the certificate was granted, instead of Weymouth, and in this state was executed, but the mistake being afterwards discovered was rectified with the consent of all parties, and the deed delivered de novo (2); the question was, whether this second delivery made a new stamp necessary; Lord Ellenborough C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, referred to statute 26 G. 3. c. 60. s. 17., which enacts, that a bill of sale of a registered ship, which does not truly and accurately recite the certificate of registry in words at length, shall be utterly null and void to all intents and (1) Webber v. Maddocks, 3 Campb, 1. (2) Cole and others, Assignees of Doyle, v, Parkin, 12 East, 471. purposes, |