committed to prison for destroying game, though, as it was proved, he had effects which might have been distrained, sufficient to answer the penalty, (the statute of 5 & 6 Ann. c. 14. enacting that the penalty is to be levied by distress and sale of the offender's goods, and, for want of distress, the offender to be committed to the house of correction) (1); or, where the justice has committed to prison, on mere suspicion, without any information laid before him. (2) It is reported to have been held (3), that, where actions for false imprisonment are brought against justices of peace, they are obliged to shew the regularity of their convictions; and that the informations laid before them, upon which their convictions are founded, must be produced and proved in court. But it appears from later authorities (4), that, in such collateral proceedings, the informality of the warrant of commitment, or of the conviction, cannot be taken advantage of by the plaintiff; and that, if the magistrate was warranted in taking cognizance of the charge, and did in fact convict, this will be sufficient to protect him, however irregularly the conviction may have been drawn up (5). It may also be collected from the late case of Gray v. Cookson (6), that, if the magistrate had a general jurisdiction over the subject-matter, evidence of facts not stated in the conviction is not admissible, to prove that the conclusion drawn by the magistrate was erroneous. It is a general rule, with respect to special and limited jurisdictions, that where a person acts as judge, (that is, where he has over the subject-matter a general jurisdiction, which he has not exceeded,) he will not be liable to have his judgment examined in an action brought against Decree. him (1). When therefore in pursuance of such judicial authority he has convicted a party, the facts, upon which the conviction is grounded, cannot be traversed (2). So where a statute provides, that the judgment of commissioners, appointed by the act, shall be final, their decision is conclusive, and cannot be questioned in any collateral proceeding. It has therefore been held, that a certificate from commissioners for settling the debts of the army, stating that so much was due from the defendant (an armyagent) to the plaintiff (an officer), was conclusive in an action brought to recover the money; and that no evidence could be received to shew, that the commissioners had formed a wrong judgment. (3) (1) Marshalsea case, 10 Rep. 76. (3) Moody v. Thurston, I Str. 481. ruled by Pratt C. J.; and a new trial afterwards refused by the whole court. See also Lane v. Hegberg, Bull. N. P. 19; Earl of Radnor v. Reeve, 2 Bos. & Pull. 391. WE CHAP. IV. Of certain other judicial Proceedings. E proceed now to treat of the admissibility of certain other judicial proceedings; and in the present chapter it is proposed to consider the admissibility of proceedings in Chancery, of depositions, inquisitions, examinations taken under acts of parliament, judgments of inferior courts, and, lastly, of awards. SECT. I. Of Proceedings in Chancery. A DECREE in the Court of Chancery may be given in evidence on the same footing, and under the same limita tions, as the verdict or judgment of a court of common law. (1) The common opinion used to be, that a bill in Chancery, Bill. which had been followed up by other proceedings, was admissible in evidence, as an admission of facts, against the complainant (2). "The allegations in the bill, it was said, must be supposed to be true: nor is it to be presumed, that the bill was preferred by a counsel or solicitor, without the privity of the party himself (2)." However, it is notorious that many of the facts stated in the bill are the mere suggestions of counsel, made for the purpose of extorting an answer from the defendant. The general rule therefore is, that a bill in Chancery will not be evidence, except to shew that such a bill did exist, and that certain facts were in issue between the parties, in order to introduce the answer or the depositions of witnesses (3); it is not to be admitted as evidence, in courts of law, to prove any facts either alleged or denied in the bill (4). Lord Kenyon, indeed, is reported to have admitted a bill in Chancery, filed by an ancestor, to be evidence of a pedigree there stated, as a declaration in the family (5). But it was resolved by the judges in the Banbury peerage case, on a question put to them by the House of Lords, that a bill in equity, or depositions, cannot be received in evidence in the courts below, on the trial of an action of ejectment, against a party not claiming or deriving in any manner under the plaintiff or defendant in the Chancery suit, either as evidence of the facts therein deposed to, or as declarations respecting pedigree (6). And even if the bill or depositions could be received, some extrinsic proof must be given of the relationship between the complainant and the party whose pedigre (1) See ante, p. 223. (2) Snow v. Philips, 1 Sid. 221; Gilb. Ev. 42. Woollet v. Roberts, 1 Chan. Cas. 64. contra. (3) Lord Ferrers v. Shirley, Fitzgib. 196. Bull. N. P. 235. Bowerman v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 3. 1 Wightw. 325. (4) Banbury Peerage case, reported from MS. in 2 Selw. N. P. 685. (5) Taylor v. Cole, sitt. after Hil. term 1799, 7 T.R. 3. 11. (6) MS. case, in 2 Selw. N. P. 685; Feb. 1809. See also Berkeley Peerage case, suprà, p. 178. Answer. is disputed. It would not be sufficient, that the bill purports to have been filed by a relation. In the Banbury peerage case before mentioned, where C D's legitimacy was in question, the claimant offered in evidence a bill filed in CD's name by E F his uncle and next friend, stating his legitimacy, but there was no proof that E F was his uncle: the judges, being referred to for their opinion, were unanimous, that extrinsic proof of the relationship was essential, and the bill, which was above 150 years old, was accordingly rejected. (1) Answers in Chancery are confessions on oath, and therefore strong evidence against the party, that makes them. But when an answer is read, all the parts must be taken together, connected, and entire. If only a part is read in evidence, the other party is entitled to have the whole read (2); and if, on exceptions being taken, a second answer is put in, the defendant may insist upon having that also read, to explain what he swore in his first answer (3). This is the general rule, when an answer of either party to the suit is given in evidence against him, to prove a point in issue. But if an answer is produced, merely for the purpose of shewing the incompetency of a witness, who has in his answer admitted himself interested in the event of the cause, that part only is to be read which states the ground of interest (4); for if the witness is incompetent, his evidence ought not to be received in any form; on the other hand, if he is competent, he ought to be examined vivâ voce in open court. When you read the answer of a party, says Ch. B. Gilbert, the confession must be all taken together: you shall not take only what makes against him, and leave out what (1) MS. case in 2 Selw. N. P. 685; Feb. 1809. See also Berkeley Peerage case, suprà, p. 178. (2) Per Holt C. J. Lynche v. Clarke, 3 Salk. 153. Earl of Bath v. Battersea, 5 Mod. 9. (3) R. v. Carr, 1 Sid. 418. Bull. N. P. 237. See aute, p. 79. (4) Sparin v. Drax, trial at bar, Bull. N. P. 238. makes makes for him; for the answer is read as the sense of the party (1). But, although the defendant may regularly insist on having the whole of the answer read, that, by comparing the several parts with each other, the true meaning and extent of the admissions may be more clearly understood, it will not therefore follow, that all the parts of his statement are equally credible, or that every thing, which he asserts, is to be admitted, as strictly proved. If, for example, he states a fact, not from his own knowledge, but on mere report, that would not be evidence in his favour; as, on the other hand, it would not be evidence against him, in case he had acknowledged the report to be different. The objection is, not that he speaks in his own. behalf, for that difficulty is waived by the other party, who offers the answer in evidence, but, that he speaks from hearsay, and has not the means of knowledge, which alone can be resorted to. In the case of Roe on demise of Pellatt and Others against Ferrars (2), where the defendant gave in evidence an answer by the lessors of the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Chambre, observing upon the degree of positive proof, which the lessors of the plaintiff had drawn from the answer in their own favour, expressed himself thus, "It is true, that the answer was introduced into the cause by the defendant, in whose behalf some parts of it were read. But, in those parts, on which the lessors of the plaintiff relied, they speak only to what "they have heard as truth." I think that was not admissible evidence, for it appears to me, that where one party reads a part of the answer of the other party in evidence, he makes the whole admissible only so far as to waive any objection to the competency of the testimony of the party making the answers, and that he does not thereby admit, as evidence, all the facts, which may happen to have been stated by way of hearsay only, in the course of the answer to a bill filed for discovery. This point, he added, does not indeed appear to have been con (1) Gilb. Ev. 44. See ante, p. 79. (2) 2 Bos. & Pull. 542. 548. tested |