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the case of Scott and Shearman. The principle there established is not confined to the judgments of courts of record, some of which are of a very inferior description, but extends equally to every court of competent or exclusive jurisdiction; and the examples cited by C. J. De Grey, in illustration of this principle, are all drawn from the proceedings in ecclesiastical courts, none of which are classed among courts of record. It seems therefore correct to infer, from the rule established in the Duchess of Kingston's case, as well as from analogy to several cases mentioned in the course of the present chapter, that a sentence of condemnation by commissioners of exeise will be conclusive, on the right of seizure coming incidentally into question in any other court, in all cases where by act of parliament they have a sole or exclusive jurisdiction.

In support of this position, the following authorities may be cited. First, in an action of trover against commissioners of excise (1), for levying the plaintiff's goods by their warrant under statute 12 C. 2. c. 23., the point was, whether, after they had adjudged low wines to be strong wines perfectly made, their judgment could be drawn in question again, so as to make the officers chargeable. The Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground, that the defendants had exceeded their jurisdiction. Rainsford B. said, that the defendants might well enough have justified by virtue of an authority from the commissioners of excise, who are judges of the fact, and whose authority is not traversable by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff here must have taken his remedy by appeal and no otherwise. But if the commissioners exceed their authority, and that appear to the Court, then their proceedings are coram non judice, and an action of trespass lies. But if that does not appear, it must be otherwise. Hale C. B., and the other judges present, argued to the same effect.

(1) Terry v. Huntington and Others, Hardr. 480., cited by Holt C. J. in Dr.

Groenvelt v. Dr. Burwell, 1 Ld. Raym, 471.

In another case, which was an action of trespass against commissioners of excise (1) for taking the plaintiff's money, the defendants pleaded not guilty, and gave in evidence their warrant and a judgment against the plaintiff, on an information against him for an offence against an excise law. It was objected on behalf of the plaintiff that this judgment was not peremptory, and that the plaintiff in this action was at liberty to disprove the truth of the matter of fact, upon which the defendants grounded their judgment. But this was denied by the Court, and a distinction was taken, namely, that if the commissioners had intermeddled with a thing which was not within their jurisdiction, then all is coram non judice, and that may be given in evidence upon this action; but it is otherwise, if they are only mistaken in their judgment in a matter within their cognizance, for that is not inquirable, otherwise than upon an appeal.

A third case may be cited to the same effect. In an action of trover for a quantity of tea (2), it appeared in evidence that the plaintiff sent the tea for one Lloyd with a permit, but the porter in his way called at the house of one R., and set it down there, where the defendant, an excise officer, seized it as forfeited, for being brought to R.'s house for R.'s use, without a permit to that place, according to the statute 10 G. 1. c. 10. s. 16. Upon not guilty pleaded, the defendant, to shew that the property was out of the plaintiff, produced a condemnation by the commissioners of excise upon an information against R. for receiving this tea without a permit, which sentence, it was insisted, was conclusive evidence of that fact, being a judgment before a proper jurisdiction. On the other side. it was insisted, that the plaintiff was no party to the suit; that R. had nothing to do with the tea; and that, if he made a feigned defence, or, as the case was, made default, yet the plaintiff ought not to be affected by that, but might

(1) Fuller v. Fotch, cor. Holt C. J., Carth. 346. Rep. temp. Holt, 287, S. C. (2) Roberts v. Fortune, cor. Lee

S

C. J., sittings after Easter term 1742,
I Hargr. Law Tracts, p. 468. n. from
Ford's MS.

show,

shew, that this was a case not subject to forfeiture. But Lee C. J. said, "The judgment of forfeiture is a judgment on the thing itself. How the tea came to R.'s house was a matter proper for the consideration of the commissioners; and, if the plaintiff was willing to have defended the suit, he might have come in pro interesse suo, which as he has not done, his property is bound. There is no more in this than the common case, namely, that courts of law pay such deference to the judgment of each other in matters within their jurisdiction, that the first determination by a proper authority ought to prevail: so that, the tea being forfeited, the property could not be in the plaintiff." And upon this the plaintiff was nonsuited.

An acquittal in the Exchequer was considered by Lord Kenyon, in the case of Cooke v. Sholl (1), to be conclusive evidence of the illegality of the seizure. That was an action of trover for several pipes of wine seized by the defendant for want of a permit. At the trial of the cause, the plaintiff gave in evidence a record of acquittal in the court of Exchequer. The defendant then insisted, that, under the circumstances of this case, the permit had expired, before the seizure was made; and Mr. Just. Heath, who tried the cause, was of that opinion; but, on its being suggested, that there had been a different determination in the court of Exchequer, he reserved the point for the opinion of the court of King's Bench, with liberty to enter a verdict for the defendant, if it should be adjudged for him. When the case came before the Court, Lord Kenyon thought the record of acquittal precluded all reasoning on the construction of the permit: but as the question respecting the judgment of acquittal was not upon the record, and the only question was on the construction of the permit, a verdict was entered for the defendant. This case, therefore, has not determined, that an acquittal in the

(1) 5 T. R, 255, and see a case in 12 Vin. Ab. (A. b. 22.) pl. 1. cor. Price B. acc.

Exchequer would be conclusive evidence of the illegality of a seizure, although certainly that appears to have been the opinion of Lord Kenyon. It may be observed, that an acquittal does not, like a conviction, ascertain any precise fact. The sentence might have proceeded on the ground, that sufficient evidence was not produced, on the part of the crown, to warrant the seizure; and, though the sentence may be conclusive as against the crown, it seems reasonable, that it should not have such a conclusive operation, in an action for scizing the property, against a third person, who was not a party with the crown in the original proceedings, and had no notice or opportunity for supporting the condemnation.

SECT. IV.

Of Sentences by Members of a College, Convictions before
Magistrates, &c.

THE principle, which has been before laid down as applicable to the sentences of courts of justice, seems to apply equally to the judicial proceedings of other tribunals, which are invested with an exclusive or peculiar jurisdiction.

A sentence of deprivation or expulsion of one of the members of a college, by the master and fellows, or by the visitor on an appeal, upon a subject within their jurisdiction, is conclusive in courts of law. And the justice of their decision cannot be questioned even in the King's Bench, though it belongs to that court to controul them, if they exceed the bounds of their jurisdiction. On this principle, a mandamus, to restore the fellow of a college, has been frequently refused (1). In the case of Philips v. Bury, it was decided, on an appeal to the House of Lords, that a sentence of deprivation, by the visitor of a college,

(1) Dr. Widrington's case, I Lev. 23. Dr. Patrick's case, 1 Lev. 65. Case of New College, 2 Lev. 14.

Sentence of expulsion by

a college.

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Convictions by magis

trates.

was conclusive evidence in an action of ejectment for one of the college estates; and the judgment of the court of King's Bench, which had been given on the opinions of three judges against the opinion of Lord Holt, was reversed (1). And in the last case on this subject, which was a prosecution for an assault in turning out of a college one who had been expelled, the court of King's Bench determined, that evidence, to impeach the sentence of expulsion, had been properly rejected at the trial. (2)

A conviction by a justice of the peace, who has competent jurisdiction, is, till reversed or quashed, conclusive evidence in favour of the justice, in an action against him for false imprisonment. Thus in the case of Strickland against Ward (3), tried before Mr. Just. Yates, (which was an action of trespass and false imprisonment against the defendant, a justice of the peace,) the defendant produced in evidence, under the general issue (4), a warrant signed by him, reciting a conviction of the plaintiff for unlawfully returning to a parish, whence he had been removed, and requiring the keeper of a house of correction to keep the plaintiff to hard labour; he also produced the conviction, referred to in the warrant, regularly drawn up: Mr. Just. Aston, upon this, gave his opinion, "that the conviction could not be controverted in evidence, but that, as the justice had a competent jurisdiction of the matter, his judgment was conclusive, till reversed or quashed; and that it could not be set aside at nisi prius.” The plaintiff was accordingly nonsuited. But where the magistrate has committed to prison, not having any jurisdiction, he will be liable to an action for false imprisonment, though the conviction has not been reversed or quashed (5); as, where the plaintiff was convicted and

(1) Philips v. Bury, Skin. 447. 1 Ld.
Raym. 5. S. C.

(2) R. v. Grundon, Cowp. 315.
(3) At Winchester sum. ass. 1767,
from a MS. note in 7 T. R. 633.
12 East, 75. 16 East, 21.

(4) St. 7 Jac. I. c. 5.

(5) Hill v. Bateman, 2 Str. 710. Crepps v. Durden, Cowp. 640. Morgan v. Hughes, 2 T. R. 225.

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