in the sentence, so that the precise ground of the determination could not be collected, the Court of King's Bench considered themselves at liberty to examine, whether the ground, on which the sentence proceeded, but which was not stated, actually falsified the warranty contained in the policy. Hence it follows, that it does not lie on the party, who produces the sentence, to shew that it has proceeded on the ground of enemy's property; but it is incumbent on the other party, who objects to the sentence, to shew that it proceeded on some other ground. (1) Where the sentence professes to be made on particular grounds, which are set forth in the sentence, but which appear not to warrant the condemnation, the sentence will not be conclusive as to such facts (2). Or if the sentence has not decided the question of property, nor declared whether it be neutral, but condemned the property as prize solely on the ground, that the ship had violated an ex parte ordinance, to which the neutral country had not assented, or on the ground of a foreign ordinance against the law of nations, such a sentence, though conclusive of the question of prize or no prize, would not be conclusive of the fact, whether or not the ship were neutral (3). Lastly, sentences of condemnation in foreign courts of prize are admissible only, where such courts are constituted according to the law of nations, and exercise their functions either in the belligerent country, or in the country of a co-belligerent or ally in the war (4). It has, therefore, been determined, that a sentence pronounced by the authority of the capturing power, within the dominions of a neutral country, to which the prize may have been taken, is illegal (5), and consequently would not be admissible evidence to falsify the warranty of neutrality. (1) Kindersley v. Chase, Park Ins. 490. (2) Calvert v. Bovil, 7 T. R. 523. 8 T.R.444. (3) Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. R. 444. Bird v. Appleton, 8 T. R. 562. Baring v. Clagett, 3 Bos. & Pull. 215. Bolton v. Gladstone, 2 Taunt. 85. 95. (4) Oddy v. Bovil, 2 East, 473. (5) Havelock v. Rockwood, 8 T. R. 268. Case of the Flad Oyen, 8 T. R. 270. n. (a); 1 Rob. Adm. Rep. 135. The Judgments reign courts. The sentence of any other foreign court of competent of other fo- jurisdiction, directly deciding a question which was properly cognizable by the law of the country, seems to be conclusive here, if the same question arise incidentally between the same parties in this country. Thus the sentence of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, directly establishing a marriage in that country, would be conclusive, in any of our courts, on the validity of the marriage (1). So, where a party, having accepted a bill of exchange drawn upon him at Leghorn, instituted a suit there, in which suit his acceptance was vacated, and, upon his return to this country, being sued again on his acceptance, applied to the court of Chancery for an injunction and relief against the second action, Lord Chancellor King decided that the cause was to be determined by the law of the country, where the bill was negotiated, and, as the acceptance had been there declared void by a competent jurisdiction, he thought the sentence must here also be conclusive (2). So on a criminal charge, as for murder committed in a foreign country, an acquittal in that country might be pleaded here in bar to an indictment for the same offence (3); because, says Mr. Justice Buller, a final determination in a court having competent jurisdiction is conclusive in all courts of concurrent-jurisdiction (4). From the two last cases, the following principle seems to be properly deducible, namely, that a party, who has been once discharged from a criminal charge or a legal demand by the sentence of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, may protect himself by that sentence against any fresh suit or prosecution instituted here for the same cause. If an action is brought in this country, as an action of debt or assumpsit, directly upon a foreign judgment, the sentence has been considered primâ facie evidence of the (1) Per Lord Hardwicke, in Roach v. Garvan, Ves. 159. (2) Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Stra. 733. (3) Hutchinson's case, cited 1 Show. Rep. 6.; also in 2 Str. 733. (4) Bull. N. P. 245. Roche's case, 1 Leach. Cr. C. 160. acc. debt, debt, but not conclusive. Lord Kenyon, indeed, in the case of Galbraith v. Neville (1), which was an action of debt on a judgment in the supreme court of Jamaica, said he entertained serious doubts concerning the doctrine laid down in the case of Walker v. Witter (2), that foreign judgments are not binding upon the parties here; and after referring to a case, which might seem to point against his opinion, he added, "that is not an authority for saying that we can revise the judgments of the lowest courts in foreign countries, where they have competent jurisdiction." However, Mr. Just. Buller, in the same case, said, "The doctrine which was laid down in the case of Sinclair v. Fraser has always been considered the true line ever since, namely, that the foreign judgment shall be primâ facie evidence of the debt, and conclusive, till it be impeached by the other party." "As to actions of this sort," he continued, "see how far the court would go, if what was said in the case of Walker v. Witter were departed from. It was there held, that the foreign judgment was only taken to be primâ facie evidence, that is, we will allow the same force to a foreign judgment, that we do to those of our own courts not of record (3): but if the matter were carried farther, we should give them more credit; we should give them equal force with those of courts of record here. Now a foreign judgment has never been considered as a record: it cannot be declared on, as such, and a plea of nul tiel record, in such a case, is a mere nullity. How then can it have the same obligatory force? In short, the result is this; that it is primâ facie evidence of the justice of the demand in an action of assumpsit, having no more credit than is given to every species of written agreements, namely, that it shall be considered as good, till it is impeached." And, in the case of Philips v. Hunter (4), Eyre C. J. said, "It is in one way only that the sentence or judgment of the court of a foreign state is examinable in our courts, (1) I Doug. Rep. 5. n. (2).; and 5 East, 475. n. (b), S. C. (2) I Doug. 1. (3) Acc. Ld. Mansfield in Herbert v. Cook, Willes Rep. 37. n. (a). (4) 2 H, Black. 410., in error. and and that is, when the party who claims the benefit of it applies to our courts to enforce it. When it is thus voluntarily submitted to our jurisdiction, we treat it not as obligatory to the extent, to which it would be obligatory perhaps in the country in which it was pronounced, nor as obligatory to the extent, to which by our law sentences and judgments are obligatory, not as conclusive, but as matter in pais, as a consideration primâ facie sufficient to raise a promise. We examine it, as we do all other considerations of promises, and for that purpose we receive evidence of what the law of the foreign state is, and whether the judgment is warranted by the law." SECT. III. On Judgments in rem in the Exchequer, and by A JUDGMENT of condemnation in the court of Exchequer, where proceedings in rem have been instituted, is conclusive evidence in any other court, as to all the world, that the goods were liable to be seized (1). The jurisdiction of the court of Exchequer in this case is not only competent, but sole and exclusive: and though no formal or express notice is given to the owner of the goods in person, yet he has sufficient notice to try the point of forfeiture, by the seizure of his property, by the proclamations according to the course of the court, and by the writ of appraisement. Whether a condemnation by the commissioners of excise ought to have the same conclusive operation, as a judgment of condemnation in the court of Exchequer, has not been clearly settled. In the case of Henshaw v. Pleasance, which was an action of trespass, brought against a revenue (1) Scott v. Shearman, 2 Black. Rep. 979. Per Ld. Kenyon C. J. in Geyer v. Aguillar, 7T. R. 696. Bull. N. P. 244. officer, officer, for seizing goods supposed to have been irregularly lodged and concealed, a sentence of condemnation by commissioners of excise was offered as conclusive evidence against the plaintiff; but Mr. Just. Blackstone, who tried the cause (1), refused to admit it to that extent, directing the jury that such a sentence was evidence, but not, like a condemnation in the Exchequer, conclusive. On a motion afterwards for a new trial, upon this supposed misdirection, the court of Common Pleas confirmed the Judge's opinion. "The reasons and authorities, it was said, relied on in the case of Scott v. Shearman, and other cases of the same kind, extend only to condemnations in the Exchequer, which is the king's supreme court of revenue, but not to the inferior jurisdiction of the boards of excise and customs." From the report of the case of Scott v. Shearman (2), it appears, that the ground of Mr. Just. Blackstone's opinion was, "that implicit credit ought to be given to any judgment in a court of record, which has competent jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that the jurisdiction of the court of Exchequer was in such a case not only competent, but sole and exclusive." The opinions of C. J. De Grey and the other Judges are not reported. They agreed in thinking the judgment of condemnation in the court of Exchequer conclusive evidence of the right of seizure, but it does not appear, whether they thought it conclusive on the ground of its being a judgment of a court of record. Nor is this reason stated as the ground of determination in any of the authorities referred to by Mr. Just. Blackstone. A different principle was certainly established in the case of the Duchess of Kingston (3), where De Grey C. J. in an elaborate judgment delivered the unanimous opinion of the Judges; and it is observable, that he pronounced this judgment within a year after the determination of the court in (1) Lond. Sitt. 1778, 2 Blac. Rep. 1174. (2) 2 Blac. Rep. 979. the |