to dress up, in the most tender and delicate terms, the queftion they found themselves under the neceffity to put; which queftion Mr. Wall pronounced to be an infult on his king, and to amount to a formal declaration of war. Yet the Gazette had told us over and over again, that we were on the most amicable footing with that court; therefore the ministry will deny the Gazette to be authority; for certainly they would not lend the fanction of their names to accounts which they know to be false; though fuch fpecious reports from fuch fancied authority, might ferve for a time to caft an obloquy on the man they feared and hated: what fort of credit then, will any other man give to minifterial apologisers, and panegyrifts?

It is much to be lamented, that this question which the Spaniard deemed a declaration of war, had not been put fooner in a lefs humble and fubmiffive ftrain, as our patriot minifter advised; if we had received the fame anfwer, which is a doubt, the Havannah had been our's long ago, without a doubt, and without offering up fo many brave men as victims to an ill timed attempt, and an unwholfome feafon; and if another noble enterprize, as was propofed, had been fet on foot at that juncture, the Spaniards, in all probability had fued for peace in a much fhorter time from the opening of the war, than from the commencement of it they had meditated war.-But the wifdom and forefight of this great man was treated as temerity, and the generous ardour he breathed for his country's glory, ferved only to make him reprefented as the incendiary of Europe.

Before I finish this letter, I cannot help obferving, that not a word is faid in the pretended preliminaries about diffolving the union between France and Spain; this makes me well affured, that the pretended preliminaries are altogether fictious,

for

for a diffolution of this union is the most neceffary article of the treaty; the bafis, without which no minister will prefume to hearken to a peace, confcious as we are, that fuch an union fubfifts between France and Spain: a treaty that does not include a formal renunciation of that union on their part, would be equal to a formal guarantee of it on our part; in its inevitable tendency it would amount to a total prohibition of any lucrative commerce with Spain in times of peace; and on any future rupture with either power, it would bring both upon us, when they would be fresh and vigorous, inftead of being worn out, as they now are, and fainting under the weight of our victorious

arms.

N. B. Left the ministry should plume themselves too much upon the prefent glorious posture of our affairs, and afcribe the merit of it to themselves, be it remembered that it was another person who then happily had the guidance of our military and naval operations, that planned the conquest of Martinico. That the fame perfon proposed an attempt on the Havannah, in cafe of a rupture with Spain, at a proper time and feafon, when fuch an attempt must have fucceeded.-That our fuccefs in Germany must be attributed to happy contingencies, and not to any peculiar affistance and encouragement given to that department of the war. Sept. 22, 1762.

Queries upon the Preliminary Articles of Peace.

"H

I. AD not France many advantages at the time of the late negociation, [Mr. Pitt's] which fhe has not at prefent; and we had not at the time of the late negociation?

2. Did not the uti poffidetis of France comprehend at that time the Landgraviate of Heffe, Munden, and the town of Gottingen in the electorate of Hanover? Does it now contain any more than the fingle town of Caffel, and that befieged, (and taken before the peace was figned;) and has France any thing at present to exchange but that town and the ifle of Minorca ?

3. What was the condition of our ally, the king of Pruffia, at that time, and what is it now? Was he not then attacked by the whole force of the mighty empire of Ruffia, and by Sweden? Is he not now free from both; and is not his condition on the whole, flourishing and profperous?

Is not the actual poffeffion of the Havannah, twelve capital fhips taken, three deftroyed, four millions value in plunder, and all the rich poffeffions of the Spanish monopoly in the new world laid open to us, a balance against the fucceffes of the Spaniards on the frontiers of Portugal ?

5. Have we not, fince the rupture of the late negociation, made ourselves mafters of Martinico, and all the rest of the French Caribbee Inlands?

6. Is not therefore our fituation, on the whole, infinitely more advantageous now, than it was at that period? Are not our allies in a better condition? Are not both France and Spain more depreffed? Are not at the fame time our expences much encreased; and have we not from all these circumftances united, a right to expect much more advantageous terms of peace from this, than from the laft negociation?

7. Since all (or at least all which are any ways confiderable) of our conquefts in the West Indies, are to be ceded to France, what is fuppofed equivalent to be paid for them, by our proud and infidious enemy out of her uti poffidetis? Is Minorca a fufficient compenfation for the fifhery, worth a million VOL. I. annually,

E

annually, and all the French Caribbees worth probably two millions more?

8. If fome of our conquefts are ceded gratis, to oblige France, merely from a principle of moderation and without any equivalent, is it not reasonable that we should retain fomething of real value, as an indemnification for an expence of seventy millions; and that we should amidst all this wonderful modera. tion in our conduct, difcover fome fmall degree of attention to our intereft?

9. Would not the retaining of either Martinico or Guadalupe be a great acquifition to England? and would not the furrender of either of them, feparately, be a great conceffion to France?

10. Is it poffible that befides the reftitution of the great French islands, we are to furrender allo our own most important island of St. Lucia, which we always had by right, and which we have now by conqueft; and what equivalent do we propose to receive for this additional and moft extraordinary conceffion?

11. If we are to retain nothing, or only fome inconfiderable spots, for what end did we waste our blood and treasure in Weft-India conquests, as in the laft negociation France offered us all we could defire, and more than we ever did defire, in North America, folely for a fhare in the Newfoundland fifbery; and were not thefe North-American acquifitions overpaid by the ceffion of that fifhery?

12. Did not our North American territories, on the plan proposed in the laft negociation, extend from 30 degrees, north latitude, on the fea fhore; and in the inland parts, from 36 degrees to the North Pole; that is from North to South, on the coaft, above 4000 English miles; and in the inland, 3500 and upwards; and did they not alfo extend (if we could travel as far as they extended) from Eaft and Weft, at least 2000 more? and

could

could the French minister after this keep his countenance, if we fuffered ourselves to be diverted by the romantic defire of adding foreft to foreft, on that wild continent, from any ferious commercial ¡ acquifition?

13. In what are we the richer by all our victories, or the French the poorer by all their loffes, if neither of the capital West Indian conquefts are to be retained? What is the particular value of our other acquifitions? Is it enough for a victorious nation to take up with mere fecurity?

14. What are the criterions of a bad peace by which nothing certain is added to our revenues, and a great certain expence incurred?

Martinico, Guadalupe, Grand Terre, Marigalante, make annually at least one hundred thousand hogfheads of white and brown fugar, the duty of which would be 600,000l. a year, for if we keep those islands, there can be no neceffity to give a draw-back to the exporter.

Their coffee, cocoa, cotton, and rum, would amount to as much as their fugar; and I think it could be easily made appear, that these islands would pay at least one million a year revenue; and this would pay half the interest of all the money borrowed the whole war, befide the amazing trade it would occafion to the kingdom.

Account of Tonnage.

T appears that the common notion of an increase of our commerce during the war, did not arise from an increase of our tonnage and exports, but from a greater demand than ufual of manufactures from a reduced number of hands. Our tonnage, as laid before the Houfe of Commons in December 1762, was as follows. E 2

From

1