widow, and the orphan, join to brand those depredators on the public with lafting infamy.

Already the treatment of the poor, the perverfion of the poor's-rate into tavern treats; the fhameful neglect in cleansing our streets; the misapplication of money; the granting licenfes to houfes of ill fame; already, I fay, all these must pass unnoticed, left Mr. Licenfer, Mr. Church-warden, Mr. Collector, Mr. Overfeer of the poor, or Mr. Scavenger, fhould think he is reflected upon, and profecute the divulger of his frauds and collufions.

Already, my dear countrymen! things are fo; and yet MORE reftraints (it is faid) are wanted. It is faid that a licenfer of the prefs is intended to be again imposed on us. But fhould that ever happen, then adieu all freedom; then civil and religious liberty will be at an end.

Then, O my fellow-citizens! oppression will talk barefaced forth, and will drop entirely the veil with which she now hides her ignominious head: then may be expected an arbitrary ministry, a venal fenate, a corrupt magiftracy, an ignorant, overbearing clergy; a defenceless navy, an enervated army, and a turbulent people: then shall we be forbid to utter our groans; for then THE LICENSING TOOL will refufe his imprimatur to any complaint, until at laft the long-stifled fire of refentment for repeated wrongs, may burft into a flame; which may destroy the licenser and his employers.

A

On the rights of juries.

MONGST other devices, to undermine the rights and power of juries, and render them infignificant, there has an opinion been advanced, that they are only judges of fact, and are. not at all to confider the law; fo that if a perfon

be

be indicted for a fact, which really is no crime in itself by law, but is worked up by words of form, as treasonably, feditiously, &c. if the fact be but proved to be done, though the wicked circumtances do not appear, they fhall be fupplied by the law, which you are not to take notice of, but find the bill, or bring in the perfon guilty, and leave the confideration of the cafe in law to the judges, whose business it is. Thus some people argue, but it is an apparent trap, at once to perjure ignorant juries, and render them fo far from being of good ufe, as to be only tools of oppreffion, to ruin and murder their innocent neighbours with the greater formality: for though it be true, that matter of fact is the most common and proper object of a jury's determination, and matter of law that of the judges, yet, as law arifes out of, and is complicated with fact, it cannot but fall under the jury's confideration.

Littleton, fect. 368, teaches us, that the jury may, at their election, either take upon them the knowledge of the law, and determine both the fact and law themfelves, or. elfe find the matter specially, and leave it to the judges: It is by applying matter of fact and law together, and from their due confideration of, and right judgment upon both, that a jury brings forth their verdict. Do we not fee in mott general iffues, as upon not guilty pleaded in trefpafs, breach of the peace, or felony, though it be matter in law, whether the party be a trefpaffer, a breaker of the peace, or a felon, yet the jury do not find the fact of the cafe by itself, leaving the law to the court, but find the party guilty or not guilty generally; fo that though they anfwer not the queftion fingly, what is law? yet they determine the law in all matters where iffue is joined. Is it not every day's practice, when perfons are indicted for murder, the jury does not

only

only find them guilty, or not guilty, but many times, upon hearing and weighing of circumftances, brings them in either guilty of the murder, or elfe only of man-flaughter, per mifadventure, or fe defendendo, as they fee caufe! Befides, as juries have ever been vefted with fuch power by law, fo to exclude from or diffeize them of the fame, were utterly to defeat the end of their inftitution. For then, if a person should be indicted for doing any. common innocent act, if it be but cloathed and difguifed in the indictment with the name of treafon, or fome other high crime, and proved by witneffes to have been done by him, the jury, tho' fatisfied in confcience that the fact is not any fuch offence as it is called, yet becaufe (according to this fond opinion) they have no power to judge of law, and the fact charged is fully proved, they fhould at this rate be bound to find him guilty: and being fo found, the judge may pronounce fentence against him, for he finds him a convicted traitor, &c. by his peers and fo juries should be made mere properties to do the drudgery, and bear the blame of unreasonable profecutions; but all this is abfurd, and abhorred by the wisdom, juftice, and mercy of our laws.

TH

On trials by juries.

HE trial by juries of our peers in all cases of indictments and informations, lying at the very root, and being one of the moft fundamental principals of our prefent happy constitution; a conftitution fo happily conftructed, as at the fame time to preferve the fixed prerogatives of the crown without the leaft encroachment on the people; fo nobly contefted for by our ancestors, and now fo firmly rivetted in the minds of the inhabitants of this

country,

country, that fure I am, no profpects, no offers, no gifts, would be capable to induce them, to defert thofe notions, principles, and maxims of liberty, which they have from their birth been taught to esteem as congenial with the very existence of Englishmen; and which is the admiration, the jealoufy and envy of foreigners. I fay, trial by juries of our peers, being the touchftone of our liberties, it well deferves a few moments enquiry: ft, upon what principles it is established; and 2dly, what fhould be the guiding rule of a jury's determination upon critical profecutions. Now as to the first object of enquiry upon what principles this inestimable bleffing of a trial by a jury of our peers, is established. The leading principle, is undoubtedly to preserve inviolable the liberty of every individual, that no man may be punished till after a legal conviction, a conviction by twelve men to whom he can have no objection, and whofe judgment cannot be fuppofed to be warped by any undue influence. This I take to be the leading principle. Again, it effectually removes any foundation of complaints, of injuftice, arbitrary determination, finifter view, perfonal pique, or any thing elfe, from the accufed perfon. I fay, it effectually removes any foundation of complaint, which certainly may with great reafon be pleaded, where the power of determination is invested in one man, when he may magifterially decide upon evidence on one fide, without hearing. what may be offered on the other fide; when he may pafs judgment upon apreconception of the cafe; when family connection, or a thoufand other poffible cafes, may influence him to pass a wrong judgment. In fuch a fituation as this, there certainly would be the strongest reafon in the world, to object to the determination. In like manner fuppofe a power of determination, invested in a set of men, who from VOL. I. S fituation

fituation, place, expectation, &c. have a vifible and apparent end to anfwer, either as to honour or lucrative advantage, in the condemnation of an accused person: Or fuppofe thefe men to act at the beck, or under the direction of a fuperior, whofe very existence in office depends upon this condemnation, furely then no one could be found, fo far loft to all true notions of justice and equity, as to approve of fuch a determination. So much for the first object of inquiry.-Now, as for the other part, what fhould be the guiding rule of a jury's determi nation, upon criminal profecutions, particularly in cafes of libels between the crown and the fubject. These are cafes which do not reft altogether upon evidences. Here a jury has not only to closely attend to a complicated evidence, and which poffibly after investigation, they may be of opinion, is pofitive as to the matter of fact; but then (being moft confeffedly judges of law as well as fact) they have to attend to the foundation of the action. A man may be prosecuted for walking or riding on the king's highway, the moft pofitive and conclufive evidence may be brought, as to the matter of fact; but I am fure no jury that well confiders the cafe, would find a perfon guilty for fo doing. Only let us confider a little the import of the word guilty: it certainly fixes the ftigma of an offence upon the perfon against whom it is levelled, declares to the world, he has, (in their opinion) committed an action contrary to the laws of his country, and deferving punishment accordingly. This idea alone, I fhould imagine, would be fufficient to determine a jury as to their verdict, when they are of opinion the foundation of the action is not criminal in itself. I fhall close what I have to fay upon this fubject, with making an obfervation or two, with regard to a libel, an offence fo undetermined in itself, that the greatest lawyers of our times (and who poffibly are as knowing and

as