The battle of New Ross was a loyalist victory, but the extraordinary resolution and courage shown by the insurgents greatly increased the alarm. Although the spirit and gallantry of his Majesty's army,' wrote Camden, finally overcame the rebels, your grace will learn how very formidable are their numbers, led on as they are by desperation and enthusiasm. . . . Major Vesey, who commanded the Dublin County Regiment after the melancholy fate of Lord Mountjoy, describes the attack which was made as the most furious possible. ... Our force was obliged twice to retire; they were, however, finally successful, but they were so harassed and fatigued as not to be able to make any forward movement, and your grace will observe how very formidable an enemy Colonel Crawford, who has been so long accustomed to all descriptions of service, states the rebels to be.' 1 The letters of Colonel Crawford and Major Vesey were inclosed, and they fully bear out Camden's estimate of the seriousness of the crisis. The insurgents,' wrote the first officer, ' yesterday marched from Carrick posed to panic, took an equally grave view. The day after Walpole's defeat, he wrote: 'Our situation is critical in the extreme. We know that there has been a complete military organisation of the people in threefourths of the kingdom. In the North, nothing will keep the rebels quiet but a conviction that, where treason has broken out, the rebellion is merely Popish ; but, even with this impression on their minds, we cannot be certain that their love of republicanism will not outweigh their inveteracy against Popery. In the capital there is a rebel army organised; and if the garrison burne to within a mile and a half of this place. This morning General Johnston was about giving orders for advancing against them, when they did it, and made as severe an attack as is possible for any troops with such arms. They were in great force, not many firearms, and no guns at first. They drove in our right, followed the troops quite into the town, and got possession of four guns. By very great personal exertion of General Johnston they were repulsed, and the repeated attacks they afterwards made (being far less vigorous than the first) were beaten back, and the guns retaken. They certainly have given proofs of very extraordinary courage and enthusiasm, and it is, in my opinion, very doubtful that the force at present under General Johnston would be able to subdue the Wexford insurgents. Should it spread now, it would be very serious indeed. . . . The militia behaved with spirit, but are quite ungovernable.' 1 'These men,' wrote Beresford, 'inflamed by their priests, who accompany them in their ranks, fight with a mad desperation. It is becoming too apparent that this is to be a religious, bloody war. We must conceal it as long as we can, because a great part of our army 1 Colonel Crawford, June 5. Two days later the same officer wrote to General Cradock, that before the attack on New Ross he had so contemptible an opinion of the rebels as troops,' that he thought the best plan would be to divide the army into small columns, and beat them in detail. 'But,' he says, 'I have now totally changed my opinion. I never saw any troops attack with more enthusiasm and bravery than the rebels did on the 5th. To insure success we must be in considerable force. Should we be defeated, a general insurrection would probably be the consequence. During the affair of the 5th inst., large bodies of people collected behind us in the county of Kilkenny, and certainly were waiting only the event of the attack made by the people of Wexford. In short, I do not think General Johnston's and General Loftus's corps, even when united, sufficiently strong-not nearly so.' (June 7, Record Office.) and most of our militia are Papists, but it cannot be long concealed. . . . If the militia should turn or the French come before the contest is ended and the rebellion crushed, Ireland goes first, and Great Britain follows, and all Europe after.' 'The only comfort we have is, that the Northern Protestants begin to see their danger, and are arming in our favour, but . . . Government are afraid to trust them, lest the Papists of the militia and army should take affront.' Castlereagh was acting as Chief Secretary during the illness of Pelham, and though he was by no means inclined to exaggerate danger, he took an equally grave view of the situation. The rebellion in Wexford,' he wrote, 'has assumed a more serious shape than was to be apprehended from a peasantry, however well organised.' 'An enemy that only yielded after a struggle of twelve hours is not contemptible. Our militia soldiers have, on every occasion, manifested the greatest spirit and fidelity, in many instances defective. subordination, but in none have they shown the smallest disposition to fraternity, but, on the contrary, pursue the insurgents with the rancour unfortunately connected with the nature of the struggle. Had the rebels carried Ross, the insurrection would have immediately pervaded the counties of Waterford and Kilkenny.' Their forces 'consist of the entire male inhabitants of Wexford, and the greatest proportion of those of Wicklow, Kildare, Carlow, and Kilkenny. From Carlow to Dublin, I am told, scarcely an inhabitant is to be seen. I am sorry to inform you, that our fears about the North are too likely to be realised. . . . Rely on it, there never was in any country so formidable an effort on the part of the people. It may not disclose itself in the full extent of its preparation if it is early met with 1 Auckland Correspondence, iv. 9, 10, 13. VOL. IV. D D vigour and success, but our forces cannot cope in a variety of distant points with an enemy that can elude an attack when it is inexpedient to risk a contest.'1 'Wexford, the peaceable, the cultivated,' wrote Cooke, 'has been and is the formidable spot. You will recollect, there were no returns, no delegates from Wexford. How artificial! You recollect in Reynolds' evidence that Lord Edward wanted to go to France, to hasten a landing from frigates at Wexford.2 Be assured the battle of New Ross was most formidable. It was a grand attempt of the rebels, well planned and boldly attempted, and the success would have been ruinous. Johnston deserves greatly. He placed himself at the head of the Dublin County Regiment when the affair grew desperate, and by personal exertions succeeded.' The Dublin yeomanry are wonderful.'3 A landing of the French or the slightest disaster, Camden again repeated, might make the situation most alarming. 'The most able generals, and a most numerous and well-disciplined army, can alone save Ireland from plunder, perhaps from separation from Great Britain.' 4 The apprehensions expressed in these letters would probably have proved in no degree exaggerated if the French had landed, or if the rebellion had spread. But day after day the insurgents in Wexford looked in vain across the sea for the promised succour. The North, in which they had placed so much trust, was still passive, and although the banner of religion had been raised, and priests were in the forefront of the battle, the Catholic province of Connaught and the great Catholic counties of the South were perfectly tranquil. 'Castlereagh to Pelham. 2 See Howell's State Trials, xxvii. 412. 3 Cooke to Pelham, June 3, 1798. 4 Camden to Portland, June 10, 1798. See, too, a number of very interesting letters on the situation, in the Auckland Correspondence, iv. 3–10. The insurrection was still confined to a few central counties, and outside Wexford it was nowhere formidable. The tranquillity of the greater part of Ulster during the rebellion, the defection of the Presbyterians from the movement of which they were the main originators, and the great and enduring change which took place in their sentiments in the last years of the eighteenth century, are facts of the deepest importance in Irish history, and deserve very careful and detailed examination. It would be an error to attribute them to any single cause. They are due to a concurrence of several distinct influences, which can be clearly traced in the correspondence of the time. Much was due to the growth of the Orange movement, which had planted a new and a rival enthusiasm in the heart of the disaffected province, and immensely strengthened the forces opposed to the United Irishmen;1 and much also to the success of long-continued military government. Martial law had prevailed in Ulster much longer than in the other provinces, and, as we have seen, an enormous proportion of the arms which had been so laboriously accumulated, had been discovered and surrendered. When the rebellion broke out, all the measures of precaution that were adopted in Dublin were taken in the towns of Ulster. The yeomanry were placed on permanent duty, and patrolled the streets by night. The inhabitants were forbidden to leave their houses between nine at night and five in the morning, and compelled to post up the names of those who were within them, which were to be called over whenever the military Our Northern accounts are still very good; no stir there except on the right side. The people called Orangemen (whose principles have been totally mis represented) keep the country in check, and will overpower the rebels, should they stir.' (Beresford to Auckland, June 1; Auckland Correspondence, iii. 442.) |