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CAMILLUS No. V.-Continued.

HAT would fuch a people have faid to our envoy, had he returned with this abfurd tale in his mouth! Countrymen! I could have obtained the surrender of your pofts, and an adequate provifion for the reparation of your loffes by unjust captures-I could have terminated your controverfy with Great Britain, and fecured the continuance of your peace, but for one obftacle, a refufal to compenfate for the negroes carried away; on this point the British government maintained a conftruction of the treaty different from ours, and adhered to it with inflexibility. I confefs, that there appeared to be much doubt concerning the true conftruction: I confefs, alfo, that the object was of inconfiderable value. Yet it made a part of our claims; and I thought the hazards of war preferable to a renunciation of it."

What would his adverfaries have replied to him on such an occafion? No ridicule would have been too ftrong, no reproach too bitter. Their triumph would have been complete: for he would have been defervedly left without advocate, without apologist.

It cannot admit of a serious doubt, that the affair of the negroes, was too queftionable in point of right, too infignificant in point of intereft, to have been fuffered to be an impediment to the immenfe objects which were to be promoted by an accommodation of differences acceptable in other refpects. There was no general principle of national right or policy to be renounced. No confideration of honor forbid the renunciation, every calculation of interest invited to it. The evils of war for one month would outweigh the advantage, if at the end of it there was a certainty of attainment.

But was war the alternative? Yes, war or disgrace.

The United States and Great Britain had been brought to iffue. The recent fpoliations on our commerce, fuperadded to the evils of a protracted Indian war, connected with the detention of the western pofts, and accompanied with indications of a defign to contract our boundaries, obftructing the courfe of our fettlements and the enjoyment of private rights, and producing serious and growing difcontent in our western country, rendered it indifpenfable, that there fhould be a fet

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tlement of old differences, and a reparation of new wrongs; or, that the sword should vindicate our rights.

This was certainly, and with reason, the general fense of our country, when our envoy left it. There are many indications that it was the opinion. of our government; and it is to be inferred, that our envoy understood the alternative to be as has been stated.

Indeed what else could be contemplated? after the depreda~ tions which had been committed upon our commerce, after the strong fenfibility which had been discovered upon the occafion in and out of our public councils, after an envoy extraordinary had been fent to terminate differences and obtain reparation; if nothing had refulted, was there any choice but reprifals? fhould we not have rendered ourselves ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of the whole world, by forbearing them?

It is curious to obferve the inconfiftency of certain men. They reprobate the treaty as incompatible with our honor, and yet they affect to believe an abortion of the negociation would not have led to war. If they are fincere, they must think that national honor confifts in perpetually railing, complaining, blustering, and fubmitting. For my part, much as I deprecate war, I entertain no doubt that it would have been our duty to meet it with decifion, had negociation failed; that a due regard to our honor, our rights and our interests would have enjoined it upon us. Nor would a pufillanimous paffivenefs have faved us from it. So unsettled a state of things would have led to fresh injuries and aggravations; and circumstances, too powerful to be refifted, would have dragged us into war. We should have loft our honor without preferving our peace. Nations in fimilar fituations have no option but to accommodate differences, or to fight. Those which have strong motives to avoid war, fhould, by their moderation, facilitate the accommodation of differences. This is a rule of good sense, a maxim of found policy.

But the misfortune is, that men will oppofe imagination to fact. Though we see Great Britain predominant on the ocean; though we obferve her pertinaciously refifting the idea of pacification with France, amidst the greateft difcouragements; though we have employed a man whofe fagacity and integrity have been hitherto undisputed, and of a character far from flexible, to ascertain what was practicable; though circumstances favored his exertions; though much time and pains were beftowed upon the fubject; though there is not only his teftimony, but the testimony of other men who were immediately on

the fcene, and in whom there is every reafon to confide, that all was attained which was attainable yet we ftill permit ourfelves to imagine, that more and better could have been done, and that by taking even now a high and menacing tone, Great Britain may be brought to our feet.

Even a ftile of politeness in our envoy has been conftrued to his difadvantage. Because he did not mistake ftrut for dignity, and rudeness for fpirit; because he did not, by petulence and afperity, inlift the pride of the British court against the success of his miffion, he is reprefented as having humiliated himself and his nation. It is forgotten that mildnefs in the manner, and firmnefs in the thing, are moft compatible with true dignity, and almost always go further than harfhness and ftatelinefs. Suppofitions that more could be done by displaying, what is called, greater fpirit, are not warranted by facts. It would be extremely imprudent on that bafis, to truft ourselves to a further experiment-to the immenfe viciffitudes in the affairs of Europe, which from moment to moment may effentially vary the relative fituations of the contending parties. If there ever was a state of things which demanded extraordinary circumspection, and forbade a spirit of adventure, it is that of the United States at the existing juncture, viewed in connection with the present very fingular and incalculable posture of Europe.

But it is afked, to avoid Scylla, may we not run upon Charybdis?—If the treaty fhould preferve our peace with Britain, may it not interrupt it with France ?-I answer, that to me there appears no room for apprehenfion. It will be fhewn in the courfe of the difcuffion, that the treaty interferes in no particular with our engagements to France, and will make no alteration whatever in the fate of things between us and her, except as to the felling prizes in our ports, which, not being required by treaty, was originally permitted merely becaufe there was no law to forbid it, and which being confined to France was of very questionable propriety on the principles of neutrality, and has been a fource of diffatisfaction to the other belligerent powers. This being the cafe, no caufe of umbrage is given to France by the treaty, and is as contrary to her intereft as to inclination, wantonly to feek a quarrel with us. Proftrate indeed were our fituation, if we could not, without offending France, make a treaty with another power, which merely tended to extinguifh controverfy, and to regulate the rules of commercial intercourfe, and this not only without violating any duty to France, but without giving any preference to another. It is aftonishing that thofe who affect fo much nicety about national

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honor, do not feel the extreme humiliation of fuch an idea. As to the denomination of alliance with Great Britain which has been given to the treaty, it is an infult to the understandings of the people, to call it by fuch a name. There is not a tittle of it which warrants the appellation.

CAMILLUS.

T

No. VI.

HERE is one more objection to the treaty for what it does not do, which requires to be noticed. This is an omiffion to provide against the impreffment of our seamen.

It is certain that our trade has fuffered embarrassments in this respect, and that there have been abuses which have operated very oppreffively upon our feamen; and all will join in the wish that they could have been guarded against in future by the treaty.

But it is easier to defire this, than to fee how it could have been done. A general stipulation against the impreffment of our feamen would have been nugatory, if not derogatory. Our right to an exemption is perfect by the laws of nations, and a contrary right is not even pretended by Great Britain. The difficulty has been, and is, to fix a rule of evidence, by which to discriminate our seamen from theirs, and by the difcrimination to give ours protection, without covering theirs in our fervice. It happens that the two nations speak the fame language, and in every exterior circumftance closely refemble each other; that many of the natives of Great Britain and Ireland are among our citizens, and that others, without being properly our citizens, are employed in our veffels.

Every body knows, that the fafety of Great Britain depends upon her marine. This was never more emphatically the case, than in the war in which fhe is now engaged. Her very exiftence as an independent power, feems to reft on a maritime fuperiority.

In this fituation, can we be furprised that there are difficulties in bringing her to confent to any arrangement which would enable us, by receiving her feamen into our employment, to detain them from her fervice? Unfortunately, there can be devised no method of protecting our seamen which does not involve that danger to her. Language and appearance, instead of being a guide, as between other nations, are

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