the day. They kept us from getting the immense benefit of the sudden strength displayed by the French Republic. They kept us from deriving any benefit from the victories of Napoleon. And they could not prevent England from searching our vessels, seizing our sailors, and capturing our merchantmen during the whole humiliating period. And then when France had been exhausted and lay bleeding at every pore, England pounced upon the silly nation which had not recognized its opportunity; and she had the extreme good luck to fight us when France could not have helped had she been inclined.

Mr. Theodore Roosevelt speaks of the "infamous conduct" of Jefferson and Madison in not preparing this republic for war. "Infamous" is a strong word even when thrown at notorious knaves: when applied to such men as Jefferson and Madison it has no more meaning than Daniel O'Connell's reference to the Duke of Wellington as "a stunted corporal," or the British epithet "Corsican ogre when applied to Napoleon. Mr. Roosevelt was young when he denounced Jefferson and Madison as "infamous "; he would not repeat that statement now, we may be sure.

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But when even a younger man, it might have occurred to Mr. Roosevelt that all wars have their remote causes, sometimes hidden sources; and he might have inquired "What was the true origin of

our War of 1812?" And had he given the subject the same fearless, intelligent, and independent study that he gave to the conquest of the Southwest, he would have put his unerring finger on the broken French treaty of 1778, and would have bravely told the world: "This dishonored treaty, this breach of national faith, this selfish ingratitude to the people who came to us in the hour of our need-this, this was the origin of our woes."

In short, the fight was already begun, and we had a friend whose strength and fidelity had borne the stern test of the battle-field. We threw away that friend, and during the strife, which had never really ceased, and which was kept up till the Southern volunteers annihilated the British at New Orleans, we got buffets from both France and Great Britain, when we could have continued the alliance with France and compelled Great Britain to keep the peace.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Jefferson made considerable preparations for war. The regular army was increased by 6,000 men; militia to the number of 100,000, to serve six months, was authorized; and $5,000,000 spent upon war equipment and coast defenses.

As events showed afterward, we did not lack for troops. What we needed was strong, loyal public sentiment supporting the administrationand generals who would fight.

CHAPTER XLVI

BURR'S TRIAL. JEFFERSON'S RECORD

AFTER the expiration of his term as Vice-President Burr was adrift. A combination of the Clintons and Livingstons in New York, aided by Hamilton, had defeated him in the race for Governor; and after he had settled old scores by calling Hamilton out and killing him in the duel, a sudden wave of indignation had driven Burr from the State. Indictments for murder having been found against him; he could not return. Jefferson had taken sides with the Livingston-Clinton faction, as any practical politician would have done, and Burr soon realized that he had no footing anywhere. The President refused to give him a foreign appointment, or to otherwise aid him, and he became desperate.

What his famous plot was in reality can not be known with certainty. Late in his life he declared that he had intended to do what Sam Houston and others did in Texas. Andrew Jackson certainly understood that some such design against Spain was in contemplation, else he would never have gone so far with Burr as to call out his Tennessee militia.

The purchase by Burr of the large Spanish grant points in the same direction, as did the talk at Blennerhasett's Island, where Mexican empire was the burden of the song. But the overtures which Burr made to Great Britain first, and then to Spain, and then to France, disclosed a purpose to sever the Union. It may be safely assumed that he would have stopped at nothing in the effort to retrieve his fortunes.

There was a good deal of secret plotting and planning, cipher despatches, vague soundings of this man and that, purchase of supplies, collection of boats, employment of men, journeying up and down the Ohio and the Mississippi.

Had Burr concentrated his mind upon the effort to wrest territory from Spain, talked that and nothing but that, frittering away no unnecessary time in social festivities, he might have done something great in the Southwest. Such a design was familiar in those regions, and was popular. George Rogers Clarke had meditated such a scheme, and had found no difficulty in gathering up volunteers. Others had brooded over similar plans, and the sentiment favoring them had only to organize to become formidable.

It was Burr's misfortune, however, to put faith in General James Wilkinson, as better men than Burr had done.

Historians of our republic differ in many things,