Lordships for trial, I conceive my learned Friend is taking the chance of introducing every thing calculated to create an unjust prejudice against the prisoner who is on his trial; and when my learned Friend says it is impossible this can be decided by the mere statement of a general principle, I humbly submit I am addressing a Court of law which will decide on general principles and on general principles alone, and that one of the most important general principles which can come before a Court for trial, perhaps, the most important of all general prinples is, that no man shall be affected by evidence which he has no opportunity of contradicting, and that he shall not be affected by the hearsay of any person whatever, unless the particular declaration the person has made is precisely and specifically connected with the confederacy

the evidence of confederacy I think may properly be laid before the Court, but in what manner and in what terms these people insisted on taking either pikes or anything else, (for it may go any length, there is no possible irrelevant matter which may not be brought before the Court) unless we abandon all general principles, I am wholly at a loss to discover. My learned Friend says, that when that general question is put, if any thing irrelevant should come out in answer to it, it may then be discarded by the Court; I understood my learned Friend to say that when Mr. Serjeant Copley's question was put, if it introduced anything irrelevant to the question that might then be discarded from the recollection of the Court.

Mr. Attorney General. Oh dear no! the question I made was, whether this examination was or was not irrelevant.

Mr. Denman. I rather supposed my learned Friend to refer to what passed as to the case of Weightman, who was following with bullets near at hand on the party who had passed; if he did not I will not observe upon that, but it is the question that I must object to; it is too late to object to the answer; if the irrelevant matter does come out, it may produce the most hurtful and injurious effects upon the interests of this man now at the bar; it is

to the question and not to the answer the objection must be made, and therefore when a question is put as to something not relevant to the general object by a set of men never shown to have been under the controul of this man, or in the least communication with him, I submit to your Lordships that that inquiry cannot possibly be pursued ; it may lead to evils of every description; it would be too late after the answer was given to exclude it; all the prejudice would then be effected, and it would not be possible to efface it from the minds of the jury. I apprehend, therefore, that my learned Friend has not answered the objection which I took; and with respect to Lord George Gordon's case, I apprehend nothing can be more clearly distinguishable from his case than the present.

Lord Chief Baron Richards. I am of opinion this evidence is admissible, and most clearly admissible; the course of the evidence has been to shew what the object of the Prisoner was; the Prisoner himself, according to the evidence, gave encouragement to those who were about him, by pointing out that there were others in other places, and particularly upon Nottingham Forest, who' were ready to support them; he has, in fact, according to the evidence as it stands now, united them to himself and himself to them; and it seems to me that what passed on their part is as much evidence to affect him, as what passed from those detachments with himself. When it is once admitted that the facts done by those persons in Nottingham Forest are to be admitted in evidence, I cannot conceive how it is possible to separate the declarations and the words of the persons who transacted those acts: for they are part of the transactions, and they serve to shew the object of those transactions; but I think it is evidence on a different principle quite, that the Prisoner has identified himself with those persons, and that he and they are as much part of the same body as he and the persons immediately accompanying him,

Mr. Justice Dallas. I am of the same opinion. I have not been able to bring myself to entertain the slightest degree of doubt upon this subject. In all cases of this sort

there are two questions to be considered of separate and distinct consideration: the first is as to the admissibility of evidence, and the second, as to the effect of it; with respect to the latter, we have not now any thing to do with that; the consideration, therefore, is reduced and limited to the former, whether this evidence be or be not admissi sible. Now first we must consider what is the nature of the charge, because the precise consideration of that will enable us to dispose of one part of the argument made by Mr. Denman, which is, that no person ought or can be affected in a Court of Justice by that which was said by another when he was not present. I apprehend that is entirely a misapprehension of the general principle in the present instance, for this is a charge founded in combination and conspiracy. I agree with Mr. Denman, that it is better to keep one's eyes steadily fixed on principles which are the invariable lights by which we ought to be guided whenever we can, than to wander into the circumstances of individual cases, which would lead to endless controversy; and agreeing with him upon this, it is only to consider what is the general principle and result of all the cases applying to a charge of this nature: and it is this, that every thing said or done in the course of the conspiracy connected with or conducive to the end, or object of that conspiracy, is evidence against each and all, whether absent or present; and be the party who he may, connected with the conspiracy, doing the act or making the declaration; it is not, therefore, a well founded objection, in a charge of this sort, to a declaration made in the absence of a party, that it is in his absence.

Now what are the facts of this case, and the question is, whether the Prisoner himself has said or done any thing that leads to rendering this evidence admissible; the charge in its nature is one of conspiracy; whether it existed or not, of course, I do not presume to say, but the very nature of the plan, considering its nature generally, and the precise declaration of the party is, that a rising is to take place in different places about the same time, and the Prisoner himself has expressly pointed to a rising of

this sort which is to take place at Nottingham; it seems therefore to me that he has connected himself directly with any act done in that neighbourhood on the night in question, by referring, in the hearing of all those he had collected and assembled together, to that which was an event to take place, and therefore I think the Prisoner himself has made that evidence by declarations he has made, anticipating and foretelling, and by foretelling implying a knowledge of the event to take place there.

But I own that in another view of this subject I cannot conceive how this objection can for a moment be sustained; no objection is made to the act done. Now I am unable to distinguish in the first instance between act and declaration, for an act done is no more evidence against an absent party, unless he be connected in some way with the party doing it than a declaration made, and therefore the admission in proof of the act done can only proceed upon the supposition that the party doing the act is sufficiently connected with the prisoner to let in the proof of the act done. Then what becomes of the rule of law ap plicable in all cases? and here we must lose sight of the leading principle established if we do not receive the declaration of the party at the time he is doing that act which qualifies the act, and shows what is the act he is about to do, and in this case it appears to me it is not to be considered merely as a declaration, but it is a demand of arms, falling in with the conspiracy, and the declaration of these persons, that there would be armed persons in different parts of the country at the same time; therefore not wandering into cases, for I agree with the Attorney General that the rule will vary according to circumstances, but keeping my eye upon the general principle, as applicable to the facts of this case, I think this evidence is most clearly admissible.

Mr. Justice Abbott. I most entirely agree with the Lord Chief Baron and my brother Dallas for the reasons which have been so fully given, that I feel it unnecessary to add

any.

Mr.Justice Holroyd, I am most clearly of the same opinion,

and as I think no legal mind can be, after the reasons given, unconvinced, that this is evidence it appears to me unnecessary to give further reasons for its admissibility.

Mr. Serjeant Copley (to Roper.) On your refusing the fire-arths, what was said outside ?

A. They told me that if I refused they should be under the necessity of breaking the door open, and taking them by force.

Q. What did you say or do upon that?

A. I told them that if they did, I would blow the first man's brains out that entered.

Q. Was any thing said in answer to that?

A. Their reply was "will you?" I said “ yes."

Q. Upon your saying "yes," did they say or do any thing further?

A. A man called for the men with the fire-arms to come forward.

Q. A man outside?

A. Yes.

Q. Upon his calling for the men with the fire-arms to come forward, did you hear anything outside?

A. The piazzas were paved with flag stones, and I heard a bustle there, and expected they were coming in.

Q. Where was the bustle?

4. Under the piazzas, near my house.

Q. Is your door under the piazzas ?

A. Yes it is.

Q. What did you do?

A. They did not make any attempt, but they came forward and asked me how many fire-arms I had.

Q. They did not make any attempt at the door, you mean? A. No.

Q. What did you tell them?

A. I told them that I had two; that the one was a rifle piece and the other a fusee; they asked me if I would give them to them; I told them no; they asked me whether I would sell them to them; I told them no, I would neither sell them nor give them, nor part with them on any account; that they were my own property.

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