thing which an enemy might find useful or convenient. The barbarous code of antiquity on this subject has become obsolete. Plunder upon land is no longer tolerated, and the sacking and desolation of towns and cities. Private property is held now to be inviolable, even by an invading army, and if taken at all, only upon full compensation being made. Bonaparte is universally condemned for making spoliations abroad for the purpose of enriching Paris; and he who now destroys private dwellings or public edifices, says Kent, or makes war upon monuments of art and models of taste, violates the modern usages of war, and is sure to meet with indignant resentment and to be held up to the general scorn and detestation of the world. The United States in a treaty with Prussia, concluded on in 1785, went so far as to insert a stipulation, that in case of war between these powers, non-combatants, cultivators of the earth, fishermen, merchants and traders in unarmed ships, artists and mechanics inhabiting towns, should not be disturbed. The question is somewhat important, whether war must be made by an open and formal declaration. The ancient usage was the herald. The last instance of a herald being sent into the hostile country, is stated to have been in 1635. International law writers differ in respect to the obligations of a public declaration; but usage has been of late years rather against the declaration. The war between England and France in 1778, began in the recall of a minister, and was prosecuted without formal declaration; and so of several other wars between these nations. After the United States had made a formal announcement of hostilities in 1812, they prosecuted them without delaying a moment for the enemy to receive notice of the declaration. On the breaking out of war, the interesting inquiry comes upwhat is the position occupied by the persons and property of the enemy found within the jurisdiction of the country? Magna Charta laid down the liberal rule six hundred years ago, "that if our merchants be safe and well treated by them, theirs should have the same favor at our hands." This was a rule for the advantage of trade. Vattel is strongly against any right to detain the persons or property of those subjects of the enemy who came into the country under the sanction of public faith. Other writers, however, disagree. The subject is now almost universally provided for in treaties. By ours with Colombia and Venezuela the persons and effects of strangers may be withdrawn; by that with Chili, they are even allowed to remain in the country and continue their trade. The act of Congress, 1798, says Chancelor Kent, authorizes the President, in case of war, to direct the conduct to be observed toward the subjects of the hostile nations found within the United States, and being aliens, and upon what security their residence should be permitted; and it is declared, in relation to those who were to depart, that they should be allowed such reasonable time as might be consistent with public safety for the recovery, disposal, and removal of their goods and effects for their departure. We have none of us forgotten the famous alien and sedition laws of 1798, which provoked the able resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky, and the lofty patriotism of Madison and Jefferson. The highest authority in the United States, however, the Supreme CONFISCATION-PRISONERS Of war. 213 Court, in pronouncing upon the case of Brown, which grew out of the last war, took the position that confiscation of the enemy's effects found in the country, as a matter of course followed on the declaration of hostilities, and that the rule was not at all affected by certain instances of a milder usage between nations. Congress might, to be sure, exempt the property and goods of aliens from seizure, but without such exemption they could not be removed from the country until the termination of war. It rested in the pleasure of Congress whether or not they should be confiscated. It may be very much questioned whether the severe doctrines of the Supreme Court could be sustained should the question occur again. The best political writers are in opposition to them, and Vattel particularly observes, that the sovereign declaring war can neither detain those subjects of the enemy who were within his dominions at the time of the declaration, nor their effects. They came into the country on the public faith. By permitting them to enter his territories and continue there, he has tacitly promised them liberty and perfect security for their return. In the case of debts due, at the breaking out of hostilities, by the subjects of the one nation to those of the other, the ancient rule was to subject them to confiscation. The principle may now be considered obsolete. The last instance we have of such confiscation was in the French and English wars of 1793, but on the return of peace the sequestrations were removed, and the rights of either party restored. The treaty made between England and the United States in 1795, declared that it was unjust and impolitic to confiscate debts contracted in good faith, and that none of these shall ever, in the event of war, or national differences, be sequestered or forfeited. After the American revolution, the debts due before its commencement were conceived to be revived, and all the rights of suit necessary to their recovery. All of our late treaties with foreign governments stipulate against the right of confiscation. Chancelor Kent thinks himself justified in assuming as a principle of public law, so far as the same is understood and declared by the highest judicial authorities in this country, that it rests in the discretion of the legislature of the Union, by a special law for that purpose, to confiscate debts contracted by our citizens and due to the enemy; but as it is asserted on the same authority, this right is contrary to universal practice, it may therefore well be considered as a naked and impolitic right, condemned by the enlightened conscience and judgment of modern times. Prisoners taken in war are to be treated with kindness and moderation. Their mutual exchange is generally provided for, and they are frequently permitted to return to their own country upon condition of not serving again during the continuance of the war. Breach of faith in this particular meets with the severest punishment. It has not been considered piracy for vessels without commission to attack the property of the enemy at sea, and capture it. But such a procceding does not vest the property in the captors, transferring it only to their government. This usage appears to be greatly inconsistent with the refinement of modern ages. Privateering constitutes a separate chapter in the laws of nations. So. Every nation has resorted to this method of destroying the commerce of the enemy, without questioning for a moment their right of doing Many have affected to consider it, after all, but legalized piracy, and calculated to blunt the finer feelings of justice and sear the heart to all noble sentiments. We are at a loss ourselves to understand how the occupation of a mere privateer can be reconciled with any of the higher feelings of our nature, an occupation whose whole end and purpose is pillage upon the high seas and pecuniary gain out of the fiercest bloodshed. The love of country, patriotic self-devotion and ardor, have no place in such concerns; and it is common enough to find foreigners under the flag of a belligerent power, preying upon the commerce of nations with whom their own is at peace. Cases such as these, we have been told, were intended by the present administration to be treated as piracy, had a war eventuated from the Mexican difficulties. But though such a course would be consonant with the principles of humanity, it would not be sanctioned, we think, by the rules of nations as now understood. It cannot be doubted, that men estimable in other respects have been found in the pursuit of privateering; but exceptions of this kind are rare, and could not, we think, occur again, in the improved moral sense of mankind. Like the good Sir Matthew Hale sitting in condemnation of witchcraft, and sentencing those guilty of it to the flames, their excuse can only be found in the peculiar circumstances of their times. Privateering was introduced into England about the time of Elizabeth, and caused great destruction to the fleets of the Spanish nation, with whom she was at war. Sir Francis Drake's privateering would in our times be counted piracy. The transition from the privateer to the pirate is but a step. In the early history of South Carolina, its coasts were infested by this last class of men, who were beaten and captured by Rhett. History tells us that these desperadoes commenced their career as privateers, and that grown wanton from excesses, they could not find it in their heart again to return to private and honest life on the return of peace. We know not how many other such examples there are. Privateers are in general licensed by their governments and allowed to appropriate the larger portion of their gains to themselves, on giving security that they will observe the rules of war and the rights of neutral nations. In the war of 1812, the legislature of New York passed an act to encourage privateering associations, by enabling them to form corporate bodies for that avowed purpose. Laudable efforts have frequently been made to put an end to a custom pregnant with so serious and demoralizing tendencies, and calculated so much to embitter and prolong national conflicts. The American and Prussian treaty of 1785 stipulated that in case of war neither party should commission privateers into its service, but the treaty of 1799 between the same governments leaves out the liberal clause. The French authorities in 1792 made a similar but unsuccessful effort to abolish the practice. The rules of privateering are these:-the captor is responsible for all illegal acts done, and the owners of the vessel separately, to the full amount of the damage. The United States have by law prohibited its citizens to cruise against the property of friendly powers, PASSPORT-TRUCE-TREATY OF PEACE. 215 and a commission from two governments is regarded in the eyes of nations as conferring upon the privateer the character of a pirate. Enemy's property captured must be brought before a prize court for condemnation, before it changes its ownership. "The condemnation must be pronounced by a prize court of the government of the captor, sitting either in the country of the captor or of his ally. Neutral ports are not intended to be auxiliary to the operations of the power at war; and the law of nations has clearly ordained that the prize court of a belligerent captor cannot exercise jurisdiction in a neutral country." Should it be impossible to carry the property into port, the captor has the power of allowing its ransom by the original owner, for an adequate consideration. The British government has, however, forbidden to its subjects the exercise of the right. Letters of marque and reprisal are sometimes issued by a country in consequence of certain injuries suffered at the hands of another, which are not of such a nature as to demand a public war. These letters confer the right to seize upon the property of the nation against which they are issued, wherever it can be found, and are regulated by the treaty stipulations of most countries. Though frequently leading to war, they cannot be considered as a war measure. A passport is frequently granted by the authority of a belligerent sovereign, and in relation to the persons to whom it is granted, interrupts the usual effects of war. A license to the subjects of the enemy still to continue their trade with the belligerent, is a privilege of similar character. It is said to be the resumption of a state of peace to the extent of the license, and that the act rests in the sovereign authority of the state, which is alone competent to decide how far considerations of commercial or political expediency in particular cases control the ordinary consequences of war. A truce or an armistice, is a temporary suspension of hostilities. It sometimes applies only to a town and its besiegers; and we have in history the finest examples of the kind, where both parties for a season indulged with each other the greatest convivialities and friendship. A general truce is one mode of concluding war without a formal treaty, and endures until either party sees fit to terminate it. The last stage in the progress of war is the treaty of peace. This strikes the arms out of the hands of either party, and restores the relation of friends and brothers. Peace is declared usually among nations by the same authority which declared war-the sovereign. In the United States there is some difference, for while a declaration of war, like every other act of legislation, must be made by the two houses of Congress, with the assent of the President, the treatymaking power is lodged in the hands of the Executive, by and with the consent of the Senate. The House of Representatives might, however, enforce a treaty of peace, by refusing the supplies necessary to conduct the war. "The effect of a treaty of peace is to put an end to the war. It is an agreement to waive all discussion concerning the respective rights of the parties, and to bury in oblivion all the original causes of the war. It leaves the contracting parties without any right of committing hostility for the very cause which kindled the war, or for what has passed in the course of it. A treaty of peace leaves everything in the state in which it finds it, if there be no express stipulation on the subject." The breach of treaty by one of the parties is a justifiable cause of war, if the other elects to consider it so. The United States declared all the treaties with France void in 1798, on account of the frequent violations of them by the French authorities. Treaties are not considered as ipso facto at end on the recurrence of hostilities. Many are particularly intended to regulate prospective wars, and of course endure with equal force through them all. These are counted transitory conventions, and are consonant to the dictates of sound and enlightened reason. The language of the British diplomatists in 1815, that Great Britain knows of no exception to the rule, that all treaties are put an end to by a subsequent war between the same parties, was certainly strong, but cannot be considered as applying to the transitory conventions as above explained. V. To this head of our essay we had appropriated the effects which war is understood to create between the belligerents themselves, but this branch of the subject fell in so naturally under the last division, that we find, upon examination, we have already very nearly exhausted it. There remain, however, yet a few principles which can properly be discussed here. It sometimes happens that a nation becomes involved in war only to the extent of certain assistance in the way of arms, ammunition, money, or troops, which, according to treaty stipulations it has been compelled to furnish to one of the belligerents, on the breaking out of hostilities. Such a treaty is what is denominated an offensive and defensive one. There are numerous instances of these treaties recorded in history, but the one with which we are most familiar is that concluded on between France and the United States of America, in 1778. By the terms of this treaty on the breaking out of a strictly defensive war in either of these countries, the other was bound to contribute its aid and countenance; and the United States fully guarantied to France all of her American possessions. The French authorities were greatly incensed at our remaining neutral during their wars of the latter part of the eighteenth century, considering that we were bound to assist them upon the faith of the convention of 1778. Had these wars been entirely defensive on the part of that government, the reasoning would have been strictly correct, and neutrality upon our part in the last degree culpable. But the fact was the very reverse, and the insane revolutionists were actually engaged in offensive hostilities against the whole of Europe. Some of the French papers have lately, with equal ignorance and spleen, been throwing this into our faces as if the fault were not really with their own country. A similar treaty was entered into between Britain and Hague, in 1717; but the States-General of Holland refusing to fulfil the terms of it many years afterwards, fortified themselves by the following declarations to the world: 1. That Great Britain was the aggressor in the war, and that unless she had been first attacked by France, the contingency contemplated in the treaty, the casus fœderis, did not arise. 2. That admitting that France was the aggressor in Europe, yet it was only in consequence of the hostilities previously commenced in |