Yes, you'll fay, Death is the Punishment of Sin, and therefore it is a Punishment to be removed out of this World; which spoils that Argument, that this World is not the happiest Place, because God removes good Men out of it: For this is the Effect of that Curfe which was entailed on Mankind for the Sin of Adam, Duft thou art, and to Duft thou fbalt return.

Now I grant, Death, as it fignifies a Separation of Soul and Body, and the Death of both, which was included in that Curse, was a Curfe and a Punishment, but not as it fignifies leaving this World, and living in the next.

We have fome Reafon to think, that tho' Man should never have died, if he had not finned, yet he should not always have lived in this World. Human Nature was certainly made for greater Things than the Enjoyments of Sense: It is capable of nobler Advancements, it is related to Heaven, and to the World of Spirits; and therefore it seems more likely, that had Man continued innocent, and by the constant Exercise of Wisdom and Virtue improved his Faculties, and raised himself above this Body, and grown up into the Divine Nature and Life, after a long and happy Life here, he should have been tranflated into Heaven as Enoch and Elias were, without dying. For had all Men continued innocent and lived to this Day, and propagated their Kind, this little Spot of Earth had many Ages fince been over-peopled, and could not have fubfifted, without tranfplanting fome Colonies of the moft divine and purified Souls into the other World:

But however that be, it is certain, that being removed out of this World and living in Heaven, is not the Curfe: This fallen Man had no Right to; for he, who by Sin had forfeited an earthly Paradise,

could

i

could not thereby gain a Title to Heaven. Eternal Life is the Gift of God, through Jefus Christ our Lord; it is the Reward of good Men, of a well-fpent Life in this World, of our Faith and Patience in doing and fuffering the Will of God; it is our last and final State, where we fhall live for ever; and therefore the Argument is ftill good, that this World cannot be the happiest Place, for then Heaven could not be a Reward. Though all Men are under the Neceflity of dying, yet if this World had been the happiest Place, God would have raised good Men to to have lived again in this World; which he could as easily have done, as have tranflated them to Heaven.

Now if this World be not the happiest Place, if prefent things be not the most valuable, as appears from this very Confideration, that we must leave this World (for to this I must confine my Difcourfe at prefent) there are feveral vcry good Ufes to be made of this: As, 1. To rectify our Notions about prefent Things. 2. To live in Expectation of fome better Things, 3. Not to be over-concerned about the Shortnefs of our Lives here.

1. To rectify our Notions about prefent Things. 'Tis our Opinions of Things which ruin us: For what Mankind account their greatest Happiness, they must love, and they must love without Bounds and Measure: And it would go a great Way to cure our extravagant Fondness and Paflion for these Things, could we perfuade ourselves that there is any I hing better. But this, I confefs, is a very hard Thing for most Men to do, because prefent Things have much the Advantage of what is abfent and future. Some who believe another Life after this, whatever great Things they may talk of the other World, yet do not feem thoroughly perfuaded, that the next World is a happier State than

this; for I think they could not be fo fond of this World if they were: And the Reafon of it is plain, because Happiness cannot be fo well known, as by feeling; now Men feel the Pleasures and Happiness of this World, but do not feel the Happinefs of the next; and therefore are apt to think, that that is the greateft Happiness which does most fenfibly affect them: But would they but ferioufly confider Things, they might fee Reason to think otherwise, that the unknown Joys and Pleafures of the other World are much greater than any Pleasures which they feel here. For let us thus reason with ourselves: I find I am mortal, and must shortly leave this World; and yet I believe that my Soul cannot die as my Body does, but fhall only be tranflated to another State; whatever I take pleasure in, in this World, I must leave behind me, and know not what I fhall find in the next: But furely the other World, where I must live for ever, is not worse furnished than this World, which I must so quickly leave. For has God made me immortal, and provided no Sorts of Pleasures and Entertainments for an immortal State, when he has fo liberally furnished the short and changeable Scene of this Life? I know not indeed what the Pleasures of the next World are; but no more did I know what the Pleasures of this World were till I came into it; and therefore, that is no Agument that there are no Pleasures there. because I do not yet know them. And if there be any Pleasures there, furely there must be greater than what are here, because it is a more lafting State. For can we think, that God has emptied all his Stores and Treasures into this World; Nay, can we think that he has given the beft Things firft, where we can only just taste them, and leave them behind

us?

us? Which is to excite and provoke an Appetite, which shall be reftlefs and uneafy to Eternity. No, furely! the other World must be infinitely a more happy Place than this, because it will last infinitely longer. The Divine Wisdom and Goodness has certainly referved the beft Things for Eternity: For as eternal Beings are the most perfect, fo they must be the most happy too, unless we can separate Perfection and Happiness. And therefore I cannot but conclude, that there are greater Pleasures, that there is a happier State of Life than this, because there is a Life which lafts for ever.

2. This will naturally teach us to live in Expectation of better Things, of greater, tho' unknown and unexperienced Pleafures; which methinks all Men fhould do, who know that there are better Things to be had, and that they must go into that State where thefe better Things are to be had. For, can any Man be contented with a lefs Degree of Happiness, who knows there is greater? This is Stupidity and Baseness of Spirit; an ignoble Mind, which is not capable of great Hopes. Ambition and Covetoufnefs indeed are ill Names, but yet they are Symptoms of a great and generous Soul, and are excellent Virtues, when directed to the right Objects; that is, to fuch Objects as are truly great and excellent; for it is only the Meanness of the Object which makes them Vices. To be ambitious of true Honour, of the true Glory and Perfection of our Natures, is the very Principle and Incentive of Virtue; but to be ambitious of Titles, of Place, of fome ceremonious Respects, and civil Pageantry, is as vain and little, as the Things are which they court. To be covetous of true and real Happiness, to fet no Bounds nor Measures to our Defire or Purfuit of it, is true Greatness of

Mind, which will take up with nothing on this fide Perfection: For God and Nature have fet no Bounds to our Defires of Happiness; but as it is in natural, so it ought to be in moral Agents, every thing grows till it comes to its Maturity and Perfection. But then Covetoufnefs is a Vice, when Men mistake their Object, and are infatiable in their Defires of that which is not their Happinefs; as Gold and Silver, Houses and Land; what is more than we want, and more than we can use, cannot be the Happiness of a Man. And thus it is on the other Hand; though Humility be a great Virtue, as it is oppofed to earthly Ambitions, as it fets us above the little Opinions and Courtship of the World, which are fuch mean Things, as argue Meannefs of Spirit to stoop to them; yet it is not Humility but Sordidness, to be regardless of true Honour. Thus, to be contented with our external Fortune in this World, whatever it be; to be able to fee the greater Profperity and Splendour of other Men, without Envy, and without repining at our own Meannefs, is a great Virtue; because these Things are not our Happiness, but for the Ufe and Conveniency of this prefent Life; and to be contented with a little of them for prefent Ufe, is an Argument that we do not think them our Happiness, which is the true Excellency of this Virtue of Contentment: But to be contented, if we may so call it, to want that which is our true Happiness, or any Degree or Portion of it, to be contented never to enjoy the greatest and the best Things, is a Vice which contradicts the natural Defires of Happinefs; and you may call it what you will, if you can think of any Name bad enough for it. It is the most defpicable Temper in the World, to have no Senfe of true Honour or HapC

pinefs;